To-day, however, in Germany the most enthusiastic advocates of the U-boat warfare are beginning to see that this means to victory will not be decisive, and I trust that the mistaken idea that England within a few months will be forced to sue for peace will lose ground in Berlin too. Nothing is more dangerous in politics than to believe the things one wishes to believe; nothing is more fatal than the principle not to wish to see the truth and to fall a prey to Utopian illusions from which sooner or later a terrible awakening will follow.
England, the motive power in the war, will not be compelled to lay down her arms in a few months" time, but perhaps--and here I concede a limited success to the U-boat scheme--perhaps England in a few months will ask herself whether it is wise and sensible to continue this war _a l"outrance_, or whether it would not be more statesmanlike to set foot upon the golden bridges the Central Powers must build for her, and then the moment will have come for great and painful sacrifices on the part of the Central Powers.
Your Majesty has rejected the repeated attempts of our enemies to separate us from our Allies, in which step I took the responsibility because Your Majesty is incapable of any dishonourable action. But at the same time, Your Majesty instructed me to notify the statesmen of the German Empire that our strength is at an end, and that after the close of the summer Germany must not reckon on us any longer. I carried out these commands and the German statesmen left me in no doubt that for Germany, too, another winter campaign would be impossible. In this one sentence may be summed up all that I have to say:
We can still wait some weeks and try if there is any possibility of dealing with Paris or Petersburg. If that does not succeed, then we must--and at the right time--play our last card and make the extreme proposals I have already hinted at. Your Majesty has proved that you have no selfish plans and that you do not expect from your German Ally sacrifices that Your Majesty would not be ready to make yourself. More than that cannot be expected.
Your Majesty, nevertheless, owes it to G.o.d and to your peoples to make every effort to avert the catastrophe of a collapse of the Monarchy; it is your sacred duty to G.o.d and to your peoples to defend those peoples, the dynastic principle and your throne with all the means in your power and to your very last breath.
On May 11 there came the following official answer from the Imperial Chancellor, which was sent by the German Emperor to the Emperor Charles, and then to me:--
In accordance with Your Majesty"s commands I beg most humbly to submit the following in answer to the enclosed _expose_ from the Imperial and Royal Minister for Foreign Affairs of 12th ult.
Since the _expose_ was drawn up, the French and English on the Western front have carried out the predicted great offensive on a wide front, ruthlessly sacrificing ma.s.ses of men and an enormous quant.i.ty of war material. The German army checked the advance of the numerically superior enemy; further attacks, as we have every reason to believe, will also be shattered by the heroism of the men and the iron will of their leaders.
Judging from all our experiences. .h.i.therto in the war, we may consider the situation of the Allied armies on the Isonzo with the same confidence.
The Eastern front has been greatly reduced owing to the political upheaval in Russia. There can be no question of an offensive on a large scale on the part of Russia. A further easing of the situation would release more men even if it were considered necessary to have a strong barrier on the Russian frontier to guard against local disturbances owing to the revolutionary movement. With the additional forces, the conditions in the West would become more favourable for us. The withdrawal of men would also provide more troops for the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy for the successful carrying out of the fighting on the Italian front until the end of the war is reached.
In both Allied Monarchies there is an ample supply of raw material for the manufacture of munitions. Our situation as regards provisions is such that with the greatest economy we can hold out until the new harvest. The same applies to Austria-Hungary, especially if her share of the supplies from Roumania are taken into consideration.
The deeds of our navy rank beside the successes of the army. When Admiral von Holtzendorff was permitted to lay before His Apostolic Majesty the plans for the U-boat warfare, the prospects of success for this stringent measure had been thoroughly tested here and the expected military advantages weighed against the political risk.
We did not conceal from ourselves that the infliction of a blockade of the coasts of England and France would bring about the entry into war of the United States and, consequently, a falling off of other neutral states. We were fully aware that our enemies would thus gain a moral and economic renewal of strength, but we were, and still are, convinced that the disadvantages of the U-boat warfare are far surpa.s.sed by its advantages. The largest share in the world struggle which began in the East has now been transferred to the West in ever increasing dimensions, where English tenacity and endurance promote and strengthen the resistance of our enemies by varied means. A definite and favourable result for us could only be achieved by a determined attack on the vital spot in the hostile forces; that is, England.
The success obtained and the effect already produced by the U-boat warfare far exceed all calculations and expectations. The latest statements of leading men in England concerning the increasing difficulty in obtaining provisions and the stoppage of supplies, as well as corresponding comments in the Press, not only include urgent appeals to the people to put forth their utmost strength, but bear also the stamp of grave anxiety and testify to the distress that England is suffering.
The Secretary of State, Helfferich, at a meeting of the Head Committee of the Reichstag on the 28th ult., gave a detailed account of the effects of the U-boat warfare on England. The review was published in the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_ of the 1st inst. I beg herewith to refer to the enclosed.[8]
According to the latest news the Food Controller, Lord Rhondda, owing to the inadequate supply of corn, has been compelled to specify a new allotment of cargo s.p.a.ce. This is already so restricted that more room for corn can only be secured by hindering the conduct of the war in other ways. Apart from abandoning overseas traffic, vessels could only be released by cutting down such imports as absorbed much s.p.a.ce. England requires not only great transport facilities for provisions but also for the import of ore to keep up war industries, and also pit props to enable the coal output to be kept at a high level. In the case of the ore needed for England and the wood available in the country, it is not possible to restrict the cargo s.p.a.ce in these two instances. Already, after three months of the U-boat warfare, it is a fact that the shortage of cargo s.p.a.ce caused by the U-boats reduces the living conditions of the population to an unbearable extent, and paralyses all war industries, so much so that the hope of defeating Germany by superior stores of munitions and a greater number of guns has had to be given up. The lack of transport facilities will also prevent the larger output of war industries in America making up for the lesser output in England. The speed with which the U-boat warfare has destroyed vessels excludes the possibility of building new vessels to furnish adequate cargo s.p.a.ce. More vessels have been destroyed in a month of U-boat warfare than the English dockyards have turned out in the last year. Even the thousand much-talked-of American wooden vessels, if they were there, would only cover the losses of four months. But they will not come before it is too late. English experts on the subject have already said quite openly that there are only two ways of counteracting the effect of the U-boats: either to build vessels quicker than the Germans destroy them, or else to destroy the U-boats quicker than the Germans can build them. The first has proved to be impossible, and the U-boat losses are far less than the new vessels building.
England will also have to reckon on a progressive rise in the loss of tonnage.
The effects of the U-boat warfare on the people"s provisions and on all private and Government activities will be felt more and more.
I antic.i.p.ate, therefore, the final results of the U-boat warfare with the greatest confidence.
According to secret but reliable information, the Prime Minister Ribot recently stated to the Italian Amba.s.sador in Paris that France was faced with exhaustion. This opinion was expressed before the beginning of the last Franco-English offensive. Since then, France has sacrificed life to a terrible extent by keeping up the intensity of the fighting until the offensive ceased.
The French nation is certainly doing marvellous things in this war, but the Government cannot sustain the enormous burden after it reaches a certain limit. A reaction in the temper of France, which is kept up by artificial means, is inevitable.
As regards our own internal situation, I do not under-estimate the difficulties presented by the inevitable results of the severe fighting and the exclusion from the seas. But I firmly believe that we shall succeed in overcoming these difficulties without permanently endangering the nation"s strength and general welfare, without any further crises and without menace to Government organisation.
Although we are justified in viewing the total situation in a favourable light, I am nevertheless in complete agreement with Count Czernin in pursuing the aim of bringing about as speedily as possible an honourable and, in the interests of the Empire and of our Allies, just peace. I also share his opinion that the important factor of the weakening of Russia must be exploited, and that a fresh tentative offer for peace must be put forward at a time when both political and military initiative are still in our hands. Count Czernin estimates a suitable time will be in two or three months, when the enemy offensive will be at an end. As a matter of fact, in view of the French and English expectations of the decisive success for their offensive, and the Entente not having lost all hopes of Russia resuming her activities, any too p.r.o.nounced preparations for peace would not only be doomed to failure, but would put new life into the enemy by revealing the hopeless exhaustion of the Central Powers" forces. At the present moment a general peace could only be bought by our submission to the will of the enemy. A peace of that nature would not be tolerated by the people and would lead to fatal dangers for the Monarchy. It appears to me that quiet determination and caution as regards the outer world are more than ever an imperative necessity. The development of affairs in Russia has. .h.i.therto been favourable for us. Party disputes are kept more and more within the narrow limits of peace and war questions by political, economic and social exigencies, and the impression grows every day that the party which makes for peace with the Central Powers will be the one to remain in power. It is our solemn duty carefully to follow and encourage the process of development and disruption in Russia and to sound the country, not with too obvious haste, but yet with sufficient expert skill to lead to practical peace negotiations. The probability is that Russia will avoid any appearance of treachery towards her Allies, and will endeavour to find a method which will practically lead to a state of peace between herself and the Central Powers, but outwardly will have the appearance of the union of both parties as a prelude to the general peace.
As in July, 1914, we entered regardlessly into a loyal alliance with Austria-Hungary, in like manner when the world war is at an end will a basis be found for terms which will guarantee a prosperous peace to the two closely united Monarchies.
This optimistic reply of Bethmann"s was obviously not only based on the idea of infusing more confidence in the future in us, but was also the true expression of a more favourable atmosphere prevailing, as Berlin naturally received the same reports from the enemy countries as we did.
I received about that time a letter from Tisza which contained the following pa.s.sage:--
The varied information received from the enemy countries leaves no doubt that the war is drawing to a close. It is now above all essential to keep a steady nerve and play the game to the end with _sangfroid_. Let there be no signs of weakness. It is not from a love of humanity in general that our enemies have become more peacefully inclined, but because they realise that we cannot be crushed.
I beg of you no longer to give vent to the sentiments in your report of April 12. A pessimistic tendency evinced now by the leader of our foreign affairs would ruin everything. I know that you are prudent, but I beg you to use your influence so that both His Majesty and his entourage may show a confident front to the world. And again, no one will have anything to say to us if they cease to believe in our powers of resistance--and are not persuaded that our Alliance rests on a solid foundation.
It was evident that the only right tactics were to make the supremest efforts at the front and throughout the country, on the one hand, in order to hold the situation a little longer, and, on the other, to persuade the enemy that, in spite of the favourable situation, we were prepared for peace without conquest. To appoint Hebel to the German military Commission to carry out this last procedure seemed devoid of sense. Neither did I expect to gain much from recent intervention in the Wilhelmstra.s.se, and endeavoured therefore to put myself in direct touch with the German Reichstag.
One of my political friends who had numerous and excellent connections with the German Reichstag put himself into communication with different leaders in Berlin and explained to them the situation in the Monarchy. It was understood that this gentleman was not acting for the Ministry, but presenting his own impressions and views. He was enjoined to be very cautious, as any indiscretion might have incalculable consequences. If the Entente were to imagine that we were thinking of ending the war, not for love of peace but because we simply could not hold out any longer, all efforts would have been vain. In that respect, Tisza was perfectly right. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary that the person to whom this delicate mission had been entrusted should act in such a manner as would keep it a secret from the Entente, a manner devoid of weakness and uniting confidence with reasonable war aims, but also in a manner which would enable the Ministry eventually to disavow the advances.
My friend undertook the task with just as great zeal as efficiency and, in brief, this is what he told the Berlin leaders, Erzberger[9]
and Sudek.u.m in particular. As far as he could judge, we had now reached a turning point. The next few weeks would decide whether it was to be peace or war _a l"outrance_. France was tired and not anxious for America"s entry into the war if it was not to be the latter. If Germany forced the Entente to continue the war the situation would be very grave. Neither Austria-Hungary nor Turkey could do more. Germany, by herself, could not bring the war to a successful end. Austria-Hungary"s position was obvious to the whole world. She was ready to make peace without annexations and without war compensation, and to devote all her energies to preventing the recurrence of a war. (Austria-Hungary"s standpoint was that a universal, equal, but extensive disarmament on sea and on land offered the only means to restore the financial situation in Europe after the war.)
Germany must publicly notify her position just as clearly as Austria-Hungary had done and must declare the following:
(1) No annexations, no indemnities.
(2) Particularly the unconditional and total release of Belgium (politically and economically).
(3) All territories occupied by Germany and Austria-Hungary to be evacuated as soon as both those States had had their territories restored to them (including the German colonies).
(4) Germany, as well as Austria-Hungary, to work for a general disarmament and guarantee that no further war be possible.
Such declaration to be a joint one from the German Government and the Reichstag, and to be made public.
The peace resolution of July 19, 1917, was the result of this step.
The Imperial Chancellor Bethmann was the first victim. The Supreme Military Command, by whom he always had been persecuted, now trying to secure his dismissal, declared such resolution to be unacceptable.
When Bethmann had gone and Michaelis had been appointed, they were satisfied.
Although the resolution in itself was satisfactory, it had one fault at the start. It was no secret that everyone connected with Pan-Germanism, especially the German generals, disagreed with the decision, and would not accept the resolution as coming from the entire country. Certainly the great majority in Germany, counting them per head, supported the resolution but the leading men, together with a considerable following, were opposed to it. The "Starvation Peace,"
the "Peace of Renunciation," and the "Scheidemann Peace" were the subjects of articles in the papers expressing the greatest disapproval of the resolution. Neither did the German Government take up any decided att.i.tude. On July 19 the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis made a speech approving the resolution, but adding "as I understand it."
The Imperial Chancellor wrote a letter to me in August confirming his very optimistic views of the situation, and defining Germany"s views regarding Belgium. The phrase, "as I understand it," above alluded to in his approval of the resolution, was explained in his letter, at any rate, as to the Belgium question: "As Germany wishes to reserve to herself the right to exercise a far-reaching military and economic influence on Belgium." He wrote as follows:--
_Berlin, August 17, 1917._
DEAR COUNT CZERNIN,--According to our agreement, I take the liberty briefly to lay before you my views of our discussions of the 14th and 15th inst., and would be extremely grateful if Your Excellency would be so kind as to advise me of your views on my activities.
The internal economic and political situation in Germany justifies me in the firm belief that Germany herself would be able to stand a fourth year of war. The bread-corn harvest promises better than we thought five or six weeks ago, and will be better than that of the previous year. The potato harvest promises a considerably higher yield than in 1916-17. Fodder is estimated to be much less than last year; by observing a unified and well-thought-out economic plan for Germany herself and the occupied territories, including Roumania, we shall be in a position to hold out with regard to fodder, as was also possible in the very dry year 1915.
There is no doubt that the political situation is grave. The people are suffering from the war, and the longing for peace is very great; however, there is no trace of any general and really morbid exhaustion, and when food is controlled any work done will be no worse than it was last year.
This economic and political prospect can only be altered if the condition of the Allies, or of the neutrals, under pressure from the Entente, should become very much worse. It would be a change for the worse for us if our Allies or the neutral states, contrary to our expectations and hopes, were to experience such shortage as would cause them to turn to us. To a certain extent, this is already the case; a further increase of their claims would greatly prejudice our economic position and in certain cases endanger it.
It must be admitted that the situation in the fourth year of war in general is more difficult than in the third year. The most earnest endeavours, therefore, will be made to bring about a peace as soon as possible.
Nevertheless, our genuine desire for peace must not lead us to come forward with a fresh peace proposal. That, in my opinion, would be a great tactical error. Our _demarche_ for peace last December found sympathy in the neutral states, but it was answered by our adversaries raising their demands. A fresh step of the kind would be put down to our weakness and would prolong the war; any peace advances must come now from the enemy.
The leading motive in my foreign policy will always be the watchful care of our Alliance with Austria-Hungary that the storm of war has made still stronger, and a trusting, friendly and loyal co-operation with the leading men of the Allied Monarchy. If the spirit of the Alliance--and in this I know Your Excellency agrees--remains on the same high level as heretofore, even our enemies would see that it was impossible for one of the Allies to agree to any separate negotiations offered to him, unless he states beforehand that the discussion would only be entered into if the object were a general peace. If this were clearly laid down there could be no reason why one of the Allies should not listen to such proposal from the enemy and with him discuss preparations for peace.
At present no decided line of action can be specified for such a proceeding. Your Excellency was good enough to ask me whether the reinstatement of the _status quo_ would be a suitable basis on which to start negotiations. My standpoint in this matter is as follows: I have already stated in the Reichstag that Germany is not striving for any great changes in power after the war, and is ready to negotiate provided the enemy does not demand the cession of any German territory; with such a conception of the term "reinstatement of the _status quo_," that form would be a very suitable basis for negotiations. This would not exclude the desired possibility of retaining the present frontiers, and by negotiating bring former enemy economic territory into close economic and military conjunction with Germany--this would refer to Courland, Lithuania and Poland--and thus secure Germany"s frontiers and give a guarantee for her vital needs on the continent and overseas.