The term "bread peace" (_Brotfrieden_) was not coined by me, but by Burgemeister Weisskirchner on the occasion of my reception by the Gemeinderat of Vienna at the Nordbahnhof. The millions whose lives were saved by those 42,000 wagon-loads of food may repeat the words without a sneer.
CHAPTER XI
THE PEACE OF BUCHAREST
At Brest-Litovsk rumours had already spread that Roumania did not intend to continue the war. These rumours a.s.sumed a very definite character after peace was concluded with the Ukraine. That peace, as well as Trotski"s att.i.tude, left no doubt in Bucharest that Roumania could no longer reckon on further co-operation on the part of Russia and gave rise to the idea in some circles that she would turn back. I say in _some_ circles, for there was one group which, to the very last moment, was all for war.
While at Brest-Litovsk I began to get into touch with the leaders of the Hungarian Parliament in order to come to an agreement on the peace aims relating to Roumania. It was evident that, as regards Roumania, a peace without annexations would be more difficult to bring about than with any other state, because the treacherous attack by the Roumanians on the whole of Hungary had raised the desire for a better strategical frontier. As might be expected, I met with violent opposition from Hungary, where, under the name of strategical frontier rectifications, as a matter of fact greater annexations were desired. The first person with whom I dealt was Stephen Tisza, who, at great trouble, was brought to modify his original standpoint and finally was led so far as to admit that the fundamental ideas for peace were capable of acceptance. On February 27, 1918, he handed me a _pro-memoria_ with the request to show it to the Emperor, in which he explained his already more conciliatory point of view, though, nevertheless, he very distinctly showed his disapproval of my intentions. The _pro-memoria_ reads as follows:
Unfortunately, Roumania can withdraw from the war not as much exhausted as justice and the justified interests of the Monarchy could wish.
The loss of the Dobrudsha will be made good by territorial gains in Bessarabia, while the frontier rectifications demanded by us are out of all proportion with Roumania"s guilt and with her military situation.
Our peace terms are so mild that they are as a generous gift offered to vanquished Roumania and are _not at all to be made a subject for negotiations_. In no case are these negotiations to a.s.sume the character of trading or bargaining. If Roumania refuses to conclude peace on the basis laid down by us our answer can only be a resumption of hostilities.
I consider it highly probable that the Roumanian Government will run that risk to prove her necessity in the eyes of the Western Powers and her own population. But it is just as probable that after breaking off negotiations she will just as quickly turn back and give way before our superior forces.
At the worst a short campaign would result in the total collapse of Roumania.
In all human probability it is almost certain that the development of affairs will take a course similar to the last phase in the peace with Northern Russia, and will lead to an easy and complete success for the Central Powers. That we lay down the frontier rectification as _conditio sine qua non_ forms a justifiable measure to protect an important interest for the Monarchy of a purely defensive nature. It is energetically demanded by the entire patriotic public opinion of Hungary. It appears out of the question that a Minister of Foreign Affairs, had he taken up another att.i.tude in the matter, would have been able to remain in the Delegation.
And, besides, the procedure--to which the greatest importance must be attached--is absolutely necessary in order not to compromise the chances of a general peace.
It is obvious from the public statements of leading statesmen of the Western Powers that they will not be prevailed upon to agree to an acceptable peace, as they do not believe in our capacity and firm resolve to carry it out. Whatever confirms their views in this respect widens the distance between us and peace; the only way to bring us really nearer to peace is to adopt an att.i.tude that will lead them to think differently.
This must const.i.tute the line of action in our resolves and undertakings. In connection with the Roumanian peace, it is evident that to yield on the frontier question--even for fear of a breakdown in the negotiations--must have a deplorable effect on the opinion our enemies have of us. It would certainly be right not to take advantage of Roumania"s desperate situation, but to grant her reasonable peace terms in accordance with the principles embodied in our statements. But if we do not act with adequate firmness on that reasonable basis we shall encourage the Western Powers in the belief that it is not necessary to conclude a peace with us on the basis of the integrity of our territory and sovereignty, and fierce and bitter fighting may be looked for to teach them otherwise.
TISZA.
_February 27, 1916._
Andra.s.sy and Wekerle were also opposed to a milder treatment of Roumania, and thus the whole Hungarian Parliament were of one accord on the question. I am not sure what standpoint Karolyi held, and I do not know if at that period the "tiger soul" which he at one time displayed to Roumania, or the pacifist soul which he laid later at the feet of General Franchet d"Esperey, dominated.
Thus at Brest-Litovsk, when the Roumanian peace appeared on the horizon, I took up the standpoint that the party desirous of peace negotiations must be supported.
The episode of the Roumanian peace must not be taken out of the great picture of the war. Like the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, the Roumanian peace was necessary from a military point of view, because it seemed desirable to release troops in the East as quickly as possible and transfer them to the Western front. It was urgently desired and repeatedly demanded that we should come to a final settlement with Roumania as soon as possible. In order to secure a speedy result I had already, from Brest-Litovsk, advised the Emperor to send word privately to King Ferdinand that he could reckon on an honourable peace should he wish to enter into negotiations. The Emperor took my advice, and Colonel Randa had one or two interviews with a member of the immediate entourage of the King. But the German opinion was that King Ferdinand must be "punished for his treachery" and no negotiations entered into with him. For this reason, and to avoid fruitless controversy, I first imparted to Herr von Kuhlmann the accomplished fact and informed him that we had put ourselves secretly into communication with King Ferdinand. This event was quite in accordance with the standard of equality in our Federation, by which every member was privileged to act according to the best of his ability and was merely bound to inform the friendly Powers of the proceedings. It was not our duty to apply to Germany for permission to take such a step.
There was a three-fold reason why I did not share Germany"s opinion on this question. In the first place, my point of view was that it was not our duty to mete out divine justice and to inflict punishment, but, on the contrary, to end the war as quickly as possible. Therefore my duty was to seize every means possible to prevent a continuance of the war. I must mention here that the idea prevailing in many circles that the Roumanians were quite at the end of their strength, and were compelled to accept all the conditions, is entirely false. The Roumanians held very strong positions, the _moral_ in the army was excellent, and in the last great attack on Maracesci, Mackensen"s troops had suffered very severely. This success turned the Roumanians"
heads, and there were many leading men in the ranks of the Roumanian army who sided entirely with those who wished to carry on the war _a l"outrance_. They did not count so much on an actual victory, but were upheld by the hope that for some time to come they could maintain the defensive and that, meanwhile, the decisive successes of their Allies on the West would secure victory for them. They were probably afraid, too, that a peace concluded with us would place them in permanent disgrace with the Entente--that they would lose the friendship of the Entente, fail to gain ours, and find themselves between two stools.
The second reason which decided me to insist on negotiating with the King was that, from a dynastic point of view, I considered it most unwise to dethrone a foreign king. There was already then a certain fall in the value of kings on the European market, and I was afraid it might develop into a panic if we put more kings off their thrones. The third reason was that, in order to conclude peace, we must have a competent representative in Roumania. If we were to depose the King we should divide Roumania into two camps and would, at the best, only be able to conclude a transitory peace with that party which accepted the dethronement of the King. A rapid and properly-secured peace could only be concluded with the legitimate head in Roumania.
In the introductory interviews which Colonel Randa had on February 4 and 5 with the confidential envoy from the King of Roumania, the envoy asked whether all the Quadruple Alliance Powers were acting in the step in question, and whether the occupied territory in Roumania would be released. I was notified of this inquiry of the King, and replied that I was persuaded that no refusal need be expected from the other Central Powers should he, with the object of securing an honourable peace, address them accordingly. As to the question of territorial possessions, I stated that, for the present, I was not able to express any opinion on the matter, as it would have to be a subject for the introductory negotiations.
The view held by the German military leaders in agreement with Hungarian politicians that Roumania should be treated differently from, and in a much sterner manner than, any other state was, if the question is considered from the point of view of retribution, quite justified. Roumania"s actions with regard to us were far more treacherous than those of Italy. Italy, owing to her geographical position and to the fact of her being totally dependent on the Western Powers--a blockade by whom might finally have forced her to submit to their demands--would have found it very difficult to remain neutral in this world war. Roumania was not only perfectly independent, but was amply provided for through her rich granaries. Apart from the fact that Roumania alone was to blame for allowing things to go so far that Russia was enabled finally to send her an ultimatum and so force her into war, it must be admitted that Roumania was far less likely to be influenced by the Entente than Italy. But neither would the Russian ultimatum have taken effect if Roumania had not consciously and willingly placed herself in a position in regard to military and political matters that gave her into Russia"s power. Bratianu said to me in one of our last interviews: "Russia is exactly like a blackc.o.c.k dancing before the hens." In admitting the truth of this appropriate comparison, it must be added that the female of the simile, longing to be embraced, directly provoked violence.
For two years Bratianu had stirred up public opinion against us in his own country. Had he not done so, and had he not finally bared his Russian frontier of all troops, the Russian ultimatum would have had no effect.
In Roumania the Avarescu Ministry was in power. On February 24 Kuhlmann and I had our first interview alone with Avarescu at the castle of Prince Stirbey, at Buftia. At this interview, which was very short, the sole topic was the Dobrudsha question. The frontier rectifications, as they stood on the Austro-Hungarian programme, were barely alluded to, and the economic questions, which later played a rather important part, were only hinted at. Avarescu"s standpoint was that the cession of the Dobrudsha was an impossibility, and the interview ended with a _non possumus_ from the Roumanian general, which was equivalent to breaking off negotiations. As regards the Dobrudsha question, our position was one of constraint. The so-called "old" Dobrudsha, the portion that Roumania in 1913 had wrested from Bulgaria, had been promised to the Bulgarians by a treaty in the time of the Emperor Francis Joseph as a reward for their co-operation, and the area that lies between that frontier and the Constanza-Carnavoda railway line was vehemently demanded by the Bulgarians. They went much further in their aspirations: they demanded the whole of the Dobrudsha, including the mouth of the Danube, and the great and numerous disputes that occurred later in this connection show how insistently and obstinately the Bulgarians held to their demands. At the same time, as there was a danger that the Bulgars, thoroughly disappointed in their aspirations, might secede from us, it became absolutely impossible to hand over the Dobrudsha to the Roumanians.
All that could be effected was to secure for the Roumanians free access to Constanza, and, further, to find a way out of the difficulty existing between Turkey and Bulgaria in connection with the Dobrudsha.
In order not to break off entirely all discussion, I suggested to Avarescu that he should arrange for his King to meet me. My plan was to make it clear to the King that it would be possible for him now to conclude a peace, though involving certain losses, but still a peace that would enable him to keep his crown. On the other hand, by continuing the war, he could not count on forbearance on the part of the Central Powers. I trusted that this move on my part would enable him to continue the peace negotiations.
I met the King on February 27 at a little station in the occupied district of Moldavia.
We arrived at Focsani at noon and continued by motor to the lines, where Colonel Ressel and a few Roumanian officers were waiting to receive me. We drove past positions on both sides in a powerful German car that had been placed at my disposal, and proceeded as far as the railway station of Padureni. A saloon carriage in the train had been reserved for me there, and we set off for Rasaciuni, arriving there at 5 o"clock.
The Roumanian royal train arrived a few minutes later, and I at once went across to the King.
Incidentally my interview with King Ferdinand lasted twenty minutes.
As the King did not begin the conversation I had to do so, and said that I had not come to sue for peace but purely as the bearer of a message from the Emperor Charles, who, in spite of Roumania"s treachery, would show indulgence and consideration if King Ferdinand would _at once_ conclude peace under the conditions mutually agreed on by the Quadruple Alliance Powers.
Should the King not consent, then a continuance of the war would be unavoidable and would put an end to Roumania and the dynasty. Our military superiority was already very considerable, and now that our front would be set free from the Baltic to the Black Sea, it would be an easy matter for us, in a very short s.p.a.ce of time, to increase our strength still more. We were aware that Roumania would very soon have no more munitions and, were hostilities to continue, in six weeks the kingdom and dynasty would have ceased to exist.
The King did not oppose anything but thought the conditions terribly hard. Without the Dobrudsha Roumania would hardly be able to draw breath. At any rate, there could be further parley as to ceding "old"
Dobrudsha again.
I said to the King that if he complained about hard conditions I could only ask what would his conditions have been if his troops had reached Budapest? Meanwhile, I was ready to guarantee that Roumania would not be cut off from the sea, but would have free access to Constanza.
Here the King again complained of the hard conditions enforced on him, and declared he would never be able to find a Ministry who would accept them.
I rejoined that the forming of a Cabinet was Roumania"s internal business, but my private opinion was that a Marghiloman Cabinet, in order to save Roumania, would agree to the conditions laid down. I could only repeat that no change could be made in the peace terms laid before the King by the Quadruple Alliance. If the King did not accept them, we should have, in a month"s time, a far better peace than the one which the Roumanians might consider themselves lucky to get to-day.
We were ready to give our diplomatic support to Roumania that she might obtain Bessarabia, and she would, therefore, gain far more than she would lose.
The King replied that Bessarabia was nothing to him, that it was steeped in Bolshevism, and the Dobrudsha could not be given up; anyhow, it was only under the very greatest pressure that he had decided to enter into the war against the Central Powers. He began again, however, to speak of the promised access to the sea, which apparently made the cession of the Dobrudsha somewhat easier.
We then entered into details, and I reproached the King for the dreadful treatment of our people interned in Roumania, which he said he regretted.
Finally, I requested that he would give me a clear and decided answer within forty-eight hours as to whether he would negotiate on the basis of our proposals or not.
The result of the interview was the appointment of the Marghiloman Ministry and the continuation of the negotiations.
Before Marghiloman consented to form a Cabinet, he approached me to learn the exact terms.
He declared himself to be in agreement with the first and hardest of the conditions--the cession of the Dobrudsha, because he was quicker than the King in seeing that in consequence of our binding obligation to Bulgaria in this connection, it could not be otherwise. As to our territorial demands, I told Marghiloman that I laid chief stress on entering into friendly and lasting relations with Roumania after peace was concluded, and, therefore, desired to reduce the demands in such measure as Roumania, on her part, would consider bearable. On the other hand, he, Marghiloman, must understand that I was bound to consider the Hungarian aspirations to a certain degree, Marghiloman, who was an old and tried parliamentarian, fully saw in what a constrained position I was placed. We finally agreed that the cession of the populated districts and towns like Turn-Saverin and Okna should not take place, and, altogether the original claims were reduced to about half. Marghiloman said he accepted the compromise.
My desire to enter into a lasting economic union with Roumania played an important part in the negotiations. It was clear to me that this demand was in Austrian, but not in Hungarian interests; but I still think that, even so, it was my duty, although joint Minister for both countries, to work for Austria, as the shortage of provisions made the opening of the Roumanian granaries very desirable. As was to be expected, this clause in the negotiations met with the most violent opposition in Hungary, and it was at first impossible to see a way out of the difficulty. I never took back my demand, however, and was firmly resolved that peace should not be signed if my plan was not realised. I was dismissed from office in the middle of the negotiations, and my successor did not attach the same importance to that particular item as I did.
On the German side there was at once evidence of that insatiable appet.i.te which we had already noticed at Brest-Litovsk. The Germans wished to have a species of war indemnity by compelling Roumania to cede her petroleum springs, her railways and harbours to German companies, and placing the permanent control of her finances in German hands. I opposed these demands in the most decided manner from the very first, as I was convinced that such terms would preclude all possibility of any friendly relations in future. I went so far as to ask the Emperor Charles to telegraph direct to the Emperor William in that connection, which met with a certain amount of success. In the end the German claims were reduced by about fifty per cent., and accepted by Marghiloman in the milder form. With regard to the petroleum question, a ninety years" lease was agreed on. In the matter of the corn supply, Roumania was to bind herself to deliver her agricultural produce to the Central Powers for a certain number of years. The plan for Germany to be in the permanent control of Roumanian finances was not carried out. In the question of price, the Roumanian views held good. The most impossible of the German demands, namely, the occupation of Roumania for five to six years after the conclusion of peace, gave rise to great difficulties. This was the point that was most persistently and energetically insisted on by the German Supreme Military Command, and it was only with great trouble and after lengthy explanations and discussions that we settled the matter on the following lines: That on the conclusion of peace the entire legislative and executive power of the Roumanian Government would be restored in principle, and that we should content ourselves with exercising a certain control through a limited number of agents, this control not to be continued after the general peace was made. I cannot say positively whether this standpoint was adhered to by my successor or not, but certain it is that Marghiloman only undertook office on condition that I gave him a guarantee that the plan would be supported by me.
As already mentioned, the question of the Dobrudsha had prepared great difficulties for us in two respects. First of all there was the relinquishing of their claim which, for the Roumanians, was the hardest term of all, and imparted to the peace the character of a peace of violence; and secondly, the matter had precipitated a dispute between Turkey and Bulgaria.
The Bulgarians" view was that the entire Dobrudsha, including the mouth of the Danube, must be promised to them, and they insisted on their point with an obstinacy which I have seldom, if ever, come across. They went so far as to declare that neither the present Government nor any other would be able to return to Sofia, and allowed it clearly to be seen that by refusing their claims we could never again count on Bulgaria. The Turks, on the other hand, protested with equal vehemence that the Dobrudsha had been conquered by two Turkish army corps, that it was a moral injustice that the gains chiefly won by Turkish forces should be given exclusively to the Bulgarians, and that they would never consent to Bulgaria receiving the whole of the Dobrudsha unless compensation was given to them. By way of compensation, they asked not only for that stretch of land which they had ceded to Bulgaria on their entry into the war (Adrianople), but also a considerable area beyond.