APPENDIX VII (cont.)
_From_ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, _received at Mazir-i-Sharif on the 17th January, 1879_.
I have received your friendly letter, dated 13th Zel Hijja (=8th December, 1878). In that letter you asked me to send you as many troops as could be got ready. I have written to you a letter to the effect that the Emperor, on account of your troubles, had communicated with the British Government, and that the Russian Amba.s.sador at London had obtained a promise from the British Ministers to the effect that they would not injure the independence of Afghanistan. Perhaps you sent your letter before you got mine. Now, I have heard that you have appointed your son, Mahomed Yakub, as your Regent, and have come out of Kabul with some troops. I have received an order from the Emperor to the effect that it is impossible to a.s.sist you with troops now. I hope you will be fortunate. It all depends on the decree of G.o.d.
Believe me, that the friendship which I made with you will be perpetual. It is necessary to send back General Vozgonoff and his companions. You can keep Dr. Yuralski with you if you please. No doubt the doctor will be of use to you and to your dependents. I hope our friendship will continue to be strengthened, and that intercourse will be carried on between us.
_From_ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR SHER ALI, _dated 29th December, 1878 (=17th Muharram, 1296)_.
(After compliments.) The Foreign Minister, General Gortchakoff, has informed me by telegraph that the Emperor has directed me to trouble you to come to Tashkent for the present. I therefore communicate this news to you with great pleasure; at the same time, I may mention that I have received no instructions about your journey to St. Petersburg. My personal interview with you will increase our friendship greatly.
_Translation of a letter from_ MAJOR-GENERAL IVANOFF, _Governor of Zarafshan, to the Heir-Apparent, _MAHOMED MUSA KHAN, _and others_.
On the 26th of Rabi-ul-Awul, at an auspicious moment, I received your letter which you sent me, and understood its contents. I was very much pleased, and at once communicated it to General Kauffmann, the Governor-General. With regard to what you wrote about the friendly relations between the Russian and Afghan Governments, and your own desire for friendship, I have the honour to state that we are also desirous of being friends. The friendship between the two Governments existed in the time of the late Amir, and I hope that it will be increased and strengthened by Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan.
May G.o.d change the wars in your country to happiness; may peace reign in it; and may your Government be strengthened! I have been forwarding all your letters to the Governor-General, General Kauffmann. May G.o.d keep you safe!
The Zarafshan Province Governor, MAJOR-GENERAL IVANOFF.
Written and sealed by the General. Written on 29th Mart (March), 1879 (=5th Rabi-ul-Saui, 1296).
_Treaty between the RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT and AMIR SHER ALI KHAN; _written from memory by MIRZA MAHOMED NABBI._
1. The Russian Government engages that the friendship of the Russian Government with the Government of Amir Sher Ali Khan, Amir of all Afghanistan, will be a permanent and perpetual one.
2. The Russian Government engages that, as Sirdar Abdulla Khan, son of the Amir, is dead, the friendship of the Russian Government with any person whom the Amir may appoint Heir-Apparent to the throne of Afghanistan, and with the heir of the Heir-Apparent, will remain firm and perpetual.
3. The Russian Government engages that if any foreign enemy attacks Afghanistan, and the Amir is unable to drive him out, and asks the a.s.sistance of the Russian Government, the Russian Government will repel the enemy, either by means of advice, or by such other means as it may consider proper.
4. The Amir of Afghanistan will not wage war with any foreign power without consulting the Russian Government, and without its permission.
5. The Amir of Afghanistan engages that he will always report in a friendly manner to the Russian Government what goes on in his kingdom.
6. The Amir of Afghanistan will communicate every wish and important affair of his to General Kauffmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, and the Governor-General will be authorized by the Russian Government to fulfil the wishes of the Amir.
7. The Russian Government engages that the Afghan merchants who may trade and sojourn in Russian territory will be safe from wrong, and that they will be allowed to carry away their profits.
8. The Amir of Afghanistan will have the power to send his servants to Russia to learn arts and trades, and the Russian officers will treat them with consideration and respect as men of rank.
9. (Does not remember.)
10. I, Major-General Stolietoff Nicholas, being a trusted Agent of the Russian Government, have made the above-mentioned Articles between the Russian Government and the Government of Amir Sher Ali Khan, and have put my seal to them.
APPENDIX VIII.
(Referred to in Chapter LVIII, Footnote 5.)
_Letter from SIRDAR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN to LEPEL GRIFFIN, ESQ., dated 15th April, 1880._
Whereas at this happy time I have received your kind letter. In a spirit of justice and friendship you wrote to inquire what I wished in Afghanistan. My honoured friend, the servants of the great [British] Government know well that, throughout these twelve years of exile in the territories of the Emperor of Russia, night and day I have cherished the hope of revisiting my native land.
When the late Amir Sher Ali Khan died, and there was no one to rule our tribes, I proposed to return to Afghanistan, but it was not fated [that I should do so]; then I went to Tashkent.
Consequently, Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan, having come to terms and made peace with the British Government, was appointed Amir of Afghanistan; but since, after he had left you, he listened to the advice of every interested [dishonest] person, and raised fools to power, until the ignorant men directed the affairs of Afghanistan, which during the reign of my grandfather, who had eighteen able sons, was so managed that night was bright like day, Afghanistan was, in consequence, disgraced before all States, and ruined. Now, therefore, that you seek to learn my hopes and wishes, they are these: that as long as your Empire and that of Russia exist, my countrymen, the tribes of Afghanistan, should live quietly in ease and peace; that these two States should find us true and faithful, and that we should rest at peace between them [England and Russia], for my tribesmen are unable to struggle with Empires, and are ruined by want of commerce; and we hope of your friendship that, sympathizing with and a.s.sisting the people of Afghanistan, you will place them under the honourable protection of the two Powers. This would redound to the credit of both, would give peace to Afghanistan, and quiet and comfort to G.o.d"s people. This is my wish; for the rest, it is yours to decide.
APPENDIX IX.
(Referred to in Chapter LVIII, Footnote 6.)
_Letter from A. C. LYALL, ESQ., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to LEPEL H. GRIFFIN, Esq., C.S.I., Chief Political Officer, Kabul, dated Simla, April, 1880._
I have the honour to inform you that the Governor-General has received and considered in council your telegrams of the 22nd and 23rd instant, forwarding the translation of a letter received by you from Sirdar Abdur Rahman on the 21st instant, together with a summary of certain oral explanations which accompanied that letter, and a statement of the recommendations suggested by it to Lieutenaut-General Sir Frederick Roberts and yourself.
In conveying to you its instructions on the subject of this important communication, the Government of India considers it expedient to recapitulate the principles on which it has. .h.i.therto been acting in northern Afghanistan, and clearly to define the point of view from which it contemplates the present situation of affairs in that country. The single object to which, as you are well aware, the Afghan policy of this Government has at all times been directed and limited, is the security of the North-West frontier of India. The Government of India has, however, no less invariably held and acted on the conviction that the security of this frontier is incompatible with the intrusion of any foreign influence into the great border State of Afghanistan. To exclude or eject such influence the Government of India has frequently subsidized and otherwise a.s.sisted the Amirs of Kabul. It has also, more than once, taken up arms against them. But it has never interfered, for any other purpose, in the affairs of their kingdom. Regulating on this principle and limiting to this object the conduct of our relations with the rulers of Kabul, it was our long-continued endeavour to find in their friendship and their strength the requisite guarantees for the security of our own frontier. Failing in that endeavour, we were compelled to seek the attainment of the object to which our Afghan policy was, and is still, exclusively directed, by rendering the permanent security of our frontier as much as possible independent of such conditions.
This obligation was not accepted without reluctance. Not even when forced into hostilities by the late Amir Sher Ali Khan"s espousal of a Russian alliance, proposed by Russia in contemplation of a rupture with the British Government, did we relinquish our desire for the renewal of relations with a strong and friendly Afghan Power, and, when the son of Sher Ali subsequently sought our alliance and protection, they were at once accorded to him, on conditions of which His Highness professed to appreciate the generosity. The crime, however, which dissolved the Treaty of Gandamak, and the disclosures which followed that event, finally convinced the Government of India that the interests committed to its care could not but be gravely imperilled by further adhesion to a policy dependent for its fruition on the grat.i.tude, the good faith, the a.s.sumed self-interest, or the personal character of any Afghan Prince.
When, therefore, Her Majesty"s troops re-entered Afghanistan in September last, it was with two well-defined and plainly-avowed objects. The first was to avenge the treacherous ma.s.sacre of the British Mission at Kabul; the second was to maintain the safeguards sought through the Treaty of Gandamak, by providing for their maintenance guarantees of a more substantial and less precarious character.
These two objects have been maintained: the first by the capture of Kabul and the punishment of the crime committed there, the second by the severance of Kandahar from the Kabul power.
Satisfied with their attainment, the Government of India has no longer any motive or desire to enter into fresh treaty engagements with the Rulers of Kabul. The arrangements and exchange of friendly a.s.surances with the Amir Sher Ali, though supplemented on the part of the Government of India by subsidies and favours of various kinds, wholly failed to secure the object of them, which was, nevertheless, a thoroughly friendly one, and no less conducive to the security and advantage of the Afghan than to those of the British Power. The treaty with Yakub Khan, which secured to him our friendship and material support, was equally ineffectual. Moreover, recent events and arrangements have fundamentally changed the situation to which our correspondence and engagements with the Amir of Afghanistan formally applied. Our advance frontier positions at Kandahar and Kuram have materially diminished the political importance of Kabul in relation to India, and although we shall always appreciate the friendship of its Ruler, our relations with him are now of so little importance to the paramount objects of our policy that we no longer require to maintain British agents in any part of his dominions.
Our only reasons, therefore, for not immediately withdrawing our forces from northern Afghanistan have hitherto been--_first_, the excited and unsettled condition of the country round Kabul, with the att.i.tude of hostility a.s.sumed by some leaders of armed gatherings near Ghazni; and, _secondly_, the inability of the Kabul Sirdars to agree among themselves on the selection of a Ruler strong enough to maintain order after our evacuation of the country.
The first-named of these reasons has now ceased to exist. In a minute dated the 30th ultimo the Viceroy and Governor-General stated that "the Government is anxious to withdraw as soon as possible the troops from Kabul and from all points beyond those to be occupied under the Treaty of Gandamak, except Kandahar. In order that this may be done, it is desirable to find a Ruler for Kabul, which will be separated from Kandahar. Steps," continued His Excellency, "are being taken for this purpose. Meanwhile, it is essential that we should make such a display of strength in Afghanistan as will show that we are masters of the situation, and will overawe disaffection."... "All that is necessary, from a political point of view, is for General Stewart to march to Ghazni, break up any opposition he may find there or in the neighbourhood, and open up direct communication with General Sir Frederick Roberts at Kabul." The military operations thus defined have been accomplished by General Stewart"s successful action before Ghazni.
With regard to the second reason mentioned for the retention of our troops in northern Afghanistan, the appearance of Abdur Rahman as a candidate for the throne of Kabul, whose claims the Government of India has no cause to oppose, and who seems to be approved, and likely to be supported, by at least a majority of the population, affords fair ground for antic.i.p.ating that our wishes in regard to the restoration, before our departure, of order in that part of the country will now be fulfilled.
The Governor-General in Council has consequently decided that the evacuation of Kabul shall be effected not later than October next, and it is with special reference to this decision that the letter and message addressed to you by Sirdar Abdur Rahman have been carefully considered by His Excellency in Council.
What first claims notice in the consideration of that letter is the desire that it expresses for the permanent establishment of Afghanistan with our a.s.sistance and sympathy under the joint protection of the British and Russian Empires. This suggestion, which is more fully developed in the Sirdar"s unwritten message, cannot be entertained or discussed.
As already stated, the primary object and declared determination of the Government of India have been the exclusion of foreign influence or interference from Afghanistan. This cardinal condition of amicable relations with Afghanistan has, at all times and in all circ.u.mstances, been deemed essential for the permanent security of Her Majesty"s Indian Empire. As such, it has. .h.i.therto been firmly maintained by successive Governors-General of India under the explicit instructions of Her Majesty"s Government. Nor has it ever been ignored, or officially contested, by the Russian Government. That Government, on the contrary, has repeatedly, and under every recent change of circ.u.mstances in Afghanistan, renewed the a.s.surances solemnly given to the British Government that "Russia considers Afghanistan as entirely beyond the sphere of her influence."
It is true that negotiations at one time pa.s.sed between the two Governments with a view to the mutual recognition of certain territories as const.i.tuting a neutral zone between their respective spheres of legitimate influence and action, and that at one time it was proposed by Russia to treat Afghanistan itself as a neutral territory. Those negotiations, however, having proved fruitless, the northern frontier of Afghanistan was finally determined by mutual agreement, and in 1876 the Russian Government formally reiterated its adherence to the conclusion that, "while maintaining on either side the arrangement come to as regards the limits of Afghanistan, which is to remain outside the sphere of Russian action, the two Cabinets should regard as terminated the discussions relative to the intermediate zone, which promised no practical result."
The position of Afghanistan as defined and settled by these engagements was again distinctly affirmed on behalf of the Queen"s Government by the Marquis of Salisbury in 1879, and the Government of India unreservedly maintains it in the fullest conviction of its essential necessity for the peaceable protection of Her Majesty"s Indian dominions. It is therefore desirable that you should take occasion to inform Abdur Rahman that the relations of Afghanistan to the British and Russian Empires are matters which the Government of India must decline to bring into discussion with the Sirdar. The Afghan states and tribes are too contiguous with India, whose North-Western frontier they surround, for the Government of India ever willingly to accept partnership with any other Power in the exercise of its legitimate and recognized influence over those tribes and States.