History of Free Thought in Reference to The Christian Religion.
by Adam Storey Farrar.
PREFACE.
The object of this Preface is to explain the design of the following Lectures, and to enumerate the sources on which they are founded.
What is the province and mode of inquiry intended in a "Critical History of Free Thought"?(1) What are the causes which led the author into this line of study?(2) What the object proposed by the work?(3) What the sources from which it is drawn?(4)-these probably are the questions which will at once suggest themselves to the reader. The answers to most of them are so fully given in the work,(5) that it will only be necessary here to touch upon them briefly.
The word "free thought" is now commonly used, at least in foreign literature(6), to express the result of the revolt of the mind against the pressure of external authority in any department of life or speculation.
Information concerning the history of the term is given elsewhere.(7) It will be sufficient now to state, that the cognate term, _free thinking_, was appropriated by Collins early in the last century(8) to express Deism.
It differs from the modern term _free thought_, both in being restricted to religion, and in conveying the idea rather of the method than of its result, the freedom of the mode of inquiry rather than the character of the conclusions attained; but the same fundamental idea of independence and freedom from authority is implied in the modern term.
Within the sphere of its application to the Christian religion, free thought is generally used to denote three different systems; viz.
Protestantism, scepticism, and unbelief. Its application to the first of these is unfair.(9) It is true that all three agree in resisting the dogmatism of any earthly authority; but Protestantism reposes implicitly on what it believes to be the divine authority of the inspired writers of the books of holy scripture; whereas the other two forms acknowledge no authority external to the mind, no communication superior to reason and science. Thus, though Protestantism by its att.i.tude of independence seems similar to the other two systems, it is really separated by a difference of kind, and not merely of degree.(10) The present history is restricted accordingly to the treatment of the two latter species of free thought,-the resistance of the human mind to the Christian religion as communicated through revelation, either in part or in whole, neither the scepticism which disintegrates it, or the unbelief which rejects it: the former directing itself especially against Christianity, the latter against the idea of revelation, or even of the supernatural generally.
An a.n.a.logous reason to that which excludes the history of Protestantism, excludes also that of the opposition made to Christianity by heresy, and by rival religions:(11) inasmuch as they repose on authorities, however false, and do not profess to resort to an una.s.sisted study of nature and truth.
This account of the province included under free thought will prepare the way for the explanation of the mode in which the subject is treated.
It is clear that the history, in order to rise above a chronicle, must inquire into the causes which have made freedom of inquiry develop into unbelief. The causes have usually been regarded by theologians to be of two kinds, viz. either superhuman or human; and, if of the latter kind, to be either moral or intellectual. Bishop Van Mildert, in his History of Infidelity, restricted himself entirely to the former.(12) Holding strongly that the existence of evil in the world was attributable, not only indirectly and originally, but directly and perpetually, to the operation of the evil spirit, he regarded every form of heresy and unbelief to be the attempt of an invisible evil agent to thwart the truth of G.o.d; and viewed the history of infidelity as the study of the results of the operation of this cause in destroying the kingdom of righteousness.
Such a view invests human life and history with a very solemn character, and is not without practical value; but it will be obvious that an a.n.a.lysis of this kind must be strictly theological, and removes the inquiry from the province of human science. Even when completed, it leaves unexplored the whole field in which such an evil principle operates, and the agencies which he employs as his instruments.
The majority of writers on unbelief accordingly have treated the subject from a less elevated point of view, and have limited their inquiry to the sphere of the operation of human causes, the _media axiomata_ as it were,(13) which express the motives and agencies which have been manifested on the theatre of the world, and visible in actual history. It will be clear that within this sphere the causes are specially of two kinds; viz. those which have their source in the will, and arise from the antagonism of feeling, which wishes revelation untrue, and those which manifest themselves in the intellect, and are exhibited under the form of difficulties which beset the mind, or doubts which mislead it, in respect to the evidence on which revelation reposes. The former, it may be feared, are generally the ground of unbelief; the latter the basis of doubt.
Christian writers, in the wish to refer unbelief to the source of efficient causation in the human will, with a view of enforcing on the doubter the moral lesson of responsibility, have generally restricted themselves to the former of these two cla.s.ses; and by doing so have omitted to explore the interesting field of inquiry presented in the natural history of the variety of forms a.s.sumed by scepticism, and their relation to the general causes which have operated in particular ages:-a subject most important, if the intellectual antecedents thus discovered be regarded as causes of doubt; and not less interesting, if, instead of being causes, they are merely considered to be instruments and conditions made use of by the emotional powers.
A history of free thought seems to point especially to the study of the latter cla.s.s. A biographical history of free thinkers would imply the former; the investigation of the moral history of the individuals, the play of their will and feelings and character; but the history of free thought points to that which has been the product of their characters, the doctrines which they have taught. Science however no less than piety would decline entirely to separate the two;(14) piety, because, though admitting the possibility that a judgment may be formed in the abstract on free thought, it would feel itself constantly drawn into the inquiry of the moral responsibility of the freethinker in judging of the concrete cases;-science, because, even in an intellectual point of view, the a.n.a.lysis of a work of art is defective if it be studied apart from the personality of the mental and moral character of the artist who produces it. If even the inquiry be restricted to the a.n.a.lysis of intellectual causes, a biographic treatment of the subject, which would allow for the existence of the emotional, would be requisite.(15)
The province of the following work accordingly is, the examination of this neglected branch in the a.n.a.lysis of unbelief. While admitting most fully and unhesitatingly the operation of emotional causes, and the absolute necessity, scientific as well as practical, of allowing for their operation, it is proposed to a.n.a.lyse the forms of doubt or unbelief in reference mainly to the intellectual element which has entered into them, and the discovery of the intellectual causes which have produced or modified them. Thus the history, while not ceasing to belong to church history, becomes also a chapter in the history of philosophy, a page in the history of the human mind.
The enumeration of the causes into which the intellectual elements of doubt are resolvable, is furnished in the text of the first Lecture.(16) If the nature of some of them be obscure, and the reader be unaccustomed to the philosophical study necessary for fully understanding them; information must be sought in the books to which references are elsewhere given, as the subject is too large to be developed in the limited s.p.a.ce of this Preface.
The work however professes to be not merely a narrative, but a "critical history." The idea of criticism in a history imparts to it an ethical aspect. For criticism does not rest content with ideas, viewed as facts, but as realities. It seeks to pa.s.s above the relative, and attain the absolute; to determine either what is right or what is true. It may make this determination by means of two different standards. It may be either independent or dogmatic;-independent if it enters upon a new field candidly and without prepossessions, and rests content with the inferences which the study suggests;-dogmatic, when it approaches a subject with views derived from other sources, and p.r.o.nounces on right or wrong, truth or falsehood, by reference to them.
It is hoped that the reader will not be unduly prejudiced, if the confession be frankly made, that the criticism in these Lectures is of the latter kind. This indeed might be expected from their very character. The Bampton Lecture is an establishment for producing apologetic treatises.
The authors are supposed to a.s.sume the truth of Christianity, and to seek to repel attacks upon it. They are defenders, not investigators. The reader has a right to demand fairness, but not independence; truth in the facts, but not hesitation in the inferences. While however the writer of these Lectures takes a definite line in the controversy, and one not adopted professionally, but with cordial a.s.sent and heartfelt conviction, he has nevertheless considered that it is due to the cause of scientific truth to intermingle his own opinions as little as possible with the facts of the history. A history without inferences is ethically and religiously worthless: it is a chronicle, not a philosophical narrative. But a history distorted to suit the inferences is not only worthless, but harmful. It is for the reader to judge how far the author has succeeded in the result: but his aim has been not to allow his opinions to warp his view of the facts. History ought to be written with the same spirit of cold a.n.a.lysis which belongs to science. Caricature must not be subst.i.tuted for portrait, nor vituperation for description.(17)
Such a mode of treatment in the present instance was the more possible, from the circ.u.mstance that the writer, when studying the subject for his private information, without any design to write upon it, had endeavoured to bring his own principles and views perpetually to the test; and to reconsider them candidly by the light of the new suggestions which were brought before him. Instead of approaching the inquiry with a spirit of hostility, he had investigated it as a student, not as a partisan. It may perhaps be permitted him without egotism to explain the causes which led him to the study. He had taken holy orders, cordially and heartily believing the truths taught by the church of which he is privileged to be an humble minister. Before doing so, he had read thoughtfully the great works of evidences of the last century, and knew directly or indirectly the character of the deist doubts against which they were directed. His own faith was one of the head as well as the heart; founded on the study of the evidences, as well as on the religious training of early years. But he perceived in the English church earnest men who held a different view; and, on becoming acquainted with contemporary theology, he found the theological literature of a whole people, the Germans, constructed on another basis; a literature which was acknowledged to be so full of learning, that contemporary English writers of theology not only perpetually referred to it, but largely borrowed their materials from German sources. He wished therefore fully to understand the character of these new forms of doubt, and the causes which had produced them. He may confess that, reposing on the affirmative verities of the Christian faith, as gathered from the scriptures and embodied in the immemorial teaching of Christ"s church, he did not antic.i.p.ate that he should discover that which would overthrow or even materially modify his own faith; but he wished, while exploring this field, and gratifying intellectual curiosity, to re-examine his opinions at each point by the light of those with which he might meet in the inquiry. The serious wish also to fulfill his duty in the sphere in which he might move, made him desire to understand these new views; that if false, he might know how to refute them when they came before him, and not be first made aware of their existence from the harsh satire of sceptical critics. His own studies were accordingly conducted in a spirit of fairness-the fairness of the inquirer, not of the doubter; and a habit of mind formed by the study of the history of philosophy, was brought to bear upon the investigation of this chapter in church history: first, of modern forms of doubt, and afterwards the consecutive history of unbelief generally. Accordingly, while he hopes that he has taken care to leave the student in no case unguided, who may accompany him in these pages through the history, he has wished to place him, as he strove to place himself, in the position to see the subject in its true light before drawing the inferences; to understand each topic to a certain extent, as it appears when seen from the opposite point of view, as well as when seen from the Christian. And when this has been effected, he has criticised each by a comparison with those principles which form his standard for testing them, the truth of which the study has confirmed to the writer"s own mind. The criticism therefore does not profess to be independent, but dogmatic; but it is hoped that the definite character of the results will not be found to have prevented fairness in the method of inquiry. If the student has the facts correctly, he can form his own judgment on the inferences.
The standard of truth here adopted, as the point of view in criticism, is the teaching of Scripture as expressed in the dogmatic teaching of the creeds of the church; or, if it will facilitate clearness to be more definite, three great truths may be specified, which present themselves to the writer"s mind as the very foundation of the Christian religion: (1) the doctrine of the reality of the vicarious atonement provided by the pa.s.sion of our blessed Lord; (2) the supernatural and miraculous character of the religious revelation in the book of G.o.d; and (3) the direct operation of the Holy Ghost in converting and communing with the human soul. Lacking the first of these, Christianity appears to him to be a religion without a system of redemption; lacking the second, a doctrine without authority; lacking the third, a system of ethics without spiritual power. These three principles accordingly are the measure, by agreement with which the truth and falsehood of systems of free thought are ultimately tested.(18)
The above remarks, together with those which occur in the text, where fuller explanation is afforded, will ill.u.s.trate the province of the inquiry, and the spirit in which it is conducted.(19)
The explanation also of the further question concerning the object which the writer proposed to effect, by the treatment of such a subject in a course of Bampton Lectures, is given so fully elsewhere, that a few words may here suffice in reference to it.(20) Experience of the wants of students in this time of doubt and transition, which those who are practically acquainted with the subject will best understand, as well as observation of the tone of thought expressed in our sceptical literature, led him to believe that a history, natural as well as literary, of doubt; an a.n.a.lysis of the forms and a statement of the intellectual causes of it, would have a value, direct and indirect, in many ways. His desire, he is willing to confess, was to guide the student, rather than to refute the unbeliever. He did not expect to furnish the combatant with ready-made weapons, which would make him omnipotent in conflict; but he hoped to give him some suggestions in reference to the tactics for conducting the contest. The Lectures have a polemical aspect, but they seek to obtain their end by means of the educational. The writer has aimed at a.s.sisting the student, in the struggle with his doubts, in the inquiry for truth, in the quiet meditative search for light and knowledge, preparatory to ministering to others. The survey of a new region, which ordinary works on the history of infidelity rarely touch, may lay bare unsuspected or undetected causes of unbelief; and thus indirectly offer a refutation of it; for intellectual error is refuted, when the origin of it is referred to false systems of thought. The anatomy of error is the first step to its cure.
In another point of view, independently of the value of the line of inquiry generally, and the special suitability of it to individual minds, there is a further use, which in the present day belongs to it in common with all inquiries into the history of thought.
It is hard to persuade the students of a past generation that the historic mode of approaching any problem is the first step toward its successful solution. Yet a little reflection may at least make the meaning of the a.s.sertion understood. If we view the literary characteristic of the present, in comparison with that of past ages, we are perhaps right in stating, that its peculiar feature is the prevalence of the method of historical criticism. If the four centuries since the Renaissance be considered, the critical peculiarity of the sixteenth and seventeenth will be found to be the investigation of ancient literature; in the former directed to _words_, in the latter to _things_. The eighteenth century broke away from the past, and, emanc.i.p.ating itself from authority, tried to rebuild truth from its foundations from present materials, independent of the judgment formed by past ages. The nineteenth century unites both methods. It ventures not to explore the universe, unguided by the experience of the past; but, while reuniting itself to the past, it does not bow to it. It accepts it as a fact, not as an authority. The seventeenth century worshipped the past; the eighteenth despised it: the nineteenth mediates, by means of criticism. Accordingly, in literary investigations at present, each question is approached from the historic side, with the belief that the historico-critical inquiry not only gratifies curiosity, but actually contributes to the solution of the problem. Some indeed a.s.sert(21) this, because they think that the historic study of philosophy is the whole of philosophy; and, believing that all truth is relative to its age, are hopeless of attaining the absolute and unaltering solution of any problem. We, on the other hand, are content to believe that the history of philosophy is only the entrance to philosophy.
But in either case, truth is sought by means of a philosophical history of the past; which, tracking the progress of truth and error in any particular department, lays bare the natural as well as the literary history; the causes of the past, as well as its form. Truth and error are thus discovered, not by breaking with the past, and using abstract speculations on original data, but by tracing the growth of thought, gathering the harvest of past investigations, and learning by experience to escape error.
These considerations bear upon the present subject in this manner: they show not only the special adaptation to the pa.s.sing tastes of the age, of an historic mode of approaching a subject, but exhibit also that the mode of proof and of refutation must be sought, not on abstract grounds, but historic. The position of an enemy is not to be forced, but turned; his premises to be refuted, not his conclusions; the antecedent reasons which led him into his opinion to be exhibited, not merely evidence offered of the fact that he is in error.
This view, that doubt might be refuted by the historic a.n.a.lysis of its operation, by laying bare the antecedent grounds which had produced it, will explain why the author was led to believe that a chapter of mental and moral physiology might be useful, which would not merely carry out the anatomy of actual forms of disease, but discover their origin by the study of the preceding natural history of the patients.
These remarks will perhaps suffice for explaining the object which was proposed in writing this history; and may justify the hope that this work, thus adapted to the wants of the time, may offer such a contribution to the subject of the Christian evidences, as not only to possess an intellectual value, but to coincide with the purpose contemplated by the founder of the Lectures.
It remains to state the sources which have been used for the literary materials of the history. Though they are sufficiently indicated in the notes, a general description of them may be useful.
They may be distributed under four cla.s.ses;
1. The histories which have been professedly devoted to the subject.
2. The notices of the history of unbelief in general histories of the church or of literature.
3. (Which ought indeed to rank first in importance;) the original authorities for the facts, i.e. the works of the sceptical writers themselves; or of the contemporary authors who have refuted them.
4. The monographs, which treat of particular writers, ages, or schools, of sceptical thought.
In approaching the subject, a student would probably commence with the first two cla.s.ses; and after having thus acquired for himself a _carte du pays_, would then explore it in detail by the aid of the third and fourth.
1. The works which have professedly treated of the history of infidelity, as a whole, are not of great importance.
One of the earliest was the _Historia Univ. Atheismi_, 1725, of Reimannus; and the _De Atheismo_, 1737, of Buddeus. (An explanation of the word _Atheism_, as employed by them, is given in Note 21. p. 413.) hey furnish, as the name implies, a history of scepticism, as well as of sceptics; yet, though the labours of such diligent and learned men can never be useless, they afford little information now available. Their date also necessarily precluded them from knowing the more recent forms of unbelief. Perhaps under this head we ought also to name the chapters on polemical theology in the great works of bibliography of the German scholars of the same time, such as Pfaff (_Hist. Litt. Thol._); Buddeus (_Isagoge_); Fabricius (_Delectus Argum._); Walch"s (_Biblical Theol. Select._); which contain lists of sceptical works, either directly, or indirectly by naming the apologists who have answered them. The references to these works will be found in Note 39. p. 436.
Among French writers, the only one of importance is Houtteville, who prefixed an Introduction to his work, _La Religion Chretienne prouvee par des faits_, 1722, containing an account of the writers for and against Christianity from the earliest times. (Translated 1739.) It contains little information concerning the authors or the events, but a clearly and correctly written a.n.a.lysis of their works and thoughts.
Among the English writers who have attempted a consecutive history of the whole subject was Van Mildert, afterwards bishop of Durham, who has been already named. The first volume of his _Boyle Lectures_, in 1802-4, was devoted to the history of infidelity; the second to a general statement of the evidences for Christianity. This work, on account of its date, necessarily stops short before the existence of modern forms of doubt; and indeed evinces no knowledge concerning the contemporary forms of literature in Germany, which had already attracted the attention of Dr.
Herbert Marsh. The point of view of the work, as already described, almost entirely precludes the author from entering upon the a.n.a.lysis of the causes, either emotional or intellectual, which have produced unbelief.
Its value accordingly is chiefly in the literary materials collected in the notes; in which respect it bears marks of careful study. Though mostly drawn from second-hand sources, it exhibits wide reading and thoughtful judgment.
A portion of the Bampton Lectures for 1852, by the Rev. J. C. Riddle, was devoted to the subject of infidelity. The author"s object, as the t.i.tle(22) implies, was to give the natural history of unbelief, to the neglect of the literary. Psychological rather than historical a.n.a.lysis was used by him for the investigation; and his examination of the moral causes of doubt is better than of the intellectual. The notes contain a collection of valuable quotations, which supplement those of Van Mildert, but are unfortunately given, for the most part, without references.
This completes(23) the enumeration of the histories professedly devoted to infidelity, with the exception of a small but very creditable production published since several of these lectures were written, _Defence of the Faith; Part I. Forms of Unbelief_, by the Rev. S. Robins, forming the first part of a work, of which the second is to treat the evidences; the third to draw the moral. It does not profess to be a very deep work;(24) but it is interesting; drawn generally from the best sources, and written in an eloquent style and devout spirit.
2. The transition is natural from these works, which treat of the history of unbelief or give lists of the works of unbelievers, to the notices of sceptical writers contained in general histories of the church or of literature.
In this, as in the former case, it is only in modern times that important notices occur concerning forms of unbelief. The circ.u.mstance that in the early ages unbelief took the form of opposition or persecution on the part of heathens, and that in the middle ages it was so rare, caused the ancient church historians and mediaeval church chroniclers to record little respecting actual unbelief, though they give information about heresy.
Even in modern times, it is not till the early part of the eighteenth century that any attention is bestowed on the subject. The earlier historians, both Protestant, such as the Magdeburg Centuriators, and Catholic, like Baronius, wrote the history of the past for a controversial purpose in relation to the contests of their own times: and in the next period, in the one church, Arnold confined himself to the history of heresy rather than unbelief; and in the other, Fleury and Tillemont wrote the history of deeds rather than of ideas, and afford no information, except in a few allusions of the latter writer to the early intellectual opposition of the heathens.
But about the middle of the eighteenth century, in the period of cold orthodoxy and solid learning which immediately preceded the rise of rationalism, as well as in that of incipient free thought, we meet not only with the historians of theological literature already named above, but with historians of thought like Brucker, and of the church like Mosheim, possessed of large taste for inquiry, and wide literary sympathies, who contribute information on the subject: and towards the close of the century we find Schrockh, who, in his lengthy and careful history of the church since the Reformation,(25) has taken so extensive a view of the nature of church history, that he has included in it an account of the struggle with freethinkers. Among the same cla.s.s, with the exception that he differs in being marked by rationalist sympathies, must be ranked Henke.(26)
In the present century the spread of the scientific spirit, which counts no facts unworthy of notice, together with the attention bestowed on the history of doctrine, and the special interest in understanding the fortunes of free thought, which sympathy in danger created during the rationalist movement, prevented the historians from pa.s.sing lightly over so important a series of facts. It may be sufficient to instance, in proof, the notices of unbelief which occur in Neander"s _Church History_.
General histories also of literature, like Schlosser"s _History of Literature in the Eighteenth Century_, or the more theological one of Hagenbach (_Geschichte des 18__n__ Jahrhunderts_) incidentally afford information.
The various works just named are the chief of this cla.s.s which furnish a.s.sistance.
3. After a general preliminary idea of the history has been obtained from these sources, in order to prevent being confused with details; it is necessary to resort next to the original sources of information, without careful study of which the history must lack a real basis.