"Three times the battalion of the 7th Light Regiment was obliged to fall back some paces to rally. Three times it charged with the bayonet, with the same ardor and success.
"At four in the afternoon the Russians were in rout, and were pursued into the valley of Inkermann.
"On this memorable day all the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the 7th Light Regiment performed their duty n.o.bly, rivalling each other in bravery and self-sacrifice."
Second: Notes on Inkermann, which Colonel A. du Picq indicates come from the letters of Captain B---- (these letters are missing).
"In what formation were the Russians? In column, of which the head fired, and whose platoons tried to get from behind the mead to enter into action?
"When Major Vaissier advanced was he followed by every one? At what distance? In what formation were the attackers? in disordered ma.s.ses?
in one rank? in two? in ma.s.s? Did the Russians immediately turn tail, receiving shots and the bayonet in the back? did they fall back on the ma.s.s which itself was coming up? What was the duration of this attack against a ma.s.s, whose depth prevented its falling back?
"Did we receive bayonet wounds?
"Did we fall back before the active reaction of the ma.s.s or merely because, after the first shock, the isolated soldiers fell back to find companions and with them a new confidence?
"Was the second charge made like the first one? Was the 6th Line Regiment engaged as the first support of the 7th Light Regiment? How were the Zouaves engaged?"
6. The Battle of Magenta
Extract from the correspondence of Colonel Ardant du Picq. Letters from Captain C----, dated August 23, 1868.
"At Magenta I was in Espina.s.se"s division, of Marshal MacMahon"s corps. This division was on the extreme left of the troops that had pa.s.sed the Ticino at Turbigo and was moving on Magenta by the left bank. Close to the village a fusillade at close range apprised us that the enemy was before us. The country, covered with trees, hedges, and vines, had hidden them.
"Our 1st Battalion and the 2nd Foreign Regiment drove the Austrians into Magenta.
"Meanwhile the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of Zouaves, with which I was, remained in reserve, arms stacked, under control of the division commander. Apparently quite an interval had been left between Espina.s.se"s division and la Motterouge"s, the 1st of the corps, and, at the moment of engagement, at least an Austrian brigade had entered the gap, and had taken in flank and rear the elements of our division engaged before Magenta. Happily the wooded country concealed the situation or I doubt whether our troops engaged would have held on as they did. At any rate the two reserve battalions had not moved. The fusillade extended to our right and left as if to surround us; bullets already came from our right flank. The General had put five guns in front of us, to fire on the village, and at the same time I received the order to move my section to the right, to drive off the invisible enemy who was firing on us. I remember that I had quit the column with my section when I saw a frightened artillery captain run toward us, crying "General, General, we are losing a piece!" The general answered, "Come! Zouaves, packs off." At these words, the two battalions leaped forward like a flock of sheep, dropping packs everywhere. The Austrians were not seen at first. It was only after advancing for an instant that they were seen. They were already dragging off the piece that they had taken. At the sight of them our men gave a yell and fell on them. Surprise and terror so possessed the Austrians, who did not know that we were so near, that they ran without using their arms. The piece was retaken; the regimental standard was captured by a man in my company. About two hundred prisoners were taken, and the Austrian regiment--Hartmann"s 9th Infantry--was dispersed like sheep in flight, five battalions of them.
I believe that had the country not been thick the result might have been different. The incident lasted perhaps ten minutes.
"The two battalions took up their first position. They had had no losses, and their morale was in the clouds. After about an hour General Espina.s.se put himself at the head of the two battalions and marched us on the village. We were in column of platoons with section intervals. The advance was made by echelon, the 2nd Battalion in front, the 3rd a little in rear, and a company in front deployed as skirmishers.
"At one hundred and fifty paces from the Austrians, wavering was evident in their lines; the first ranks threw themselves back on those in rear. At that instant the general ordered again, "Come! Packs off.
At the double!" Everybody ran forward, shedding his pack where he was.
"The Austrians did not wait for us. We entered the village mixed up with them. The fighting in houses lasted quite a while. Most of the Austrians retired. Those who remained in the houses had to surrender.
I found myself, with some fifty officers and men, in a big house from which we took four hundred men and five officers, Colonel Hauser for one.
"My opinion is that we were very lucky at Magenta. The thick country in which we fought, favored us in hiding our inferior number from the Austrians. I do not believe we would have succeeded so well in open country. In the gun episode the Austrians were surprised, stunned.
Those whom we took kept their arms in their hands, without either abandoning them or using them. It was a typical Zouave attack, which, when it succeeds, has astonishing results; but if one is not lucky it sometimes costs dearly. Note the 3rd Zouaves at Palestro, the 1st Zouaves at Marignano. General Espina.s.se"s advance on the village, at the head of two battalions, was the finest and most imposing sight I have ever seen. Apart from that advance, the fighting was always by skirmishers and in large groups."
7. The Battle of Solferino
Extract from the correspondence of Colonel Ardant du Picq. Letters from Captain C----.
"The 55th infantry was part of the 3rd division of the 4th corps.
"Coming out of Medole, the regiment was halted on the right of the road and formed, as each company arrived, in close column. Fascines were made.
"An aide-de-camp came up and gave an order to the Colonel.
"The regiment was then put on the road, marched some yards and formed in battalion ma.s.ses on the right of the line of battle. This movement was executed very regularly although bullets commenced to find us.
Arms were rested, and we stayed there, exposed to fire, without doing anything, not even sending out a skirmisher. For that matter, during the whole campaign, it seemed to me that the skirmisher school might never have existed.
"Then up came a Major of Engineers, from General Niel, to get a battalion from the regiment. The 3rd battalion being on the left received the order to march. The major commanding ordered "by the left flank," and we marched by the flank, in close column, in the face of the enemy, up to Casa-Nova Farm, I believe, where General Niel was.
"The battalion halted a moment, faced to the front, and closed a little.
""Stay here," said General Niel; "you are my only reserve!"
"Then the general, glancing in front of the farm, said to the major, after one or two minutes, "Major, fix bayonets, sound the charge, and forward!"
"This last movement was still properly executed at the start, and for about one hundred yards of advance.
"Shrapnel annoyed the battalion, and the men shouldered arms to march better.
"At about one hundred yards from the farm, the cry "Packs down," came from I do not know where. The cry was instantly repeated in the battalion. Packs were thrown down, anywhere, and with wild yells the advance was renewed, in the wildest disorder.
"From that moment, and for the rest of the day, the 3rd Battalion as a unit disappeared.
"Toward the end of the day, after an attempt had been made to get the regiment together, and at the end of half an hour of backing and filling, there was a roll-call.
"The third company of grenadiers had on starting off in the morning one hundred and thirty-two to one hundred and thirty-five present. At this first roll-call, forty-seven answered, a number I can swear to, but many of the men were still hunting packs and rations. The next day at reveille roll-call, ninety-three or four answered. Many came back in the night.
"This was the strength for many days I still remember, for I was charged with company supply from June 25th.
"As additional bit of information--it was generally known a few days later that at least twenty men of the 4th company of grenadiers were never on the field of battle. Wounded of the company, returned for transport to Medole, said later that they had seen some twenty of the company together close to Medole, lying in the gra.s.s while their comrades fought. They even gave some names, but could not name them all. The company had only been formed for the war on April 19th, and had received that same day forty-nine new grenadiers and twenty-nine at Milan, which made seventy-eight recruits in two months. None of these men were tried or punished. Their comrades rode them hard, that was all."
8. Mentana
Extract from the correspondence of Colonel Ardant du Picq. Letters from Captain C----, dated August 23, 1868.
"November 3, at two in the morning, we took up arms to go to Monte-Rotondo. We did not yet know that we would meet the Garibaldians at Mentana.
"The Papal army had about three thousand men, we about two thousand five hundred. At one o"clock the Papal forces met their enemies. The Zouaves attacked vigorously, but the first engagements were without great losses on either side. There is nothing particular in this first episode. The usual thing happened, a force advances and is not halted by the fire of its adversary who ends by showing his heels. The papal Zouaves are marked by no ordinary spirit. In comparing them with the soldiers of the Antibes legion, one is forced to the conclusion that the man who fights for an idea fights better than one who fights for money. At each advance of the papal forces, we advanced also. We were not greatly concerned about the fight, we hardly thought that we would have to partic.i.p.ate, not dreaming that we could be held by the volunteers. However, that did not happen.
"It was about three o"clock. At that time three companies of the battalion were employed in protecting the artillery--three or four pieces placed about the battle-field. The head of the French column was then formed by the last three companies of the battalion, one of the 1st Line Regiment; the other regiments were immediately behind.
Colonel Fremont of the 1st Line Regiment, after having studied the battle-field, took two cha.s.seur companies, followed by a battalion of his regiment and bore to the right to turn the village.
"Meanwhile the 1st Line Regiment moved further to the right in the direction of Monte-Rotondo, against which at two different times it opened a fire at will which seemed a veritable hurricane. Due to the distance or to the terrain the material result of the fire seemed to be negligible. The moral result must have been considerable, it precipitated a flood of fugitives on the road from Mentana to Monte-Rotondo, dominated by our sharpshooters, who opened on the fugitives a fire more deadly than that of the cha.s.sepots. We stayed in the same position until night, when we retired to a position near Mentana, where we bivouacked.
"My company was one of the two cha.s.seur companies which attacked on the right with the 1st Line Regiment. My company had ninety-eight rifles (we had not yet received the cha.s.sepots). It forced the volunteers from solidly held positions where they left a gun and a considerable number of rifles. In addition, it put nearly seventy men out of action, judging by those who remained on the field. It had one man slightly wounded, a belt and a carbine broken by bullets.
"There remained with the general, after our movement to the right, three companies of cha.s.seurs, a battalion of the 29th, and three of the 59th. I do not include many elements of the Papal army which had not been engaged. Some of my comrades told me of having been engaged with a cha.s.seur company of the 59th in a sunken road, whose sides had not been occupied; the general was with this column. Having arrived close to the village, some shots either from the houses or from enemy sharpshooters, who might easily have gotten on the undefended flanks, provoked a terrible fusillade in the column. In spite of the orders and efforts of the officers, everybody fired, at the risk of killing each other, and this probably happened. It was only when some men, led by officers, were able to climb the sides of the road that this firing ceased. I do not think that this was a well understood use of new arms.
"The fusillade of the 1st Line Regiment against Monte-Rotondo was not very effective, I believe negligible. I do not refer to the moral result, which was great.