It follows then, I think, that we must either give up const.i.tutional depravity, or discard the notion that we can make a right choice without Divine aid. And here, if I mistake not, we shall find the precise point on which modern Calvinism has verged over into the New Divinity theory of depravity. Perceiving that to acknowledge any depravity of man"s moral const.i.tution would either imply the necessity of supernatural aid in order to a right choice, or else free man from responsibility, Dr.
Taylor and his a.s.sociates have resolved all depravity into _choice_ or _voluntary preference_. They deny that there is any thing in the nature of man, antecedently to his act of willing, that possesses a moral character. Their idea is perfectly consistent with the notion of natural ability; and that the advocates of the New Divinity have embraced this idea is evidently a proof that they think closely and are seeking after consistency, let it lead them where it will. The only wonder is, that all who cleave to the dogma of natural ability do not follow them. The doctrine of natural ability, if it is any thing more than a name, appears evidently to be a part of the old Pelagian system, and should never be separated from its counterpart--the doctrine of self conversion and the natural perfectability of the human character. But this clearly implies that there is no serious derangement or radical viciousness of the moral man. Here, then, is another instance in which Calvinists in general revolt at the legitimate results of their own system.
But while the New Divinity advocates have fearlessly removed an important objection to their doctrine, they have, by this very act, as it is believed, however little they may have designed it, set themselves in fearful array against the Scripture doctrine of depravity and salvation by grace, and have opened a wide door for the introduction of numerous and dangerous heresies. It is true, they will not own that they have gone very far from the old system. They think the doctrine of natural depravity is a.s.serted when they say, "nature is _such_ that he will sin, and only sin, in all the appropriate circ.u.mstances of his being." (See Dr. Taylor"s Sermon.) But what this "nature" is, we are at a loss to determine; as also what the "_such_" is that is predicated of this nature; nor has Dr. T. told us how he knows that all men will sin and only sin, when in fact they have natural power to avoid it; or in what other than "the appropriate circ.u.mstances of their being" those are who become regenerate. In fact, while this theory claims to be orthodox, and thus to a.s.similate itself with the old theory, it has only exchanged one inconsistency for a half score. Its advocates, to be consistent, must come out plain and open Pelagians, and then meet the Scripture doctrine of depravity and salvation by grace as they can, or they must go back to their old ground, and endure the manifest inconsistency they are now endeavouring to avoid; or, what seems to me better than either, come on to the Arminian ground, which shuns all these difficulties, while it maintains const.i.tutional depravity and salvation by grace from the foundation to the top stone, including of course a gracious ability to choose life and gain heaven.
2. Another argument in favour of the _necessity_ of Divine grace, in order to a right choice, is the fact, that G.o.d actually gives grace to those who finally perish, as well as to those who are saved. Of this fact the Scriptures afford decisive proof. They speak in general terms.
Jesus Christ "is the true light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world." "The grace of G.o.d that bringeth salvation hath appeared unto all men." They speak in special terms of the unregenerate--that they _grieve_, _resist_, and _quench_ the _Spirit_ of _grace_, which certainly they could not do if they had it not. But if they have the operations of the Spirit, what are these operations? What is the Spirit doing to the inner man? Will it be said he is bringing motives to bear upon the mind? But what motives other than those found in the Gospel?
These the sinner has without the Spirit. If these motives can convert sinners, any of us can convert our neighbours. "But," it is said, "the Spirit makes the heart _feel_ these motives." Aye, truly he does, and that not by operating upon the motives, but upon the _heart_, and this is the very work we contend for. It is thus that the Spirit graciously arouses and quickens the dead soul, and brings it to _feel_, and excites it to _act_, in the great work of salvation.
Since, then, it must be granted that unregenerate sinners, and those who are finally lost, have the operations of this Spirit of grace, let me seriously inquire, For what purpose is this grace given? On the Calvinistic ground it cannot be that they may have a chance for salvation, and thus be without excuse; for this is secured without grace. Since they have natural ability to come to Christ, the abuse of that ability is sufficient to secure their just condemnation. So say the Calvinists; and on this ground they maintain that the reprobates are justly condemned. For what purpose, then, is this grace given? If we may establish a general principle by an induction of particulars; if we may judge of the design of the G.o.d of providence or grace, by noticing, in any given case, the uniform results, then we can easily determine this point. _G.o.d gives grace to the reprobates that their condemnation may be the more aggravated_. The argument stands thus: G.o.d gives grace to the reprobates for some important purpose. He does not give it that salvation may be possible to them, for they are able to be saved without it; he does not give it to make salvation certain, for this it does not effect; nevertheless he gives them grace, the invariable effect of which is to increase their condemnation. The only consistent inference; therefore is, that he gives grace to the reprobates that they may have a more aggravated condemnation. Here, then, we trace the Calvinistic theory to one of these _logical consequences_ charged upon it in the sermon, and which has been so strenuously denied by the reviewers--a consequence which, revolting as it is, must nevertheless be charged upon it still, unless its advocates can show why grace is given to the reprobates when they have all necessary ability to repent and believe without it.
3. On the ground of this doctrine, also, there would be some difficulty in accounting for the necessity of giving grace, in all cases, even to the elect. Why may not some of these repent without grace? Nay, why may not some of the reprobates, in the plenitude of their natural ability, repent and be converted, in despite of the decree of reprobation? Did G.o.d foresee that they would not, and on that foresight predicate his decree of reprobation? But that would be a _conditional_ reprobation, and would therefore imply its counterpart--a conditional election. This no cla.s.s of Calvinists will admit. How happens it, then, that some of these reprobates do not get converted, since they not only have natural powers enough to make a right choice but have some grace beside? Is it because G.o.d has fixed the barrier in something else, by which this ability, grace, and all are rendered nugatory? But this would render their condemnation unjust, Calvinists themselves being judges. They tell us that the only just ground of condemnation is, that _the sinner will not come to Christ_. Here, then, is the most extraordinary thing that angels or men ever knew; for almost six thousand years there has been upon our earth a succession of generations of sinners, and its the present generation of them there are eight hundred millions. All of these, throughout all their generations, have had no other obstruction to salvation but what exists in their own will, and each and all have had by nature all needful ability in the will to a right choice, and have had a measure of grace super-added, and yet not a reprobate among them all has ever made a right choice; and not one of the elect ever did or ever will make such a choice until G.o.d, by an omnipotent act, "makes his elect willing in the day of his power!!" This is a miracle to which all the other miracles in the world are as nothing--a miracle which Omnipotence alone can accomplish by a Divine const.i.tution and an all-controlling energy. Thus this doctrine destroys itself. It a.s.sumes positions, with respect to free will, that cannot be maintained, only on the supposition of an _efficient_ superior agency to direct the action of that _free will_, in a course of sinful volition, in hundreds of millions of cases, without a single variation, save where that variation is the result of the same superior Power acting in the opposite direction.
4. That the sinner receives aid by Divine grace to enable him to repent; and that he could not repent, without this, appears evident from the Scriptural representation of the ground of man"s responsibility. "If I had not come," says the Saviour, "ye had not had sin." "This is the condemnation, that light has come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light." "He that believeth not is condemned already, _because_ he hath not believed in the only begotten Son of G.o.d."
"_Because_ I have called, and ye have refused, &c, I also will laugh at your calamity." These and many other pa.s.sages seem to imply that the sinner is rejected on the ground of his neglecting offered grace. But if this is the ground of his condemnation, it is not for the abuse of natural power. I see no way for a plausible attempt even to get rid of this argument, unless it should be attempted to raise a question respecting the nature of this grace. It may be said that "these pa.s.sages only relate to gracious provisions, such as the atonement, the Scriptures of truth, &c, and have no reference whatever to a gracious influence upon the mind. The mind had sufficient strength to believe, repent, &c, but something must be presented to believe in; and some provision must be made to make repentance available." In reply I would say, First, Even this shows that man could not have been saved from sin without grace, and hence on this ground this theory would be involved in the very difficulty which it attempts to throw upon our view of the subject, viz., that grace is necessary to make men guilty, because none can be guilty in a case where their course is unavoidable. But, leaving this for another place, I would say farther, in reply to the above, that the Scriptures do not represent this grace as confined to _external provisions_, but on the contrary speak of it as operating upon and influencing the mind, and that, too, in the very way for which we contend. Look at a few Scriptural expressions, promiscuously selected, and see how clearly they sustain our position. In the first place, to give the argument full force, let us notice the Scripture account of man"s natural condition. He is "in darkness," "asleep," "dead," "without strength," "sick," "deaf," "blind," "lame," "bound," "helpless;" and all this in consequence of sin. Indeed, this is the very definition of his sinful character and condition. If such language does not describe _utter inability_ of the sinner to serve G.o.d, then no language can do it. Now let us see what grace does. Its very design is to "awake the sleeper;" to unstop deaf ears, and "open blind eyes;" to "lighten every man;" to "strengthen with might by the Spirit in the inner man." "Christ strengthens" the sinner, that he may "do all things." It is on the ground that "G.o.d worketh in him to will and to do," that man is exhorted to "work out his salvation with fear and trembling." "Thou strengthenedst me with strength _in my soul_." But leaving farther quotations of this kind, let the reader fix his attention on the stress which the Scriptures lay upon the striving of the Spirit. All the efficacy of the word is ascribed to the Spirit; and hence the apostle declares that he "preached the Gospel, with the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven;" that it "came, not in word, but in _power_." Indeed, "the letter (of the word) killeth, but the Spirit giveth life." Hence the frequent cautions not to "grieve" or "quench the Spirit." Now what, I ask, can all these scriptures mean? Is there any plausibility in the idea, that by such expressions nothing is meant but the general provisions of grace in the Gospel economy? That no direct, gracious influence of the Spirit upon the heart is intended? In fact, the new idea of conversion by motives and moral suasion seems to be a device to meet this very difficulty. The old Calvinists charge the advocates of the New Divinity with holding that all the Spirit does in operating upon the heart, is not by operating upon it directly, but indirectly _through the truth_: which has given rise to the saying, "If I were as eloquent as the Holy Ghost, I could convert souls as well as he." And if they do hold this, it is no wonder, for indeed it is the legitimate consequence of the doctrine of natural ability. They doubtless arrive at it thus:--According to the Scriptures, man"s responsibility turns on his rejecting or improving the grace of G.o.d. That grace cannot be an internal gracious influence upon man"s moral nature, because that would conflict with the notion of responsibility, on the ground of natural power. These scriptures therefore can mean nothing more than that a gracious atonement is provided, and a record of Divine truth made, and now, in the use of his natural power, the sinner is required to judge of and embrace this truth, which if he does, he in this sense improves the grace of G.o.d, and is converted; but if he does it not, he grieves the Spirit, and is condemned. Thus in the one case, if he is converted, it is in the use of his natural power, "choosing in the view of motives;"
and in the other case, if he is not converted, it is in the use of his natural power, refusing in view of motives. Is not this correct reasoning? And ought not the New-Haven divines to be commended for carrying out the system to its legitimate results? And ought not all to follow them in this, who hold to natural ability? And yet no wonder that they hesitate here, for cold and spiritless indeed must be that system of religious experience that resolves the conversion of the soul into a mere natural operation of choosing, through the influence of moral suasion.
Leaving this system, therefore, to labour under its fatal embarra.s.sments, it may be seen, I think, that the system here vindicated corresponds with the Scriptures and is consistent with itself; for it makes man"s responsibility turn upon grace improved or misimproved, and it makes that grace an internal quickening influence, and a strengthening energy upon the heart; and these different features of the theory, when placed together, all seem at once to be compatible with each other.
5. Express pa.s.sages of Scripture teach the doctrine here maintained.
I need not now repeat the pa.s.sages already referred to, in which the state of the depraved heart is described, and which show, if any human language can show it, that man is naturally "without strength." But my object is to call the attention of the reader to some very direct and express pa.s.sages, to show that it is grace, and grace alone, that enables the soul to do the will of G.o.d. "I can do all things," saith the apostle, "through Christ who strengtheneth me." Query: would not the apostle have thought it presumption to have said, I can do all things without strength from Christ? Has he ever intimated such a sentiment in all his writings? Does he not rather say, "We are not sufficient of ourselves _to think any thing as of ourselves_, but our _sufficiency is of G.o.d?_" This is the apostle"s general language, and it is in perfect accordance with the declaration of his Master, "Without me ye can do nothing." "As the branch _cannot_ bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, _no more can ye_, except ye abide in me." "No man _can come_ to me, except the Father draw him." "Likewise the Spirit Helpeth our infirmities; for we know not what to pray for as we ought." "My grace is sufficient for thee; for my strength is made perfect in weakness." "The G.o.d of all grace--stablish, strengthen, settle you."
"For this cause I bow my knees to the Father, &c, that he would grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with _might_, by his _Spirit_, in the _inner_ man," "according to the power that worketh _in us_." It is useless to quote farther. If these pa.s.sages do not show that our strength to do good is of grace, then it appears to me the Holy Spirit must fail of an _ability_ to communicate that idea through human language. Will it be said that some of these pa.s.sages refer to the regenerate, and therefore are not in point to meet the case of the unregenerate? I would ask, in reply, whether regenerating grace takes away our natural ability? Certainly if the regenerate can neither think nor do any thing acceptable without grace, much more do the unregenerate need this grace to enable them to make a right choice. And yet in the face of these most explicit scriptures, we are repeatedly told that man has natural power to make himself a new heart!
To the foregoing considerations, I might add, if any farther proof of our doctrine were necessary, and if this paper had not been extended so far already, the universal experience of all Christians. This appears, from their language, to be the experience of Bible saints, under both the Jewish and Christian dispensations. And what Christian now living, but feels now, and felt when he first embraced the Saviour, that the strength to do this was from G.o.d--directly from G.o.d, through grace. Hear his prayers--he pleads his weakness--he asks _for strength_. And what does he mean by that prayer? Does he ask for some external accommodation and aid? No; he wants strength, _by the Spirit, in the inner man_. And this is the prayer of all Christians, whether they advocate this notion of natural ability or not. The sayings and writings also of these very advocates of natural ability, so powerful is this feeling of dependence, are often in perfect coincidence, with the doctrine we defend. A most striking instance of this is found in Dr. Wood"s pamphlet (page 97) in opposition to Dr. Taylor, as follows:--"The common theory (of Calvinistic orthodoxy) leads us to entertain low thoughts of ourselves, especially in a moral view; and to feel that we are not of ourselves _sufficient for any thing spiritually good_, and that, for whatever holiness we now possess, or may hereafter attain, we are dependent on Divine grace." What stronger gracious ability do Arminians hold to, than this? "Not of ourselves sufficient for any thing spiritually good." And is this the common theory of Calvinism? Then Calvinism here, as in other points, is divided against itself. Indeed one would be induced to think, were it not for the context, either that Dr. Wood differed from his brothers generally, on this point, or was off his guard at this moment.
But he tells us, in this very paragraph, that he "does not differ at all from the generality of ministers, in New-England, respecting the natural powers and faculties of man, as a moral and accountable being." But he fears the "unqualified language" which Dr. T. "employs respecting the natural state, the free will, and the power of man." On reading this last pa.s.sage, I confess I am at a loss to know what to say or believe of this Calvinistic opinion of natural power. Dr. Taylor"s "unqualified language" respecting "the power of man," I take to be a frank statement of Dr. Wood"s opinion, and that of other Calvinists. Dr. T. says man has natural power _sufficient_ to make a right choice. Does not Dr. Wood say this? He says he does not differ from "the generality;" and it is notorious that this is the doctrine of the generality of those ministers. Dr. Tyler, of Portland, one of Dr. Wood"s coadjutors in opposing Dr. Taylor, says, in a sermon[5] on free salvation, "There is no reprobation taught in the Scriptures, which destroys human liberty, or which impairs the sinner"s _natural power_. Every man is a free moral agent. Life and death are set before him, and he is _capable_ of choosing between them." What language can be more "unqualified" than this? It teaches us that man has _natural power_, which renders him _capable_ to make a right choice. It is true, Dr. Taylor, and "those who believe with him," carry out this doctrine into its legitimate and practical bearings. On the ground of this power, they exhort sinners "to make themselves new hearts." One of them, as reported to me by a preacher, went so far as to say, in a public address, that sinners ought to be ashamed to ask the aid of the Holy Spirit to convert them, since they had power to convert themselves. And what objection can any, who hold to natural power to choose life, urge against this? If, as Dr.
Tyler teaches, in his "Examination of Dr. Taylor"s Theological Views," a right choice implies regeneration; and if every man is _naturally capable_ of a right choice, as taught by this same Dr. Tyler, and the "generality" of his brethren, then it follows conclusively, and I see not how any sophistry can cover up the inference, these sinners have natural power to convert themselves. Instead therefore of hypocritically pleading their own weakness, before a _throne of grace_, and asking for mercy and grace to help them in their time of need, they ought to be crimsoned with shame, for their folly and hypocrisy, turn away from their impertinent suit, throw themselves upon the _resources of nature_, and regenerate their own hearts. If however these gentlemen believe it impossible for sinners to do this, then, taking their whole theory together, this power is no power, and community, up to this hour, has been deluded by unmeaning words--words which only serve to conceal the deformity of a theological system, which, when thoroughly examined, is found after all, to teach that the poor reprobate has no adequate power by nature, and receives no available aid from grace to choose salvation, and must therefore, from the imperious necessity of his nature and condition, go down to interminable death.
NUMBER XI.
SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.
It is not pretended that there are no difficulties in our view of the subject. What important theory is there in philosophy, politics, morals, or religion, against which some apparently plausible objection may not be urged? But the inquiry in each case should be, Are those objections fatal to the system? Or are the difficulties in the proposed system greater than in some other view of the subject? For reasonable men will refuse to be driven into the vortex of skepticism merely because there are some difficulties and obscurities in all subjects of faith, which the limitations to human vision will not permit us to penetrate. To form an enlightened comparative view in the case before us, it will be important that we glance at the different theories on the subject of depravity and the ground of responsibility.
1. One form in which this subject has been held is, "That the sin of Adam introduced into his nature such a radical impotence and depravity that it is impossible for his descendants to make any voluntary efforts toward piety and virtue, or in any respect to correct and improve their moral and religious character, and that faith and all the Christian graces are communicated by the sole and irresistible operation of the Spirit of G.o.d, without any endeavour or concurrence on the part of man."
This of course makes the elect entirely pa.s.sive in their conversion; and consigns the reprobate to destruction for the sin of Adam, which, it is maintained, is imputed to him by virtue of a federal relation; or at best gives him over to unavoidable personal and eternal condemnation for possessing a nature which he had no agency in bringing upon himself, and from which he has no power to extricate himself. The difficulties of this system are so numerous and so palpable, whether it be tried by the standard of Scripture, of reason, or of common sense, that I need not here allude to them. Suffice it to say that they have pressed so heavily upon the Calvinists themselves as to baffle all their ingenuity and invention at defence, and have driven them finally into all those changes and modifications so frequently alluded to in this controversy.
I will here say in advance that, in my opinion, this, after all, is the strongest position Calvinism can a.s.sume. The moment its advocates depart from this, they must either, to be consistent with themselves, verge over into the other extreme of Pelagianism, or strike off into the "golden mean" of Arminianism. This may be more clearly seen in the sequel.
2. Pelagianism is another, and an opposite theory. It has a variety of shades, called Pelagian, Semi-pelagian, &c. Its varieties, however, relate to some minor modifications of the relation of the human family to Adam, touching natural evil, the death of the body, and greater exposure to temptation. But there is a uniformity in the essential part of the theory, which is, that human nature is free from sin or guilt until it becomes guilty by _intelligent, voluntary exercise_. The objections to this theory are, among others, as follows. It is in direct opposition to the Scripture doctrine of native depravity--a doctrine which has been often and ably treated of and defended by Calvinistic and, Arminian divines--a doctrine which is embodied in a palpable form in every man"s own experience--a doctrine which not only flashes upon the mind of the student in every page of the history of man, but also upon the mind of the unlettered nurse in the earliest emotions of the infant that struggles in her arms.
Another objection to this theory is, that it gives to infants, previous to intelligent voluntary exercise, no moral character. Hence, should they die at this age, as mult.i.tudes doubtless do, they would not be fit subjects either for the rewards of heaven or the pains of h.e.l.l. At the Judgment, as they will not be subjects of praise or blame, they will neither be on the right hand nor the left, and of course will neither be sentenced to "everlasting punishment," nor welcomed "into life eternal."
If, however, they by any means go into a state of punishment, their sufferings will be unjust; or if they are admitted into heaven, it will not be a salvation by grace, nor will it be preceded by regeneration, nor will their song be, "Unto Him that hath loved us," &c. This is not only contrary to the whole Gospel system, but also is in direct opposition to many scriptures, especially Rom. v, 18: "Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." It also leaves infants involved in the natural evils of diseases, pains; and death, not only without any a.s.signable cause, but also in direct opposition to the cause a.s.signed by the apostle--"And so death pa.s.sed upon all men, for that all have sinned."
A third objection to this theory is, that it destroys the Scripture doctrine of regeneration. The Scripture account of this matter is, in substance, that there is a radical change of our moral nature by the efficient operations of the Holy Ghost. But as this doctrine makes sin consist exclusively in exercise, so holiness must consist wholly in exercise. The whole work, therefore, of regeneration is a mere change of volition; and this volition is not the result of a preceding change of moral const.i.tution, but it is, like any other volition, produced by the native power of the mind, under the exciting influence of motives. The Holy Spirit, therefore, may well be dispensed with in this work. The supernatural character of the change must be given up, and the whole work is resolvable into a natural process. It is here worthy of remark that this is not mere speculation. Such has, in fact, been the final result of this theory, I believe, in every case where it has long been defended. And hence, in close connection with this, the supernatural efficacy of the atonement, and of course the Divine character of the Redeemer, are found to be notions not at all essential to the system, and somewhat discordant with the philosophy of its other parts, and are therefore soon brought into discredit. And this, too, as may be seen by the history of the Church, has been the practical result wherever Pelagianism or Semi-pelagianism has been cherished. It has degenerated into Socinianism. It may be said, then, in one word, that this doctrine of Pelagianism does, in its teachings, tendencies, and practical results, supplant and overthrow all the essential principles of the Gospel system.
3. A third and intermediate theory on the subject of depravity and human responsibility is the one presented and advocated in the preceding number. This system is presented, in part, in the very language in which the Ultra-Calvinists present theirs. Arminians, as well as "Calvinists, say that the sin of Adam introduced into his nature such a radical impotence and depravity that it is impossible for his descendants [who, it is believed, are propagated in the moral likeness of their fallen ancestor] to make any voluntary efforts [una.s.sisted by grace] toward piety and virtue, or in any respect to correct and improve their moral and religious character." Thus far we go together; but this is a point of divergency, from which we take very different directions. Instead of going on to say "that the Christian graces are communicated by the irresistible operation of the Spirit of G.o.d, without any endeavour or concurrence on the part of man," we say that "the saving grace of G.o.d hath appeared unto all Men;" and that this grace so enlightens, strengthens, and aids the human mind, that it is thereby enabled to make that choice which is the turning point, conditionally, of the soul"s salvation; and that it is by this same gracious aid that the man, when he has this good will, is enabled "to work out his salvation" unto the end. It is in this latter part of the statement that we are at issue with the Calvinists; but we are at issue on both parts with the Pelagians of every grade, including, of course, the advocates of the New Divinity in our country.
To the foregoing statement of our doctrine it is proper to add that we believe that the merits of the atonement are so available for and in behalf of the whole human family, that the guilt of depravity is not imputed to the subject of it until, by intelligent volition, he makes the guilt his own by resisting and rejecting the grace of the Gospel; and that being thus by grace in a justified state, the dying infant is ent.i.tled to all the promised blessings of the new covenant, and will, of course, have wrought in him all that meetness necessary to qualify him for the gracious rewards of the saints in glory. Thus, according to this system, the dying infant, as well as the dying adult believer, is sanctified by the blood of the covenant, and saved by grace.
These are the three systems which are presented to the inquirer after truth as the alternatives, and perhaps I may say the only alternatives of choice, in reference to this subject. It is true, the doctrine of _natural ability_ has been proposed as another alternative, holding an intermediate place between the doctrines of native impotency as first stated and of Pelagianism. And it may therefore appear to some, that I ought, in my enumeration, to have given this as a separate and distinct theory. My reason, however, for not doing this is, that there cannot, in my opinion, be such a resting place between the doctrines of derived const.i.tutional depravity and Pelagianism. Natural ability that is any thing more than a name--that is, in fact, an _ability_, destroys the idea of const.i.tutional depravity; and depravity that is any thing more than a name--that is, in fact, _const.i.tutional depravity_, destroys the idea of natural ability. A striking proof of this is found in the fact that a great portion of those divines in the Calvinistic Churches who have been most decided in preaching up natural ability, have gone over and embraced the New Divinity, which, as we have seen, abjures the doctrine of const.i.tutional depravity. The New-Haven divines are certainly gentlemen of talents and of close thought; and they have been following up this doctrine for a number of years, and it has landed them upon the logical conclusion that _there is no such depravity_. But we need not trust to the conclusions of the New Divinity advocates, to show that the notions of natural ability and natural freedom from guilt and sin necessarily and reciprocally imply each other. Why have Calvinists left their old ground of natural impotency, and resorted to the dogma of a natural ability? It is for the avowed reason that there can be no guilt without an ability to avoid it. But since the sin of his nature is unavoidable to the new-born infant, of course he can have no guilt, and by consequence _no sin_, until he is capable of an intelligent moral choice. Again: this same theory tells us that where there is no natural ability there is no moral character. But as the infant cannot be reasonably supposed to have ability to put forth an intelligent holy volition, he can have no moral character, and of course no sin.
The only way to avoid this conclusion in connection with the a.s.sumed premises is, to maintain that "the infant, from his birth, is a voluntary agent; and thus, in fact, to a certain extent, sinful." And would you believe, reader, that any reasonable man would resort to such an idea for the sake of helping out a theory? _And yet it is even so_. A paper lately published under the sanction of the New Divinity, purporting to be an inquiry into "what is the real difference between the New-Haven divines and those who differ from them," says, "The ground has of late been taken (if we understand the discussions on this subject) that mankind are literally _at birth_ voluntary and accountable agents, and actual sinners against G.o.d; that the new-born infant is a responsible subject of G.o.d"s moral government, and actually sins with a knowledge of his duty, and in the same sense with the adult sinner violates moral obligation, does wrong, ought to be penitent, and to change its moral character." And as a proof that this is the ground now a.s.sumed, the same writer gives us a quotation from Rev. Mr. Harvey, who has been one of the most active in this state in opposition to the New-Haven divines, in which he says, "A moral being, for aught we know, may commence his existence in an _active_, _voluntary_ state of the will; he may be a voluntary agent from his birth, and thus, in fact, to a certain extent sinful, and that without supposing that _depravity is seated in any thing but the will_." This same writer also states that Dr. Spring, in a treatise on "native depravity," a work which I have not at hand, has advanced and defended the sentiment of "_actual_ sin from birth." And has it indeed come to this at last, that this natural ability, for which Calvinists have so strenuously contended, is nothing more than the power the new-born infant has to commit actual sin on the one hand, or "make himself a new heart" on the other! Alas for Calvinism! To what miserable shifts--yes, I must call them _miserable_ shifts--is this system driven! On this subject I will not express myself in accordance with my feelings. The respect I have for the intelligent, learned, and pious gentlemen who have advanced this idea, restrains me in this matter. Such a result, in the advocacy of a favourite theory, is however in strict accordance with the known obliquity of the greatest and purest minds. But while we respect the authors of such a theory, and while we feel the necessity of taking heed to ourselves, lest we also fall by the same example of prejudice, we cannot suffer our common sense to be imposed upon by such gross absurdities. In this, however, we see that, as before, in trying to maintain their _ability_, they gave up their _depravity_: so here, in trying to establish their _depravity_, they destroy their _ability_. Nay, what is still worse for this theory, this very attempt to prove that infants are "_actual_ sinners from their birth," is an indirect denial of the doctrine of derived depravity. Why do these gentlemen wish to establish this point? Why, forsooth, in order to show that men are _guilty_ from their birth, which is an acknowledgment, of course, that they cannot prove them guilty only by proving that they have intelligent moral exercise. Consequently it is a concession that this exercise is the occasion and origin of their guilt.
This is not the first time that Calvinism, in trying to save itself, has gone over and joined the ranks of its opposers. Can the reader see the difference between this doctrine of actual sin from the birth, viewed in connection with its origin and bearings, and the New Divinity, which makes sin consist exclusively in moral exercise? Let these old-side Calvinists, then, sheath the sword of controversy which they have drawn against their brethren, and join in with them to defend, if possible, the Pelagian doctrine which, it would seem, after all, they hold in common stock. Has the Rev. Mr. Harvey been so active in getting up an opposition theological school in Connecticut to teach that the infant "commences his existence in an _active voluntary_ state of the will, and is thus (_on this account_) to a certain extent sinful?" This is clearly a work of supererogation--a useless expenditure of money and of talents.
The New-Haven Theological School is capable--alas! too capable of carrying on this work, especially if Mr. Harvey and his friends will cease their opposition, and unite in their a.s.sistance. Does Mr. Harvey fear that the New-Haven divines will not begin their "_moral exercise_"
early enough to make it _natural depravity?_ They have given a.s.surances that they will not be particular on that point. Only allow that there is no sin previous to the first intelligent act of choice--previous to the corresponding power to make themselves new hearts, and they will be satisfied. They have said already that "this capableness of sinning, if it is not at the exact moment of birth, [and they do not affirm that it is not,] commences so early in their existence, that it is proper, for all the great purposes of instruction, to speak of it as existing from the beginning of their days." Hence we see nothing between these gentlemen on this point worth contending about. It will, however, be important that all who hold to conversion by motives and mere moral suasion should not put the commencement of these "moral exercises" so far back that the subject cannot understand Gospel truth; otherwise they may yet get into another difficulty as serious as the one they are trying to avoid. But to the subject. It has been very distinctly shown, I think, from the reasoning of the Calvinists themselves, and from the nature of the case, that there can be no such intermediate theory as they contend for, between the native impotency of old Calvinism and Pelagianism. But as this is an important point, I will ill.u.s.trate it farther by an examination of the _seat_ of this Calvinistic depravity.
It is seen, by the quotation above from Mr. Harvey, that he considers "depravity as seated in nothing but the will." And this is avowedly the sentiment of at least all those Calvinists who believe in natural ability. It is on this ground that they reiterate incessantly, "You can if you will;" "There is no difficulty except what is found in a perverse will." It is on this ground, also, that they tell us "a right choice is conversion." They do not say a right choice is a _condition_ or a fruit of the new birth; but _it is itself the new birth_. But to understand this subject clearly, it is important to know what they mean by the will. It appears to me they use this term with great indefiniteness, if not lat.i.tude of meaning. If they mean by this what I understand to be the legitimate meaning of the term "the mental power or susceptibility of putting forth volitions;" then to say that all depravity is seated in the will, is to be guilty of the gross absurdity of teaching that the affections have not a moral character. If by the will, however, they mean, as they frequently seem to mean, the affections themselves going out in desire after some proposed good, then indeed they establish the New-Haven theory, that all sin consists in moral exercise. Thus by placing all depravity in the will, whether by this is meant the power of willing, or the exercise of the affections, they, in the one case, exclude sin from the affections altogether, and in the other affirm the doctrine of Pelagianism. But if by the will they mean something different from either of the above definitions, then I frankly confess I know not what they mean. Should they however, change their ground, and place the seat of this depravity in the const.i.tution of man"s moral nature, as it exists anterior to any act of volition, then and in that case they throw the subject back on the old ground of natural impotency; for to talk of a natural power to change the moral const.i.tution, as it existed prior to choice, and which const.i.tution must, by the law of its nature, exercise a controlling influence over the mind, is the same as to talk of a natural power to alter one"s own nature, or to unmake and remake himself. In this case we must have supernatural aid, or we must remain as we are.
We shall not be fully prepared to judge correctly on this subject until we have examined one more preliminary question, viz. What is the precise meaning that we are to attach to the terms, _natural_ and _moral ability_, as used by the Calvinists? To ascertain this, I have examined such authors as I have had access to, with care; and I have been particular to consult _recent_ authors, that I might not be accused of charging old and exploded doctrines upon our opposers; and _various_ authors, that I might ascertain any varieties that appertain to the different Calvinistic schools. In particular, the author of "Views in Theology;" Dr. Griffin, in a late work on "Divine Efficiency;" Rev.
Tyler Thatcher, of the Hopkinsian school; and a doctrinal tract, ent.i.tled, "Man a Free Agent without the Aid of Divine Grace," written, it is presumed, by one of the divines of the New-Haven school have been consulted. There is among them all a remarkable uniformity on this point. If I understand them, the substance of what they say is, "Natural power consists in the possession of understanding, conscience, and will; and moral power is the _exercise_ of these faculties." Mr. Thatcher says this in so many words.--The tract alluded to gives this definition of natural power. Dr. Griffin says "their [sinners"] faculties const.i.tute a natural ability, that is, a full power to love and serve G.o.d, if their hearts are well disposed." It certainly must appear, at the first glance, very singular to every mind not embarra.s.sed by theory, that either the _possession_ of faculties, or the _exercise_ of faculties, should be called _power_. The idea of _power_ is supposed, by the best philosophical writers, to be undefinable, from the fact that it is a simple idea; but here, strange to tell, we have it a.n.a.lyzed in two different forms. Faculties are power--the exercise of faculties is power. Now, although we cannot define power, every one doubtless has a clear conception of it; and I humbly conceive that the common sense of every man will decide that neither of the above definitions embraces the true idea of power. The _exercise_ of faculties _implies_ power, it is granted; but every one must see that it is not power itself. And although the _faculties_ of the mind are sometimes called the _powers_ of the mind by a kind of borrowed use of the term power, just as the limbs or muscles are called the _powers_ of the body, yet it requires very little discrimination to see that as we may possess these powers of the body entire, and yet they be defective from some cause, as to some of their appropriate functions, so we may possess these powers or faculties of mind entire, and yet they may be defective in that moral strength necessary to a holy choice. Hence the possession of these faculties does not even _imply_ power adequate to a holy choice; much less are they _power itself_. I marvel therefore at these definitions of moral and natural power, and am thereby confirmed in the opinion advanced in my former number, viz. "That the whole of this distinction (of natural and moral ability) and the reasoning from it, proceed on the ground of a most unphilosophical a.n.a.lysis of mind, and an unwarranted definition of terms." This may seem a strong statement from so humble an individual as myself, in view of the many able minds that have adopted the opinions here opposed. But neither their opinion nor mine will weigh much, in this controversy, except as sustained by reasonable arguments; and by such arguments the present writer expects to stand or fall. Look then, reader, to both sides of this subject. Dr. Griffin himself seems to be at a loss how to explain himself on this subject. When he wishes to oppose the New-Haven divines, and guard against their error, he says, "If you mean by power, an ability that works without Divine efficiency, I hope I shall be the last to believe that." "And every body knows that the ma.s.s of the New-England divines, from the beginning, have acknowledged no such doctrine."
And why is _Divine efficiency_ necessary?--Because man has no ability that will "work," without it. Thus the moment he sets up a guard against Pelagianism, he throws himself back either upon our doctrine, or upon the old Calvinistic doctrine of "native impotency." There is no standing place any where else. The New-Haven divines are right, if natural ability is right; and the time cannot be far distant when the love of consistency will drive all, who hold to natural ability, either on to the New Divinity ground, or back to old Calvinism. From this remark the reader will see how much depends, if my views are correct, upon the proper adjustment of this question. It is in fact the turning point, which is to give a character to the theology of the Churches. Let us not then be in haste to pa.s.s over it. Hear Dr. Griffin farther. "Now if you ask me what is that power, which is never exerted without Divine efficiency? I can only say, that, in the account of the Divine mind, it is the proper basis of obligation, and therefore by the decision of common sense, must be called a power." The doctor had a little before told us, that this power was faculties--he is not satisfied with this; and what well instructed mind, like the doctor"s, could be? It is something that forms the "basis of obligation," he knows not what it is.
He merely infers there is such a power, because men are held responsible. But this inference will flow quite as naturally, by taking the Arminian ground of gracious ability, and save the other difficulties beside. At any rate, it will save the absurdity of holding to an ability, that will not "work," without being strengthened by Divine aid, and yet that this same ability is sufficient for all purposes of obligation without that aid.
We shall find equal difficulty, if we take up and examine this definition of _moral_ power. It is "the exercise of natural power." But these same writers tell us that, while we have this natural power sufficient without Divine grace to form a basis of obligation, "we are entirely dependent upon G.o.d"s grace for moral power"--in other words, according to the definition of moral power, we are dependent upon grace for the _exercise_ of our natural power--and since natural power means the faculties of the understanding, will, and conscience--the statement is simply and evidently this: we are dependent upon Divine grace for the exercise of our understanding, conscience, and will, in making a holy choice. Why? Because the understanding, conscience, and will are so depraved by nature, that it is not in their nature to "work" in this exercise, without this Divine grace. Is not this holding the gracious ability after all? Is it singular then that Dr. Griffin should say, in another place--"They (sinners) are bound to go forth to their work at once, _but they are not bound to go_ alone: it is their privilege and duty to cast themselves _instantly_ on the Holy Ghost, and not to take a single step in their own _strength?_" Or is it any wonder that the Christian Spectator should say, that "this statement of Dr. Griffin brings him directly on the ground of evangelical Arminianism?" And is this the ability that "the ma.s.s of the New-England divines have held to from the beginning?" Not exactly. They only slide over on this ground occasionally, when they are pressed hard with Pelagianism on the one hand, and the old doctrine of pa.s.sivity on the other. For the truth is, as before remarked, they have not a single point to balance themselves upon between these two, only as they light upon our ground.
There is still another difficulty in this moral power, as it is called.
It implies the absurdity, that power to obey G.o.d is obedience itself.
For a right exercise of our natural powers is obedience. But the right exercise of our natural power is moral power--therefore
Our moral power to obey G.o.d is obedience!! And this will give us a clue to the proper understanding of that oft-repeated Calvinistic saying--"You have power to obey G.o.d, if your heart is rightly disposed,"
or in short hand--"You can if you will." Now the verb _will_ here evidently means the right _exercise_ of the natural faculties--that is, as shown above, it means obedience. Hence the whole and proper meaning of this notable saying is--"You have power to obey G.o.d, _if you obey him_." "You _can_ if you _do_." This is a sort of logic which, when scanned down to its naked character, one would get as little credit in refuting, as its abettors are ent.i.tled to for its invention and use. And yet this is the logic which, in its borrowed and fict.i.tious costume has led thousands in our land to suppose that Calvinism, as it is now modified, is the same, or nearly the same with Methodism.
There is still another striking solecism, necessarily connected with this definition of power. It supposes it to have no actual existence, until the necessity for it ceases. For in the order of cause and effect, natural power effects the act of obedience; and this effect of natural power, producing obedience, gives existence to moral power. Thus we have power to obey, super-added to the power that has actually obeyed! If, however, Calvinists say this is treating the subject unfairly, because their very definition shows that they do not mean by it any thing which _enables_ man to obey--I answer, that my reasoning went upon the ground, that it was what they call it--_power;_ and if they do not mean power, that is only acknowledging the position I started upon, that this Calvinistic power is no power at all. And here I ask, in the name of candour, What is the use of calling things by wrong names? What confusion and error may not be introduced by applying common and well defined terms in such a manner, that, when the things to which they are applied, are defined, it is seen that the terms thus applied are worse than useless; they directly mislead the mind! It is the direct way to bring Christian theology and Christian ministers into distrust and reproach.
One thought more, with respect to this moral power, and I will pa.s.s on.
The doctrine of Calvinism is, if I understand it, that G.o.d controls the natural power of men, by means of their moral power. This some of them expressly affirm. And to show that I am not mistaken with respect to the others, let the reader carefully attend to the following considerations.
What is it secures the fulfilment of the Divine decrees, in respect to the elect and the reprobate? Why do not some of the reprobates, in the use of natural ability, repent and get to heaven? Because they have not the moral power. Why do not some of the elect, in the use of the same ability, fall into sin and finally perish? Because G.o.d makes and keeps them willing in the day of his power--that is, he irresistibly imparts to them this moral power. Thus, by means of this, which he keeps in his own hands he executes his decrees. For G.o.d, of set purpose, so const.i.tuted this natural power, that it does not "work" without Divine efficiency. By moral power; therefore, natural power is controlled. Now, to say nothing here of the absurdity of efficiently and irresistibly controlling one power by another, and yet calling that other the essence of free agency, and the basis of obligation--look at the absurdity in another point of view. Since moral power is the exercise of natural power, the former must be the _effect_ of the latter. And since, according to Calvinism, natural power is controlled by moral power, it follows conclusively; that the effect controls its cause!! And since the cause must act, before the effect is produced, it follows that the effect, before it has an existence, acts upon its cause to produce its own existence!!! This is certainly a nullification of both cause and effect: Such are some of the difficulties of these definitions of power--definitions as contrary to the common understandings of men, and the common laws of language, as they are to sound philosophy--definitions which, if they were always understood, when the terms were used; would make the propositions in which these terms are found, sound very differently to the common ear. I trust therefore it has been made to appear, that "this distinction of natural and moral ability, and the reasonings upon it, are founded on a most unphilosophical a.n.a.lysis of mind and an unwarranted definition of terms," and that, after all the efforts of the Calvinists to find out another alternative, they will be under the necessity, if they would be consistent, either of going back to the old Calvinistic ground, of remediless impotency, or of advancing on to the Pelagian ground of the New Divinity; or they must accept of the Arminian theory of gracious ability. And that the reader may be prepared to make his selection, I will here remind him of the arguments adduced in favour of the latter doctrine, in the last number, while I next proceed to answer more specifically the objections that have been urged against it, which however for an obvious reason must be withheld until the next number.
NUMBER XII.
OBJECTIONS TO GRACIOUS ABILITY ANSWERED.
In consulting different authors to find the strongest objections that have been urged against our doctrine of ability by grace, I have fixed upon the doctrinal tract, already alluded to, ent.i.tled, "Man a Free Agent without the Aid of Divine Grace," as concentrating in a small compa.s.s, and in a clear and able manner, the sum total of these objections. I may not follow the precise order of this writer, and possibly shall pa.s.s over some of his remarks as of minor importance; but the substance of his reasoning shall receive such notice as I shall be able to give it.
1. The first objection is, in substance, this: that without being a free agent man cannot be _man;_ that free agency in fact enters into the very definition of an intelligent, morally responsible being; and therefore he must be such by nature.
This objection gains all its plausibility from the writer"s definition of free agency. "It consists," he says, "in the possession of _understanding_, _conscience_, and _will_." Now we grant that the being who possesses these is an intelligent voluntary agent. But these faculties, as we have seen, may be disordered, so that, for all holy purposes, they may be defective. The understanding may be darkened, the conscience may be seared, the power to choose good may be weakened either positively or relatively. _Liberty_ is a distinct faculty of the soul; and as such is as subject to derangement as any other mental susceptibility. It has, we say, suffered materially by the fall; so that man has not his original apt.i.tude or facility to good. And whether we consider this as a weakness appertaining directly to the faculty of the will itself, or whether we consider it a relative weakness, (which is probably the more philosophical,) resulting from the loss of a moral equilibrium in the mind, by reason of the uncontrolled sway of the pa.s.sions, in either case the primary cause and the practical result are the same. Sin has perverted the soul, and given it an unholy declination from righteousness to an extent which none but G.o.d can rectify. With this view of the subject, the writer may call man a free agent if he pleases; but he is only free to unrighteousness, and not to holiness.
Our objector was aware that his argument might be disposed of in this way; and hence in a note he says, "Some writers speak of man, in his natural state, as _free only_ to evil. But in what does such freedom differ from mere instinct? With no power to do otherwise, how is he who murders a fellow creature more criminal than the tiger, or even a falling rock that destroys him?" The fallacy of this argument consists chiefly in a misrepresentation of our theory. Instead of holding that man "has no power to do otherwise," we believe, as much as this author, that man has ample power at his command to do otherwise; but that this power is of grace, and not of nature. Any farther supposed difficulties growing out of this view of the subject will be explained, I trust satisfactorily, as we advance.[6]
2. "Every man is conscious that he possesses the faculties which const.i.tute free agency."--Here again we must keep in view the writer"s definition. We shall find no difficulty in granting that every man is conscious that he possesses the faculties of understanding, conscience, and will; but that these, unaided by grace, const.i.tute man free to a holy choice, is denied; and this is the very question in debate. To affirm it therefore in argument is begging the question.
It however, the author means to say, as his reasoning on this point seems to imply, that man is conscious of being a free agent, in the responsible sense of the term, this is also granted; but then this does not touch the question whether this power is of grace or of nature. But, says the writer, "When man, under the influence of grace, does choose the good, he is not conscious of any new faculty or power to choose, but only he uses that power in a different manner. The power or faculty which chooses evil and which chooses good, is the same power differently used." Whoever disputed this?--understanding by power a faculty of the soul, as this author evidently does. We all acknowledge that the soul gets no new faculties by grace; but we believe that the mind, in the exercise of its natural faculties, is a.s.sisted by grace to make a right choice. But, says the writer, in this connection, "Power to choose between two objects is power to choose either." If the writer means to say that power to choose either the one or the other of two objects _is_ power to choose either--this is an identical proposition: it is only saying, _If a thing is, it is_. But if he means to say, when two objects are presented to the mind, and the mind finds itself possessed of a power to attach itself voluntarily to one, that therefore it has the _same power_ to attach itself to the other, this is denied; and as no proof is given or pretended by the objector, nothing but a denial is necessary. On this point the founder of the Calvinistic school was undoubtedly correct--philosophically and theologically correct--when he said, "Man has not an equally free election of good and evil."