"1. Under instructions to be communicated to the proper commanders, troops will disembark in the following order:
"First--The 2d Division, 5th Corps (Lawton"s). The Gatling Gun Detachment will accompany this division.
"Second--Gen. Bates" Brigade. This brigade will form as a reserve to the 2d Division, 5th Corps.
"Third--The dismounted cavalry division (Wheeler"s).
"Fourth--The 1st Division, 5th Corps (Kent"s).
"Fifth--The squadron of the 2d Cavalry (Rafferty"s).
"Sixth--If the enemy in force vigorously resist the landing, the light artillery, or a part of it, will be disembarked by the battalion commander, and brought to the a.s.sistance of the troops engaged. If no serious opposition be offered this artillery will be unloaded after the mounted squadron.
"2. All troops will carry on the person the blanket-roll (with shelter-tent and poncho), three days" field rations (with coffee, ground), canteens filled, and 100 rounds of ammunition per man.
Additional ammunition, already issued to the troops, tentage, baggage, and company cooking utensils will be left under charge of the regimental quartermaster, with one non-commissioned officer and two privates from each company.
"3. All persons not immediately on duty with and const.i.tuting a part of the organizations mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs will remain aboard ship until the landing be accomplished, and until notified they can land.
"4. The chief quartermaster of the expedition will control all small boats and will distribute them to the best advantage to disembark the troops in the order indicated in paragraph 1.
"5. The ordnance officer--2d Lieut. Brooke, 4th Infantry--will put on sh.o.r.e at once 100 rounds of ammunition per man, and have it ready for distribution on the firing-line.
"6. The commanding general wishes to impress officers and men with the crushing effect a well-directed fire will have upon the Spanish troops. All officers concerned will rigidly enforce fire discipline, and will caution their men to fire only when they can be see the enemy.
"By command of Maj.-Gen. Shafter.
"E. J. McClernand, "A. A. G."
The small boats belonging to the Navy and the transports, together with a number of steam launches, furnished by the Navy, were brought alongside and loaded with troops as prescribed in the order just quoted. When Gen. Lawton"s Division was fairly loaded in the small boats, the latter were towed in long lines by the steam launches toward the sh.o.r.e. The sea was somewhat rough, but by the exercise of caution and good judgment the beach was reached and the troops disembarked satisfactorily. As a precaution against a possible attack upon the part of any Spaniards who might have been hidden in the adjacent block-houses and woods, the Navy opened a furious cannonade on these places while the troops were moving toward the sh.o.r.e. It was learned afterward that the Spanish garrison had retired in the direction of Siboney soon after daylight.
By night about 6,000 troops were on sh.o.r.e. Gen. Lawton was ordered to push down a strong force to seize and hold Siboney.
On the 23d the disembarkation was continued and about 6,000 more men landed. Early on this date Gen. Lawton"s advance reached Siboney, the Spanish garrison of about 600 men retiring as he came up, and offering no opposition except a few scattering shots at long range. Some of the Cuban troops pursued the retreating Spaniards and skirmished with them. During the afternoon of this date the disembarkation of Kent"s Division was commenced at Siboney, which enabled me to establish a base eight miles nearer Santiago and to continue the unloading of troops and supplies at both points.
The disembarkation was continued throughout the night of the 23d and 24th, and by the evening of the 24th the disembarkation of my command was practically completed.
PREPARING FOR THE ADVANCE.
The orders for June 24th contemplated Gen. Lawton"s Division taking a strong defensive position a short distance from Siboney, on the road to Santiago; Kent"s Division was to be held near Santiago, where he disembarked; Bates" Brigade was to take position in support of Lawton, while Wheeler"s Division was to be somewhat to the rear on the road from Siboney to Baiquiri. It was intended to maintain this situation until the troops and transportation were disembarked and a reasonable quant.i.ty of necessary supplies landed. Gen. Young"s Brigade, however, pa.s.sed beyond Lawton on the night of the 23d-24th, thus taking the advance, and on the morning of the latter date became engaged with a Spanish force intrenched in a strong position at La Guasima, a point on the Santiago road about three miles from Siboney. Gen. Young"s force consisted of one squadron of the 1st Cavalry, one of the 10th Cavalry, and two of the 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry; in all, 964 officers and men.
The enemy made an obstinate resistance, but were driven from the field with considerable loss. Our own loss was 1 officer and 15 men killed, 6 officers and 46 men wounded. The reported losses of the Spaniards were 9 killed and 27 wounded. The engagement had an inspiring effect upon our men and doubtless correspondingly depressed the enemy, as it was now plainly demonstrated to them that they had a foe to meet who would advance upon them under a heavy fire delivered from intrenchments. Gen. Wheeler, division commander, was present during the engagement and reports that our troops, officers and men, fought with the greatest gallantry. His report is attached, marked "A." This engagement gave us a well-watered country farther to the front on which to encamp our troops.
My efforts to unload transportation and subsistence stores, so that we might have several days" rations on sh.o.r.e, were continued during the remainder of the month. In this work I was ably seconded by Lieut.-Col. Charles F. Humphrey, deputy Q. M. G., U. S. A., chief quartermaster, and Col. John F. Weston, A. O. G. S., chief commissary; hut, notwithstanding the utmost efforts, it was difficult to land supplies in excess of those required daily to feed the men and animals, and the loss of the scow, mentioned as having broken away during the voyage, as well as the loss at sea of lighters sent by Quartermaster"s Department was greatly felt. Indeed, the lack of steam launches, lighters, scows, and wharves can only be appreciated by those who were on the ground directing the disembarkation and landing of supplies. It was not until nearly two weeks after the army landed that it was possible to place on sh.o.r.e three days" supplies In excess of those required for the daily consumption.
After the engagement at La Guasima, and before the end of the month, the army, including Gen. Garcia"s command, which had been brought on transports to Siboney from Aserraderos, was mostly concentrated at Sevilla, with the exception of the necessary detachments at Baiquiri and Siboney.
On June 30th I reconnoitered the country about Santiago and made my plan of attack. From a high hill, from which the city was in plain view, I could see the San Juan Hill and the country about El Caney.
The roads were very poor, and, indeed, little better than bridle-paths until the San Juan River and El Caney were reached.
The position of El Caney, to the northeast of Santiago, was of great importance to the enemy as holding the Guantanamo road, as well as furnishing shelter for a strong outpost that might be used to a.s.sail the right flank of any force operating against San Juan Hill.
In view of this, I decided to begin the attack next day at El Caney with one division, while sending two divisions on the direct road to Santiago, pa.s.sing by the El Pozo house, and as a diversion to direct a small force against Aguadores, from Siboney along the railroad by the sea, with a view of attracting the attention of the Spaniards in the latter direction and of preventing them from attacking our left flank.
During the afternoon I a.s.sembled the division commanders and explained to them my general plan of battle. Lawton"s Division, a.s.sisted by Cap.r.o.n"s Light Battery, was ordered to move out during the afternoon toward El Caney, to begin the attack there early the next morning.
After carrying El Caney, Lawton was to move by the El Caney road toward Santiago, and take position on the right of the line. Wheeler"s Division of dismounted cavalry, and Kent"s Division of infantry, were directed on the Santiago road, the head of the column resting near El Pozo, toward which heights Grimes" Battery moved on the afternoon of the 30th, with orders to take position thereon early the next morning, and at the proper time prepare the way for the advance of Wheeler and Kent, on San Juan Hill. The attack at this point was to be delayed until Lawton"s guns were heard at El Caney and his infantry fire showed he had become well engaged.
The remainder of the afternoon and night was devoted to cutting out and repairing the roads, and other necessary preparations for battle.
These preparations were far from what I desired them to be, but we were in a sickly climate; our supplies had to be brought forward by a narrow wagon road, which the rains might at any time render impa.s.sable; fear was entertained that a storm might drive the vessels containing our stores to sea, thus separating us from our base of supplies; and, lastly, it was reported that Gen. Pando, with 8,000 reinforcements for the enemy, was _en route_ from Manzanillo, and might be expected in a few days. Under these conditions, I determined to give battle without delay.
THE BATTLE OF EL CANEY.
Early on the morning of July 1st, Lawton was in position around El Caney, Chaffee"s Brigade on the right, across the Guantanamo road, Miles" Brigade in the center, and Ludlow"s on the left. The duty of cutting off the enemy"s retreat along the Santiago road was a.s.signed to the latter brigade. The artillery opened on the town at 6:15 a. m.
The battle here soon became general, and was hotly contested. The enemy"s position was naturally strong, and was rendered more so by block-houses, a stone fort, and intrenchments cut in solid rock, and the loop-holing of a solidly built stone church. The opposition offered by the enemy was greater than had been antic.i.p.ated, and prevented Lawton from joining the right of the main line during the day, as had been intended. After the battle had continued for some time, Bates" Brigade of two regiments reached my headquarters from Siboney. I directed him to move near El Caney, to give a.s.sistance if necessary. He did so, and was put in position between Miles and Chaffee. The battle continued with varying intensity during most of the day and until the place was carried by a.s.sault about 4:30 p. m. As the Spaniards endeavored to retreat along the Santiago road, Ludlow"s position enabled him to do very effective work, and to practically cut off all retreat in that direction.
After the battle at El Caney was well opened, and the sound of the small-arm fire caused us to believe that Lawton was driving the enemy before him, I directed Grimes" Battery to open fire from the heights of El Pozo on the San Juan block-house, which could be seen situated in the enemy"s intrenchments extending along the crest of San Juan Hill. This fire was effective, and the enemy could be seen running away from the vicinity of the block-house. The artillery fire from El Pozo was soon returned by the enemy"s artillery. They evidently had the range of this hill, and their first sh.e.l.ls killed and wounded several men. As the Spaniards used smokeless powder, it was very difficult to locate the position of their pieces, while, on the contrary, the smoke caused by our black powder plainly indicated the position of our battery.
At this time the cavalry division, under Gen. Sumner, which was lying concealed in the general vicinity of the El Pozo house, was ordered forward with directions to cross the San Juan River and deploy to the right of the Santiago side, while Kent"s Division was to follow closely in its rear and deploy to the left.
These troops moved forward in compliance with orders, but the road was so narrow as to render it impracticable to retain the column of fours formation at all points, while the undergrowth on either side was so dense as to preclude the possibility of deploying skirmishers. It naturally resulted that the progress made was slow, and the long-range rifles of the enemy"s infantry killed and wounded a number of our men while marching along this road, and before there was any opportunity to return this fire. At this time Generals Kent and Sumner were ordered to push forward with all possible haste and place their troops in position to engage the enemy. Gen. Kent, with this end in view, forced the head of his column alongside of the cavalry column as far as the narrow trail permitted, and thus hurried his arrival at the San Juan and the formation beyond that stream. A few hundred yards before reaching the San Juan the road forks, a fact that was discovered by Lieut.-Col. Derby of my staff, who had approached well to the front in a war balloon. This information he furnished to the troops, resulting in Sumner moving on the right-hand road, while Kent was enabled to utilize the road to the left.
Gen. Wheeler, the permanent commander of the cavalry division, who had been ill, came forward during the morning, and later returned to duty and rendered most gallant and efficient service during the remainder of the day.
After crossing the stream, the cavalry moved to the right with a view of connecting with Lawton"s left, when he could come up, and with their left resting near the Santiago road.
In the meantime Kent"s Division, with the exception of two regiments of Hawkins" Brigade, being thus uncovered, moved rapidly to the front from the forks previously mentioned in the road, utilizing both trails, but more especially the one to the left, and, crossing the creek, formed for attack in front of San Juan Hill. During the formation the 2d Brigade suffered severely. While personally superintending this movement, its gallant commander, Col. Wikoff, was killed. The command of the brigade then devolved upon Lieut.-Col.
Worth, 13th Infantry, who was soon severely wounded, and next upon Lieut.-Col. Lisc.u.m, 24th Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fell under the terrible fire of the enemy, and the command of the brigade then devolved upon Lieut.-Col. Ewers, 9th Infantry.
While the formation just described was taking place, Gen. Kent took measures to hurry forward his rear brigade. The 10th and 2d Infantry were ordered to follow. Wikoff"s Brigade, while the 21st was sent on the right-hand road to support the 1st Brigade, under Gen. Hawkins, who had crossed the stream and formed on the right of the division.
The 2d and 10th Infantry, Col. E. P. Pearson commanding, moved forward in good order on the left of the division, pa.s.sed over a green knoll, and drove the enemy back toward his trenches.
After completing their formation under a destructive fire, and advancing a short distance, both divisions found in their front a wide bottom, in which had been placed a barbed-wire entanglement, and beyond which there was a high hill, along the crest of which the enemy was strongly posted. Nothing daunted, these gallant men pushed on to drive the enemy from his chosen position, both divisions losing heavily. In this a.s.sault Col. Hamilton, Lieuts. Smith and Shipp were killed, and Col. Carroll, Lieuts. Thayer and Myer, all in the cavalry, were wounded.
Great credit is due to Brig.-Gen. H. S. Hawkins, who, placing himself between his regiments, urged them on by voice and bugle calls to the attack so brilliantly executed.
In this fierce encounter words fail to do justice to the gallant regimental commanders and their heroic men, for, while the generals indicated the formations and the points of attack, it was, after all, the intrepid bravery of the subordinate officers and men that planted our colors on the crest of San Juan Hill and drove the enemy from his trenches and block-houses, thus gaining a position which sealed the fate of Santiago.
_In this action on this part of the field most efficient service was rendered by Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, and the Gatling Gun Detachment under his command. The fighting continued at intervals until nightfall, but our men held resolutely to the positions gained at the cost of so much blood and toil._
I am greatly indebted to Gen. Wheeler, who, as previously stated, returned from the sick-list to duty during the afternoon. His cheerfulness and aggressiveness made itself felt on this part of the battle-field, and the information he furnished to me at various stages of the battle proved to be most useful.
THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO.
My own health was impaired by overexertion in the sun and intense heat of the day before, which prevented me from partic.i.p.ating as actively in the battle as I desired; but from a high hill near my headquarters I had a general view of the battle-field, extending from El Caney on the right to the left of our lines on San Juan Hill. His staff officers were stationed at various points on the field, rendering frequent reports, and through them, by the means of orderlies and the telephone, I was enabled to transmit my orders. During the afternoon I visited the position of Grimes" Battery on the heights of El Pozo, and saw Sumner and Kent in firm possession of San Juan Hill, which I directed should be intrenched during the night. My engineer officer, Lieut.-Col. Derby, collected and sent forward the necessary tools, and during the night trenches of very considerable strength were constructed.