"All these things should only hasten still more the measures, to be taken for re-organizing the army, and particularly for the defence of Paris; an object to which their thoughts appear essentially turned.
"From the conversations we have had with the two aides-de-camp, it follows definitively, and we repeat it with regret, that the person of the Emperor will be one of the greatest difficulties. They think, that the combined powers will require guarantees and precautions, that he may never re-appear on the stage of the world. They a.s.sert, that their people themselves demand security against his enterprises. _It is our duty to observe, that his escape before the conclusion of our negotiations would be considered as an act of bad faith on our part, and might essentially involve the safety of France._ We have hopes, however, that this affair also may be terminated to the Emperor"s satisfaction; since they have made few objections to his residence, and that of his brothers, in England; which they appeared to prefer to the scheme of a retreat in America.
"_The imperial prince has not been mentioned in any of our conversations._ It was not our business, to start this subject, on which they did not enter.
(Signed) "H. SeBASTIANI.
Count de PONTeCOULANT.
LA FAYETTE.
D"ARGENSON.
Count DE LA FOReT.
Benjamin CONSTANT."
The committee, immediately on the receipt of this despatch, appointed Messieurs Andreossy, de Valence, Flaugergues, Boissy d"Anglas, and Labenardiere, to repair in quality of commissioners to the head-quarters of the allied armies, to demand a suspension of hostilities, and negotiate an armistice.
The Duke of Otranto, ever eager to open an ostensible correspondence, under cover of which he might carry on secret communications if necessary, persuaded the government, that it would be proper to pave the way for the commissioners by a previous step; and in consequence he addressed a letter of congratulation to the Duke of Wellington, in which he entreated him with pompous meanness, to bestow on France his suffrage and protection.
Copies of the former instructions were delivered to the commissioners; and to these were added the following:
"_Instructions for Messieurs the Commissioners appointed to treat for an Armistice._
"Paris, June the 27th, 1815.
"The first overtures made to our plenipotentiaries on the conditions, at the price of which the commander in chief of one of the enemy"s armies would consent to an armistice, are of a nature to alarm us respecting those, which the commanders of the armies of the other powers might also demand, and to render the possibility of an arrangement very problematical. However unfavourable our military situation at the present moment may be, there are sacrifices, to which the interest of the nation will not allow us to submit.
"It is evident, that the motive, on which Prince Blucher founded his demand of six of our fortified towns, which were named, and some others besides, which were not named, _the security of his army_, is one of those allegations brought forward by force, to carry as far as possible the advantages arising from the success of the moment. This allegation is very easily refuted: since it may be termed an act of derision, to demand pledges for the security of an army already master of a considerable portion of our territory, and which is marching without obstacle almost alone in the heart of France. There is another declaration made on the part of Prince Blucher, calculated still more to disquiet us: which is, that he can be induced only by immense advantages, to take upon himself to conclude an armistice, for which he has no authority. In this declaration there is a frankness of exaction, that offers many difficulties in the way of accommodation.
However, though the committee of government is far from being inclined to favour the cessions required, it does not tie itself up, by a peremptory refusal, from entering into discussions of an arrangement, the conditions of which are not carried beyond the bounds traced by the true interests of the public.
"If, to arrive at a conclusion, we must submit to the cession of some fortified town, it is thoroughly to be understood, that such a cession ought not to take place, unless it were the guarantee of an armistice, to be prolonged till peace is concluded. It is unnecessary to add, that the delivery of such a town is not to take place; till the armistice has been ratified by the respective governments.
"One of the points, that demands all the zeal of messieurs the commissioners, is that of fixing the line, where the occupation of the French territory by the enemy"s armies is to stop.
"It would be of great importance, to obtain the line of the Somme; which would place the foreign troops nearly thirty leagues from Paris, messieurs the commissioners ought strongly to insist on keeping them at least at this distance.
"If the enemy were yet more exacting, and we should be finally compelled to greater condescension, a line traced between the Somme and the Oise should not let them approach within twenty leagues of Paris. The line, that separates the department of the Somme from that of the Oise, might be taken, detaching from the latter the northern part of the department of the Aisne, and thence a straight line through the department of the Ardennes, which should be continued till it reached the Meuse near Mezieres.
"However, in fixing the line of the armistice, we must rely on the ability of messieurs the commissioners, to endeavour to obtain the most favourable arrangement.
"Their mission being to the English and Prussian armies in common, there is no occasion to inform them, that it is indispensable for the armistice to be common to both armies.
"It would be very important likewise, to introduce into the armistice, as one of its clauses, that it should extend to the armies of all the other enemies, taking for its basis the _status quo_ of the respective armies, at the moment when information of the armistice should reach them. If this stipulation be rejected, under pretence, that the commanders of the English and Russian armies have no right, to make arrangements in the names of the commanders of the armies of the other powers; they may at least consent, to invite the others to accede to it on the basis above mentioned.
"As even the negotiations for the armistice, from the nature of the conditions already placed foremost, which must be the subject of more serious debate, will inevitably occasion some delay, it is a precaution rigidly necessary to be obtained, that, in order to treat of an armistice, all movements should be stopped for a few days, or at least for eight and forty hours.
"There is one precautionary arrangement, which messieurs the commissioners must not neglect. This is, to stipulate, that the enemy"s armies shall levy no extraordinary contributions.
"Though the particular object of their mission is the conclusion of an armistice, as it is scarcely to be imagined, that messieurs the commissioners, in their intercourse with the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blucher, will not hear from these generals either proposals, or suggestions, or at least simple conjectures, respecting the views the allied sovereigns may adopt with respect to the form of government in France; messieurs the commissioners undoubtedly will not fail, carefully to collect every thing, that may appear to them capable of having any influence on the part to be taken definitively by the government.
"The copy of the instructions given to messieurs the plenipotentiaries appointed to repair to the allied sovereigns, which has been delivered to them, will make them acquainted with the bases, on which the government has been desirous. .h.i.therto of founding its negotiations. It is possible, that the course of events may oblige it, to _extend these bases_: but messieurs the commissioners will judge, that, if absolute necessity compel it, to a.s.sent to arrangements _of a different nature_, so that we cannot preserve _the principle of our independence in all its plenitude_, it is a sacred duty, to endeavour to emanc.i.p.ate ourselves from the greater part of the inconveniences, that are attached to the bare misfortune of its being modified.
"A copy of the letter, written from Laon by messieurs the plenipotentiaries, and dated yesterday, the 26th, is also delivered to messieurs the commissioners. The resolutions[79], which have been taken to-day by the government, will furnish them with the means of answering all the objections, that may be made to them on the danger and possibility of the return of the Emperor Napoleon.
[Footnote 79: These resolutions consisted in sending General Beker to Malmaison, to watch Napoleon.]
"That the language of messieurs the commissioners may perfectly accord with all that has been done by the committee of government, copies of the letters, that have been written to Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington, respecting the approaching departure of Napoleon and his brothers, are hereto annexed.
"On the questions relative to the form of government of France, provisionally, messieurs the commissioners will confine themselves to hearing the overtures, that may be made to them; and they will take care, to transmit an account of them, in order that, according to the nature of their reports, government may come to such a determination, as the safety of our country may prescribe."
From this doc.u.ment it appears, that the committee, already foreseeing the impossibility of preserving the throne to Napoleon II., was disposed to enter into a discussion with the allies on the choice of a sovereign. Bound by its mandate, it would never have consented willingly, to covenant with the Bourbons; but it would have had no repugnance, at least as I conjecture, to allow the crown to be placed on the head of the King of Saxony, or of the Duke of Orleans.
The party of the latter prince, for which M. Fouche had collected recruits, was reinforced by a great number of deputies and generals.
"The qualities of the duke; the remembrance of Jemappes, and of some other victories under the republic, in which he was not unconcerned; the possibility of forming a treaty, that should reconcile the interests of all parties; the name of Bourbon, which might have been employed abroad, without uttering it at home: all these motives, and others besides, afforded in this choice a prospect of repose and security even to those, who could not see in it the presage of happiness."
The King of Saxony had no other t.i.tle to the suffrages of France, than the heroic fidelity, which he had maintained toward it in 1814. But after him the empire might have returned to Napoleon II.: and as a prince, possessed of experience, wisdom, and virtue, may reign indifferently over any people, and render them happy, the French nation would have resigned itself to the government of a foreign monarch, till the day when his death would have restored the sceptre to the hands of its legitimate possessor.
The deference which the committee was prepared to pay to the will of the allied powers, was not the effect of its own weakness. It was enjoined it by the alarming reports, which Marshal Grouchy sent it daily, of the defection and dejected state of the army.
The soldiers, it is true, discouraged by the abdication of the Emperor, and the reports of the return of the Bourbons, appeared irresolute. "Our wounds," said they, "will no longer ent.i.tle us to any thing but proscription." The generals themselves, rendered timid by their uncertainty of the future, spoke with circ.u.mspection: but all, generals and soldiers, maintained the same sentiments in the bottom of their hearts; and their hesitation, their lukewarmness, were the work of their leader; who, in France as on the banks of the Dyle, wanting resolution and strength of mind, did not take the trouble to conceal, that he considered the national cause as lost, and awaited only a favourable opportunity, to pacify the Bourbons and their allies by a prompt and complete submission.
The committee, however, having their eyes opened by private letters, conceived suspicions of the veracity of the marshal"s reports. It commissioned General Corbineau, to give it an account of the state of the army. Informed of the truth, it was no longer afraid of being obliged to submit humbly to the law of the victor: and, desirous of preventing Marshal Grouchy, whose intentions had ceased to be a mystery, from endangering the independence of the nation by an inconsiderate act, it prohibited him from negotiating any armistice, or commencing any negotiation; and ordered him, to lead his army to Paris.
The Prince of Eckmuhl, whose want of firmness was so wretchedly displayed in the retreat from Moscow, could not resist this fresh blow: the example of Marshal Grouchy led him away; and, persuaded like him, that it was necessary to submit without delay, he declared to the government, that there was not a moment to be lost in recalling the Bourbons, and proposed to it, to send to the king the following offers:
1st, To enter Paris without a foreign guard:
2d, To take the tri-coloured c.o.c.kade:
3d, To guaranty security of person and property to all, whatever may have been their functions, offices, votes, or opinions:
4th, To retain the two chambers:
5th, To ensure to persons in office the retention of their places, and to the army that of their ranks, pensions, honours, and prerogatives:
6th, To retain the legion of honour, and its inst.i.tution, as the first order in the state.
The committee, too _clear-sighted_ to be caught by this proposal, was eager to reject it; and, faithful to its system of concealing nothing from the two chambers, acquainted the princ.i.p.al members with it; repeating to: them, that, be the event what it might, "it would never propose to them any thing pusillanimous, or contrary to its duty; and that it would defend to the last extremity the independence of the nation, the inviolability of the chambers, and the liberty and security of the citizens."
The representatives answered this declaration by placing Paris in a state of siege, and voting an address to the army[80]. "Brave soldiers," such were its words; "a great reverse must have astonished, but not dejected you. Your country has need of your constancy and courage. To you it has confided the care of the national glory; and you will answer its expectations.
[Footnote 80: On the 2d of July the chamber voted an address to the French.
This address, which perished in the birth, related to the political situation of France with respect to the allies. It appeared to me not very interesting, and I thought I might dispense with a particular account of it. It gave rise, however, to a remarkable incident. M.
Manuel, who had the princ.i.p.al hand in drawing it up, had not thought proper, to speak of the Emperor"s successor in it; and the chamber decided, to add in the address, that Napoleon II. had been called to the empire.]
"Plenipotentiaries have been sent to the allied powers ... the success of the negotiations depends on you. Close round the tri-coloured flag, consecrated by glory and the wishes of the nation. You will see us, if necessary, in your ranks; and we will convince the world, that twenty-five years of glory and sacrifices will never be effaced, and that a people, who wills to be free, must ever remain so."