On July 30, 1916, the village of Guillemont and Falfemont Farm to the southeast were attacked, in conjunction with a French attack north of the Somme. A battalion entered Guillemont, and part of it pa.s.sed through to the far side; but as the battalions on either flank did not reach their objectives, it was obliged to fall back, after holding out for some hours on the western edge of the village. In a subsequent local attack on August 7, 1916, our troops again entered Guillemont, but were again compelled to fall back owing to the failure of a simultaneous effort against the enemy"s trenches on the flanks of the village.
[Sidenote: Dominating enemy positions.]
[Sidenote: Series of French and British attacks.]
The ground to the south of Guillemont was dominated by the enemy"s positions in and about that village. It was therefore hoped that these positions might be captured first, before an advance to the south of them in the direction of Falfemont Farm was pushed further forward. It had now become evident, however, that Guillemont could not be captured as an isolated enterprise without very heavy loss, and, accordingly, arrangements were made with the French Army on our immediate right for a series of combined attacks, to be delivered in progressive stages, which should embrace Maurepas, Falfemont Farm, Guillemont, Leuze Wood, and Ginchy.
[Sidenote: Attacks and counterattacks.]
An attempt on August 16, 1916, to carry out the first stage of the prearranged scheme met with only partial success, and two days later, after a preliminary bombardment lasting thirty-six hours, a larger combined attack was undertaken. In spite of a number of enemy counterattacks the most violent of which leveled at the point of junction of the British with the French, succeeded in forcing our allies and ourselves back from a part of the ground won--very valuable progress was made, and our troops established themselves in the outskirts of Guillemont village and occupied Guillemont Station. A violent counterattack on Guillemont Station was repulsed on August 23, 1916, and next day further important progress was made on a wide front north and east of Delville Wood.
[Sidenote: Advance by bombing and sapping.]
[Sidenote: Progress near Thiepval.]
Apart from the operations already described, others of a minor character, yet involving much fierce and obstinate fighting, continued during this period on the fronts of both the British armies. Our lines were pushed forward wherever possible by means of local attacks and by bombing and sapping, and the enemy was driven out of various forward positions from which he might hamper our progress. By these means many gains were made which, though small in themselves, in the aggregate represented very considerable advances. In this way our line was brought to the crest of the ridge above Martinpuich, and Pozieres Windmill and the high ground north of the village were secured, and with them observation over Martinpuich and Courcelette and the enemy"s gun positions in their neighborhood and around Le Sars. At a later date our troops reached the defenses of Mouquet Farm, northwest of Pozieres, and made progress in the enemy"s trenches south of Thiepval. The enemy"s counter-attacks were incessant and frequently of great violence, but they were made in vain and at heavy cost to him. The fierceness of the fighting can be gathered from the fact that one regiment of the German Guards Reserve Corps which had been in the Thiepval salient opposite Mouquet Farm is known to have lost 1,400 men in fifteen days.
[Sidenote: A general attack.]
The first two days of September, 1916, on both army fronts were spent in preparation for a more general attack, which the gradual progress made during the preceding month had placed us in a position to undertake. Our a.s.sault was delivered at 12 noon on September 3, 1916, on a front extending from our extreme right to the third enemy trenches on the right bank of the Ancre, north of Hamel. Our allies attacked simultaneously on our right.
[Sidenote: Guillemont stormed.]
[Sidenote: Counterattacks on Guillemont.]
Guillemont was stormed and at once consolidated, and our troops pushed on unchecked to Ginchy and the line of the road running south to Wedge Wood. Ginchy was also seized, but here, in the afternoon, we were very strongly counterattacked. For three days the tide of attack and counterattack swayed backward and forward among the ruined houses of the village, till, in the end, for three days more the greater part of it remained in the enemy"s possession. Three counterattacks made on the evening of September 3, 1916, against our troops in Guillemont all failed, with considerable loss to the enemy. We also gained ground north of Delville Wood and in High Wood, though here an enemy counterattack recovered part of the ground won.
On the front of General Gough"s army, though the enemy suffered heavy losses in personnel, our gain in ground was slight.
[Sidenote: British a.s.sault on Falfemont Farm.]
In order to keep touch with the French who were attacking on our right the a.s.sault on Falfemont Farm on September 3, 1916, was delivered three hours before the opening of the main a.s.sault. In the impetus of their first rush our troops reached the farm, but could not hold it.
Nevertheless, they pushed on to the north of it, and on September 4, 1916, delivered a series of fresh a.s.saults upon it from the west and north.
[Sidenote: Leuze Wood cleared.]
Ultimately this strongly fortified position was occupied piece by piece, and by the morning of September 5, 1916, the whole of it was in our possession. Meanwhile further progress had been made to the northeast of the farm, where considerable initiative was shown by the local commanders. By the evening of the same day our troops were established strongly in Leuze Wood, which on the following day was finally cleared of the enemy.
[Sidenote: Advance on the right.]
[Sidenote: Enemy"s barrier broken.]
In spite of the fact that most of Ginchy and of High Wood remained in the enemy"s hands, very noteworthy progress had been made in the course of these four days" operations, exceeding anything that had been achieved since July 14, 1916. Our right was advanced on a front of nearly two miles to an average depth of nearly one mile, penetrating the enemy"s original second line of defense on this front, and capturing strongly fortified positions at Falfemont Farm, Leuze Wood, Guillemont, and southeast of Delville Wood, where reached the western outskirts of Ginchy. More important than this gain in territory was the fact that the barrier which for seven weeks the enemy had maintained against our further advance had at last been broken. Over 1,000 prisoners were taken and many machine guns captured or destroyed in the course of the fighting.
Preparations for a further attack upon Ginchy continued without intermission, and at 4.45 p.m. on September 9, 1916, the attack was reopened on the whole of the Fourth Army front. At Ginchy and to the north of Leuze Wood it met with almost immediate success. On the right the enemy"s line was seized over a front of more than 1,000 yards from the southwest corner of Bouleau Woods, in a northwesterly direction, to a point just south of the Guillemont-Morval tramway. Our troops again forced their way into Ginchy, and pa.s.sing beyond it carried the line of enemy trenches to the east. Further progress was made east of Delville Wood and south and east of High Wood.
[Sidenote: German prisoners taken.]
Over 500 prisoners were taken in the operations of September 9, 1916, and following days, making the total since July 1, 1916, over 17,000.
[Sidenote: French progress.]
Meanwhile the French had made great progress on our right, bringing their line forward to Louage Wood (just south of Combles)--Le Forest-Clery-sur-Somme, all three inclusive. The weak salient in the allied line had therefore disappeared and we had gained the front required for further operations.
[Sidenote: Ability of new armies.]
[Sidenote: Depth of enemy fortifications.]
[Sidenote: Failure of counterattacks.]
Still more importance, however, lay in the proof afforded by the results described of the ability of our new armies, not only to rush the enemy"s strongest defenses, as had been accomplished on July 1 and 14, 1916, but also to wear down and break his power of resistance by a steady, relentless pressure, as they had done during the weeks of this fierce and protracted struggle. As has already been recounted, the preparations made for our a.s.sault on July 1, 1916, had been long and elaborate; but though the enemy knew that an attack was coming, it would seem that he considered the troops already on the spot, secure in their apparently impregnable defenses, would suffice to deal with it. The success of that a.s.sault, combined with the vigor and determination with which our troops pressed their advantage, and followed by the successful night attack of July 14, 1916, all served to awaken him to a fuller realization of his danger. The great depth of his system of fortification, to which reference has been made, gave him time to reorganize his defeated troops, and to hurry up numerous fresh divisions and more guns. Yet in spite of this, he was still pushed back, steadily and continuously.
Trench after trench and strong point after strong point were wrested from him. The great majority of his frequent counterattacks failed completely, with heavy loss; while the few that achieved temporary local success purchased it dearly, and were soon thrown back from the ground they had for the moment regained.
The enemy had, it is true, delayed our advance considerably, but the effort had cost him dear; and the comparative collapse of his resistance during the last few days of the struggle justified the belief that in the long run decisive victory would lie with our troops, who had displayed such fine fighting qualities and such indomitable endurance and resolution.
[Sidenote: Mouquet Farm in hands of British.]
Practically the whole of the forward crest of the main ridge on a front of some 9,000 yards, from Delville Wood to the road above Mouquet Farm, was now in our hands, and with it the advantage of observation over the slopes beyond. East of Delville Wood, for a further 3,000 yards to Leuze Wood, we were firmly established on the main ridge, while further east, across the Combles Valley, the French were advancing victoriously on our right. But though the centre of our line was well placed, on our flanks there was still difficult ground to be won.
[Sidenote: High ground from Ginchy to Morval.]
From Ginchy the crest of the high ground runs northward for 2,000 yards, and then eastward, in a long spur, for nearly 4,000 yards. Near the eastern extremity of this spur stands the village of Morval commanding a wide field of view and fire in every direction. At Leuze Wood my right was still 2,000 yards from its objective at this village, and between lay a broad and deep branch of the main Combles Valley, completely commanded by the Morval spur, and flanked, not only from its head northeast of Ginchy, but also from the high ground east of the Combles Valley, which looks directly into it.
[Sidenote: The French near Combles.]
Up this high ground beyond the Combles Valley the French were working their way toward their objective at Sailly-Saillisel, situated due east of Morval, and standing at the same level. Between these two villages the ground falls away to the head of the Combles Valley, which runs thence in a southwesterly direction. In the bottom of this valley lies the small town of Combles, then well fortified and strongly held, though dominated by my right at Leuze Wood and by the French left on the opposite heights. It had been agreed between the French and myself that an a.s.sault on Combles would not be necessary, as the place could be rendered untenable by pressing forward along the ridges above it on either side.
[Sidenote: Difficulties in way of French advance.]
The capture of Morval from the south presented a very difficult problem, while the capture of Sailly-Saillisel, at that time some 3,000 yards to the north of the French left, was in some respects even more difficult.
The line of the French advance was narrowed almost to a defile by the extensive and strongly fortified Wood of St. Pierre Vaast on the one side, and on the other by the Combles Valley, which, with the branches running out from it and the slopes each side, is completely commanded, as has been pointed out, by the heights bounding the valley on the east and west.
[Sidenote: Close cooperation necessary on right.]
On my right flank, therefore, the progress of the French and British forces was still interdependent, and the closest cooperation continued to be necessary in order to gain the further ground required to enable my centre to advance on a sufficiently wide front. To cope with such a situation unity of command is usually essential, but in this case the cordial good feeling between the allied armies, and the earnest desire of each to a.s.sist the other, proved equally effective, and removed all difficulties.
[Sidenote: Enemy defense on main ridge over Thiepval.]
On my left flank the front of General Gough"s army bent back from the main ridge near Mouquet Farm down a spur descending southwestward, and then crossed a broad valley to the Wonderwork, a strong point situated in the enemy"s front-line system near the southern end of the spur on the higher slopes of which Thiepval stands. Opposite this part of our line we had still to carry the enemy"s original defenses on the main ridge above Thiepval, and in the village itself, defenses which may fairly be described as being as nearly impregnable as nature, art, and the unstinted labor of nearly two years could make them.
[Sidenote: British advance on Thiepval defenses.]
[Sidenote: Positions might be rushed.]
Our advance on Thiepval and on the defenses above it had been carried out up to this date, in accordance with my instructions given on July 3, 1916, by a slow and methodical progression, in which great skill and much patience and endurance had been displayed with entirely satisfactory results. General Gough"s army had, in fact, acted most successfully in the required manner as a pivot to the remainder of the attack. The Thiepval defenses were known to be exceptionally strong, and as immediate possession of them was not necessary to the development of my plans after July 1, 1916, there had been no need to incur the heavy casualties to be expected in an attempt to rush them. The time was now approaching, although it had not yet arrived, when their capture would become necessary; but from the positions we had now reached and those which we expected shortly to obtain, I had no doubt that they could be rushed when required without undue loss. An important part of the remaining positions required for my a.s.sault on them was now won by a highly successful enterprise carried out on the evening of September 14, 1916, by which the Wonderwork was stormed.
[Sidenote: Plan of combined attack.]