[Sidenote: Persian gendarmes officered by Swedes.]
[Sidenote: Fairy-tales of Turkish conquest.]
At the time Britain and Russia came to an agreement regarding Persia they were not on so good a footing with each other as they are to-day.
In order that neither should get an advantage over the other, it was decided that the Persian gendarmes--about 6,000 in number--should be officered by neutrals, and, unfortunately as it turned out for the Allies, they mutually chose Swedes. On the outbreak of war neither Britain nor Russia desired that Persia should be brought into it. The German amba.s.sador in Persia, however, had other views, and suborned Swedish officers in command of the Persian gendarmes. Partly by this means, and partly by Turkish agents, a rebellion was brought about within the Russian sphere. Religion had nothing to do with the trouble in Persia. Turkish forces entered Persian Kurdistan and announced that they were on their way to conquer India and the Russian East, while their compatriots would overrun Egypt. These were the fairy-tales with which the Germans had originally enticed the Turks into the war. The Turks were willing to believe them, and apparently did believe them. The responsible Germans had no such illusions, but hoped to attain their ends by causing internal disturbances within India and Egypt. These German canards, put about in war time, have been adopted by some writers in this country as the foundation from which to write contemporary history. It may interest them to know that India possesses the strongest natural frontiers in the world.
[Sidenote: Strategy depends on geography.]
Strategy nowadays is very largely a matter of geography. Modern armies are circ.u.mscribed in their movements by the available means of transportation, whether these be by railroad, river, or roadway, and this means geography applied in giving direction to troop movements.
[Sidenote: Geographies of the war area.]
Before entering into a review of the combined Anglo-Russian campaign a preliminary survey of the strategical geography of the war area will make the position more clear.
[Sidenote: Constantinople once the world clearing-house.]
[Sidenote: Still the easiest route.]
In ancient times the only practical way by road and ferry from Europe to Asia or Africa was by way of the Balkan valleys and across the Bosphorus or Dardanelles. Hence arose the importance of the ferryhouse--Constantinople. That city in those days was the center of the known world and the clearing-house for the merchandise of Asia, Africa, and Europe. From Scutari, on the opposite sh.o.r.e, the overland route meandered across Asia Minor to Aleppo in Syria. Here the sign-post to India pointed down the Euphrates Valley, by way of Bagdad, while that to Egypt and Arabia followed the Levant or eastern sh.o.r.e of the Mediterranean. Between each fork lay the Syrian desert. A glance at the map shows the reason why in those days this was the only practical route, as to-day it is the easiest. The wall of the Ural Mountains, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasian Mountains, and the Black Sea shut out direct communication from Europe to Asia, or _vice versa_, except by the Constantinople ferry or a sea voyage.
[Sidenote: Another practical route.]
[Sidenote: The road for invasion of Egypt or India.]
[Sidenote: The Taurus range is the natural frontier of Egypt.]
In Asia Minor progress was further barred by the watershed of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers to the south, and the Caucasian Mountains to the east. A practical way was found at the lower elevations of the Taurus and Ama.n.u.s mountains--two parallel spurs which strike the sea at the Gulf of Alexandretta. This narrow neck of the bottle, as it were, is of enormous military importance alike to the Turks and to the British.
Through it must pa.s.s any army of invasion by land from Europe or Asia Minor to Egypt or India; and, conversely, through it must pa.s.s any invading army from Mesopotamia into Asia Minor. If the British should conquer Mesopotamia and should intend to hold it--as they undoubtedly would--they will have no strategical frontiers until they secure the watershed of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and the Taurus pa.s.sage. If they secure the latter, Syria, Palestine, and Arabia will fall to them like apples off a tree. It would then be no longer necessary to defend the Suez Ca.n.a.l. The natural frontier of Egypt is the Taurus mountain range. Asia Minor is the real Turkey; the other portions of the empire--Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Arabia, and Turkey in Europe--are only appendages. The eastern door into Asia Minor is Erzerum, and the southern door is the Taurus pa.s.sage. Turkey can only part with these at the cost of her life. Russia has already captured Erzerum, and the British possess the Island of Cyprus, which commands the head of the Gulf of Alexandretta--twenty miles from the Taurus pa.s.sage. That is, broadly, the situation.
[Sidenote: Aleppo is the starting point of caravan routes.]
Near the crossing of the Taurus and Ama.n.u.s mountains lies the city of Aleppo, the starting-point for the overland caravan routes to Bagdad and India, and also to Damascus, Mecca, and Egypt. Just as surely as pioneer travelers always chose the easiest route, so the railways of to-day follow in their footsteps. The physical features of nature constrained both modern as well as ancient armies to travel the same way. Hence a railway map of the Balkans and of Asiatic Turkey is a first consideration in appreciating the strategical bearings of the Anglo-Russian campaign in Turkey-in-Asia, or the alleged rival Germanic-Turkish schemes for the invasion of Egypt, Persia, and India.
Of no less importance is a knowledge of the available sea routes and inland rivers.
[Sidenote: Bulgaria and Turkey depend on aid from Germany.]
The ability of Bulgaria and Turkey to carry on the war depends on aid from Germany in men, munitions, and money. These allies are the weakest members of the Central Group, and may be the first to give in if circ.u.mstances are adverse to their adventure.
[Sidenote: The importance of the Balkan railway.]
Their sole communication with the Central Powers is by the Balkan railway from the Danube to Constantinople by way of Sofia. If this line is severed, then these nations are out of the game. The Allies have all winter been organizing the defenses of Salonica as a _pied-a-terre_ for such an attack. Should Rumania join the Allies in the spring, then a further attack may be expected from the north, in which Russian troops would join. Turkey is now too preoccupied with her own troubles to be able to a.s.sist Bulgaria.
[Sidenote: Asia Minor"s only important line.]
[Sidenote: Railway planned from Aleppo to Bagdad.]
In Asia Minor the only railway of importance is the trunk line from Scutari, on the Bosphorus, to the Taurus Tunnel, in course of completion near Adana. One branch runs west to Smyrna, and another east to Angora.
Beyond the Taurus Tunnel is another in course of completion through the Ama.n.u.s Mountains. Every person and everything destined for the Bagdad front or for the invasion of Egypt has to be transported over these mountains. So also have rails for the completion of the Aleppo-to-Bagdad railway. These tunnels are expected to be finished this year--when it will be too late. From Aleppo the Syrian railway runs south through Damascus to Medina and Mecca in Arabia. Branches reach the Levant seaports of Tripoli, Beirut, and Haifa. Another railway was started from Aleppo to Bagdad shortly before the war, and construction begun at both ends. We have no reliable information as to how far it has progressed, but the presumption is that there is a large gap between Ras-el-ain and Mosul and between the latter place and Samara.
[Sidenote: The city of Aleppo key of railways as once of caravan routes.]
It is at once apparent how important the city of Aleppo is as the junction for the three main railways of Asiatic Turkey. Napoleon considered that it was the key to India, because it commanded the caravan routes. To-day it would be more correct to say that Aleppo is the key to the outer _approaches_ to India and Egypt, the inner defenses of which are impregnable.
[Sidenote: Reasons for a British army in Egypt.]
[Sidenote: Vantage points held by Great Britain.]
The British maintain a large army in Egypt not so much because it is required there as because it is a most convenient central camp within striking distance of all the battle-fronts in the East. This permits of throwing a large army secretly and unexpectedly where it can be most effective. Similar camps are available at Malta and Cyprus. Any attack on Egypt on a formidable scale would be a veritable trap for the invaders. It will be recalled that when Britain held up the Russian advance on Constantinople, in 1878, she entered into a treaty with Turkey guaranteeing the latter in the possession of Asia Minor (only) against all enemies. The consideration was the lease of the Island of Cyprus, which dominates the Taurus pa.s.sage. In other words, Britain holds the cork with which she can close the Syrian tube and put the closure on any invasion of India or Egypt from this side. This treaty was abrogated some eighteen months ago, when Turkey declared war on the British Empire. Britain, in consequence, annexed Egypt and Cyprus.
At the outbreak of the war the Indian Government, apparently off their own bat, despatched a small force to the Persian oil fields to seize and hold the pipe-line, which had been tampered with and the supply cut off for a time.
[Sidenote: The Turks threaten Basra.]
[Sidenote: British advance up the Tigris to Kut-el-Amara.]
It became necessary to hold in force three triangular points--Basra, Muhammereh, and Awaz. A strong Turkish force, with headquarters at Amara, was equidistant about 100 miles from both Basra and Awaz, and could elect to strike the divided British forces either by coming down the Tigris River to Basra, or by going overland to Awaz. Reinforcements were sent from India, and Amara occupied. The oil fields seemed secure.
Then the unexpected happened. A Turkish army came down the Shat-el-Hai--an ancient ca.n.a.l or waterway connecting the Tigris River at Kut-el-Amara with the Euphrates at Nasiriyeh (or Nasdi)--about 100 miles to the west of Basra--and threatened the latter place. (Shat-el-Hai means the river which flows by the village of Hai. Kut-el-Amara means the fort of Amara and is not to be confused with the town of Amara lower down the Tigris River.) This led to the British driving the Turks out of Nasiriyeh and also advancing up the Tigris River from Amara to occupy Kut-el-Amara, where a battle was fought. The Turks were strongly entrenched and expected to hold up the Anglo-Indian troops here, but a turning movement made them retire on Bagdad--about 100 miles to the northwest. It was known that large Turkish reinforcements were on the way to Bagdad and an attempt was made to antic.i.p.ate them.
[Sidenote: General Townshend"s attempt to take Bagdad.]
General Townshend advanced on Bagdad with less than a division of mixed Anglo-Indian troops--some 16,000 to 20,000 strong. At Ctesiphon he found a Turkish army of four divisions, with two others in reserve, awaiting him. After a two days" indecisive battle, Townshend, recognizing he had insufficient forces, retired on his forward base at Kut-el-Amara. The Arabs in the neighborhood awaited the issue of the battle, ready to take sides, for the time being, with the winner.
[Sidenote: The Turks much stronger in numbers.]
[Sidenote: Secret of European success in Asia.]
It says much for the stamina of this composite division that, although opposed throughout by five or six times their number of Turks and Turkish irregulars, the latter were unable to overwhelm them. To the Western mind, unacquainted with the mentality and moral weakness of the Moslem under certain circ.u.mstances, this may appear a most foolhardy adventure. To the Anglo-Indian the most obvious thing to do when in a tight corner is to go for the enemy no matter what their numbers. All Europeans in India develop an extraordinary pride in race, and an inherent contempt for numbers. It is the secret of their success there.
Most Moslems fight well when posted behind strong natural defenses. In open country, such as Mesopotamia, they do not show to so much advantage. Another trait is that when their line of retreat is threatened they are more timorous than European troops. This weakness will have important bearings on the future of the campaign on the Tigris Valley, because the communications of the Turks are threatened by the Russians far in their rear and in more than one place.
[Sidenote: Kut-el-Amara of great strategical importance.]
Townshend"s camp at Kut-el-Amara is well supplied with stores and munitions, and will soon be relieved. When his retreat was cut off at the bend of the Tigris River he could still have retired safely by following the Shat-el-Hai to Nasiriyeh. There was no thought, however, of retreat, Kut-el-Amara is geographically of great strategical importance, and the British garrison there has served the useful purpose of detaining large forces of the enemy where it was desired they should remain while important Allied developments were taking place in their flank and rear. Most of these Turkish reinforcements were withdrawn from Armenia when the depth of winter appeared to make it impossible for the Russians to break through the lofty hills of Caucasia.
[Sidenote: Turks deceived by rumor about Grand Duke Nicholas.]
[Sidenote: The Grand Duke"s strategy.]
The rumor, so diligently put about, that the Grand Duke Nicholas had been retired in disgrace, after so ably extricating the Russian armies in Poland, and that he had been sent to Caucasia, served its purpose.
The Turks were deceived by it, and sent part of their forces from Armenia to oppose the Anglo-Indian advance on Bagdad and arrived in time to turn the scale after the battle of Ctesiphon. When the Grand Duke fell on the unwary Turks their defeat was complete. Flying from Erzerum, one army made for Trebizond, another for the Lake Van district, and the rest went due west towards Sivas. The Grand Duke"s right wing, center, and left are following in the same directions. He has two flying wings further south--one in the Lake Urumia district and the other advancing along the main caravan route from Kermanshah to Bagdad, while the British are furthest south at Kut-el-Amara. It will be observed that the whole of the Allied armies from the Black Sea to Kut-el-Amara are in perfect echelon formation, and it would be a strange coincidence if this just happened--say, by accident. Like the Syrian and Arabian littoral, Mesopotamia is another tube confined within the Syrian desert on the one side and the mountains of Armenia and Persia on the ether. All egress is stopped by the Allies" echelon formation, except by Aleppo.
[Sidenote: Possible to cut Turkish Empire in two.]
Petrograd advices at the time of writing (March 9th) state that the Grand Duke"s main army is making for the Gulf of Alexandretta with intent to cut the Turkish Empire in two. This is not only possible, but highly probable, and the echelon formation of the Allies, together with the configuration of the country, lends itself to such an operation. The British army in Egypt and the British fleet could in such an eventuality cooperate to advantage.
[Sidenote: Russians must take Trebizond.]
[Sidenote: Turks will endeavor to hold Armenian Taurus.]