So much then for the psychology of the sovereigns of Rumania as I received it from their own lips.
[Sidenote: Russian efforts to aid Rumania.]
Ever since the loss of Bucharest the world has been asking why Rumania entered the war. It seems to be the general opinion that her action at that time was unwarranted and that she had been betrayed. There has even been a widely circulated report that Germany, through the King, has intrigued to bring about this disaster. Again, I have heard that the Russian High Command had purposely sacrificed Rumania. At this time, when much of the evidence is still unattainable, it is impossible for me to make absolutely authoritative statements, but immediately after leaving Rumania I spent three hours with General Brussiloff discussing the situation. A few days later I had the privilege of meeting the former Tsar at Kieff (to whom the Queen had given me a letter), and I know from his own lips his feelings in regard to Rumania. Subsequently, I was at the headquarters of the Russian High Command and there learned at first hand the extraordinary efforts that Alexieff was making to support Rumania. The British efforts to cooperate with Rumania and prevent disaster I knew thoroughly at that time.
[Sidenote: Lack of vision and foresight.]
I never saw the slightest evidence that either Russia or her allies had any intention whatever of disregarding their duties or their responsibilities to this little country. That there was lack of vision and foresight on all sides is quite apparent. But that there was bad faith on the part of any of the contracting parties I do not believe. It is probably true that the reactionary government in Petrograd was glad to see the Rumanian disaster, but it must be realized that this was a military situation primarily, and that ninety per cent of it in the first three months was in the hands, not of the Petrograd politicians but of the military authorities at the front. Brussiloff and Alexieff are men incapable of intrigue or bad faith. The Emperor, with whom I talked at Kieff, and the Grand d.u.c.h.ess Maria Pavlowna nearly wept at the misfortune of Rumania, and I am certain that the former Tsar was in no way a party to any breach of faith with this little ally.
[Sidenote: Military conditions prior to Rumania"s venture.]
[Sidenote: Failure of Germans at Verdun.]
I have said that there was not bad faith toward Rumania on the part of the Allies when they induced her to enter the war, and that there was not lack of intelligence on the part of Rumania when she followed their advice. In order to understand the point of view of the Allies it is necessary to have clearly in mind the military conditions existing in the whole theatre of operations during the six months prior to Rumania"s fatal venture. In February the Germans had a.s.sembled a large portion of their mobile reserves for their effort against Verdun. The constant wastage of German human material continued almost without intermission into May, with spasmodic recurrences up to the present time. Hundreds of thousands of Germans were drawn from the visible supply of enemy manhood by these offensives. By early May the failure of the Verdun venture had probably become manifest to the German High Command, and there is evidence that they were commencing to conserve their troops for other purposes.
[Sidenote: General Brussiloff"s offensive.]
On the 5th of June there began in Galicia and Volhynia the great offensive of General Brussiloff which lasted, almost without intermission, on one or another part of his front, until October. By the middle of June this drive of the Russians began to divert German troops for the defense of Kovel. In July started the British-French offensive in the West.
[Sidenote: German troops diverted to Eastern front.]
With their reservoirs of men already greatly reduced by the Verdun attacks, the Germans, by the middle of July, were compelled to find supports to meet the continuous offensives on both the Eastern and Western fronts. I cannot estimate the number of troops required by them against the French and British, but I do know that between the 5th of June and the 30th of August a total of thirty divisions of enemy troops were diverted from other fronts against Brussiloff alone. This heavy diversion was the only thing that prevented the Russians from taking Kovel in July and forcing the entire German line in the East. So continuous and pressing were the Russian attacks that more than two months elapsed before the enemy could bring this offensive to a final stop on the Kovel sector. Enemy formations arriving were ground up in detail as fast as they came, and by the middle of July it was clear to us, who were on the fighting line in Volhynia, that the Germans were having extraordinary difficulties in filling their losses from day to day. In June their first supports came by army corps; in July they were coming by divisions; and early in August we checked the arrival of single regiments, while the Austrians were often so hard pressed that they sent isolated battalions to fill the holes in their lines.
[Sidenote: Teuton losses.]
In the meantime the Russians had cleared the Bukovina of the enemy. It was believed that Rumania could put in the field twenty-two divisions of excellent troops. The enemy losses in prisoners alone, up to the first of September, from Brussiloff"s offensive, were above four hundred thousand and over four hundred guns. It seemed then that these extra twenty-two divisions thrown in by Rumania could meet but little resistance.
[Sidenote: The Allied plan of operation.]
[Sidenote: Munitions to come daily from Russia.]
In order that the Rumanian attempt to cooperate might be safeguarded in the highest degree, a coordinated plan of operations on the part of the Allies was agreed upon with Rumania. The allied force in Saloniki under General Sarrail was to commence a heavy offensive intended to pin down the Bulgarian and Turkish forces to the southern line, thus protecting the Rumanian line of the Danube. Brussiloff"s left flank in Galicia was to start a drive through the Bukovina toward the Hungarian plain, thus relieving the Rumanians from any pressure on the south. A Russian force of fifty thousand men in the Dobrudja was to protect the Rumanian left.
This, in view of the apparent shortage of enemy reserves, seemed to protect the army of Rumania on both flanks in its advance into Transylvania. In addition Rumania was to receive certain shipments of munitions of war daily from Russia. It was the opinion of the military advisers in Rumania that under no circ.u.mstances could the Germans divert against her within three months more than sixteen divisions, while some of the experts advising her placed the number as low as ten.
[Sidenote: Bulgar and Austrian attack.]
[Sidenote: Rumanians on defensive.]
Now let us see what happened. For some reason, which I do not know, the offensive on the south was delayed, and when it did start it attained no important results nor did it detain sufficient enemy troops in that vicinity to relieve Rumania. On the contrary, heavy forces of Bulgars and Austrians immediately attacked the line of the Danube, taking the Rumanian stronghold of Turtekaia, with the bulk of the Rumanian heavy guns. In order to safeguard Bucharest, then threatened, the Rumanians were obliged to withdraw troops from their Transylvania advance, which up to this time had been highly successful. These withdrawals represented the difference between an offensive and a defensive, and the Transylvania campaign potentially failed when Bucharest was threatened from the south.
[Sidenote: Defense in Dobrudja falls.]
The Russian expedition in the Dobrudja, which was supported by a Rumanian division and a mixed division of Serbs and Slavs, partially recruited from prisoners captured by the Russians, failed to work in harmony, and the protection of the Rumanian left became, after the capture of Turtekaia, a negligible factor which ultimately collapsed entirely. Thus we see in the beginning that through no bad faith the southern a.s.sets on which Rumania depended proved to be of little or no value to her.
[Sidenote: The case with Brussiloff"s army.]
There still remained the Russian agreement to cooperate in Galicia and the Bukovina. I can speak of this situation with authority because I had been on the southwestern front almost without intermission since June, and know that there was every intent on the part of Brussiloff to carry out to the limit of his capacity his end of the programme. The success of this, however, was impaired by a situation, over which he had no control, which developed in Galicia in September. It must not be forgotten that all the Russian troops on the southwestern front had been fighting constantly for nearly three months. When I came through Galicia on my way to Rumania I found Brussiloff"s four southern armies engaged in a tremendous action. Early in September they had made substantial advances in the direction of Lemberg, and were in sight of Halicz on the Dniester when they began to encounter terrific and sustained counter-attacks.
[Sidenote: Efforts to cooperate with Rumania.]
That the force of this may be understood I would mention the case of the army attacking Halicz. When I first went to the southwestern front in June, there were facing this army three Austrian divisions, three Austrian cavalry divisions, and one German division. In September, at the very moment when Brussiloff was supposed to be heavily supporting Rumania, there were sent against this same army--on a slightly extended front--three Austrian divisions, two Austrian cavalry divisions, two Turkish divisions, and nine German divisions. The army on the extreme Russian left, whose duty it was to partic.i.p.ate in the offensive in the Bukovina, had made important advances toward Lemberg from the south, and just at the time that Rumania entered the war it also was subjected to tremendous enemy counter-attacks. For several weeks it held its position only with the greatest difficulty and by diverting to itself most of the available reserves. Something more than one army corps did endeavor to cooperate with Rumania, but the situation I have described in Galicia made it impossible for sufficient supports to reach the Bukovina offensive to enable it to fulfill its mission.
[Sidenote: Reasons for delay in munitions.]
Thus we see that after the first month of the campaign the cooperative factors which alone had justified Rumania"s entering into the war had proved to be failures. The arrival of material from Russia was delayed because, after Turtekaia was taken, a new Russian corps was sent to the Dobrudja to stiffen up that front. The railroad communications were bad and immediately became congested by the movements of troops, thus interfering with the shipping of badly needed material. I have since heard the Russian reactionary government charged with purposely holding up these shipments; but I am inclined to believe that my explanation of the cause of the delays in the arrival of material is the correct one.
[Sidenote: Allies underestimated German force.]
The greatest mistake on the part of the Allies was their estimate of the number of troops that the Germans could send to Rumania during the fall of 1916. As I have said, experts placed this number at from ten to sixteen divisions, but, to the best of my judgment, they sent, between the 1st of September and the 1st of January, not less than thirty. The German commitments to the Rumanian front came by express, and the Russian supports, because of the paucity of lines of communication, came by freight. The moment that it became evident what the Germans could do in the way of sending troops, Rumania was doomed.
[Sidenote: Russians too late to save Bucharest.]
The move of Alexieff and the Russian High Command in the middle of October, which is one of tangible record and not of opinion, should absolutely eliminate the charges of bad faith on the part of Russia, for he immediately appropriated for the support of Rumania between eight and ten army corps, which were instantly placed in motion, regardless of the adverse condition their absence caused on his own front. It is quite true that these troops arrived too late to save Bucharest; but that they came as quickly as possible, I can a.s.sert without reservation, for I was on the various lines of communication for nearly a month and found them blocked with these corps, which represented the cream of the Russian army, to make good the moral obligations of Russia to Rumania. In November I had a talk with Brussiloff, who authorized me to quote him as follows on the Rumanian situation:
[Sidenote: Rumania feels bitterness of defeat.]
H.Q.--S.W.F.--Nov. 7.
Rumania is now feeling for the first time the pressure of war and the bitterness of defeat; but Rumania must realize that her defeats are but incidents in the greater campaign; for behind her stands great Russia, who will see to it that her brave little ally, who has come into the war for a just cause, does not ultimately suffer for daring to espouse this cause for which we are all fighting. I can speak with authority when I state that, from the Emperor down to the common soldier, there is a united sentiment in Russia that Rumania shall be protected, helped, and supported in every way possible. Rumanians must feel faith in Russia and the Russian people, and must also know that in the efforts we are making to save them sentiment is the dominant factor, and we are not doing it merely as a question of protecting our own selfish interest and our left flank.
[Sidenote: No wanton breach of faith.]
It seems to me that the evidence I have submitted above clears the Allies, including Russia, of any wanton breach of faith toward Rumania, though the failure of their intention to relieve her certainly does not diminish their responsibility toward her in the future.
[Sidenote: Germans on defensive in the north.]
In the final a.n.a.lysis the determining factor in the ruin of Rumania was the failure of the Allies to foresee the number of troops the Germans could send against them. Their reasoning up to a certain point was accurate. In July, August, and for part of September it was, I believe, almost impossible for the Germans to send troops to Transylvania, which accounts for the rapidity of the Rumanian advance at the beginning of their operations. The fallacy in the Allied reasoning seems to me to have been that every one overlooked certain vital factors in the German situation. First, that she would ultimately support any threat against Hungary to the limit of her capacity, even if she had to evacuate Belgium to get troops for this purpose. For with Hungary out of the war it is a mate in five moves for the Central Empires. Second: the Allies failed to a.n.a.lyze correctly the troop situation on the eastern front, apparently failing to grasp one vital point. An army can defend itself in winter, with the heavy cold and snows of Russia sweeping the barren s.p.a.ces, with perhaps sixty per cent of the number of troops required to hold those identical lines in summer. It should have been obvious that, when the cold weather set in in the north, the Germans would take advantage of this situation, and by going on the defensive in the north release the margin representing the difference in men required to hold their lines in summer and in winter. Possibly the same condition applies to the west, though I cannot speak with any authority on that subject.
Apparently this obvious action of the Germans is exactly what happened.
When their northern front had been combed, we find forces subtracted piecemeal from the north, reaching an aggregate of thirty divisions, or at least nearly fifteen divisions more than had been antic.i.p.ated. The doom of Rumania was sealed.
[Sidenote: Retreating armies must reach defenses.]
What happened in the Russian effort to support Rumania is exactly what has occurred in nearly all the drives that I have been in during this war. An army once started in retreat in the face of superior forces can hold only when supported _en bloc_ or when it reaches a fortified line.
The Germans with all their cleverness and efficiency were not able to stop the Russian offensive of 1916 until they had fallen back on the fortified lines of the Stokhod in front of Kovel. In the Galician drive against the Russians in 1915, the armies of the Tsar were not able to hold until they reached the San River, on which they fought a series of rear-guard actions.
[Sidenote: Russian corps on Sereth line.]
So it was in Rumania. The Russian corps arriving on the installment plan were swept away by the momentum of the advancing enemy, who could not be halted until the fortified line of the Sereth was reached.
[Sidenote: Rumanians played the game.]
[Sidenote: Russia in chaos.]
Whether one blames the Allies for lack of vision or not, I think one must at least acquit Rumania of any responsibility for her own undoing.
Her case as represented by the King seems a just and sufficient reason for her having entered the war. Her action during the war has been straightforward and direct, and I have never heard of any reason to believe that the King or the Rumanian High Command has ever looked back in the furrow since they made the decision to fight on the side of the Allies. They followed the advice given them as to their partic.i.p.ation in the war. They have played the game to the limit of their resources and to-day stand in a position almost unparalleled in its pathos and acuteness. In front of them, as they struggle with courage and desperation for the small fragment of their kingdom that remains, are the formations of the Turks, Bulgars, Austrians, Hungarians, and Germans, with Mackensen striving to give them a death-blow. Behind them is Russia in chaos. German agitators and irresponsible revolutionists have striven in vain to destroy the morale of their army and shake their faith in their government and their sovereign. It is estimated that three million Rumanian refugees have taken shelter behind their lines.
Their civil population, or that portion of it which remains, will this winter be dest.i.tute of almost every necessity of life.