[Footnote 764: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x.
ch. xvi., xvii.]
We are thus left to depend mainly on his disciples and successors for any general account of his system. And of the earliest and most immediate of these the writings have perished.[765] Our sole original authority is Diogenes Laertius, who was unquestionably an Epicurean. The sketch of Epicurus which is given in his "Lives" is evidently a "labor of love." Among all the systems of ancient philosophy described by him, there is none of whose general character he has given so skillful and so elaborate an a.n.a.lysis. And even as regards the particulars of the system, nothing could be more complete than Laertius"s account of his physical speculations. Additional light is also furnished by the philosophic poem of Lucretius "On the Nature of Things," which was written to advocate the physical theory of Epicurus. These are the chief sources of our information.
[Footnote 765: Some fragments of the writings of Metrodorus, Phaedrus, Polystratus, and Philodemus, have been found among the Herculanean Papyri, and published in Europe, which are said to throw some additional light on the doctrines of Epicurus. See article on "Herculanean Papyri,"
in Edinburgh Review, October, 1862.]
It is said of Epicurus that he loved to hearken to the stories of the indifference and apathy of Pyrrhon, and that, in these qualities, he aspired to imitate him. But Epicurus was not, like Pyrrhon, a skeptic; on the contrary, he was the most imperious dogmatist. No man ever showed so little respect for the opinions of his predecessors, or so much confidence in his own. He was fond of boasting that he had made his own philosophy--_he_ was a "self-taught" man! Now "Epicurus might be perfectly honest in saying he had read very little, and had worked out the conclusions in his own mind, but he was a copyist, nevertheless; few men more entirely so."[766] His psychology was certainly borrowed from the Ionian school. From thence he had derived his fundamental maxim, that "sensation is the source of all knowledge, and the standard of all truth." His physics were copied from Democritus. With both, "atoms are the first principle of all things." And in Ethics he had learned from Aristotle, that if an absolute good is not the end of a practical life, _happiness_ must be its end.[767] All that is fundamental in the system of Epicurus was borrowed from his predecessors, and there is little that can be called new in his teaching.
[Footnote 766: Maurice"s "Ancient Philosophy," p. 236.]
[Footnote 767: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. vi]
The grand object of philosophy, according to Epicurus, _is the attainment of a happy life_. "Philosophy," says he, "is the power by which reason conducts men to happiness." Truth is a merely relative thing, a variable quant.i.ty; and therefore the pursuit of truth for its own sake is superfluous and useless. There is no such thing as absolute, unchangeable right: no action is intrinsically right or wrong. "We choose the virtues, not on their own account, but for the sake of pleasure, just as we seek the skill of the physician for the sake of health."[768] That which is nominally right in morals, that which is relatively good in human conduct, is, therefore, to be determined by the effects upon ourselves; that which is agreeable--pleasurable, is right; that which is disagreeable--painful, is wrong. "The virtues are connate with living pleasantly."[769] Pleasure (?d???), then, is the great end to be sought in human action. "Pleasure is the chief good, the beginning and end of living happily."[770]
[Footnote 768: "Fundamental Maxims," preserved in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. x.x.x.]
[Footnote 769: "Epicurus to Menaeceus," in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxvii.]
[Footnote 770: Id., ib.]
The proof which Epicurus offers in support of his doctrine, "that pleasure is the chief good," is truly characteristic. "All animals from the moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure and offended with pain, by their natural instincts, and without the employment of reason.
Therefore we, also, of our own inclination, flee from pain."[771] "All men like pleasure and dislike pain; they naturally shun the latter and pursue the former." "If happiness is present, we have every thing, and when it is absent, we do every thing with a view to possess it."[772]
Virtue thus consists in man"s doing deliberately what the animals do instinctively--that is, choose pleasure and avoid pain.
[Footnote 771: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x.
ch. xxix.]
[Footnote 772: Id., ib., bk. x. ch. xxvii.]
"Every kind of pleasure" is, in the estimation of Epicurus, "alike good," and alike proper. "If those things which make the pleasures of debauched men put an end to the fears of the mind, and to those which arise about the heavenly bodies [supernatural powers], and death and pain,... we should have no pretense for blaming those who wholly devote themselves to pleasure, and who never feel any pain, or grief (which is the chief evil) from any quarter."[773] Whilst, however, all pleasures of the body, as well as the mind, are equal in dignity, and alike good, they differ in intensity, in duration, and, especially, in their consequences. He therefore divides pleasure into two cla.s.ses; and in this, as Cousin remarks, is found the only element of originality in his philosophy. These two kinds of pleasure are:
1. _The pleasure of movement, excitement, energy_ (?d??? ??
????se?).[774] This is the most lively pleasure; it supposes the greatest development of physical and mental power. "Joy and cheerfulness are beheld in motion and energy." But it is not the most enduring pleasure, and it is not the most perfect. It is accompanied by uneasiness; it "brings with it many perturbations," and it yields some bitter fruits.
[Footnote 773: "Fundamental Maxims," No. 9, in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. x.x.xi.]
[Footnote 774: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x.
ch. xxviii.]
2. _The second kind of pleasure is the pleasure of repose, tranquillity, impa.s.sibility_ (?d??? ?atast?at???). This is a state, a "condition,"
rather than a motion. It is "the freedom of the body from pain, and the soul from confusion."[775] This is perfect and unmixed happiness--the happiness of G.o.d; and he who attains it "will be like a G.o.d among men."
"The storm of the soul is at an end, and body and soul are perfected."
Now, whilst "no pleasure is intrinsically bad,"[776] prudence (f????s??), or practical wisdom, would teach us to choose the highest and most perfect happiness. Morality is therefore the application of reason to the conduct of life, and virtue is wisdom. The office of reason is to "determine our choices"--to take account of the duration of pleasures, to estimate their consequences, and to regard the happiness of a whole lifetime, and not the enjoyment of a single hour. Without wisdom men will choose the momentary excitements of pa.s.sion, and follow after agitating pleasures, which are succeeded by pain; they will consequently lose "tranquillity of mind." "It is not possible," says Epicurus, "to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly."[777] The difference, then, between the philosopher and the ordinary man is this--that while both seek pleasure, the former knows how to forego certain indulgences which cause pain and vexation hereafter, whereas the ordinary man seeks only immediate enjoyment.
Epicurus does not dispense with virtue, but he simply employs it as a means to an end, namely, the securing of happiness.[778]
[Footnote 775: Id., ib.]
[Footnote 776: "Fundamental Maxims," No. 7.]
[Footnote 777: Ibid., No. 5.]
[Footnote 778: Pressense, "Religions before Christ," p. 141.]
Social morality is, like private morality, founded upon _utility._ As nothing is intrinsically right or wrong in private life, so nothing is intrinsically just or unjust in social life. "Justice has no independent existence: it results from mutual contracts, and establishes itself wherever there is a mutual engagement to guard against doing or sustaining any injury. Injustice is not intrinsically bad; it has this character only because there is joined with it the fear of not escaping those who are appointed to punish actions marked with this character."[779] Society is thus a contract--an agreement to promote each other"s happiness. And inasmuch as the happiness of the individual depends in a great degree upon the general happiness, the essence of his ethical system, in its political aspects, is contained in inculcating "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."
If you ask Epicurus what a man shall do when it is clearly his immediate interest to violate the social contract, he would answer, that if your general interest is secured by always observing it, you must make momentary sacrifices for the sake of future good. But "when, in consequence of new circ.u.mstances, a thing which has been p.r.o.nounced just does not any longer appear to agree with utility, the thing which was just... ceases to be just the moment it ceases to be useful."[780] So that self-interest is still the basis of all virtue. And if, by the performance of duty, you are exposed to great suffering, and especially to death, you are perfectly justified in the violation of any and all contracts. Such is the social morality of Epicurus.
With coa.r.s.e and energetic minds the doctrine of Epicurus would inevitably lead to the grossest sensuality and crime; with men whose temperament was more apathetic, or whose tastes were more pure, it would develop a refined selfishness--a perfect egoism, which Epicurus has adorned with the name "tranquillity of mind--impa.s.sibility,"
(?ta?a??a).[781]
[Footnote 779: "Fundamental Maxims," Nos. 35, 36.]
[Footnote 780: Ibid., No. 41.]
[Footnote 781: It is scarcely necessary to discuss the question whether, by making pleasure the standard of right, Epicurus intended to encourage what is usually called sensuality. He earnestly protested against any such unfavorable interpretation of his doctrine:--"When we say that pleasure is a chief good, we are not speaking of the pleasures of the debauched man, or those which lie in sensual enjoyment, as some think who are ignorant, and who do not entertain our opinions, or else interpret them perversely; but we mean the freedom of the body from pain, and the soul from confusion" ("Epicurus to Menaeceus," in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives," bk. x. ch. xxvii.). The most obvious tendency of this doctrine is to extreme selfishness, rather than extreme sensuality--a selfishness which prefers one"s own comfort and case to every other consideration.
As to the personal character of Epicurus, opinions have been divided both in ancient and modern times. By some the garden has been called a "sty." Epicurus has been branded as a libertine, and the name "Epicurean" has, in almost all languages, become the synonym of sensualism. Diogenes Laertius repels all the imputations which are cast upon the moral character of his favorite author, and ascribes them to the malignity and falsehood of the Stoics. "The most modern criticism seems rather inclined to revert to the vulgar opinion respecting him, rejecting, certainly with good reason, the fanatical panegyrics of some French and English writers of the last century. Upon the whole, we are inclined to believe that Epicurus was an apathetic, decorous, formal man, who was able, without much difficulty, to cultivate a measured and even habit of mind, who may have occasionally indulged in sensual gratifications to prove that he thought them lawful, but who generally preferred, as a matter of taste, the exercises of the intellect to the more violent forms of self-indulgence. And this life, it seems to us, would be most consistent with his opinions. To avoid commotion, to make the stream of life flow on as easily as possible, was clearly the aim of his philosophy."--Maurice"s "Ancient Philosophy," p. 236.]
To secure this highest kind of happiness--this pure impa.s.sivity, it was necessary to get rid of all superst.i.tious fears of death, of supernatural beings, and of a future retribution.[782] The chief causes of man"s misery are his illusions, his superst.i.tions, and his prejudices. "That which princ.i.p.ally contributes to trouble the spirit of men, is the persuasion which they cherish that the stars are beings imperishable and happy (_i.e.,_ that they are G.o.ds), and that then our thoughts and actions are contrary to the will of those superior beings; they also, being deluded by these fables, apprehend an eternity of evils, they fear the insensibility of death, as though that could affect them...." "The real freedom from this kind of trouble consists in being emanc.i.p.ated from all these things."[783] And this emanc.i.p.ation is to be secured by the study of philosophy--that is, of that philosophy which explains every thing on natural or physical principles, and excludes all supernatural powers.
[Footnote 782: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. 1. 100-118.]
[Footnote 783: Epicurus to Herodotus, in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," p. 453 (Bohn"s edition).]
That ignorance which occasions man"s misery is two-fold, (i.) _Ignorance of the external world, which leads to superst.i.tion._ All unexplained phenomena are ascribed to unseen, supernatural powers; often to malignant powers, which take pleasure in tormenting man; sometimes to a Supreme and Righteous Power, which rewards and punishes men for their good or evil conduct. Hence a knowledge of Physics, particularly the physics which Democritus taught, was needful to deliver men from false hopes and false fears.[784] (ii.) _Ignorance of the nature of man, of his faculties, powers, and the sources and limits of his knowledge_, from whence arise illusions, prejudices, and errors. Hence the need of Psychology to ascertain the real grounds of human knowledge, to explain the origin of man"s illusions, to exhibit the groundlessness of his fears, and lead him to a just conception of the nature and end of his existence.
[Footnote 784: "The study of physics contributes more than any thing else to the tranquillity and happiness of life."--Diogenes Laertius, "Lives," bk. x. ch. xxiv. "For thus it is that _fear_ restrains all men, because they observe many things effected on the earth and in heaven, of which effects they can by no means see the causes, and therefore think that they are wrought by a _divine_ power. For which reasons, when we have clearly seen that _nothing can be produced from nothing_, we shall have a more accurate perception of that of which we are in search, and shall understand whence each individual thing is generated, and how all things are done without the agency of the G.o.ds."--Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. l. 145-150.]
Physics and Psychology are thus the only studies which Epicurus would tolerate as "conducive to the happiness of man." The pursuit of truth for its own sake was useless. Dialectics, which distinguish the true from the false, the good from the bad, on _a priori_ grounds, must be banished as an unnecessary toil, which yields no enjoyment. Theology must be cancelled entirely, because it fosters superst.i.tious fears. The idea of G.o.d"s taking knowledge of, disapproving, condemning, punishing the evil conduct of men, is an unpleasant thought. Physics and Psychology are the most useful, because the most "agreeable," the most "comfortable" sciences.
EPICUREAN PHYSICS.
In his physical theories Epicurus followed Leucippus and Democritus. He expounds these theories in his letters to Herodotus and Pythocles, which are preserved in Diogenes Laertius.[785] We shall be guided mainly by his own statements, and when his meaning is obscure, or his exposition is incomplete, we shall avail ourselves of the more elaborate statements of Lucretius,[786] who is uniformly faithful to the doctrine of Epicurus, and universally regarded as its best expounder.
The fundamental principle of his philosophy is the ancient maxim--"_de nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil fosse reverti_;" but instead of employing this maxim in the sense in which it is used by Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and others, to prove there must be something self-existent and eternal, or in other words, "that nothing which once was not can ever of itself come into being," he uses it to disprove a divine creation, and even presents the maxim in an altered form--viz., "nothing is ever _divinely_ generated from nothing;"[787] and he thence concludes that the world was by no means made for us by _divine_ power.[788]
Nature is eternal. "The universal whole always was such as it now is, and always will be such." "The universe also is infinite, for that which is finite has a limit, but the universe has no limit."[789]
[Footnote 785: "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x.]
[Footnote 786: "De Natura Rerum."]
[Footnote 787: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i.]
[Footnote 788: Ibid.]
[Footnote 789: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x.
ch. xxiv.]