_Character of the Marques de la Romana._
In him the Spanish army have lost their brightest ornament, his country their most upright patriot, and the world the most strenuous and zealous defender of the cause in which we are engaged; and I shall always acknowledge with grat.i.tude the a.s.sistance which I received from him, as well by his operations as by his counsel, since he had been joined with this army.
_January 26, 1811._
_None but the worst men enter the Army as Privates._
In respect to recruiting the army, my own opinion is, that the government have never taken an enlarged view of the subject. It is expected that people will become soldiers in the line, and leave their families to starve, when, if they become soldiers in the militia, their families are provided for. This is an inconsistency that must strike the mind of even the least reflecting of mankind. What is the consequence?
That none but the worst description of men enter the regular service.
But admitting the truth of the expense, I say that the country has not a choice between army and no army, between peace or war. They must have a large and efficient army, one capable of meeting the enemy abroad, or they must expect to meet him at home; and then farewell to all considerations of measures of greater or lesser expense, and to the ease, the luxury, and happiness of England. G.o.d forbid that I should see the day on which hostile armies should contend within the United Kingdom; but I am very certain that I shall not only see that day, but shall be a party in the contest, unless we alter our system, and the public feel in time the real nature of the contest in which we are at present engaged, and determine to meet its expense. I have gone a little beyond the question of recruiting; but depend upon it that you will get men when you provide for the families of soldiers in the line and not in the militia, and not before.
_January 28, 1811._
_Buonaparte"s "disgusting Tyranny."_
I am glad to hear such good accounts of affairs in the North. G.o.d send that they may prove true, and that we may overthrow this disgusting tyranny: however, of this I am certain, that whether true or not at present, something of the kind must occur before long, and, if we can only hold out, we shall yet see the world relieved.
_March 23, 1811._
_A French army in England would be the consequence of our withdrawal from the Peninsula._
I shall be sorry if government should think themselves under the necessity of withdrawing from this country, on account of the expense of the contest. From what I have seen of the objects of the French government, and the sacrifices they make to accomplish them, I have no doubt that if the British army were for any reason to withdraw from the Peninsula, and the French government were relieved from the pressure of military operations on the Continent, they would incur all risks to land an army in his majesty"s dominions. Then indeed would commence an expensive contest; then his majesty"s subjects discover what are the miseries of war, of which, by the blessing of G.o.d, they have hitherto had no knowledge; and the cultivation, the beauty, and prosperity of the country, and the virtue and happiness of its inhabitants, would be destroyed: whatever might be the result of the military operations; G.o.d forbid that I should be a witness, much less an actor, in the scene.[6]
[Footnote 6: At this time the clamours of the opposition regarding the expense of the war induced a fear that the government might determine to discontinue it.]
_March 23, 1811._
_The Peninsular Governments must not mind unpopularity._
I recommend to them (the Spaniards and Portuguese) to advert seriously to the nature of the task which they have to perform. Popularity, however desirable it may be to individuals, will not form, or feed, or pay an army; will not enable it to march and fight; will not keep it in a state of efficiency for long and arduous services. The resources which a wise government must find for these objects must be drawn from the people, not by measures which will render those unpopular who undertake to govern a country in critical circ.u.mstances, but by measures which must for a moment have a contrary effect. The enthusiasm of the people in favour of any individual never saved any country. They must be obliged by the restraint of law and regulation, to do those things and to pay those contributions, which are to enable the government to carry on this necessary contest.
_April 9, 1811._
_Coolness in action, not headlong bravery, is required in the Army._
The desire to be forward in engaging the enemy is not uncommon in the British array; but that quality which I wish to see the officers possess, who are at the head of the troops, is a cool, discriminating judgment in action, which will enable them to decide with prompt.i.tude how far they can and ought to go, with propriety; and to convey their orders, and act with such vigour and decision, that the soldiers will look up to them with confidence in the moment of action, and obey them with alacrity.
_May 15, 1811._
_The battle of Albuera one of the most glorious in the War._
You will have heard of the Marshal"s (Beresford) action on the 16th. The fighting was desperate, and the loss of the British has been very severe; but, adverting to the nature of the contest, and the manner in which they held their ground against all the efforts the whole French army could make against them, notwithstanding all the losses which they had sustained, I think this action one of the most glorious, and honourable to the character of the troops, of any that has been fought during the war.
_May 20, 1811._
_Portuguese Troops, better than Spanish._
What a pity it is that the Spaniards will not set to work seriously to discipline their troops! We do what we please now with the Portuguese troops; we manoeuvre them under fire equally with our own, and have some dependence on them; but these Spaniards can do nothing but stand still, and we consider ourselves fortunate if they do not run away.
_May 25, 1811._
_Disorganized state of the Peninsular Governments._
Those unfortunate governments in the Peninsula have been reduced to such a state of decrepitude, that I believe there was no authority existing within Spain or Portugal before the French invaded these countries. The French invasion did not improve this state of things; and, since what is called in Spain the revolution, and in Portugal the restoration, no crime that I know of has been punished in either, excepting that of being a French partisan. Those malversations in office--those neglects of duty; the disobedience of orders; the inattention to regulation, which tend to defeat all plans for military operation, and ruin a state that is involved in war, more certainly than the plots of all the French partisans, are pa.s.sed unnoticed; and, notwithstanding the numerous complaints which Marshal Beresford and I have made, I do not know that one individual has yet been punished, or even dismissed from his office. The cause of this evil is the mistaken principle on which the government have proceeded. They have imagined that the best foundation for their power was a low, vulgar popularity; the evidence is the shouts of the mob of Lisbon, and the regular attendance at their levees, and the bows and sc.r.a.pes of people in office, who ought to have other modes of spending their time; and to obtain this babble the government of Portugal, as well as the successive governments in Spain, have neglected to perform those essential duties of all governments, viz., to force those they are placed over to do their duty, by which, before this time, these countries would have been out of danger.
The other evil is connected very materially with the first. The government will not regulate their finances, because it will interfere with some man"s job. They will not lay on new taxes, because in all countries those who lay on taxes are not favourites with the mob. They have a general income-tax, called 10 per cent., and, in some cases, 20 per cent., which they have regulated in such a manner as that no individual, I believe, has paid a hundredth part of what he ought to have paid. Then, for want of money, they can pay n.o.body, and, of course, have not the influence which they ought to have over the subordinate departments.
In addition to embarra.s.sments of all descriptions surrounding us on all sides, I have to contend with an ancient enmity between these two nations, which is more like that of cat and dog than anything else, of which no sense of common danger, or common interest, or anything, can get the better, even in individuals.
_June 12, 1811._
To write an anonymous letter is the meanest action of which any man can be guilty.
_Dispatch, July 3, 1811._
_British Officers, as well at Soldiers, require to be kept in order._
I must also observe that British officers require to be kept in order, as well as the soldiers under their command, particularly in a foreign service. The experience which I have had of their conduct in the Portuguese service has shown me that there must be authority, and that a strong one, to keep them within due bounds, otherwise they would only disgust the soldiers over whom they should be placed, the officers whom they should be destined to a.s.sist, and the country in whose service they should be employed.
_October 1, 1811._
_Money in aid of Labour better than Charity._
That which would be desirable is, if possible, to aid laborious exertions to procure a subsistence by small advances of money; and I propose to keep this principle in view in the distribution of the money entrusted to me, by which not only it will subsist those to whom it will be given for a longer period, but it may be hoped that the people will resume their habits of industry, and that they will soon again be able to provide for their own subsistence.
_Oct. 11, 1811._
_A General Re-action against Buonaparte predicted._