[Sidenote: Success of the attack on Umbrella Hill.]
[Sidenote: Capture of the south-western defenses.]
The attack was successful in reaching all objectives, except for a section of trench on the left and some of the final objectives in the centre. Four hundred and fifty prisoners were taken and many Turks killed. The enemy also suffered heavily from the preliminary bombardment, and subsequent reports from prisoners stated that one of the divisions holding the Gaza sector was withdrawn after losing 33 per cent of its effectives, one of the divisions in general reserve being drawn into the Gaza sector to replace it. The attack thus succeeded in its primary object, which was to prevent any units being drawn from the Gaza defences to meet the threat to the Turkish left flank, and to draw into Gaza as large a proportion as possible of the available Turkish reserves. Further, the capture of Sheikh Hasan and the south-western defences const.i.tuted a very distinct threat to the whole of the Gaza position, which could be developed on any sign of a withdrawal on the part of the enemy.
Our losses, though considerable, were not in any way disproportionate to the results obtained.
[Sidenote: Water and transport difficulties.]
Meanwhile on our right flank the water and transport difficulties were found to be greater than antic.i.p.ated, and the preparations for the second phase of the attack were somewhat delayed in consequence.
On the early morning of November 1 the 53rd (Welsh) Division, with the Imperial Camel Corps on its right, had moved out into the hills north of Beersheba, with the object of securing the flank of the attack on Sheria. Mounted troops were also sent north along the Hebron Road to secure Dhaheriyeh if possible, as it was hoped that a good supply of water would be found in this area, and that a motor road which the Turks were reported to have constructed from Dhaheriyeh to Sheria could be secured for our use.
The 53rd (Welsh) Division, after a long march, took up a position from Towal Abu Jerwal (six miles north of Beersheba) to Muweileh (four miles north-east of Abu Irgeig). Irish troops occupied Abu Irgeig the same day.
[Sidenote: Advance on Kohleh and Khuweilfeh.]
On November 3 we advanced north on Ain Kohleh and Tel Khuweilfeh, near which place the mounted troops had engaged considerable enemy forces on the previous day. This advance was strongly opposed, but was pushed on through difficult hill country to within a short distance of Ain Kohleh and Khuweilfeh. At these places the enemy was found holding a strong position with considerable and increasing forces. He was obviously determined not only to bar any further progress in this direction, but, if possible, to drive our flankguard back on Beersheba. During the 4th and 5th he made several determined attacks on the mounted troops. These attacks were repulsed.
[Sidenote: Hostile cavalry between Khuweilfeh and Hebron Road.]
By the evening of November 5 the 19th Turkish Division, the remains of the 27th and certain units of the 16th Division had been identified in the fighting round Tel el Khuweilfeh, and it was also fairly clear that the greater part of the hostile cavalry, supported apparently by some infantry ("depot" troops) from Hebron, were engaged between Khuweilfeh and the Hebron Road.
[Sidenote: Enemy tries to draw forces north of Beersheba.]
The action of the enemy in thus employing the whole of his available reserves in an immediate counter-stroke so far to the east was apparently a bold effort to induce me to make essential alterations in my offensive plan, thereby gaining time and disorganizing my arrangements. The country north of Beersheba was exceedingly rough and hilly, and very little water was to be found there. Had the enemy succeeded in drawing considerable forces against him in that area the result might easily have been an indecisive fight (for the terrain was very suitable to his methods of defence) and my own main striking force would probably have been made too weak effectively to break the enemy"s centre in the neighborhood of Sheria Hareira. This might have resulted in our gaining Beersheba, but failing to do more--in which case Beersheba would only have been an incubus of a most inconvenient kind.
However, the enemy"s action was not allowed to make any essential modification to the original plan, which it had been decided to carry out at dawn on November 6.
[Sidenote: Effort to reach Sheria.]
By the evening of November 5, all preparations had been made to attack in the Kauwukah and Rushdi systems and to make every effort to reach Sheria before nightfall.
The mounted troops were to be prepared in the event of a success by the main force to collect, as they were somewhat widely scattered owing to water difficulties, and push north in pursuit of the enemy. Tel el Khuweilfeh was to be attacked at dawn on the 6th, and the troops were to endeavor to reach line Tel el Khuweilfeh-Rijm el Dhib.
[Sidenote: The plan of attack.]
At dawn on the 6th the attacking force had taken up positions of readiness to the S.E. of the Kauwukah system of trenches. The attack was to be commenced by an a.s.sault on the group of works forming the extreme left of the enemy"s defensive system, followed by an advance due west up the railway, capturing the line of detached works which lay east of the railway. During this attack London and Irish troops were to advance towards the Kauwukah system, bringing forward their guns to within wire-cutting range. They were to a.s.sault the southeastern face of the Kauwukah system as soon as the bombardment had proved effective, and thence take the remainder of the system in enfilade.
[Sidenote: All objectives of the attack captured.]
The attack progressed rapidly, the Yeomanry storming the works on the enemy"s extreme left with great dash; and soon after noon the London and Irish troops commenced their attack. It was completely successful in capturing all its objectives, and the whole of the Rushdi system in addition. Sheria Station was also captured before dark. The Yeomanry reached the line of the Wadi Sheria to Wadi Union; and the troops on the left were close to Hareira Redoubt, which was still occupied by the enemy. This attack was a fine performance, the troops advancing 8 or 9 miles during the day and capturing a series of very strong works covering a front of about 7 miles, the greater part of which had been had and strengthened by the enemy for over six months. Some 600 prisoners were taken and some guns and machine-guns captured. Our casualties were comparatively slight. The greatest opposition was encountered by the Yeomanry in the early morning, the works covering the left of the enemy"s line being strong and stubbornly defended.
[Sidenote: Mounted troops are ordered to take up the pursuit.]
During the afternoon, as soon as it was seen that the attack had succeeded, mounted troops were ordered to take up the pursuit and to occupy Huj and Jemmamah.
The 53rd (Welsh) Division had again had very severe fighting on the 6th.
Their attack at dawn on Tel el Khuweilfeh was successful, and, though they were driven off a hill by a counterattack, they retook it and captured another hill, which much improved their position. The Turkish losses in this area were very heavy indeed, and the stubborn fighting of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, Imperial Camel Corps, and part of the mounted troops during November 2 to 6 drew in and exhausted the Turkish reserves and paved the way for the success of the attack on Sheria. The 53rd (Welsh) Division took several hundred prisoners and some guns during this fighting.
[Sidenote: Bombardment of Gaza continues.]
The bombardment of Gaza had meanwhile continued, and another attack was ordered to take place on the night of the 6th-7th.
The objectives were, on the right, Outpost Hill and Middles.e.x Hill (to be attacked at 11.30 p. m. on the 6th), and on the left the line Belah Trench-Turtle Hill (to be attacked at dawn on the 7th).
[Sidenote: Airmen observe enemy movements.]
During the 6th a certain amount of movement on the roads north of Gaza was observed by our airmen and fired on by our heavy artillery, but nothing indicating a general retirement from Gaza.
The attack on Outpost Hill and Middles.e.x Hill met with little opposition, and as soon, after they had been taken, as patrols could be pushed forward, the enemy was found to be gone. East Anglian troops on the left also found at dawn that the enemy had retired during the night, and early in the morning the main force occupied the northern and eastern defences of Gaza. Rearguards were still occupying Beit Hanun and the Atawineh and Tank systems, from whence Turkish artillery continued to fire on Gaza and Ali Muntar till dusk.
[Sidenote: The Turks evacuate Gaza.]
[Sidenote: Turkish rearguard makes counterattacks.]
As soon as it was seen that the Turks had evacuated Gaza a part of the force pushed along the coast to the mouth of the Wadi Hesi, so as to turn the Wadi Hesi line and prevent the enemy making any stand there.
Cavalry had already pushed on round the north of Gaza, and became engaged with an enemy rearguard at Beit Hanun, which maintained its position till nightfall. The force advancing along the coast reached the Wadi Hesi by evening, and succeeded in establishing itself on the north bank in the face of considerable opposition, a Turkish rearguard making several determined counterattacks.
On our extreme right the situation remained practically unchanged during the 7th; the enemy made no further attempt to counterattack, but maintained his positions opposite our right flank guard.
[Sidenote: London troops take Tel el Sheria.]
In the centre the Hareira Tepe Redoubt was captured at dawn; some prisoners and guns were taken. The London troops, after a severe engagement at Tel el Sheria, which they captured by a bayonet charge at 4 a. m. on the 7th subsequently repulsing several counterattacks, pushed forward their line about a mile to the north of Tel el Sheria; the mounted troops on the right moved towards Jemmamah and Huj, but met with considerable opposition from hostile rearguards.
[Sidenote: Charge of the Worcester and Warwick Yeomanry.]
[Sidenote: Reports of the Royal Flying Corps.]
During the 8th the advance was continued, and interest was chiefly centred in an attempt to cut off, if possible, the Turkish rearguard which had held the Tank and Atawineh systems. The enemy had, however, retreated during the night 7th-8th, and though considerable captures of prisoners, guns, ammunition, and other stores were made during the day, chiefly in the vicinity of Huj, no large formed body of the enemy was cut off. The Turkish rearguards fought stubbornly and offered considerable opposition. Near Huj a fine charge by some squadrons of the Worcester and Warwick Yeomanry captured 12 guns, and broke the resistance of a hostile rearguard. It soon became obvious from the reports of the Royal Flying Corps, who throughout the 7th and 8th attacked the retreating columns with bombs and machine-gun fire, and from other evidence, that the enemy was retiring in considerable disorganization, and could offer no very serious resistance if pressed with determination.
Instructions were accordingly issued on the morning of the 9th to the mounted troops, directing them on the line El Tine-Beit Duras, with orders to press the enemy relentlessly. They were to be supported by a portion of the force, which was ordered to push forward to Julis and Mejdel.
[Sidenote: Enemy pursued toward Hebron by the Yeomanry.]
The enemy opposite our right flank guard had commenced to retreat towards Hebron on the morning of the 8th. He was pursued for a short distance by the Yeomanry, and some prisoners and camels were captured, but the Yeomanry were then recalled to rejoin the main body of the mounted troops for the more important task of the pursuit of the enemy"s main body.
[Sidenote: The problem of water and forage.]
By the 9th, therefore, operations had reached the stage of a direct pursuit by as many troops as could be supplied so far in front of railhead. The problem, in fact, became one of supply rather than man[oe]uvre. The question of water and forage was a very difficult one.
Even where water was found in sufficient quant.i.ties, it was usually in wells and not on the surface, and consequently if the machinery for working the wells was damaged, or a sufficient supply of troughs was not available, the process of watering a large quant.i.ty of animals was slow and difficult.
[Sidenote: Enemy organizes a counterattack.]
[Sidenote: Enemy"s losses heavy.]
On the evening of November 9 there were indications that the enemy was organizing a counterattack towards Arak el Menshiye by all available units of the force which had retired towards Hebron, with the object of taking pressure off the main force, which was retiring along the coastal plain. It was obvious that the Hebron force, which was believed to be short of transport and ammunition, to have lost heavily and to be in a generally disorganized state, could make no effective diversion, and that this threat could practically be disregarded. Other information showed the seriousness of the enemy"s losses and the disorganization of his forces.
[Sidenote: Imperial Camel Corps ordered to Tel de Nejile.]