and "horse." Thus according to him the meanings of words can only be known from words occurring in injunctive sentences; he deduces from this the conclusion that words must denote things only as related to the other factors of the injunction (_anvitabhidhana vada_), and no word can be comprehended as having any denotation when taken apart from such a sentence. This doctrine holds that each word yields its meaning only as being generally related to other factors or only as a part of an injunctive sentence, thus the word _gam_ accusative case of _go_ (cow) means that it is intended that something is to be done with the cow or the bovine genus, and it appears only as connected with a specific kind of action, viz. bringing in the sentence _gam anaya_--bring the cow.
k.u.marila however thinks that words independently express separate meanings which are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea (_abhihitanvayavada_). Thus in _gam anaya_, according to k.u.marila, _gam_ means the bovine cla.s.s in the accusative character and _anaya_ independently means
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[Footnote 1: According to Nyaya G.o.d created all words and a.s.sociated them with their meanings.]
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bring; these two are then combined into the meaning "bring the cow." But on the former theory the word _gam_ means that it is connected with some kind of action, and the particular sentence only shows what the special kind of action is, as in the above sentence it appears as a.s.sociated with bringing, but it cannot have any meaning separately by itself. This theory of k.u.marila which is also the Nyaya theory is called abhihitanvayavada [Footnote ref 1].
Lastly according to Prabhakara it is only the Veda that can be called [email protected], and only those sentences of it which contain injunctions (such as, perform this sacrifice in this way with these things). In all other cases the validity of words is only inferred on the ground of the trustworthy character of the speaker. But k.u.marila considers the words of all trustworthy persons as [email protected]
The [email protected] of Non-perception (anupalabdhi).
In addition to the above [email protected] k.u.marila admits a fifth kind of [email protected], viz. _anupalabdhi_ for the perception of the non-existence of a thing. k.u.marila argues that the non-existence of a thing (e.g. there is no jug in this room) cannot be perceived by the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could come into contact in order to perceive the non-existence. Some people prefer to explain this non-perception as a case of anumana.
They say that wherever there is the existence of a visible object there is the vision of it by a perceiver. When there is no vision of a visible object, there is no existence of it also. But it is easy to see that such an inference presupposes the perception of want of vision and want of existence, but how these non-perceptions are to be accounted for is exactly the point to be solved. How can the perception of want of vision or want of existence be grasped?
It is for this that we have to admit a separate mode of [email protected] namely anupalabdhi.
All things exist in places either in a positive (_sadrupa_) or in a negative relation (_asadrupa_), and it is only in the former case
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[Footnote 1: See [email protected]_ by Dr [email protected] Jha and S.N.
Dasgupta"s _Study of Patanjali_, appendix. It may be noted in this connection that [email protected] did not favour the [email protected] doctrine of sound which consists in the belief that apart from the momentary sounds of letters composing a word, there was a complete word form which was manifested ([email protected]) but not created by the pa.s.sing sounds of the syllables. The work of the syllable sounds is only to project this word manifestation. See Vacaspati"s _Tattvabindu, S"lokavarttika_ and [email protected]_. For the doctrine of anvitabhidhana see Sahkanatha"s [email protected]@rtti_.]
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that they come within the purview of the senses, while in the latter case the perception of the negative existence can only be had by a separate mode of the movement of the mind which we designate as a separate [email protected] as anupalabdhi. Prabhakara holds that non-perception of a visible object in a place is only the perception of the empty place, and that therefore there is no need of admitting a separate [email protected] as anupalabdhi. For what is meant by empty s.p.a.ce? If it is necessary that for the perception of the non-existence of jug there should be absolutely empty s.p.a.ce before us, then if the place be occupied by a stone we ought not to perceive the non-existence of the jug, inasmuch as the place is not absolutely empty. If empty s.p.a.ce is defined as that which is not a.s.sociated with the jug, then the category of negation is practically admitted as a separate ent.i.ty. If the perception of empty s.p.a.ce is defined as the perception of s.p.a.ce at the moment which we a.s.sociated with a want of knowledge about the jug, then also want of knowledge as a separate ent.i.ty has to be accepted, which amounts to the same thing as the admission of the want or negation of the jug. Whatever attempt may be made to explain the notion of negation by any positive conception, it will at best be an attempt to shift negation from the objective field to knowledge, or in other words to subst.i.tute for the place of the external absence of a thing an a.s.sociated want of knowledge about the thing (in spite of its being a visible object) and this naturally ends in failure, for negation as a separate category has to be admitted either in the field of knowledge or in the external world. Negation or abhava as a separate category has anyhow to be admitted.
It is said that at the first moment only the ground is seen without any knowledge of the jug or its negation, and then at the next moment comes the comprehension of the non-existence of the jug.
But this also means that the moment of the perception of the ground is a.s.sociated with the want of knowledge of the jug or its negation. But this comes to the same thing as the admission of negation as a separate category, for what other meaning can there be in the perception of "only the ground" if it is not meant that it (the perception of the ground) is a.s.sociated with or qualified by the want of knowledge of the jug? For the perception of the ground cannot generate the notion of the non-existence of the jug, since even where there is a jug the ground is perceived.
The qualifying phrase that "only the ground is perceived" becomes
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meaningless, if things whose presence is excluded are not specified as negative conditions qualifying the perception of the ground. And this would require that we had already the notion of negation in us, which appeared to us of itself in a special manner unaccountable by other means of proof. It should also be noted that non-perception of a sensible object generates the notion of negation immediately and not through other negations, and this is true not only of things of the present moment but also of the memory of past perceptions of non-existence, as when we remember that there was no jug here. Anupalabdhi is thus a separate [email protected] by which the absence or want of a sensible object--the negation of a thing--can be comprehended.
Self, Salvation, G.o.d.
[email protected] has to accept the existence of soul, for without it who would perform the Vedic commandments, and what would be the meaning of those Vedic texts which speak of men as performing sacrifices and going to Heaven thereby? The soul is thus regarded as something entirely distinct from the body, the sense organs, and buddhi; it is eternal, omnipresent, and many, one in each body. Prabhakara thinks that it is manifested to us in all cognitions. Indeed he makes this also a proof for the existence of self as a separate ent.i.ty from the body, for had it not been so, why should we have the notion of self-persistence in all our cognitions--even in those where there is no perception of the body?
k.u.marila however differs from Prabhakara about this a.n.a.lysis of the consciousness of self in our cognitions, and says that even though we may not have any notion of the parts of our body or their specific combination, yet the notion of ourselves as embodied beings always appears in all our cognitions. Moreover in our cognitions of external objects we are not always conscious of the self as the knower; so it is not correct to say that self is different from the body on the ground that the consciousness of self is present in all our cognitions, and that the body is not cognized in many of our cognitions. But the true reason for admitting that the self is different from the body is this, that movement or willing, knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc., cannot be attributed to the body, for though the body exists at death these cannot then be found. So it has to be admitted that they must belong to some other ent.i.ty owing to the a.s.sociation with which the body appears
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to be endowed with movement etc. Moreover knowledge, feeling, etc. though apparent to the perceiver, are not yet perceived by others as other qualities of the body, as colour etc., are perceived by other men. It is a general law of causation that the qualities of the const.i.tuent elements (in the cause) impart themselves to the effect, but the earth atoms of which the body is made up do not contain the qualities of knowledge etc., and this also corroborates the inference of a separate ent.i.ty as the vehicle of knowledge etc. The objection is sometimes raised that if the soul is omnipresent how can it be called an agent or a mover? But [email protected] does not admit that movement means atomic motion, for the principle of movement is the energy which moves the atoms, and this is possessed by the omnipresent soul.
It is by the energy imparted by it to the body that the latter moves. So it is that though the soul does not move it is called an agent on account of the fact that it causes the movement of the body. The self must also be understood as being different from the senses, for even when one loses some of the senses he continues to perceive his self all the same as persisting all through.
The question now arises, how is self cognized? Prabhakara holds that the self as cognizor is never cognized apart from the cognized object, nor is the object ever cognized without the cognizor entering into the cognition as a necessary factor. Both the self and the object shine forth in the self-luminous knowledge in what we have already described as [email protected]@sa (perception as three-together). It is not the soul which is self-illumined but knowledge; so it is knowledge which illumines both the self and the object in one operation. But just as in the case of a man who walks, the action of walking rests upon the walker, yet he is regarded as the agent of the work and not as the object, so in the case of the operation of knowledge, though it affects the self, yet it appears as the agent and not as the object. Cognition is not soul, but the soul is manifested in cognition as its substratum, and appears in it as the cognitive element "I" which is inseparable from all cognitions. In deep sleep therefore when no object is cognized the self also is not cognized.
k.u.marila however thinks that the soul which is distinct from the body is perceived by a mental perception ([email protected]_ as the substratum of the notion of "I," or in other words the self perceives itself by mental perception, and the perception of its
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own nature shines forth in consciousness as the "I." The objection that the self cannot itself be both subject and object to its own operation does not hold, for it applies equally to Prabhakara"s theory in which knowledge reveals the self as its object and yet considers it as the subject of the operation. The a.n.a.logy of linguistic usage that though the walking affects the walker yet he is the agent, cannot be regarded as an escape from this charge, for the usage of language is not philosophical a.n.a.lysis. Though at the time of the cognition of objects the self is cognized, yet it does not appear as the knower of the knowledge of objects, but reveals itself as an object of a separate mental perception which is distinct from the knowledge of objects. The self is no doubt known as the substratum of "I," but the knowledge of this self does not reveal itself necessarily with the cognition of objects, nor does the self show itself as the knower of all knowledge of objects, but the self is apprehended by a separate mental intuition which we represent as the "I." The self does not reveal itself as the knower but as an object of a separate intuitive process of the mind. This is indeed different from Prabhakara"s a.n.a.lysis, who regarded the cognition of self as inseparable from the object-cognition, both being the result of the illumination of knowledge.
k.u.marila agrees with Prabhakara however in holding that soul is not self-illuminating (_svayamprakas"a_), for then even in deep sleep the soul should have manifested itself; but there is no such manifestation then, and the state of deep sleep appears as an unconscious state. There is also no bliss in deep sleep, for had it been so people would not have regretted that they had missed sensual enjoyments by untimely sleep. The expression that "I slept in bliss" signifies only that no misery was felt. Moreover the opposite representation of the deep sleep state is also found when a man on rising from sleep says "I slept so long without knowing anything not even my own self." The self is not atomic, since we can simultaneously feel a sensation in the head as well as in the leg. The Jaina theory that it is of the size of the body which contracts and expands according to the body it occupies is unacceptable. It is better therefore that the soul should be regarded as all-pervading as described in the Vedas. This self must also be different in different persons for otherwise their individual experiences of objects and of pleasure and pain cannot be explained [Footnote ref 1].
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[Footnote 1: See _S"lokavarttika_, atmavada _S"astra-dipika_, atmavada and [email protected]]
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k.u.marila considered the self to be merely the potency of knowledge (jnanas"akti) [Footnote ref 1]. Cognitions of things were generated by the activity of the manas and the other senses. This self itself can only be cognized by mental perception, Or at the time of salvation there being none of the senses nor the manas the self remains in pure existence as the potency of knowledge without any actual expression or manifestation. So the state of salvation is the state in which the self remains devoid of any of its characteristic qualities such as pleasure, pain, knowledge, willing, etc., for the self itself is not knowledge nor is it bliss or ananda as Vedanta supposes; but these are generated in it by its energy and the operation of the senses. The self being divested of all its senses at that time, remains as a mere potency of the energy of knowledge, a mere existence. This view of salvation is accepted in the main by Prabhakara also.
Salvation is brought about when a man enjoys and suffers the fruits of his good and bad actions and thereby exhausts them and stops the further generation of new effects by refraining from the performance of kamya-karmas (sacrifices etc. performed for the attainment of certain beneficent results) and guarantees himself against the evil effects of sin by a.s.siduously performing the nitya-karmas (such as the sandhya prayers etc., by the performance of which there is no benefit but the non-performance of which produces sins). This state is characterized by the dissolution of the body and the non-production of any further body or rebirth.
[email protected] does not admit the existence of any G.o.d as the creator and destroyer of the universe. Though the universe is made up of parts, yet there is no reason to suppose that the universe had ever any beginning in time, or that any G.o.d created it. Every day animals and men are coming into being by the action of the parents without the operation of any G.o.d. Neither is it necessary as Nyaya supposes that dharma and adharma should have a supervisor, for these belong to the performer and
_
[Footnote 1: It may be mentioned in this connection that unlike Nyaya [email protected] did not consider all activity as being only of the nature of molecular vibration (_parispanda_). It admitted the existence of energy (_s"akti_) as a separate category which manifested itself in actual movements. The self being considered as a s"akti can move the body and yet remain unmoved itself. Manifestation of action only means the relationing of the energy with a thing. Nyaya strongly opposes this doctrine of a non-sensible (atindriya) energy and seeks to explain all action by actual molecular motion.]
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no one can have any knowledge of them. Moreover there cannot be any contact ([email protected]_) or inherence (_samavaya_) of dharma and adharma with G.o.d that he might supervise them; he cannot have any tools or body wherewith to fashion the world like the carpenter. Moreover he could have no motive to create the world either as a merciful or as a cruel act. For when in the beginning there were no beings towards whom should he be actuated with a feeling of mercy? Moreover he would himself require a creator to create him. So there is no G.o.d, no creator, no creation, no dissolution or pralaya. The world has ever been running the same, without any new creation or dissolution, [email protected]@[email protected] or pralaya.
[email protected] as philosophy and [email protected] as ritualism.
From what we have said before it will be easy to see that [email protected] agrees in the main with [email protected] about the existence of the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities, rupa, rasa, etc. k.u.marila"s differences on the points of jati, samavaya, etc. and Prabhakara"s peculiarities have also been mentioned before. On some of these points it appears that k.u.marila was influenced by [email protected] thought rather than by Nyaya. [email protected] and [email protected] are the only Hindu systems which have tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics; other systems have generally followed them or have differed from them only on minor matters. The physics of Prabhakara and k.u.marila have thus but little importance, as they agree in general with the [email protected] view. In fact they were justified in not laying any special stress on this part, because for the performance of sacrifices the common-sense view of [email protected] about the world was most suitable.
The main difference of [email protected] with Nyaya consists of the theory of knowledge. The former was required to prove that the Veda was self-valid and that it did not derive its validity from G.o.d, and also that it was not necessary to test its validity by any other means. To do this it began by trying to establish the self-validity of all knowledge. This would secure for the Veda the advantage that as soon as its orders or injunctions were communicated to us they would appear to us as valid knowledge, and there being nothing to contradict them later on there would be nothing in the world which could render the Vedic injunctions
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invalid. The other [email protected] such as perception, inference, etc.
were described, firstly to indicate that they could not show to us how dharma could be acquired, for dharma was not an existing thing which could be perceived by the other [email protected], but a thing which could only be produced by acting according to the injunctions of the Vedas. For the knowledge of dharma and adharma therefore the [email protected] of the Veda was our only source. Secondly it was necessary that we should have a knowledge of the different means of cognition, as without them it would be difficult to discuss and verify the meanings of debatable Vedic sentences. The doctrine of creation and dissolution which is recognized by all other Hindu systems could not be acknowledged by the [email protected] as it would have endangered the eternality of the Vedas. Even G.o.d had to be dispensed with on that account.
The Veda is defined as the collection of Mantras and [email protected] (also called the _vidhis_ or injunctive sentences). There are three cla.s.ses of injunctions (1) apurva-vidhi, (2) niyama-vidhi, and (3) [email protected] Apurva-vidhi is an order which enjoins something not otherwise known, e.g. the grains should be washed (we could not know that this part of the duty was necessary for the sacrifice except by the above injunction). Niyama-vidhi is that where when a thing could have been done in a number of ways, an order is made by the Veda which restricts us to following some definite alternative (e.g. though the chaff from the corn could be separated even by the nails, the order that "corn should be threshed" restricts us to the alternative of threshing as the only course acceptable for the sacrifice). In the niyama-vidhi that which is ordered is already known as possible but only as an alternative, and the vidhi insists upon one of these methods as the only one. In apurva-vidhi the thing to be done would have remained undone and unknown had it not been for the vidhi.
In [email protected] all that is enjoined is already known but not necessarily as possible alternatives. A certain mantra "I take up the rein" (_imam [email protected]@m [email protected]_) which could be used in a number of cases should not however be used at the time of holding the reins of an a.s.s.
There are three main principles of interpreting the Vedic sentences. (1) When some sentences are such that connectively they yield a meaning but not individually, then they should be
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taken together connectively as a whole. (2) If the separate sentences can however yield meanings separately by themselves they should not be connected together. (3) In the case of certain sentences which are incomplete suitable words from the context of immediately preceding sentences are to be supplied.
The vidhis properly interpreted are the main source of dharma.