[Sidenote: Enemy pierces outposts near Jaffa.]
[Sidenote: Attacks costly to Turks.]
During this period attacks by the enemy along the whole line led to severe local fighting. On November 25 our advanced posts north of the river Auja were driven back across the river. From the 27th to the 30th the enemy delivered a series of attacks directed especially against the high ground north and north-east of Jaffa, the left flank of our position in the hills from Beit ur el Foka to El Burj, and the Neby Samwil ridge. An attack on the night of the 29th succeeded in penetrating our outpost line north-east of Jaffa, but next morning the whole hostile detachment, numbering 150, was surrounded and captured by Australian Light Horse. On the 30th a similar fate befell a battalion which attacked near El Burj; a counter-attack by Australian Light Horse took 220 prisoners and practically destroyed the attacking battalion.
There was particularly heavy fighting between El Burj and Beit ur el Foka, but the Yeomanry and Scottish troops successfully resisted all attacks and inflicted severe losses on the enemy. At Beit ur el Foka one company took 300 prisoners. All efforts by the enemy to drive us off the Neby Samwil ridge were completely repulsed. These attacks cost the Turks very dearly. We took 750 prisoners between November 27 and 30, and the enemy"s losses in killed and wounded were undoubtedly heavy. His attacks in no way affected our positions nor impeded the progress of our preparations.
[Sidenote: Improvement of roads and water supply.]
Favored by a continuance of fine weather, preparations for a fresh advance against the Turkish positions west and south of Jerusalem proceeded rapidly. Existing roads and tracks were improved and new ones constructed to enable heavy and field artillery to be placed in position and ammunition and supplies brought up. The water supply was also developed.
[Sidenote: Advances of British troops.]
The date for the attack was fixed as December 8. Welsh troops, with a Cavalry regiment attached, had advanced from their positions north of Beersheba up the Hebron-Jerusalem road on the 4th. No opposition was met, and by the evening of the 6th the head of this column was ten miles north of Hebron. The Infantry were directed to reach the Bethlehem-Beit Jala area by the 7th, and the line Surbahir-Sherafat (about three miles south of Jerusalem) by dawn on the 8th, and no troops were to enter Jerusalem during this operation.
It was recognized that the troops on the extreme right might be delayed on the 7th and fail to reach the positions a.s.signed to them by dawn on the 8th. Arrangements were therefore made to protect the right flank west of Jerusalem, in case such delay occurred.
[Sidenote: Three days of rain make roads almost impa.s.sable.]
On the 7th the weather broke, and for three days rain was almost continuous. The hills were covered with mist at frequent intervals, rendering observation from the air and visual signalling impossible. A more serious effect of the rain was to jeopardize the supply arrangements by rendering the roads almost impa.s.sable--quite impa.s.sable, indeed, for mechanical transport and camels in many places.
[Sidenote: Artillery support difficult.]
The troops moved into positions of a.s.sembly by night, and, a.s.saulting at dawn on the 8th, soon carried their first objectives. They then pressed steadily forward. The mere physical difficulty of climbing the steep and rocky hillsides and crossing the deep valleys would have sufficed to render progress slow, and the opposition encountered was considerable.
Artillery support was soon difficult, owing to the length of the advance and the difficulty of moving guns forward. But by about noon London troops had already advanced over two miles, and were swinging north-east to gain the Nablus-Jerusalem road; while the Yeomanry had captured the Beit Iksa spur, and were preparing for a further advance.
[Sidenote: Enemy defences west of Jerusalem captured.]
As the right column had been delayed and was still some distance south of Jerusalem, it was necessary for the London troops to throw back their right and form a defensive flank facing east towards Jerusalem, from the western outskirts of which considerable rifle and artillery fire was being experienced. This delayed the advance, and early in the afternoon it was decided to consolidate the line gained and resume the advance next day, when the right column would be in a position to exert its pressure. By nightfall our line ran from Neby Samwil to the east of Beit Iksa, through Lifta to a point about one and one-half miles west of Jerusalem, whence it was thrown back facing east. All the enemy"s prepared defences west and north-west of Jerusalem had been captured, and our troops were within a short distance of the Nablus-Jerusalem road.
[Sidenote: Operations isolate Jerusalem.]
Next morning the advance was resumed. The Turks had withdrawn during the night, and the London troops and Yeomanry, driving back rearguards, occupied a line across the Nablus-Jerusalem road four miles north of Jerusalem, while Welsh troops occupied a position east of Jerusalem across the Jericho road. These operations isolated Jerusalem, and at about noon the enemy sent out a _parlementaire_ and surrendered the city.
At noon on the 11th I made my official entry into Jerusalem.
There were many encounters between American ships and German submarines in the months of 1917, following the Declaration of War. Official accounts of the most important of these encounters are given in the following pages.
AMERICAN SHIPS AND GERMAN SUBMARINES
FROM OFFICIAL REPORTS
[Sidenote: The destroyer _Ca.s.sin_ sights a submarine.]
On October 15, 1917, the U. S. destroyer _Ca.s.sin_ was patrolling off the south coast of Ireland; when about 20 miles south of Mine Head, at 1.30 p. m., a submarine was sighted by the lookout aloft four or five miles away, about two points on the port bow. The submarine at this time was awash and was made out by officers of the watch and the quartermaster of the watch, but three minutes later submerged.
The _Ca.s.sin_, which was making 15 knots, continued on its course until near the position where the submarine had disappeared. When last seen the submarine was heading in a south-easterly direction, and when the destroyer reached the point of disappearance the course was changed, as it was thought the vessel would make a decided change of course after submerging. At this time the commanding officer, the executive officer, engineer officer, officer of the watch, and the junior watch officer were all on the bridge searching for the submarine.
[Sidenote: Torpedo sighted running at high speed.]
[Sidenote: Torpedo strikes destroyer and depth charges also explode.]
At about 1.57 p. m. the commanding officer sighted a torpedo apparently shortly after it had been fired, running near the surface and in a direction that was estimated would make a hit either in the engine or fire room. When first seen the torpedo was between three or four hundred yards from the ship, and the wake could be followed on the other side for about 400 yards. The torpedo was running at high speed, at least 35 knots. The _Ca.s.sin_ was maneuvering to dodge the torpedo, double emergency full speed ahead having been signaled from the engine room and the rudder put hard left as soon as the torpedo was sighted. It looked for the moment as though the torpedo would pa.s.s astern. When about fifteen or twenty feet away the torpedo porpoised, completely leaving the water and shearing to the left. Before again taking the water the torpedo hit the ship well aft on the port side about frame 163 and above the water line. Almost immediately after the explosion of the torpedo the depth charges, located on the stern and ready for firing, exploded.
There were two distinct explosions in quick succession after the torpedo hit.
[Sidenote: Ingram"s sacrifice saves his comrades.]
But one life was lost. Osmond K. Ingram, gunner"s mate first cla.s.s, was cleaning the muzzle of No. 4 gun, target practice being just over when the attack occurred. With rare presence of mind, realizing that the torpedo was about to strike the part of the ship where the depth charges were stored and that the setting off of these explosives might sink the ship, Ingram, immediately seeing the danger, ran aft to strip these charges and throw them overboard. He was blown to pieces when the torpedo struck. Thus Ingram sacrificed his life in performing a duty which he believed would save his ship and the lives of the officers and men on board.
Nine members of the crew received minor injuries.
After the ship was. .h.i.t, the crew was kept at general quarters.
[Sidenote: Port engine still workable.]
The executive officer and engineer officer inspected the parts of the ship that were damaged, and those adjacent to the damage. It was found that the engine and fire rooms and after magazine were intact and that the engines could be worked; but that the ship could not be steered, the rudder having been blown off and the stern blown to starboard. The ship continued to turn to starboard in a circle. In an effort to put the ship on a course by the use of the engines, something carried away which put the starboard engine out of commission. The port engine was kept going at slow speed. The ship, being absolutely unmanageable, sometimes turned in a circle and at times held an approximate course for several minutes.
[Sidenote: Radio officers improvise temporary wireless.]
Immediately after the ship was torpedoed the radio was out of commission. The radio officer and radio electrician chief managed to improvise a temporary auxiliary antenna. The generators were out of commission for a short time after the explosion, the ship being in darkness below.
When this vessel was torpedoed, there was another United States destroyer, name unknown, within signal distance. She had acknowledged our call by searchlight before we were torpedoed. After being torpedoed, an attempt was made to signal her by searchlight, flag, and whistle, and the distress signal was hoisted. Apparently through a misunderstanding she steamed away and was lost sight of.
[Sidenote: Another submarine fight.]
At about 2.30 p. m., when we were in approximately the same position as when torpedoed, a submarine conning tower was sighted on port beam, distant about 1,500 yards, ship still circling under port engine. Opened fire with No. 2 gun, firing four rounds. Submarine submerged and was not seen again. Two shots came very close to submarine.
[Sidenote: American and British vessels stand by.]
At 3.50 p. m., U. S. S. _Porter_ stood by. At 4.25 p. m., wreckage which was hanging to stern dropped off. At dark stopped port engine and drifted. At about 9 p. m., H. M. S. _Jessamine_ and H. M. S. _Tamarisk_ stood by. H. M. S. _Jessamine_ signalled she would stand by until morning and then take us in tow. At this time sea was very rough, wind about six or seven and increasing.
[Sidenote: Attempts to tow the _Ca.s.sin_ fail.]
H. M. S. _Tamarisk_ prepared to take us in tow and made one attempt after another to get a line to us. Finally, about 2.10 a. m., October 16, the _Tamarisk_ lowered a boat in rough sea and sent gra.s.s line by means of which our eight-inch hawser was sent over to her. At about 2.30 a. m. _Tamarisk_ started towing us to Queenstown, speed about four knots, this vessel towing well on starboard quarter of _Tamarisk_, due to condition of stern described above. At 3.25 hawser parted.
[Sidenote: The _Tamarisk_ succeeds in getting out a line.]
Between this time and 10.37 a. m., when a towing line was received from H. M. S. _Snowdrop_, various attempts were made by the _Tamarisk_ and two trawlers and a tug to tow the _Ca.s.sin_. An eleven-inch towing hawser from the _Tamarisk_ parted. All ships, except her, lost the _Ca.s.sin_ during the night. The _Ca.s.sin_ was drifting rapidly on a lee sh.o.r.e, and had it not been for the _Tamarisk_ getting out a line in the early morning, the vessel would have undoubtedly grounded on Hook Point, as it is extremely doubtful if her anchors would have held.
About thirty-five feet of the stern was blown off or completely ruptured. The after living compartments and after storerooms are completely wrecked or gone, and all stores and clothing from these parts of the ship are gone or ruined. About forty-five members of the crew, including the chief petty officers, lost practically everything but the clothes they had on.
At the time of the explosion there were a number of men in the after compartments. How they managed to escape is beyond explanation.