In the numerous conferences at which the question was discussed, Kuhlmann and I played the part of honest mediators who were making every effort to reconcile the two so divergent standpoints. We both saw clearly that the falling off of the Bulgars or Turks might be the result if a compromise was not effected. Finally, after much trouble, we succeeded in drawing up a programme acceptable to both sides. It took this form: That "old" Dobrudsha should at once be given back to Bulgaria, and the other parts of the area to be handed over as a possession to the combined Central Powers, and a definite decision agreed upon later.
Neither Turkey nor Bulgaria was quite satisfied with the decision, nor yet averse to it; but, in the circ.u.mstances, it was the only possible way of building a bridge between the Turks and the Bulgars.
Just as England and France secured the entry into the war of Italy through the Treaty of London, so did the Emperor Francis Joseph and Burian, as well as the Government in Berlin, give binding promises to the Bulgars to secure their co-operation, and these promises proved later to be the greatest obstacles to a peace of understanding.
Nevertheless, no sensible person can deny that it is natural that a state engaged in a life-and-death struggle should seek an ally without first asking whether the keeping of a promise later will give rise to important or minor difficulties. The fireman extinguishing flames in a burning house does not first ask whether the water he pumps on it has damaged anything. When Roumania attacked us in the rear the danger was very great, the house was in flames, and the first act of my predecessor was naturally, and properly, to avert the great danger.
There was no lack of promises, and the Dobrudsha was a.s.signed to the Bulgarians. Whether and in what degree the Turks had a right, through promises, to the territory they, on their part, had ceded to the Bulgars I do not know. But they certainly had a moral right to it.
On the occasion of the Roumanian peace in the spring of 1918, too severe a test of the loyalty of Bulgars and Turks to the alliance was dangerous. For some time past the former had been dealing in secret with the Entente. The alliance with Turkey rested mainly on Talaat and Enver. Talaat told me in Bucharest, however, quite positively that he would be forced to send in his resignation if he were to return empty-handed, and in that case the secession of Turkey would be very probable.
We tried then at Bucharest to steer our way through the many shoals; not mortally to offend the Roumanians, to observe as for as possible the character of a peace of understanding, and yet to keep both Turks and Bulgars on our side.
The cession of the Dobrudsha was a terribly hard demand to make on the Roumanians, and was only rendered bearable for them when Kuhlmann and I, with the greatest difficulty and against the most violent opposition from the Bulgarians, obtained for them free access to the Black Sea.
When later, in one breath, we were reproached with having enforced a peace of violence on the Roumanians and with not having treated the Bulgarian claims and wishes with sufficient consideration--the answer to the charge is obvious. _Because_ we were compelled to consider both Bulgaria and Turkey we were forced to demand the Dobrudsha from the Roumanians and treat them with greater severity than we should have done otherwise, in order finally to gain the Turks and the Bulgars for our negotiation plans. Judged according to the Versailles standard, the Peace of Bucharest would be a peace of understanding, both as regards form and contents.
The Central Powers" mediators, both at Versailles and St. Germain, would have been glad had they been treated in the same way as the Marghiloman Ministry was treated.
The Roumanians lost the Dobrudsha, but acquired safe and guaranteed access to the sea; they lost a district of spa.r.s.ely populated mountainous country to us, and through us they acquired Bessarabia.
They gained far more than they lost.
CHAPTER XII
FINAL REFLECTIONS
The farther the world war progressed, the more did it lose the character of the work of individual men. It a.s.sumed rather the character of a cosmic event, taking more and more from the effectiveness of the most powerful individuals.
All settlements on which coalitions were based were connected with certain war aims by the Cabinets, such as the promises of compensation given to their own people, the hopes of gain from the final victory.
The encouragement of intense and boundless hatred, the increasing crude brutality of the world all tended to create a situation making each individual like a small stone which, breaking away from an avalanche of stones, hurls itself downwards without a leader and without goal, and is no longer capable of being guided by anyone.
The Council of Four at Versailles tried for some time to make the world believe that they possessed the power to rebuild Europe according to their own ideas. According to their own ideas! That signified, to begin with, four utterly different ideas, for four different worlds were comprised in Rome, Paris, London, and Washington. And the four representatives--"the Big Four," as they were called--were each individually the slave of his programme, his pledges, and his people. Those responsible for the Paris negotiations _in camera_, which lasted for many months, and were a breeding ground for European anarchy, had their own good reasons for secrecy; there was no end to the disputes, for which no outlet could be found.
Here, Wilson had been scoffed at and cursed because he deserted his programme; certainly, there is not the slightest similarity between the Fourteen Points and the Peace of Versailles and St. Germain, but it is forgotten now that Wilson no longer had the power to enforce his will against the three others. We do not know what occurred behind those closed doors, but we can imagine it, and Wilson probably fought weeks and months for his programme. He could have broken off proceedings and left! He certainly could have done so, but would the chaos have been any less; would it have been any better for the world if the only one who was not solely imbued with the l.u.s.t of conquest had thrown down his arms? But Clemenceau, too, the direct opposite of Wilson, was not quite open in his dealings. Undoubtedly this old man, who now at the close of his life was able to satisfy his hatred of the Germans of 1870, gloried in the triumph; but, apart from that, if he had tried to conclude a "Wilson peace," all the private citizens of France, great and small, would have risen against him, for they had been told for the last five years: _Que les boches payeront tout_.
What he did, he enjoyed doing; but he was forced to do it or France would have dismissed him.
And Italy? From Milan to Naples is heard the subterraneous rumbling of approaching revolution; the only means the Government have adopted to check the upheaval is to drown the revolution in a sea of national interests. I believe that in 1917, when the general discontent was much less and finances were much better, the Italian Government might much more probably have accepted Wilson"s standpoint than after final victory. Then they could not do it. At Versailles they were the slaves of their promises. And does anyone believe that Lloyd George would have had the power at Versailles to extend the Wilson principle of the right of self-determination to Ireland and the Dominions? Naturally, he did not wish to do otherwise than he did; but that is not the question here, but rather that neither could have acted very differently even had he wished to do so.
It seems to me that the historical moment is the year 1917 when Wilson lost his power, which was swallowed up in Imperialism, and when the President of the United States neglected to force his programme on his Allies. Then power was still in his hands, as the American troops were so eagerly looked for; but later, when victory came, he no longer held it.
And thus there came about what is now a fact. A dictated peace of the most terrible nature was concluded and a foundation laid for a continuance of unimaginable disturbances, complications and wars.
In spite of all the apparent power of victorious armies, in spite of all the claims of the Council of Four, a world has expired at Versailles--the world of militarism. Solely bent on exterminating Prussian militarism, the Entente have gained so complete a victory that all fences and barriers have been pulled down and they can give themselves up unchecked to a torrent of violence, vengeance and pa.s.sion. And the Entente are so swallowed up by their revengeful paroxysm of destruction that they do not appear to see that, while they imagine they still rule and command, they are even now but instruments in a world revolution.
The Entente, who would not allow the war to end and kept up the blockade for months after the cessation of hostilities, has made Bolshevism a danger to the world. War is its father, famine its mother, despair its G.o.dfather. The poison of Bolshevism will course in the veins of Europe for many a long year.
Versailles is not the end of the war, it is only a phase of it. The war goes on, though in another form. I think that the coming generation will not call the great drama of the last five years the world-war, but the world-revolution, which it will realise began with the world-war.
Neither at Versailles nor St. Germain has any lasting work been done.
The germs of decomposition and death lie in this peace. The paroxysms that shattered Europe are not yet over; as, after a terrible earthquake, the subterraneous rumblings may still be heard. Again and again we shall see the earth open, now here, now there, and shoot up flames into the heavens; again and again there will be expressions of elementary nature and elementary force that will spread devastation through the land--until everything has been swept away that reminds us of the madness of the war and the French peace.
Slowly but with unspeakable suffering a new world will be born. Coming generations will look back to our times as to a long and very bad dream, but day follows the darkest night. Generations have been laid in their graves, murdered, famished, and a prey to disease. Millions, with hatred and murder in their hearts, have died in their efforts to devastate and destroy.
But other generations will arise and with them a new spirit: They will rebuild what war and revolution have pulled down. Spring comes always after winter. Resurrection follows after death; it is the eternal law in life.
Well for those who will be called upon to serve as soldiers in the ranks of whoever comes to build the new world.
_June, 1919._
APPENDIX
1
=Resolutions of the London Conference, of April 26, 1915=[11]
On February 28, 1917, the _Isvestia_ published the following text of this agreement:
"The Italian Amba.s.sador in London, Marchese Imperiali, acting on the instructions of his Government, has the honour to convey to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, the French Amba.s.sador in London, M. Cambon, and the Russian Amba.s.sador in London, Count Benckendorff, the following notable points:
--1. A _Military Convention_ shall be concluded without delay between the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy. This convention to determine the minimum of forces to be directed by Russia against Austria-Hungary in case that country should turn all its forces against Italy, provided Russia decides to concentrate chiefly against Germany. The Military Convention referred to shall also settle questions bearing upon an armistice, in so far as these by their nature come within the scope of the Army Command.
--2. Italy on her part undertakes to carry on war with all the means at her disposal, together with France, Great Britain and Russia, against all countries at war with them.
--3. The naval forces of France and Great Britain are to render Italy undiminished, active a.s.sistance until the _destruction of the Austrian fleet_, or until the moment peace is concluded. A _Naval Convention_ shall be concluded without delay between France, Great Britain and Italy.
--4. At the coming conclusion of peace Italy is to receive: the district of the _Trentino; the whole of South Tyrol as far as its natural geographical boundary, thereby understood the Brenner; the city and district of Trieste; the provinces of Goerz and Gradisca, the whole of Istria_ as far as Quarnero, including Volosca and the Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussin, also the smaller islands of Plavnica, Unie, Canidolo, Palazzoli, as well as the island of St.
Peter de Nembi, Astinello and Cruica, with the neighbouring islands.
Note: 1. By way of supplement to --4, the frontier shall be drawn through the following-points: From the peak of the Umbrail in a northerly direction as far as the Stilfserjoch, and thence along the watershed of the Ratische Alps as far as the sources of the rivers Etsch and Eisack, then over the Reschen-Scheideck, the Brenner and the Oetztaler and Zillertaler Alps; the frontier line then to turn southwards, cutting the Toblach range, and proceeding as far as the present frontier of Grein, drawn towards the Alps; following this it will run to the heights of Tarvis, then, however, pursuing a course along the watershed of the Julian Alps, over the heights of Predil, Mangart and Triglav group, and the pa.s.ses of Podbrda, Podlaneskan and Idria. From there the frontier continues in a south-easterly direction to the Schneeberg, so that the basin of the River Save, with its sources, shall not fall within the Italian territory. From the Schneeberg the frontier proceeds towards the coast, enclosing Castua, Matuglie and Volosca in the Italian possessions.
--5. Similarly, Italy is to receive the province of Dalmatia in its present form, including Lissarik and Trebinje in the north, and all possessions as far as a line drawn from the coast at Cape Blanca eastward to the watershed in the south, so as to include in the Italian possessions all valleys on the course of the rivers debouching at Sebenico, such as Cikola, Kerke and Budisnica, with all those situate on their sources. Similarly also, Italy is promised _all the islands lying north and west of the Dalmatian coast_, beginning with the islands of Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Skerda Maon, Pago and Puntadura, etc., in the north; as far as Malarda in the south, adding also the islands of St. Andrae, Busi, Lissa, Lessina, Torzola, Curzola, Cazza and Lagosta, with all rocks and islets thereto pertaining, as well as Pelagosa, but not to include the islands of Great and Lesser Zirona, Pua, Solta and Brazza.
The following are to be _neutralised_: (1) The entire coast from Cape Blanca in the north as far as the southern end of the peninsula of Sabbioncello, and in the south including the whole of the mentioned peninsula in the neutralised area; (2) a part of the coast beginning from a point situate 10 versts south of the cape of Alt-Ragusa, as far as the river Wojusa in the south, so as to include within the boundaries of the neutralised zone _the whole of the Bay of Cattaro_ with its ports, Antivari, Dulcigno, San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo; this not to affect the declarations of the contracting parties in April and May, 1909, as to the rights of _Montenegro_.
In consideration, however, of the fact that these rights were only admitted as applying to the present possessions of Montenegro, they shall not be so extended as to embrace any lands or ports which may in the future be ceded to Montenegro. In the same way, no part of the coast at present belonging to Montenegro shall be subject to future neutralisation. The restrictions in the case of the port of Antivari, agreed by Montenegro itself in 1909, remain in force. (3) Finally, the islands not accorded to Italy.
Note: 3. The following lands in the Adriatic Sea are accorded by the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance to the territories of _Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro_: In the north of the Adriatic, _the entire coast, commencing from the Bay of Volosca_ on the frontier of Istria as far as the _northern frontier_ of Dalmatia, including the whole of the coast-line now belonging to Hungary, the entire coast of Croatia, the port of Fiume and the small harbours of Novi and Carlopago, as also the islands of Velia, Pervicchio, Gregorio, Goli and Arbe. In the south of the Adriatic, where Serbia and Austrian interests lie, the entire coast from Cape Planca as far as the river Drina, with the princ.i.p.al ports of _Spaluto, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and San Giovanni di Medua_, and with the islands of Greater Zirona, Pua, Solta, Brazza, Jaklian and Calamotta.
The port of Durazzo can be accorded to an independent Mohammedan State of Albania.
--6. Italy to be given full possession of _Valona, the Island of Sa.s.seno_, and a sufficiently extensive territory to protect it in military respects, approximately from the River Vojusa in the north and east to the boundary of the Chimara district in the south.