McNamara was being unnecessarily harsh with himself. There were several reasons, quite unrelated to either the Secretary of Defense or his a.s.sistants, that explain the failure of voluntarism to integrate housing used by servicemen. A major cause--witness the failure of President Johnson"s proposed civil rights bill in 1966--was that open housing lacked a national consensus or widespread public support.
Voluntary compliance was successful in other areas, such as public accommodation, transportation, and to some extent even in dependent schooling, precisely because the requests of local commanders were supported by a growing national consensus and the force of national legislation. In dealing with housing discrimination, however, these same commanders faced public indifference or open hostility without the comforting support of federal law. Even with the commander"s wholehearted commitment to open housing, a commitment that equal opportunity directives from the services could by no means insure, his effectiveness against such widespread discrimination was questionable.
Nothing in his training prepared him for the delicate negotiations involved in obtaining integrated housing. Moreover, it was extremely difficult if not impossible to isolate the black serviceman"s housing plight from that of other black citizens; thus, an open housing campaign really demanded comprehensive action by the whole federal government. The White House had never launched a national open housing campaign; it was not, indeed, until 16 February 1967 that President Johnson submitted a compulsory national open housing bill to Congress.[23-80]
[Footnote 23-80: A weakened version of this bill eventually emerged as the Civil Rights Act of 1968.]
Whatever the factors contributing to the lack of progress, (p. 603) McNamara admitted that "the voluntary program had failed and failed miserably."[23-81] Philosophically, Robert McNamara found this situation intolerable. He had become interested in the "unused potential" of his department to change American society as it affected the welfare of servicemen. As Fitt explained, the secretary believed
any department which administers 10% of the gross national product, with influence over the lives of 10 million people, is bound to have an impact. The question is whether it"s going to be a dumb, blind impact, or a marshaled and ordered impact.
McNamara wanted to marshal that impact by committing defense resources to social goals that were still compatible with the primary mission of security.[23-82]
[Footnote 23-81: McNamara, _The Essence of Security_, p. 124.]
[Footnote 23-82: Quoted by Brower, "McNamara Seen Now, Full Length," p. 89.]
Clearly, the Secretary of Defense considered open housing for service families one of these goals, and when his attention was drawn to the immediacy of the problem by the ACCESS demonstration he acted quickly.
At his instigation Vance ordered the local commanders of all services to conduct a nationwide census of all apartment houses, housing developments, and mobile home courts consisting of five or more rental units within normal commuting distance of all installations having at least 500 servicemen. He also ordered the commanders to talk to the owners or operators of these properties personally and to urge them to open their properties to all servicemen. He organized an Off-base Equal Opportunity Board, consisting of the open housing coordinators of each service and his office to monitor the census. Finally, he announced the establishment of a special action program under the direction of Thomas D. Morris, now the a.s.sistant Secretary for Manpower. Aimed at the Washington, D.C., area specifically, the program was designed to serve as a model for the rest of the country.[23-83]
[Footnote 23-83: Memo, Dep SecDef for Secys of Military Departments, 11 Apr 67, sub: Equal Opportunity for Military Personnel in Rental of Off-Base Housing. Vance"s instructions were spelled out in great detail, replete with charts and forms, in Memo, ASD (M) for Dep Under Secys of Military Departments (Manpower), 22 Apr 67, same sub. Copies of both in CMH.]
Vance also notified the service secretaries that subsequent to the census all local commanders would be asked to discuss the census findings with local community leaders in an effort to mobilize support for open housing. Later a.s.sistant Secretary Morris, with the help of the acting civil rights deputy, L. Howard Bennett, spelled out a program for "aggressive" negotiation with community leaders and cooperation with other government agencies, in effect a last-ditch attempt to achieve open housing for servicemen through voluntary compliance. Underscoring the urgency of the housing campaign, the department demanded a monthly report from all commanders on their open housing activities,[23-84] and Morris promptly launched a proselytizing effort of his own in the metropolitan Washington area.
Described simply by McNamara as "a decent man," Morris spoke indefatigably before civil leaders and realtors on behalf of open housing.[23-85]
[Footnote 23-84: Memos, ASD (M) for Dep Under Secys of Military Departments, 22 Apr and 17 Jul 67, sub: Equal Opportunity for Military Personnel in Rental of Off-Base Housing. For the effect of this order on an individual commander, see article by Charles Hunter in Charleston, South Carolina, _Post_, August 30, 1967. See also Interv, author with Bennett, 13 Dec 73.]
[Footnote 23-85: Intervs, author with McNamara, 11 May 72, and Jordan, 7 Jan 72.]
The department"s national housing census confirmed the gloomy (p. 604) statistics projected from earlier studies indicating that housing discrimination was widespread and intractable and damaging to servicemen"s morale.[23-86] McNamara decided that local commanders "were not going to involve themselves," and for the first time since sanctions were mentioned in his equal opportunity directive some four years before, he decided to use them in a discrimination case. The Secretary of Defense himself, not the local commander nor the service secretaries, made the decision: housing not opened to _all_ servicemen would be closed to _all_ servicemen.[23-87] Aware of the controversy accompanying such action, the secretary"s legal counsel prepared a justification. Predictably, the department"s lawyer argued that sanctions against discrimination in off-base housing were an extension of the commander"s traditional right to forbid commerce with establishments whose policies adversely affected the health or morals of his men. Acutely conscious of the lack of federal legislation barring housing discrimination, Vance and his legal a.s.sociates were careful to distinguish between an owner"s legal right to choose his tenants and the commander"s power to impose a military order on his men.
[Footnote 23-86: McNamara, _The Essence of Security_, p. 126.]
[Footnote 23-87: Interv, author with McNamara, 11 May 72.]
Although committed to a nationwide imposition of sanctions on housing if necessary, the Secretary of Defense hoped that the example of a few cases would be sufficient to break the intransigence of offending landlords; certainly a successful test case would strengthen the hand of the commanders in their negotiations with community leaders.
Metropolitan Washington was the obvious area for the first test case, and the Maryland General a.s.sembly further focused attention on that region when on 28 February 1967 it called on the Secretary of Defense to end housing discrimination for all military personnel in the state.[23-88] On the night of 21 June, Gerhard Gesell received an unexpected phone call: there would be something in tomorrow"s paper, Robert McNamara told him, that should be especially interesting to the judge.[23-89] And there was, indeed, on the front page. As of 1 July, all military personnel would be forbidden to lease or rent housing in any segregated apartment building or trailer court within a three-and-a-half-mile radius of Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.
Citing the special housing problems of servicemen returning from Vietnam, McNamara pointed out that in the Andrews area of Maryland less than 3 percent of some 22,000 local apartment units were open to black servicemen. The Andrews situation, he declared, was causing problems "detrimental to the morale and welfare of the majority of our Negro military families and thus to the operational effectiveness of the base."[23-90]
[Footnote 23-88: Joint Resolution 47 of the Maryland General a.s.sembly as cited in Memo, SecDef for Secretaries of Military Departments, 22 Jun 67, sub: Unsatisfactory Housing of Negro Military Families Living Off-Post in the Andrews Air Force Base Area, copy in CMH. See also New York _Times_, May 26, 1967, and Yarmolinsky, _The Military Establishment_, p. 352.]
[Footnote 23-89: Interv, author with Gesell, 3 Nov 74.]
[Footnote 23-90: Memo, SecDef for Secretaries of Military Departments, 22 Jun 67, sub: Unsatisfactory Housing of Negro Military Families Living Off-Post in the Andrews Air Force Base Area, SD files. The quotation is from McNamara"s News Conference, 22 June 1967, as quoted in the New York _Times_, June 23, 1967.]
The secretary"s rhetoric, skillfully justifying sanctions in (p. 605) terms of military efficiency and elementary fairness for returning combat veterans, might have explained the singular lack of adverse congressional reaction to the order. No less a personage than Chairman L. Mendel Rivers of the House Armed Services Committee admitted that he had no objection to the sanctions near Andrews. Asked about possible sanctions elsewhere, Rivers added that he would cross that bridge later.[23-91]
[Footnote 23-91: New York _Times_, June 23, 1967.
Rivers did criticize later applications of the housing sanctions; see Washington _Post_, December 28, 1977.]
Rivers and his congressional allies would have little time for reflection, because McNamara quickly made it clear that the Andrews action was only a first step. Sanctions were imposed in rapid succession on areas surrounding four other military installations in Maryland, Fort George G. Meade, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Edgewood a.r.s.enal, and Fort Holabird.[23-92] More pressure was placed on segregationists when McNamara announced on 8 September his intention to extend the sanctions nationwide. He singled out California, where the Defense Department census had shown black servicemen barred from a third of all rental units, for special attention. In fact, off-limits sanctions imposed on broad geographical areas were used only once more--in December 1967 against multiple rental properties in the northern Virginia area.[23-93] In the meantime, the Department of Defense had developed a less dramatic but equally effective method of exerting economic pressure on landlords. On 17 July 1967 McNamara ordered the establishment of housing referral offices at all installations where more than 500 men were a.s.signed. All married servicemen seeking off-base housing were required to obtain prior clearance from these offices before entering into rental agreements with landlords.[23-94]
[Footnote 23-92: Actually, McNamara imposed the sanctions in the first two instances, the Secretary of the Army in the other two.]
[Footnote 23-93: DOD News Release No. 1209-67, 26 Dec 67.]
[Footnote 23-94: Memo, SecDef for Service Secys et al., 17 Jul 67, sub: Off-Base Housing Referral Services, SD files.]
Finally, in the wake of the pa.s.sage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the Supreme Court"s ruling against housing discrimination in _Jones_ v. _Mayer_, McNamara"s successor, Clark M. Clifford, was able to combine economic threats with new legal sanctions against landlords who continued to discriminate. On 20 June 1968 Clifford ordered the services to provide advice and legal a.s.sistance to servicemen who encountered discrimination in housing. The services were also to coordinate their housing programs with the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Justice, provide a.s.sistance in locating nondiscriminatory rental units, and withhold authorization for servicemen to sign leases where discriminatory practices were evident.
In a separate action the manpower a.s.sistant secretary also ordered that housing referral offices be established on all bases to which 100--as opposed to the earlier 500--military personnel were a.s.signed.[23-95]
[Footnote 23-95: In _Jones_ v. _Mayer_ (392 U.S.
409, 421 [1968]) the Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1968 "bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property." For Clifford"s response, see Memo, SecDef for Secys of Military Departments, et al., 20 Jun 68; Clark Clifford, News Conference, 20 Jun 68; Memo, ASD (M&RA) for Secys of Military Departments, et al., 25 Nov 68.
For instructions concerning legal a.s.sistance to servicemen and civilian employees of the Department of Defense under the 1968 Civil Rights Act, see DOD Instr 1338.12, 8 Aug 68. Copy of all in CMH.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: FIRST AID. _Soldier of the 23d Infantry gives water to heat stroke victim during "Operation Wahiawa," Vietnam._]
The result of these directives was spectacular. By June 1968 the (p. 606) ratio of off-base housing units carried on military referral listings--that is, apartment and trailer court units with open housing policies a.s.sured in writing by the owner or certified by the local commander--rose to some 83 percent of all available off-base housing for a gain of 247,000 units over the 1967 inventory.[23-96] In the suburban Washington area alone, the number of housing units opened to all servicemen rose more than 300 percent in 120 days--from 15,000 to more than 50,000 units.[23-97] By the end of 1968 some 1.17 million rental units, 93 percent of all those identified in the 1967 survey, were open to all servicemen.[23-98] Still, these impressive gains did not signal the end of housing discrimination for black servicemen. The various Defense Department sanctions excluded dwellings for four families or less, and the evidence suggests that the original and hastily compiled off-base census on which all the open housing gains were measured had ignored some particularly intransigent landlords in larger apartment houses and operators of trailer courts on the grounds that their continued refusal to negotiate with commanders had made (p. 607) the likelihood of integrating their properties extremely remote.
[Footnote 23-96: SecDef News Conference, 29 Jun 68, transcript in CMH.]
[Footnote 23-97: McNamara, _The Essence of Security_, p. 127.]
[Footnote 23-98: Bahr, "_The Expanding Role of the Department of Defense_," p. 123.]
The campaign for open housing is the most noteworthy chapter in the fight for equality of treatment and opportunity for servicemen. The efforts of the Department of Defense against other forms of off-base discrimination were to a great extent successful because they coincided with court rulings and powerful civil rights legislation.
The campaign for open housing, on the other hand, was launched in advance of court and congressional action and in the face of much popular feeling against integrated housing. McNamara"s fight for open housing demonstrates, as nothing had before, his determination to use, if necessary, the department"s economic powers in the civilian community to secure equal treatment and opportunity for servicemen. In the name of fair housing, McNamara invested not only his own prestige but also the Defense Department"s manpower and financial resources. In effect, this willingness to use the extreme weapon of off-limits sanctions revitalized the idea of using the Department of Defense as an instrument of social change in American society.
McNamara"s willingness to push the department beyond the national consensus on civil rights (as represented by the contemporary civil rights laws) also signified a change in his att.i.tude. Unlike Yarmolinsky and Robert Kennedy, McNamara limited his attention to discrimination"s effect on the individual serviceman and, ultimately, on the military efficiency of the armed forces. Despite his interest in the cause of civil rights, he had, until the open housing campaign, always circ.u.mscribed the department"s equal opportunity program to fit a more traditional definition of military mission. Seen in this light, McNamara"s attack against segregated housing represented not only the subst.i.tution of a new and more powerful technique--sanctions--for one that had been found wanting--voluntary compliance, but also a substantial evolution in his own social philosophy. He later implied as much.
We request cooperation and seek voluntary compliance [in obtaining open housing].... I am fully aware that the Defense Department is not a philanthropic foundation or a social-welfare inst.i.tution. But the Department does not intend to let our Negro servicemen and their families continue to suffer the injustices and indignities they have in the past. I am certain my successors will pursue the same policy.[23-99]
[Footnote 23-99: McNamara, _The Essence of Security_, p. 127.]
By 1967 the major programs derived from Secretary McNamara"s equal opportunity policy had been defined, and the Department of Defense could look back with pride on the substantial and permanent changes it had achieved in the treatment of black servicemen in communities near military bases.[23-100] Emphasizing voluntary compliance with its policy, the department had proved to be quite successful in its campaign against discrimination in off-base recreation, public transportation and accommodation, in the organized reserves, and even, to a limited extent, in off-base schools. It was logical that the services should seek voluntary compliance before resorting to more drastic methods. As the Gesell Committee had pointed out, base (p. 608) commanders had vast influence in their local communities, influence that might be used in countless ways to alter the patterns of off-base discrimination. For the first time the armed forces had fought discrimination by making the local commander responsible for a systematic program of negotiations in the community.
[Footnote 23-100: This a.n.a.lysis owes much to the author"s correspondence with Alfred Fitt and the interviews with McNamara, Gesell, and Jordan. See also Memo, Timpane tor Stephen Schulman, 11 Feb 65, sub: Service Reports of Equal Rights Activities, and Paul Memo. Copies of all in CMH.]
But voluntary compliance had its limits. Its success depended in large measure on the ability and will of local commanders, who, for the most part, were unprepared by training or temperament to deal with the complex and explosive problems of off-base discrimination. Even if the commander could qualify as a civil rights reformer, he had little time or incentive for a duty that would go unrecognized in terms of his efficiency rating yet must compete for his attention with other necessary duties that were so recognized. Finally, the successful use of voluntary compliance techniques depended on the implied threat of legal or economic pressures, yet, for a considerable period following McNamara"s 1963 directive, no legal strictures against some forms of discrimination existed, and the use of economic sanctions had been so carefully circ.u.mscribed by defense officials as to render the possibility of their use extremely remote.
The decision to circ.u.mscribe the use of economic sanctions against off-base discrimination made sense. Closing a base because of discrimination in nearby communities was practically if not politically impossible and might conceivably become a threat to national security. As to sanctions aimed at specific businesses, the secretary"s civil rights a.s.sistants feared the possibility that the abrupt or authoritarian imposition of sanctions by an insensitive or unsympathetic commander might sabotage the department"s whole equal opportunity program in the community. They were determined to leave the responsibility for sanctions in the hands of senior civilian officials. In the end it was the most senior of these officials who acted. When his attention turned to the problem of discrimination in off-base housing for black servicemen in 1967, Secretary McNamara quickly decided to use sanctions against a discriminatory practice widely accepted and still legal under federal law.
The combination of voluntary compliance techniques and economic sanctions, in tandem with the historic civil rights legislation of the mid-1960"s, succeeded in eliminating most of the off-base discrimination faced by black servicemen. Ironically, in view of its unquestioned control in the area, the Department of Defense failed to achieve an equal success against discrimination within the military establishment itself. Complaints concerning the number, promotion, a.s.signment, and punishment of black servicemen, a limited problem in the mid-1960"s, went mostly unrecognized. Relatively speaking, they were ignored by the Gesell Committee and the civil rights organizations in the face of the more pressing off-base problems and only summarily treated by the services, which remained largely silent about on-base and in-house discrimination. Long after off-base discrimination had disappeared as a specific military problem, this neglected on-base discrimination would rise up again to trouble the armed forces in more militant times.[23-101]
[Footnote 23-101: Interv, author with Bennett, 13 Dec 73.]
CHAPTER 24 (p. 609)