Germany is ready to evacuate the occupied French territory, but must reserve to herself the right, _by means of the peace negotiations, to the economic exploitation of the territory of Longwy and Briey_, if not through direct incorporation, by a legal grant to exploit. We are not in a position to cede to France any noteworthy districts in Alsace-Lorraine.
I should wish to have a free hand in the negotiations in the matter of _connecting Belgium with Germany in a military and economic sense_. The terms that I read out, taken from notes at the Kreuznach negotiations--the military control of Belgium until the conclusion of a defensive and offensive Alliance with Germany, the acquisition of Liege (or a long-term rental thereof)--were the maximum claims of the Supreme Military and Naval Command. The Supreme Military Command agrees with me that these terms or similar ones can only be secured if peace can be enforced on England. But we are of opinion that a vast amount of economic and military influence must be brought to bear in Belgium in the matter of the negotiations and would perhaps not meet with much resistance, because Belgium, from economic distress, will come to see that her being joined to Germany is the best guarantee for a prosperous future.
As regards Poland, I note that the confidential hint from Your Excellency to give up Galicia and enrol it in the new Polish State is subject to the ceding of portions of Alsace-Lorraine to France, which was to be as a counter-sacrifice, but must be considered as out of the question. The development of Poland as an independent State must be carried out in the sense of the proclamation of November 5, 1916. Whether this development will prove to be an actual advantage for Germany or will become a great danger for the future will be tested later. There are already many signs of danger, and what is particularly to be feared is that the Austro-Hungarian Government cannot notify us now during the war of her complete indifference to Poland and leave us a free hand in the administration of the whole state.
It will also remain to be seen whether, in view of the danger caused to Germany and also to her relations with Austria-Hungary through Poland"s unwillingness to accept the situation, it would not be more desirable politically for Germany, while retaining the frontier territory as being necessary for military protection, to grant to Poland full right of self-determination, also with the possibility of being joined to Russia.
The question of the annexation of Roumania, according to the Kreuznach debate of May 1, must be treated further and solved in connection with the questions that are of interest to Germany respecting Courland, Lithuania and Poland.
It was a special pleasure to me to meet you, dear Count Czernin, here in Berlin and to discuss openly and frankly with you the questions that occupy us at present. I hope in days to come there may be an opportunity for a further exchange of thoughts enabling us to solve problems that may arise, and carry them out in full agreement.
With the expression of my highest esteem, I remain your very devoted
MICHAELIS.
I replied to the Chancellor that I welcomed, as a matter of course, the agreement to maintain complete frankness, but remarked that I could not share his optimism. I explained that the increasing war-weariness, both in Germany and in Austria-Hungary, rendered it imperative to secure peace in good time, that is, before any revolutionary signs appeared, for any beginning of disturbances would spoil the chance of peace. The German point of view in the case of Belgium seemed to me quite mistaken, as neither the Entente nor Belgium would ever consent to the terms. I could not, therefore, conceal from him that his point of view was a serious obstacle to peace; that it was also in direct opposition to the Reichstag view, and I failed to understand it.
I then spoke of the necessity of coming to an understanding as to the minimum of the war aims in which an important part is played by the question whether and how we can achieve a voluntary and peaceable annexation of Poland and Roumania by the Central Powers.
I finally again pointed out that I interpreted the views of the German Reichstag as demanding a peace without annexation or indemnity, and that it would be out of the question for the German Government to ignore the unanimous decision of the Reichstag. It was not a question of whether we _wished_ to go on fighting, but whether we _could_, and it was my duty to impress upon him in time that we were bound to end the war.
Dr. Michaelis was more given to Pan-Germanism than his predecessor.
It was astonishing to what degree the Pan-Germans misunderstood the situation. They disliked me so intensely that they avoided me, and I had very few dealings with them. They were not to be converted. I remember one instance, when a representative of that Party called on me in Vienna to explain to me the conditions under which his group was prepared to conclude peace: the annexation of Belgium, of a part of east France (Longwy and Briey), of Courland and Lithuania, the cession of the English Fleet to Germany, and I forget how many milliards in war indemnity, etc. I received this gentleman in the presence of the Amba.s.sador von Wiesner, and we both agreed that it was purely a case for a doctor.
There was a wide breach between the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis"s ideas and our own. It was impossible to bridge it over. Soon after he left office to make way for the statesmanlike Count Hertling.
About this time very far-reaching events were being enacted behind the scenes which had a very p.r.o.nounced influence on the course of affairs.
Acts of great indiscretion and interference occurred on the part of persons who, without being in any important position, had access to diplomatic affairs. There is no object here in mentioning names, especially as the responsible political leaders themselves only heard the details of what had happened much later, and then in a very unsatisfactory way--at a time when the pacifist tendencies of the Entente were slackening.[10]
It was impossible then to see clearly in such a labyrinth of confused and contradictory facts. The truth is that in the spring or early summer of 1917 leading statesmen in the countries of the Allies and of the Entente gathered the impression that the existence of the Quadruple Alliance was at an end. At the very moment when it was of the utmost importance to maintain secrecy concerning the conditions of our Alliance the impression prevailed, and, naturally, the Entente welcomed the first signs of disruption in the Quadruple Alliance.
I do not know if the opportunity will ever occur of throwing a clear light on all the proceedings of those days. To explain the further development it will suffice to confirm what follows here. This is what happened. In the spring of 1917 connecting links were established with Paris and London. The first impressions received were that the Western Powers were ready to make use of us as a bridge to Germany and to a general peace. At a somewhat later stage the wind veered and the Entente endeavoured to make a separate peace with us.
Several important details only came to my knowledge later, some at the time of my resignation in the spring of 1918, and some not until the collapse in the winter of 1918-19. There was no lack of voices to blame me for a supposed double policy, which the public also suspected, and to accuse me of having made different statements to Berlin from those I made in Paris. These charges were brought by personal enemies who deliberately slandered me, which tales were repeated by others who knew nothing about the affair. The fact is that when I heard of the episode I immediately _possessed myself of doc.u.ments proving that not only did I know nothing whatever about the matter_, but could not possibly have known.
Astronomical causes sometimes give rise to disturbances in the universe, the reason of which cannot be understood by the observer. I felt in the same way, without being able to prove anything definite, from certain signs that I noticed, that in those worlds on the other side of the trenches events were happening that were inexplicable to me. I felt the effect, but could not discover the cause. In the spirit of the Entente, now more favourably disposed for peace, an undertone was distinctly audible. There was anxiety and a greater inclination for peace than formerly, but again probably only in view of the alleged laxity of our Alliance conditions and the hopes of the downfall of the Quadruple Alliance. A friend of mine, a subject of a neutral state, wrote to me from Paris in the summer and told me he had heard from a reliable source that apparently at the Quai d"Orsay they expected the Monarchy to separate from Germany, which, as a matter of course, would alter the entire military situation.
Soon afterwards very secret information was received from a neutral country that a Bulgarian group was negotiating with the Entente behind the back and without the knowledge of Radoslawoff. As soon as suspicion of a breach in the Alliance had been aroused in our Allies, the Bulgarian party hastened to forestall the event. We felt as safe about Radoslawoff as about Talaat Pasha; but in both countries other forces were at work.
The suspicions aroused in our friends concerning our plans were a further disadvantage, certainly only of a technical nature, but yet not to be underestimated. Our various agents worked splendidly, but it lay in the nature of the case that their dealings were more protracted than those carried out by the Foreign Minister himself. According to the course taken by the conversations, they were obliged to seek fresh instructions; they were more tied, and therefore forced to a.s.sume a more halting att.i.tude than a responsible leader would have to do. In the summer of 1917, therefore, I suggested going to Switzerland myself, where negotiations were proceeding. But my journey could not have been kept secret, and if an effort had been made to do so it would have been all the more certain to arouse suspicion, owing to the mistrust already awakened. But not in Berlin. I believe I still held the confidence of the leading men in Berlin sufficiently to avert that. I should have explained the situation to the Imperial Chancellor, and that would have sufficed. In Turkey and Bulgaria the case was different.
One party in Bulgaria favoured the Entente. If Bulgaria was under the impression that our group was falling asunder she would have staked everything to try and save herself by a separate peace. In Constantinople, too, there was an Entente group. Talaat and Enver were as reliable as they were strong. But a journey undertaken by me to Switzerland in the conditions described might prove to be the alarm signal for a general _sauve qui peut_. But the very suggestion that the two Balkan countries would act as they supposed we should do would have sufficed to destroy any attempt at peace in Paris and London.
The willingness to prepare for peace on the part of the enemy declined visibly during the summer. It was evident from many trifling signs, separately of small import, collectively of much. In the summer of 1917, too, the first horror of the U-boat warfare began to grow less.
It was seen by the enemy that it could not accomplish what he had first feared, and that again put life into the desire for a final military victory.
These two facts together probably contributed to fan back the peace wind blowing from the West. Among other things, the Armand-Revertera negotiations were proceeding the whole time. It is not yet the moment to speak of the negotiations which in the spring of 1918, together with the letters of the Emperor to Prince Sixtus, created such a sensation. But this much must be stated: that Revertera in the negotiations proved himself to be an equally correct as efficient agent who acted exactly according to the instructions he received from the Ballplatz. Our various attempts to take up the threads of peace when emanating from the Ballplatz were always intended for our entire group of Powers.
Naturally, it was not in the interests of the Entente to _prevent_ us from separating from Germany, and when the impression was produced in London and Paris unofficially that we were giving Germany up, we ourselves thus used _sabotage_ in the striving for a general peace; for it would, of course, have been pleasing to the Entente to see Germany, her chief enemy, isolated.
There was a twofold and terrible mistake in thus trifling with the idea of a separate peace. First of all, it could not release us from the terms of the Pact of London, and yet it spoiled the atmosphere for negotiating a general peace. At the time when these events were being enacted, I presumed, but only knew for certain later, that Italy, in any case, would claim the promises made to her.
In the spring of 1917 Ribot and Lloyd George conferred with Orlando on the subject, when at St. Jean de Maurienne, and endeavoured to modify the terms in case of our separating from Germany. Orlando refused, and insisted on his view that, even in the event of a separate peace, we should still have to yield up Trieste and the Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pa.s.s to Italy, and thus have to pay an impossible price. And secondly, these separatist tactics would break up our forces, and had already begun to do so.
When a person starts running away in a fight he but too easily drags others with him. I do not doubt that the Bulgarian negotiations, opened with the purpose of taking soundings, were connected with the foregoing events.
The effect of this well-meant but secret and dilettante policy was that we suggested to the Entente a willingness to separate from our Allies, and lost our position in the struggle for a separate peace.
For we saw that in separating from Germany we could not escape being crippled; that, therefore, a separate peace was impossible, and that we had dealt a death-blow at the still intact Quadruple Alliance.
Later I had information from England relating to the official view of the situation there, which differed very much from the optimistic confidential reports, and proved that the desire for peace was not so strong. It will easily be understood that for us the English policy was always the most interesting. England"s entry into the war had made the situation so dangerous that an understanding arrived at with her--that is, an understanding between England and Germany through our intervention--would have put an end to the war.
This information was to the effect that England was less than ever inclined to confer with Germany until the two cardinal points had been guaranteed--the cession of Alsace-Lorraine and the abolition of German militarism. The former was a French claim, and England must and would support France in this to her very utmost; the second claim was necessary in the interests of the future peace of the world. Germany"s military strength was always estimated very highly in England, but the army"s deeds in this war had surpa.s.sed all expectations. The military successes had encouraged the growth of the military spirit. The peace resolution pa.s.sed in the Reichstag proved nothing, or at any rate, not enough, for the Reichstag is not the real exponent of the Empire in the outside world; it became paralysed through an unofficial collateral Government, the generals, who possessed the greater power.
Certain statements made by General Ludendorff--so the Entente said--proved that Germany did not wish for an honourable peace of understanding. Besides this the Wilhelmstra.s.se did not a.s.sociate itself with the majority in the Reichstag. The war was not being waged against the German nation, but against its militarism, and to conclude peace with the latter would be impossible. It appeared, further, that in no circ.u.mstances would England restore Germany"s colonies. So far as the Monarchy was concerned, England appeared to be ready to conclude a separate peace with her, though subject to the promises made to her own Allies. According to the latter there was much territory to be given up to Italy, Serbia and Roumania. But in exchange we might reckon on a sort of annexation of newly made states like Poland.
This information left no doubt that England was not then thinking of making advances to Germany; the fear of Prussian militarism was at the bottom of her reasons for refusing. My impression was that, through a more favourable continuous development, a settlement and understanding might be feasible on the territorial but not on the military questions. On the contrary, the stronger Germany"s military power proved itself to be, the more did the Entente fear that their enemy"s power of defence would be invincible unless it was broken then.
Not only the period preceding war and the outbreak of war, but the actual course of the war has been full of many and disturbing misunderstandings. For long it was not understood here what England meant by the term militarism. It was pointed out that the English Navy was jealously defending the dominion of the seas, that France and Russia stood ready armed for the attack, and that Germany was only in a similar position to any other state; that every state strengthened and equipped its defensive forces as thoroughly as possible.
By the term "Prussian militarism" England did not only mean the strength of the German army. She understood it to be a combination of a warlike spirit bent on oppressing others, and supported by the best and strongest army in the world. The first would have been innocuous without the second; and the splendid German army was in England"s eyes the instrument of a domineering and conquest-loving autocrat.
According to England"s view, Germany was exactly the counterpart of France under Bonaparte--if for Napoleon be subst.i.tuted a many-headed being called "Emperor, Crown Prince, Hindenburg, Ludendorff"--and just as little as England would treat with Napoleon would she have any dealings with the individual who to her was the personification of the l.u.s.t for conquest and the policy of violence.
The notion of the existence of German militarism seems to be quite justified, although the Emperor and the Crown Prince played the smallest part in it. But it seems to me an altogether wrong conception that militarism is a speciality of Germany. The negotiations at Versailles must now have convinced the general public that it is not only on the banks of the Spree that militarism reigns.
Germany in former days was never able to understand that on the enemy continent, by the side of morally unjustified envy, fear and anxiety as to Germany"s plans practically reigned, and that the talk about the "hard" and "German" peace, about "victory and triumph" was like throwing oil on the flames of their fears; that in England and France, too, at one time, there was a current of feeling urging for a peace of settlement, and that such expressions as the foregoing were highly detrimental to all pacifist tendencies.
In my opinion the air raids on England may be ranked in the same category as these expressions. They were carried out with the greatest heroism by the German fliers, but no other object was gained but to irritate and anger England and rouse to the utmost resistance all who otherwise had pacifist tendencies. I said this to Ludendorff when he called on me at the Ballplatz in the summer of 1917, but it made not the slightest impression on him.
The _demarche_ for peace made by the Pope and our reply have been published in the European Press. We accepted the n.o.ble proposals made by the Holy Father. I have therefore nothing to add on that matter.
In the early part of the summer of 1917 the Socialist Conference at Stockholm had become a practical question. I issued pa.s.sports to the representatives of our Social Democrats, and had several difficulties to overcome in connection therewith. My own standpoint is made clear by the following letter to Tisza.
(_Not dated._)
DEAR FRIEND,--I hear that you do not approve of the delegation of Socialists for Stockholm. To begin with, it is not a delegation.
The men came to me of their own accord and applied for permission to travel, which I granted. Adler, Ellenbogen and Seitz were there, Renner as well. The two first are capable men, and I value them in spite of the differences that exist between us. The two last are not well known to me. But all are genuinely desirous of peace, and Adler in particular does not wish the downfall of the Empire.
If they secure peace it will be a socialistic one, and the Emperor will have to pay out of his own pocket; I am sure too, dear friend, that if it is not possible to end the war, the Emperor will have to pay still more; you may be sure of that.
Or, as may be expected, if they do not secure peace, then my prediction was all the more correct, for then I shall have proved to them that it is not the inefficiency of the Diplomatic Service but the conditions surrounding it that must be blamed for the war not coming to an end.
If I had refused to grant permission for them to travel, they would have continued to the last declaring that, if they had been allowed to proceed, they would have secured peace.
Everyone is indignant with me here, particularly in the Herrenhaus. They even go so far that they imagine I had tried to "buy" the Socialists by promising to lower the Customs dues if they returned with peace. I do not want the dues, as you know, but that has no connection with Stockholm, "Sozie" and peace.
I was at an Austrian Cabinet Council lately and gave the death-blow to the Customs dues--but I felt rather like Daniel in the lions" den when I did it; N. and E. in particular were very indignant. The only one who entirely shares my standpoint beside Trnka is the Prime Minister Clam.