[Footnote 1: It is important to note that it is not unlikely that k.u.marila was indebted to [email protected] for this; for [email protected]"s main contention is that "it is not fire, nor the connection between it and the hill, but it is the fiery hill that is inferred" for otherwise inference would give us no new knowledge see [email protected]@na"s _Indian Logic_, p. 87 and [email protected]_, p. 120.]
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absence of the gamaka or vyapya, should also be noted, for a knowledge of such a negative relation is not indispensable for the forming of the notion of the permanent relation [Footnote ref 1]. The experience of a large number of particular cases in which any two things were found to coexist together in another thing in some relation a.s.sociated with the non-perception of any case of failure creates an expectancy in us of inferring the presence of the gamya in that thing in which the gamaka is perceived to exist in exactly the same relation [Footnote ref 2]. In those cases where the circle of the existence of the gamya coincides with the circle of the existence of the gamaka, each of them becomes a gamaka for the other.
It is clear that this form of inference not only includes all cases of cause and effect, of genus and species but also all cases of coexistence as well.
The question arises that if no inference is possible without a memory of the permanent relation, is not the self-validity of inference destroyed on that account, for memory is not regarded as self-valid. To this k.u.marila"s answer is that memory is not invalid, but it has not the status of pramana, as it does not bring to us a new knowledge. But inference involves the acquirement of a new knowledge in this, that though the coexistence of two things in another was known in a number of cases, yet in the present case a new case of the existence of the gamya in a thing is known from the perception of the existence of the gamaka and this knowledge is gained by a means which is not perception, for it is only the gamaka that is seen and not the gamya. If the gamya is also seen it is no inference at all.
As regards the number of propositions necessary for the explicit statement of the process of inference for convincing others (_pararthanumana_) both k.u.marila and Prabhakara hold that three premisses are quite sufficient for inference. Thus the first three premisses pratijna, hetu and [email protected] may quite serve the purpose of an anumana.
There are two kinds of anumana according to k.u.marila viz. [email protected]@rstasambandha and [email protected]@[email protected]
The former is that kind of inference where the permanent
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[Footnote 1: k.u.marila strongly opposes a Buddhist view that concomitance (_vyapti_) is ascertained only by the negative instances and not by the positive ones.]
[Footnote 2: "_tasmadanavagate"pi sarvatranvaye sarvatas"ca vyatireke bahus"ah sahityavagamamatradeva [email protected]@h._"
_Nyayaratnakara_, p. 288.]
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relation between two concrete things, as in the case of smoke and fire, has been noticed. The latter is that kind of inference where the permanent relation is observed not between two concrete things but between two general notions, as in the case of movement and change of place, e.g. the perceived cases where there is change of place there is also motion involved with it; so from the change of place of the sun its motion is inferred and it is held that this general notion is directly perceived like all universals [Footnote ref 1].
Prabhakara recognizes the need of forming the notion of the permanent relation, but he does not lay any stress on the fact that this permanent relation between two things (fire and smoke) is taken in connection with a third thing in which they both subsist. He says that the notion of the permanent relation between two things is the main point, whereas in all other a.s.sociations of time and place the things in which these two subsist together are taken only as adjuncts to qualify the two things (e.g. fire and smoke). It is also necessary to recognize the fact that though the concomitance of smoke in fire is only conditional, the concomitance of the fire in smoke is unconditional and absolute [Footnote ref 2]. When such a conviction is firmly rooted in the mind that the concept of the presence of smoke involves the concept of the presence of fire, the inference of fire is made as soon as any smoke is seen. Prabhakara counts separately the fallacies of the minor ([email protected]_), of the enunciation (_pratijnabhasa_) and of the example ([email protected]@[email protected]_) along with the fallacies of the middle and this seems to indicate that the [email protected] logic was not altogether free from Buddhist influence. The cognition of smoke includes within itself the cognition of fire also, and thus there would be nothing left unknown to be cognized by the inferential cognition. But this objection has little force with Prabhakara, for he does not admit that a [email protected] should necessarily bring us any new knowledge, for [email protected] is simply defined as "apprehension."
So though the inferential cognition always pertains to things already known it is yet regarded by him as a [email protected], since it is in any case no doubt an apprehension.
[Footnote 1: See _S"lokavarttika, Nyayaratnakara, S"astradipika, [email protected], Siddhantacandrika_ on anumana.]
[Footnote 2: On the subject of the means of a.s.suring oneself that there is no condition (_upadhi_) which may vitiate the inference, Prabhakara has nothing new to tell us. He says that where even after careful enquiry in a large number of cases the condition cannot be discovered we must say that it does not exist ([email protected]@ne aupadhikatvanavagamat_, see [email protected]_, p. 71).]
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Upamana, Arthapatti.
a.n.a.logy (_upamana_) is accepted by [email protected] in a sense which is different from that in which Nyaya took it. The man who has seen a cow (_go_) goes to the forest and sees a wild ox (_gavaya_), and apprehends the similarity of the gavaya with the _go,_ and then cognizes the similarity of the _go_ (which is not within the limits of his perception then) with the _gavaya._ The cognition of this similarity of the _gavaya_ in the _go,_ as it follows directly from the perception of the similarity of the _go_ in the _gavaya,_ is called upamana (a.n.a.logy). It is regarded as a separate [email protected], because by it we can apprehend the similarity existing in a thing which is not perceived at the moment. It is not mere remembrance, for at the time the _go_ was seen the _gavaya_ was not seen, and hence the similarity also was not seen, and what was not seen could not be remembered. The difference of Prabhakara and k.u.marila on this point is that while the latter regards similarity as only a quality consisting in the fact of more than one object having the same set of qualities, the former regards it as a distinct category.
_Arthapatti_ (implication) is a new [email protected] which is admitted by the [email protected] Thus when we know that a person Devadatta is alive and perceive that he is not in the house, we cannot reconcile these two facts, viz. his remaining alive and his not being in the house without presuming his existence somewhere outside the house, and this method of cognizing the existence of Devadatta outside the house is called _arthapatti_ (presumption or implication).
The exact psychological a.n.a.lysis of the mind in this arthapatti cognition is a matter on which Prabhakara and k.u.marila disagree. Prabhakara holds that when a man knows that Devadatta habitually resides in his house but yet does not find him there, his knowledge that Devadatta is living (though acquired previously by some other means of proof) is made doubtful, and the cause of this doubt is that he does not find Devadatta at his house. The absence of Devadatta from the house is not the cause of implication, but it throws into doubt the very existence of Devadatta, and thus forces us to imagine that Devadatta must remain somewhere outside. That can only be found by implication, without the hypothesis of which the doubt cannot be removed.
The mere absence of Devadatta from the house is not enough for
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making the presumption that he is outside the house, for he might also be dead. But I know that Devadatta was living and also that he was not at home; this perception of his absence from home creates a doubt as regards my first knowledge that he is living, and it is for the removal of this doubt that there creeps in the presumption that he must be living somewhere else. The perception of the absence of Devadatta through the intermediate link of a doubt pa.s.ses into the notion of a presumption that he must then remain somewhere else. In inference there is no element of doubt, for it is only when the smoke is perceived to exist beyond the least element of doubt that the inference of the fire is possible, but in presumption the perceived non-existence in the house leads to the presumption of an external existence only when it has thrown the fact of the man"s being alive into doubt and uncertainty [Footnote ref 1].
k.u.marila however objects to this explanation of Prabhakara, and says that if the fact that Devadatta is living is made doubtful by the absence of Devadatta at his house, then the doubt may as well be removed by the supposition that Devadatta is dead, for it does not follow that the doubt with regard to the life of Devadatta should necessarily be resolved by the supposition of his being outside the house. Doubt can only be removed when the cause or the root of doubt is removed, and it does not follow that because Devadatta is not in the house therefore he is living. If it was already known that Devadatta was living and his absence from the house creates the doubt, how then can the very fact which created the doubt remove the doubt? The cause of doubt cannot be the cause of its removal too. The real procedure of the presumption is quite the other way. The doubt about the life of Devadatta being removed by previous knowledge or by some other means, we may presume that he must be outside the house when he is found absent from the house. So there cannot be any doubt about the life of Devadatta. It is the certainty of his life a.s.sociated with the perception of his absence from the house that leads us to the presumption of his external existence.
There is an opposition between the life of Devadatta and his absence from the house, and the mind cannot come to rest without the presumption of his external existence. The mind oscillates between two contradictory poles both of which it accepts but
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[Footnote 1: See [email protected]_, pp. 113-115.]
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cannot reconcile, and as a result of that finds an outlet and a reconciliation in the presumption that the existence of Devadatta must be found outside the house.
Well then, if that be so, inference may as well be interpreted as presumption. For if we say that we know that wherever there is smoke there is fire, and then perceive that there is smoke in the hill, but no fire, then the existence of the smoke becomes irreconcilable, or the universal proposition of the concomitance of smoke with fire becomes false, and hence the presumption that there is fire in the hill. This would have been all right if the universal concomitance of smoke with fire could be known otherwise than by inference. But this is not so, for the concomitance was seen only in individual cases, and from that came the inference that wherever there is smoke there is fire. It cannot be said that the concomitance perceived in individual cases suffered any contradiction without the presumption of the universal proposition (wherever there is smoke there is fire); thus arthapatti is of no avail here and inference has to be accepted. Now when it is proved that there are cases where the purpose of inference cannot be served by arthapatti, the validity of inference as a means of proof becomes established. That being done we admit that the knowledge of the fire in the hill may come to us either by inference or by arthapatti.
So inference also cannot serve the purpose of arthapatti, for in inference also it is the hetu (reason) which is known first, and later on from that the sadhya (what is to be proved); both of them however cannot be apprehended at the same moment, and it is exactly this that distinguishes arthapatti from anumana.
For arthapatti takes place where, without the presumption of Devadatta"s external existence, the absence from the house of Devadatta who is living cannot be comprehended. If Devadatta is living he must exist inside or outside the house. The mind cannot swallow a contradiction, and hence without presuming the external existence of Devadatta even the perceived non-existence cannot be comprehended. It is thus that the contradiction is resolved by presuming his existence outside the house. Arthapatti is thus the result of arthanupapatti or the contradiction of the present perception with a previously acquired certain knowledge.
It is by this [email protected] that we have to admit that there is a special potency in seeds by which they produce the
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shoots, and that a special potency is believed to exist in sacrifices by which these can lead the sacrificer to Heaven or some such beneficent state of existence.
S"abda [email protected]
S"abda or word is regarded as a separate means of proof by most of the recognized Indian systems of thought excepting the Jaina, Buddhist, Carvaka and [email protected] A discussion on this topic however has but little philosophical value and I have therefore omitted to give any attention to it in connection with the Nyaya, and the [email protected] systems. The validity and authority of the Vedas were acknowledged by all Hindu writers and they had wordy battles over it with the Buddhists who denied it. Some sought to establish this authority on the supposition that they were the word of G.o.d, while others, particularly the [email protected] strove to prove that they were not written by anyone, and had no beginning in time nor end and were eternal.
Their authority was not derived from the authority of any trustworthy person or G.o.d. Their words are valid in themselves.
Evidently a discussion on these matters has but little value with us, though it was a very favourite theme of debate in the old days of India. It was in fact the most important subject for [email protected], for the [email protected] sutras_ were written for the purpose of laying down canons for a right interpretation of the Vedas.
The slight extent to which it has dealt with its own epistemological doctrines has been due solely to their laying the foundation of its structure of interpretative maxims, and not to writing philosophy for its own sake. It does not dwell so much upon salvation as other systems do, but seeks to serve as a rational compendium of maxims with the help of which the Vedas may be rightly understood and the sacrifices rightly performed.
But a brief examination of the doctrine of word (_s"abda_) as a means of proof cannot be dispensed with in connection with [email protected] as it is its very soul.
S"abda (word) as a [email protected] means the knowledge that we get about things (not within the purview of our perception) from relevant sentences by understanding the meaning of the words of which they are made up. These sentences may be of two kinds, viz. those uttered by men and those which belong to the Vedas.
The first becomes a valid means of knowledge when it is not
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uttered by untrustworthy persons and the second is valid in itself. The meanings of words are of course known to us before, and cannot therefore be counted as a means of proof; but the meanings of sentences involving a knowledge of the relations of words cannot be known by any other acknowledged means of proof, and it is for this that we have to accept s"abda as a separate means of proof. Even if it is admitted that the validity of any sentence may be inferred on the ground of its being uttered by a trustworthy person, yet that would not explain how we understand the meanings of sentences, for when even the name or person of a writer or speaker is not known, we have no difficulty in understanding the meaning of any sentence.
Prabhakara thinks that all sounds are in the form of letters, or are understandable as combinations of letters. The const.i.tuent letters of a word however cannot yield any meaning, and are thus to be regarded as elements of auditory perception which serve as a means for understanding the meaning of a word. The reason of our apprehension of the meaning of any word is to be found in a separate potency existing in the letters by which the denotation of the word may be comprehended. The perception of each letter-sound vanishes the moment it is uttered, but leaves behind an impression which combines with the impressions of the successively dying perceptions of letters, and this brings about the whole word which contains the potency of bringing about the comprehension of a certain meaning. If even on hearing a word the meaning cannot be comprehended, it has to be admitted that the hearer lacks certain auxiliaries necessary for the purpose. As the potency of the word originates from the separate potencies of the letters, it has to be admitted that the latter is the direct cause of verbal cognition. Both Prabhakara and k.u.marila agree on this point.
Another peculiar doctrine expounded here is that all words have natural denotative powers by which they themselves out of their own nature refer to certain objects irrespective of their comprehension or non-comprehension by the hearer. The hearer will not understand the meaning unless it is known to him that the word in question is expressive of such and such a meaning, but the word was all along competent to denote that meaning and it is the hearer"s knowledge of that fact that helps him to
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understand the meaning of a word. Mimamsa does not think that the a.s.sociation of a particular meaning with a word is due to conventions among people who introduce and give meanings to the words [Footnote ref 1]. Words are thus acknowledged to be denotative of themselves. It is only about proper names that convention is admitted to be the cause of denotation. It is easy to see the bearing of this doctrine on the self-validity of the Vedic commandments, by the performance of which such results would arise as could not have been predicted by any other person.
Again all words are believed to be eternally existent; but though they are ever present some manifestive agency is required by which they are manifested to us. This manifestive agency consists of the effort put forth by the man who p.r.o.nounces the word. Nyaya thinks that this effort of p.r.o.nouncing is the cause that produces the word while [email protected] thinks that it only manifests to the hearer the ever-existing word.
The process by which according to Prabhakara the meanings of words are acquired maybe exemplified thus: a senior commands a junior to bring a cow and to bind a horse, and the child on noticing the action of the junior in obedience to the senior"s commands comes to understand the meaning of "cow"