Owing to lack of water I was unable, without preparations which would require some considerable time, to approach within striking distance of the enemy, except in the small sector near the sea coast opposite Gaza.
My proposals received the approval of the War Cabinet, and preparations were undertaken to enable the plan I had formed to be put into execution.
[Sidenote: To strike on Turk"s left flank.]
I had decided to strike the main blow against the left flank of the main Turkish position, Hareira and Sheria. The capture of Beersheba was a necessary preliminary to this operation, in order to secure the water supplies at that place and to give room for the deployment of the attacking force on the high ground to the north and north-west of Beersheba, from which direction I intended to attack the Hareira-Sheria line.
[Sidenote: Necessary to take Beersheba.]
This front of attack was chosen for the following reasons. The enemy"s works in this sector were less formidable than elsewhere, and they were easier of approach than other parts of the enemy"s defences. When Beersheba was in our hands we should have an open flank against which to operate, and I could make full use of our superiority in mounted troops, and a success here offered prospects of pursuing our advantage and forcing the enemy to abandon the rest of his fortified positions, which no other line of attack would afford.
[Sidenote: Attacked Gaza to deceive enemy.]
[Sidenote: a.s.surance of naval cooperation at Gaza.]
It was important, in order to keep the enemy in doubt up to the last moment as to the real point of attack, that an attack should also be made on the enemy"s right at Gaza in conjunction with the main operations. One of my Commanders was therefore ordered to prepare a scheme for operations against Gaza on as large a scale as the force at his disposal would permit. I also asked the Senior Naval Officer of Egypt, Rear-Admiral T. Jackson, C.B., M.V.O., to afford me naval cooperation by bombarding the Gaza defences and the enemy"s railway stations and depots north of Gaza. Rear-Admiral Jackson afforded me cordial a.s.sistance, and during the period of preparation Naval Officers worked in the closest cooperation with my staff at General Headquarters and the staff of the G.O.C. troops operating in that region.
[Sidenote: Difficulties regarding water and transport.]
The difficulties to be overcome in the operations against Beersheba and the Sheria-Hareira line were considerable, and careful preparations and training were necessary. The chief difficulties were those of water and transport, and arrangements had to be made to ensure that the troops could be kept supplied with water while operating at considerable distances from their original water base for a period which might amount to a week or more; for, though it was known that an ample supply of water existed at Beersheba, it was uncertain how quickly it could be developed or to what extent the enemy would have damaged the wells before we succeeded in occupying the town. Except at Beersheba, no large supply of water would be found till Sheria and Hareira had been captured.
[Sidenote: No good roads south of Gaza-Beersheba line.]
[Sidenote: Railway lines to be laid.]
The transport problem was no less difficult; there were no good roads south of the line Gaza-Beersheba, and no reliance could therefore be placed on the use of motor transport. Owing to the steep banks of many of the wadis which intersected the area of operations, the routes pa.s.sable by wheeled transport were limited, and the going was heavy and difficult in many places. Practically the whole of the transport available in the force, including 30,000 pack camels, had to be allotted to one portion of the eastern force to enable it to be kept supplied with food, water, and ammunition at a distance of 15 to 20 miles in advance of railhead. Arrangements were also made for railhead to be pushed forward as rapidly as possible towards Karm, and for a line to be laid from Gamli toward Beersheba for the transport of ammunition.
A railway line was also laid from Deir el Belah to the Wadi Ghuzze, close behind the sector held by another portion of the eastern force.
[Sidenote: Rushing up artillery and supplies.]
Considerable strain was thrown on the military railway from Kantara to the front during the period of preparation. In addition to the normal requirements of the force, a number of siege and heavy batteries, besides other artillery and units, had to be moved to the front, and large depots of supplies, ammunition, and other stores acc.u.mulated at the various railheads. Preparations had also to be made and the necessary material acc.u.mulated to push forward the lines from Deir el Belah and Sh.e.l.lal.
[Sidenote: The enemy determined to maintain Gaza to Beersheba line.]
During the period from July to October, 1917, the enemy"s force on the Palestine front had been increased. It was evident, from the arrival of these reinforcements and the construction of railway extensions from El Tine, on the Ramleh-Beersheba railway, to Deir Sineid and Belt Hanun, north of Gaza, and from Deir Sineid to Huj, and from reports of the transport of large supplies of ammunition and other stores to the Palestine front, that the enemy was determined to make every effort to maintain his position on the Gaza-Beersheba line. He had considerably strengthened his defences on this line; and the strong localities mentioned had, by the end of October, been joined up to form a practically continuous line from the sea to a point south of Sheria, except for a gap between Ali Muntar and the Sihan Group. The defensive works round Beersheba remained a detached system, but had been improved and extended.
[Sidenote: Date of attack on Beersheba.]
The date of the attack on Beersheba, which was to commence the operations, was fixed as October 31, 1917. Work had been begun on the railway from Sh.e.l.lal towards Karm, and on the line from Gamli to El Buggar. The development of water at Ecani, Khalasa, and Asluj proceeded satisfactorily. These last two places were to be the starting point for the mounted force detailed to make a wide flanking movement and attack Beersheba from the east and north-east.
[Sidenote: The Turks make a strong reconnaissance.]
On the morning of October 27 the Turks made a strong reconnaissance towards Karm from the direction of Kauwukah, two regiments of cavalry and two or three thousand infantry, with guns, being employed. They attacked a line of outposts near El Girheir, held by some Yeomanry, covering railway construction. One small post was rushed and cut up, but not before inflicting heavy loss on the enemy; another post, though surrounded, held out all day, and also caused the enemy heavy loss. The gallant resistance made by the Yeomanry enabled the 53rd (Welsh) Division to come up in time, and on their advance the Turks withdrew.
[Sidenote: Bombardment of Gaza defenses.]
The bombardment of the Gaza defences commenced on October 27, and on October 30 warships of the Royal Navy, a.s.sisted by a French battleship, began cooperating in this bombardment.
On the evening of October 30 the portion of the eastern force, which was to make the attack on Beersheba, was concentrated in positions of readiness for the night march to its positions of deployment.
[Sidenote: Imperial Camel Corps, Infantry and Cavalry.]
The night march to the positions of deployment was successfully carried out, all units reaching their appointed positions up to time. The plan was to attack the hostile works between the Khalasa road and the Wadi Saba with two divisions, masking the works north of the Wadi Saba with the Imperial Camel Corps and some infantry, while a portion of the 53rd (Welsh) Division further north covered the left of the corps. The right of the attack was covered by a cavalry regiment. Further east, mounted troops took up a line opposite the southern defences of Beersheba.
[Sidenote: Enemy"s advanced works taken.]
As a preliminary to the main attack, in order to enable field guns to be brought within effective range for wire-cutting, the enemy"s advanced works at 1,070 were to be taken. This was successfully accomplished at 8.45 a.m., after a short preliminary bombardment, by London troops, with small loss, 90 prisoners being taken. The cutting of the wire on the main line then proceeded satisfactorily, though pauses had to be made to allow the dust to clear; and the final a.s.sault was ordered for 12.15 p.m. It was successful all along the front attacked, and by about 1 p.m.
the whole of the works between the Khalasa road and the Wadi Saba were in our hands.
Some delay occurred in ascertaining whether the enemy still occupied the works north of the road; it was decided, as they were still held by small parties, to attack them from the south. After a preliminary bombardment the works were occupied with little opposition by about 7.30 p.m.
[Sidenote: British casualties light.]
The casualties were light, considering the strength of the works attacked; a large proportion occurred during the advance towards the positions previous to the a.s.sault, the hostile guns being very accurate and very difficult to locate.
[Sidenote: The road toward Beersheba.]
Meanwhile, the mounted troops, after a night march, for part of the force of 25 and for the remainder of 35 miles, arrived early in the morning of the 31st about Khasim Zanna, in the hills some five miles east of Beersheba. From the hills the advance into Beersheba from the east and north-east lies over an open and almost flat plain, commanded by the rising ground north of the town and flanked by an underfeature in the Wadi Saba called Tel el Saba.
A force was sent north to secure Bir es Sakaty, on the Hebron road, and protect the right flank, this force met with some opposition and was engaged with hostile cavalry at Bir es Sakaty and to the north during the day. Tel el Saba was found strongly held by the enemy, and was not captured till late in the afternoon.
[Sidenote: Rapid advance of Australian Light Horse.]
Meanwhile, attempts to advance in small parties across the plain towards the town made slow progress. In the evening, however, a mounted attack by Australian Light Horse, who rode straight at the town from the east, proved completely successful. They galloped over two deep trenches held by the enemy just outside the town, and entered the town at about 7 p.
m., capturing numerous prisoners.
The Turks at Beersheba were undoubtedly taken completely by surprise, a surprise from which the dash of London troops and Yeomanry, finely supported by their artillery, never gave them time to recover. The charge of the Australian Light Horse completed their defeat.
[Sidenote: Prisoners and guns taken.]
A very strong position was thus taken with slight loss, and the Turkish detachment at Beersheba almost completely put out of action. About 2,000 prisoners and 13 guns were taken, and some 500 Turkish corpses were buried on the battlefield. This success laid open the left flank of the main Turkish position for a decisive blow.
[Sidenote: Complete success of Beersheba operations.]
[Sidenote: The attack on Gaza.]
The actual date of the attack at Gaza had been left open till the result of the attack at Beersheba was known, as it was intended that the former attack, which was designed to draw hostile reserves towards the Gaza sector, should take place twenty-four to forty-eight hours previous to the attack on the Sheria position. After the complete success of the Beersheba operations, and as the early reports indicated that an ample supply of water would be available at that place, it was hoped that it would be possible to attack Sheria by November 3 or 4. The attack on Gaza was accordingly ordered to take place on the morning of November 2.
Later reports showed that the water situation was less favorable than had been hoped, but it was decided not to postpone the attack.
[Sidenote: The works on Umbrella Hill princ.i.p.al objectives.]
The objective of this attack were the hostile works from Umbrella Hill (2,000 yards south-west of the town) to Sheikh Hasan, on the sea (about 2,500 yards north-west of the town). The front of the attack was about 6,000 yards, and Sheikh Hasan, the furthest objective, was over 3,000 yards from our front line. The ground over which the attack took place consisted of sand dunes, rising in places up to 150 feet in height. This sand is very deep and heavy going. The enemy"s defences consisted of several lines of strongly built trenches and redoubts.
As Umbrella Hill flanked the advance against the Turkish works further west, it was decided to capture it by a preliminary operation, to take place four hours previous to the main attack. It was accordingly attacked, and captured at 11 p. m. on November 1 by a portion of the 52nd (Lowland) Division. This attack drew a heavy bombardment of Umbrella Hill itself and our front lines, which lasted for two hours, but ceased in time to allow the main attack, which was timed for 3 a.
m., to form up without interference.
It had been decided to make the attack before daylight owing to the distance to be covered between our front trenches and the enemy"s position.