I have, however, long considered it probable, that even _we_ should witness a general resistance throughout Europe to the fraudulent and disgusting tyranny of Buonaparte, created by the example of what has occurred in Spain and Portugal; and that _we_ should be actors and advisers in these scenes; and I have reflected frequently upon the measures which should be pursued to give a chance of success.
Those who embark in projects of this description should be made to understand, or to act as if they understood, that having once drawn the sword they must not return it, till they shall have completely accomplished their object. They must be prepared, and must be forced, to make all sacrifices to the cause. Submission to military discipline and order is a matter of course; but when a nation determines to resist the authority, and to shake off the government of Buonaparte, they must be prepared and forced to sacrifice the luxuries and comforts of life, and to risk all in a contest, which it should be clearly understood before it is undertaken, has for its object to save all or nothing.
The first measure for a country to adopt is to form an army, and to raise a revenue from the people to defray the expense of the army: above all, to form a government of such strength, as that army and people can be forced by it to perform their duty. This is the rock upon which Spain has split; and all our measures in any other country which should afford hopes of resistance to Buonaparte should be directed to avoid it. The enthusiasm of the people is very fine, and looks well in print; but I have never known it to produce any thing but confusion. In France, what was called enthusiasm was power and tyranny, acting through the medium of popular societies, which have ended by overturning Europe, and in establishing the most powerful and dreadful tyranny that ever existed. In Spain, the enthusiasm of the people spent itself in _vivas_ and vain boasting. The notion of its existence prevented even the attempt to discipline the armies; and its existence has been alleged, ever since, as the excuse for the rank ignorance of the officers and the indiscipline and constant misbehaviour of the troops.
I therefore earnestly recommend you, wherever you go, to trust nothing to the enthusiasm of the people. Give them a strong and a just, and, if possible, a good government; but, above all, a strong one, which shall enforce upon them to do their duty by themselves and their country; and let measures of finance to support an army go hand in hand with measures to raise it.
I am quite certain that the finances of Great Britain are more than a match for Buonaparte, and that we shall have the means of aiding any country that may be disposed to resist his tyranny. But those means are necessarily limited in every country by the difficulty of procuring specie. This necessary article can be obtained in sufficient quant.i.ties only by the contributions of the people; and although Great Britain can and ought to a.s.sist with money, as well as in other modes, every effort of this description, the princ.i.p.al financial as well as military effort, ought to be by the people of the resisting country.
_Dec. 10, 1811._
_The French System of Predatory War._
In the early days of the revolutionary war, the French, at the recommendation, I believe, of Brissot, adopted a measure which they called a _levee en ma.s.se_; and put every man, animal, and article, in their own country, in requisition for the service of the armies. This system of plunder was carried into execution by the popular societies throughout the country. It is not astonishing that a nation, among whom such a system was established, should have been anxious to carry on the war beyond their own frontiers. This system both created the desire and afforded the means of success; and with the war, they carried, wherever they went, the system of requisition; not, however, before they had, by these and other revolutionary measures, entirely destroyed all the sources of national prosperity at home.
Wherever the French armies have since gone, their subsistence, at least, the most expensive article in all armies, and means of transport, have been received from the country for nothing. Sometimes, besides subsistence, they have received clothing and shoes; in other instances, besides these articles, they have received pay; and from Austria and Prussia, and other parts of Germany and Italy, they have drawn, besides all these articles of supply for their troops, heavy contributions in money for the supply of the treasury at Paris. To this enumeration ought to be added the plunder acquired by the generals, officers, and troops; and it will be seen that the new French system of war is the greatest evil that ever fell on the civilised world.
The capital and industry of France having been destroyed by the revolution, it is obvious that the government cannot raise a revenue from the people of France adequate to support the large force which must be maintained in order to uphold the authority of the new government, particularly in the newly-conquered or ceded states; and to defend the widely-extended frontier of France from all those whose interest and inclination must lead them to attack it. The French government, therefore, under whatever form administered, must seek for support for their armies in foreign countries. War must be a financial resource; and that appears to me to be the greatest misfortune which the French revolution has entailed upon the present generation.
_Jan. 31, 1812._
I consider the Portuguese troops, next to the British, the best in the Peninsula.
_May 3, 1812._
It is very difficult to manage the defence of the kingdom of Portugal, the whole country being frontier.
_June 11, 1812._
_How to establish National Credit._
When a nation is desirous of establishing public credit, or, in other words, of inducing individuals to confide their property to its government, they must begin by acquiring a revenue equal to their fixed expenditure; and they must manifest an inclination to be honest, by performing their engagements in respect to their debts.
_June 25. 1812._
_The Spaniards cry "Viva!" but don"t act._
I do not expect much from the exertions of the Spaniards, notwithstanding all that we have done for them. They cry _viva!_ and are very fond of us, and hate the French; but they are, in general, the most incapable of useful exertion of all the nations that I have ever known; the most vain, and at the same time the most ignorant, particularly of military affairs, and above all of military affairs in their own country.
_August 18, 1812._
_Imbecility of the Spanish Leaders._
It is extraordinary that the revolution in Spain should not have produced one man with any knowledge of the real situation of the country. It really appears as if they were all drunk, and thinking, and talking of any other subject but Spain.
_November 1, 1812._
_Evils of uncontrolled popular Legislatures._
The theory of all legislation is founded in justice; and, if we could be certain that legislative a.s.semblies could on all occasions act according to the principles of justice, there would be no occasion for those checks and guards which we have seen established under the best systems.
Unfortunately, however, we have seen that legislative a.s.semblies are swayed by the fears and pa.s.sions of individuals; when unchecked, they are tyrannical and unjust; nay, more, it unfortunately happens too frequently, that the most tyrannical and unjust measures are the most popular. Those measures are particularly popular which deprive rich and powerful individuals of their properties under the pretence of the public advantage; and I tremble for a country in which, as in Spain, there is no barrier for the preservation of private property, excepting the justice of a legislative a.s.sembly possessing supreme powers.
_January 29, 1813._
_Ingrat.i.tude of the Portuguese to the British Army._
I must say, that the British army, which I have the honour to command, have met with nothing but ingrat.i.tude from the government and authorities in Portugal for their services; and that everything that could be done has been done by the civil authorities, lately, to oppress the officers and soldiers on every occasion in which it has by any accident been in their power. I hope, however, that we have seen the last of Portugal.
_July 20, 1813._
Jealousy of the interference of foreigners in their internal concerns, is the characteristic of all Spaniards.
_July 12, 1813._
Sound sense is better than abilities.
_August 8, 1813._
_Basis of military operations against the United States from the side of Canada._
Any offensive operation founded upon Canada must be preceded by a naval superiority on the lakes. But even if we had that superiority, I should doubt our being able to do more than secure the points on those lakes at which the Americans could have access. In such countries as America, very extensive, thinly peopled, and producing but little food in proportion to their extent, military operations by large bodies are impracticable, unless the party carrying them on has the uninterrupted use of a navigable river, or very extensive means of land transport, which such a country can rarely supply.
I conceive, therefore, that were your army larger even than the proposed augmentation would make it, you could not quit the lakes; and, indeed, would be tied to them the more necessarily in proportion as your army would be large.[7]
[Footnote 7: The letter from the Duke the above is taken was written in reply to an application by the home government for his opinion. We frequently find the Duke applied to for his opinion on political matters at home, while serving in the Peninsula.]
_February 22, 1814._