"The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms the existence of something, may have a full, fixed, and certain connexion, in several ways."
"1. They, may have a full and perfect connexion _in and of themselves_.
So G.o.d"s infinity and other attributes are necessary. So it is necessary, _in its own nature_, that two and two should be four."
2. The subject and predicate of a proposition, affirming the existence of something which is already come to pa.s.s, are fixed and certain.
3. The subject and predicate of a proposition may be fixed and certain _consequentially_,--and so the existence of the things affirmed may be "consequentially necessary." "Things which are _perfectly connected_ with the things that are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a necessity of consequence." This is logical necessity.
"And here it may be observed, that all things which are future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are necessary only in this last way,"--that is, "by a connexion with something that is necessary in its own nature, or something that already is or has been. This is the necessity which especially belongs to controversies about acts of the will." (p. 30.)
Philosophical necessity is _general_ and _particular._ 1. "The existence of a thing may be said to be necessary with a _general_ necessity, when all things considered there is a foundation for the certainty of its existence." This is unconditional necessity in the strictest sense.
2. _Particular_ necessity refers to "things that happen to particular persons, in the existence of which, no will of theirs has any concern, at least at that time; which, whether they are necessary or not with regard to things in general, yet are necessary to them, and with regard to any volition of theirs at that time, as they prevent all acts of the will about the affair." (p. 31.) This particular necessity is absolute to the individual, because his will has nothing to do with it--whether it be absolute or not in the general sense, does not affect his case.
"What has been said to show the meaning of terms _necessary_ and _necessity_, may be sufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms _impossible_ and _impossibility_. For there is no difference, but only the latter are negative and the former positive." (ibid.)
_Inability and Unable._
"It has been observed that these terms in their original and common use, have relation to will and endeavour, as supposable in the case." That is have relation to the connexion of volition with effects. "But as these terms are often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers on controversies about free will, they are used in a quite different and far more extensive sense, and are applied to many cases wherein no will or endeavour for the bringing of the thing to pa.s.s is or can be supposed:" e. g. The connexion between volitions and their causes or motives.
_Contingent and Contingency._
"Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pa.s.s by chance or accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connexion with its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of things, is not discerned; and so is what we have no means of foreseeing.
But the word, contingent, is abundantly used in a very different sense; not for that, whose connexion with the series of things we cannot discern so as to foresee the event, but for something which has absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has any fixed connexion." (p. 31. 32.)
Contingency and chance Edwards uses as equivalent terms. In common use, contingency and chance are relative to our knowledge--implying that we discern no cause. In another use,--the use of a certain philosophical school,--he affirms that contingency is used to express absolutely no cause; or, that some events are represented as existing without any cause or ground of their existence. This will be examined in its proper place. I am now only stating Edwards"s opinions, not discussing them.
Sec. IV. Of the Distinction of natural and moral Necessary and Inability.
We now return to the question:--Is the connexion between motive and volition necessary?
The term necessary, in its common or vulgar use, does not relate to this question, for in that use as we have seen, it refers to the connexion between volition considered as a cause, and its effects. In this question, we are considering volition as an effect in relation to its cause or the motive. If the connexion then of motive and volition be necessary, it must be necessary in the philosophical or metaphysical sense of the term. Now this philosophical necessity Edwards does hold to characterize the connexion of motive and volition. This section opens with the following distinction of philosophical necessity: "That necessity which has been explained, consisting in an infallible connexion of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, as intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is distinguished into _moral_ and _natural_ necessity." He then appropriates _moral philosophical necessity_ to express the nature of the connexion between motive and volition: "And sometimes by moral necessity is meant that necessity of connexion and _consequence_ which arises from _moral causes_, as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connexion which there is in many cases between these, and such certain volitions and actions. And it is in _this_ sense that I use the phrase _moral necessity_ in the following discourse." (p. 32.) Natural _philosophical_ necessity as distinguished from this, he employs to characterize the connexion between natural causes and phenomena of our being, as the connexion of external objects with our various sensations, and the connexion between truth and our a.s.sent or belief. (p. 33.)
In employing the term _moral_, however, he does not intend to intimate that it affects at all the absoluteness of the necessity which it distinguishes; on the contrary, he affirms that "moral necessity may be as absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause. It must be allowed that there may be such a thing as a _sure_ and _perfect_ connexion between moral causes and effects; so this only (i. e. the sure and perfect connexion,) is what I call by the name of _moral necessity_." (p. 33.)
Nor does he intend "that when a moral habit or motive is so strong that the act of the will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the _nature of things!_" But these terms, moral and natural, are convenient to express a difference which really exists; a difference, however, which "does not lie so much in the nature of the _connexion_ as in the two terms _connected_." Indeed, he soon after admits "that choice in _many cases_ arises from nature, as truly as other events." His sentiment is plainly this choice lies in the great system and chain of nature as truly as any other phenomenon, arising from its antecedent and having its consequents or effects: but we have appropriated nature to express the chain of causes and effects, which lie without us, and which are most obvious to us; and choice being, "as it were, a new principle of motion and action," lying within us, and often interrupting or altering the external course of nature, seems to demand a peculiar designation.
(p. 34.)
Edwards closes his remarks on moral necessity by justifying his reduction of motive and volition under philosophical necessity. "It must be observed, that in what has been explained, as signified by the name of _moral necessity_, the word _necessity_ is not used according to the original design and meaning of the word; for, as was observed before, such terms, _necessary, impossible, irresistible,_ &c. in common speech, and their most proper sense, are always relative, having reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavour, that is insufficient.
But no such opposition, or contrary will and endeavour, is supposable in the case of moral necessity; which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself; which does not admit of the supposition of a will to oppose and resist it. For it is absurd to suppose the same individual will to oppose itself in its present act; or the present choice to be opposite to, and resisting present choice: as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time. And therefore the very case supposed never admits of any trial, whether an opposing or resisting will can overcome this necessity." (p. 35.)
This pa.s.sage is clear and full. Common necessity, or necessity in the original use of the word, refers to the connexion between volition and its effects; for here an opposition to will is supposable. I may choose or will to raise a weight; but the gravity opposed to my endeavour overcomes it, and I find it _impossible_ for me to raise it, and the weight _necessarily_ remains in its place. In this common use of these terms, the _impossibility_ and the _necessity_ are _relative_ to my volition; but in the production of choice itself, or volition, or the sense of the most agreeable, there is no reference to voluntary endeavour. Choice is not the cause of itself: it cannot be conceived of as struggling with itself in its own production. The cause of volition does not lie within the sphere of volition itself; if any opposition, therefore, were made to the production of a volition, it could not be made by a volition. The mind, with given susceptibilities and habits, is supposed to be placed within the influence of objects and their circ.u.mstances, and the choice takes place in the correlation of the two, as the sense of the most agreeable. Now choice cannot exist before its cause, and so there can be no choice in the act of its causation. It comes into existence, therefore, by no necessity relating to voluntary endeavour; it comes into existence by a philosophical and absolute necessity of cause and effect. It is necessary as the falling of a stone which is thrown into the air; as the freezing or boiling of water at given temperatures; as sensations of sight, sound, smell, taste, and feeling, when the organs of sense and the objects of sense are brought together. The application of the epithet _moral_ to the necessity of volition, evidently does not alter in the least the character of that necessity. It is still philosophical and absolute necessity, and as sure and perfect as natural necessity. This we have seen he expressly admits, (p. 33;) affirming, (p. 34,) that the difference between a moral and natural necessity is a mere difference in the "two terms connected," and not a difference "_in the nature of the connexion_."
_Natural and moral inability._
"What has been said of natural and moral necessity, may serve to explain what is intended by natural and moral _inability_. We are said to be _naturally_ unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most commonly called _nature_ does not allow of it, or because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will; either in the faculty of the understanding, const.i.tution of body, or external objects." (p. 35.) We may make a voluntary endeavour to know something, and may find ourselves _unable_, through a defect of the understanding. We may make a voluntary effort _to do_ something by the instrumentality of our hand, and may find ourselves unable through a defect of the bodily const.i.tution; or external objects may be regarded as presenting such a counter force as to overcome the force we exert.
This is natural inability; this is all we mean by it. It must be remarked too, that this is _inability_ not _metaphysically_ or _philosophically_ considered, and therefore not _absolute_ inability; but only inability in the common and vulgar acceptation of the term--a relative inability, relative to volition or choice--an inability to do, although we will to do.
What is moral inability? "Moral inability consists not in any of these things; but either in the want of inclination, or the strength of a contrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be said, in one word, that moral inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination. For when a person is unable to will or choose such a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the same thing as his being unable through the want of an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such circ.u.mstances and under the influence of such views." (bid.)
The inability in this case does not relate to the connexion between volition and its consequents and effects; _but to the production of the volition itself_. Now the inability to the production of a volition, cannot be affirmed of the volition, because it is not yet supposed to exist, and as an effect cannot be conceived of as producing itself. The inability, therefore, must belong to the causes of volition, or to the motive. But motive, as we have seen, lies in the _state of the mind_, and in the _nature and circ.u.mstances of the object;_ and choice or volition exists when, in the correlation of mind and object, the sense of the most agreeable is produced. Now what reason can exist, in any given case, why the volition or sense of the most agreeable is not produced? Why simply this, that there is not such a correlation of mind and object as to produce this sense or choice. But wherein lies the deficiency? We may say generally, that it lies in both mind and object--that they are not suited to each other. The mind is not _in a state_ to be agreeably impressed by the object, and the object does not possess qualities of beauty and agreeableness to the mind. On the part of the mind, there is either a want of inclination to the object, or a stronger inclination towards another object: on the part of the object, there is a want of interesting and agreeable qualities to the _particular state_ of mind in question, or a _suitableness_ to a different state of mind: and this const.i.tutes "the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary." And both these may clearly be resolved into one, that above mentioned, viz, a want of inclination on the part of the mind to the object, and a stronger inclination towards another object; or, as Edwards expresses it, "the opposition or want of inclination." For a want of inclination to one object, implying a stronger inclination to another object, expresses that the _state of the mind_, and the nature and circ.u.mstances of the one object, are not correlated; but that the _state of mind_, and the nature and circ.u.mstances of the other object, are correlated. The first, is a "want of sufficient motives;" the second, stronger "motives to the contrary."
Moral inability lies entirely out of the sphere of volition; volition, therefore, cannot produce or relieve it, for this would suppose an effect to modify its cause, and that too before the effect itself has any existence. Moral inability is a _metaphysical_ inability: it is the perfect and fixed impossibility of certain laws and principles of being, leading to certain volitions; and is contrasted with _physical inability_, which is the established impossibility of a certain volition, producing a certain effect. So we may say, that _moral ability_ is the certain and fixed connexion between certain laws and principles of being, and volitions; and is contrasted with _natural_ ability, which is the established connexion between certain volitions and certain effects.
Moral inability, although transcending the sphere of volition, is a _real inability_. Where it exists, there is the absolute impossibility of a given volition,--and of course an absolute impossibility of certain effects coming to pa.s.s by that volition. The impossibility of water freezing above an established temperature, or of boiling below an established temperature, is no more fixed than the impossibility of effects coming to pa.s.s by a volition, when there is a moral inability of the volition. The difference between the two cases does not lie "in the nature of the connexion," but "in the two terms connected."
Edwards gives several instances in ill.u.s.tration of moral inability.
"A woman of great honour and chast.i.ty may have a moral inability to prost.i.tute herself to her slave." (ibid.) There is no correlation between _the state of her mind_ and _the act_ which forms the object contemplated,--of course the sense of the most agreeable or choice cannot take place; and while the state of her mind remains the same, and the act and its circ.u.mstances remain the same, there is, on the principle of Edwards, an utter inability to the choice, and of course to the consequents of the choice.
"A child of great love and duty to his parents, may be thus unable to kill his father." (ibid.) This case is similar to the preceding.
"A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and temptations, and in the absence of such and such restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his l.u.s.t." There is here a correlation between _the state of mind_ and the _object_, in its _nature and circ.u.mstances_,--and of course the sense of the most agreeable or choice takes place. There is a _moral ability_ to the choice, and a _moral inability_ to forbear, or to choose the opposite.
"A drunkard, under such and such circ.u.mstances, may be unable to forbear taking strong drink." (ibid.) This is similar to the last.
"A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent acts to an enemy, or to desire his prosperity; yea, some may be so under the power of a vile disposition, that they may be unable to love those who are most worthy of their esteem and affection." (ibid.) The _state of mind_ is such,--that is, the disposition or sensitivity, as not to be at all correlated to the great duty of loving one"s neighbour as one"s self,--or to any moral excellency in another: of course the sense of the most agreeable is not produced; and in this state of mind it is absolutely impossible that it should be produced. "A strong habit of virtue, a great esteem of holiness, may cause a moral inability to love wickedness in general." (p. 36.) "On the other hand, a great degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under an inability to love and choose holiness, and render him _utterly unable_ to love an infinitely Holy Being, or to choose and cleave to him as the chief good." (ibid.) The love and choice of holiness is necessarily produced by the correlation of the mind with holiness; and the love and choice of holiness is _utterly impossible_ when this correlation does not exist. Where a moral inability to evil exists, nothing can be more sure and fixed than this inability. The individual who is the subject of it has absolutely no power to alter it. If he were to proceed to alter it, he would have to put forth a volition to this effect; but this would be an evil volition, and by supposition the individual has no ability to evil volitions.
Where a moral inability to good exists, nothing can be more sure and fixed than this inability. The individual who is the subject of it, has absolutely no power to alter it. If he were to proceed to alter it, he would have to put forth a volition to this effect; but this would be a good volition, and by supposition the individual has no ability to good volitions.
_General and habitual, particular and occasional Inability._
The first consists "in a fixed and habitual inclination, or an habitual and stated defect or want of a certain kind of inclination." (p. 36.)
The second is "an inability of the will or heart to a particular act, through the strength or defect of present motives, or of inducements presented to the view of the understanding, _on this occasion_." (ibid.)
An habitual drunkard, and a man habitually sober, on some _particular occasion_ getting drunk, are instances of general and particular inability. In the first instance, the _state_ of the man"s mind has become correlated to the object; under all times and circ.u.mstances _it is fixed_. In the second instance, the _state_ of the man"s mind is correlated to the object only when presented on certain occasions and under certain circ.u.mstances. In both instances, however, the choice is necessary,--"it not being possible, in any case, that the will should at present go against the motive which has now, all things considered, the greatest advantage to induce it."
"Will and endeavour against, or diverse from _present_ acts of the will, are in no case supposable, whether those acts be _occasional_ or _habitual_; for that would be to suppose the will at present to be otherwise than at present it is." (ibid.)
The pa.s.sage which follows deserves particular attention. It may be brought up under the following question:
Although will cannot be exerted against present acts of the will, yet can present acts of the will be exerted to produce future acts of the will, opposed to present habitual or present occasional acts?
"But yet there may be will and endeavour against _future_ acts of the will, or volitions that are likely to take place, as viewed at a distance. It is no contradiction, to suppose that the acts of the will at one time may be against the act of the will at another time; and there may be desires and endeavours to prevent or excite future acts of the will; but such desires and endeavours are in many cases rendered insufficient and vain through fixedness of habit: when the occasion returns, the strength of habit overcomes and baffles all such opposition." (p. 37.)
Let us take the instance of the drunkard. The choice or volition to drink is the fixed correlation of his disposition and the strong drink.
But we may suppose that his disposition can be affected by other objects likewise: as the consideration of the interest and happiness of his wife and children, and his own respectability and final happiness. When his cups are removed, and he has an occasional fit of satiety and loathing, these considerations may awaken at the time the sense of the most agreeable, and lead him to avoid the occasions of drunkenness, and to form resolutions of amendment; but when the appet.i.te and longing for drink returns, and he comes again in the way of indulgence, then these considerations, brought fairly into collision with his habits, are overcome, and drinking, as the most agreeable, a.s.serts its supremacy.
"But it may be comparatively easy to make an alteration with respect to such future acts as are only _occasional_ and _transient_; because the occasional or transient cause, if foreseen, may often easily be prevented or avoided." (ibid.)
In the case of occasional drunkenness, for instance, the habitual correlation is not of mind and strong drink, but of mind and considerations of honour, prudence, and virtue. But strong drink being a.s.sociated on some occasion with objects which are correlated to the mind, as hospitality, friendship, or festive celebrations,--may obtain the mastery; and in this case, the individual being under no temptation from strong drink in itself considered, and being really affected with the sense of the most agreeable in relation to objects which are opposed to drunkenness, may take care that strong drink shall not come again into circ.u.mstances to give it an advent.i.tious advantage. The repet.i.tion of occasional drunkenness would of course by and by produce a change in the sensitivity, and establish an habitual liking for drink. "On this account, the moral inability that attends fixed habits, especially obtains the name of _inability_. And then, as the will may remotely and indirectly resist itself, and do it in vain, in the case of strong habits; so reason may resist present acts of the will, and its resistance be insufficient: and this is more commonly the case, also, when the acts arise from strong habit." (ibid.)
In every act of the will, the will at the moment is unable to act otherwise; it is in the strictest sense true, that a man, at the moment of his acting, must act as he does act; but as we usually characterize men by the habitual state of their minds, we more especially speak of moral inability in relation to acts which are known to have no correlation to this habitual state. This habitual state of the mind, if it be opposed to reason, overcomes reason; for nothing, not even reason itself, can be the strongest motive, unless it produce the sense of the most agreeable; and this it cannot do, where the habitual disposition or sensitivity is opposed to it.
_Common usage with respect to the phrase_ want of power _or_ inability _to act in a certain way._
"But it must be observed concerning _moral inability_, in each kind of it, that the word _inability_ is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The word signifies only a natural inability, in the proper use of it; and is applied to such cases only wherein a present will or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said to be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said, _according to the ordinary use of language_, that a malicious man, let him be never so malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to show his neighbour a kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appet.i.te be never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. _In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power if he has it in his choice or at his election; and a man cannot be truly said to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will_." (ibid.)
Men, in the common use of language, and in the expression of their common and generally received sentiments, affirm that an individual has any thing in his power when it can be controlled by volition. Their connexion of power does not arise from the connexion of volition with its cause, but from the conception of volition as itself a cause with its effects. Thus the hand of a malicious man when moved to strike, having for its antecedent a volition; and if withheld from striking, having for its antecedent likewise a volition; according to the common usage of language, he, as the subject of volition, has the power to strike or not to strike. Now as it is "improperly said that he cannot perform those external voluntary actions which depend on the will, it is in some respects more improperly said, that he is unable to exert the acts of the will themselves; because it is more evidently false, with respect to these, that he cannot if he will; for to say so is a downright contradiction; it is to say he _cannot_ will if he _does_ will: and, in this case, not only is it true that it is easy for a man to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing." (ibid.)