280. The punishment of sin is twofold according to its duration. (a) Grave sin, since it deprives of spiritual life and turns man away from his Last End, introduces a radical and, of itself, irreparable disorder, and thus incurs an eternal punishment; those who die in grave sin will be sentenced to eternal punishment. (b) Venial sin does not inflict spiritual death, but is a defect or excess, not as regards the Last End, but as regards the means to the Last End. Thus, it incurs, not an eternal, but a temporal punishment.
281. The punishment of sin is twofold according to its quality. (a) Sin by which man turns away from his Last End is punished by the pain of loss, the deprivation of eternal happiness which was despised. This pain may be called infinite, inasmuch as it is the loss of Infinite Good. (b) Sin, in so far as it is an inordinate turning towards created things, is punished by the pain of sense, which comes through creatures. This pain is finite.
282. Sin may be a punishment of sin: (a) if a later sin results from a former sin (e.g., G.o.d may permit those who refuse to serve Him, to become the servants of their pa.s.sions); (b) if the commission of sin is accompanied by internal or external sufferings (e.g., the jealous indulge their vice at the expense of great mental torment).
283. Not all the afflictions that befall mankind are chastis.e.m.e.nts. In the strict sense, only those evils are punishments which are inflicted by the lawgiver against the will of the offender as a vindication of justice violated by the personal offense of the latter. Hence we must distinguish punishment from the following: (a) from satisfaction, which is compensation willingly endured for one"s own sin, or freely offered for another"s (e.g., David after his repentance performed penance for his sins; Christ on the cross offered His satisfaction for the human race); (b) from medicinal afflictions, which are intended, not as reparations to injured justice, but as remedies to preserve men against sin or relapse, or to afford them opportunities for progress (e.g., the calamities of Job, the condition of the man born blind, the dolors of the Blessed Virgin, the physical evils Which in this world sometimes happen to subjects as a punishment on their rulers, etc.); (c) from the natural defects of fallen human nature, such as hunger, thirst, disease, etc. These are only indirectly the consequences of original sin, the direct punishment, from which they follow, being the infirmity and corruption of nature produced by original sin.
Question III
LAW
284. In the previous Question we considered the internal principles of human acts--that is, habits, good and bad, from which they proceed. Now we shall turn to the external principles, good and bad, that move one to one"s acts. The external principle that moves to evil is the demon, who tempts us to sin; the external principle that moves to good is G.o.d, who instructs us by His law and helps us by His grace to fulfill it. Temptation has been discussed already, and grace belongs to Dogmatic Theology; the next Question to be considered, therefore, is Law.
Art. 1: LAW IN GENERAL
(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 90-92.)
285. Definition.--Law is an ordinance of the reason for the common good promulgated by him who has authority in the community.
(a) It is an ordinance, that is, a command or prohibition which has obligatory and lasting force. Hence, advice is not a law, because not obligatory; a rule that binds only during the lifetime of the lawgiver or of those who received it is not strictly a law, because not enduring.
(b) It is an ordinance of the reason, since the rule and standard of human acts is reason (see 64 sqq.). Hence, the arbitrary will of a ruler commanding what is against reason would not be law, but rather iniquity.
(c) It is made for the common good, that is, it must tend to promote, directly or indirectly, general happiness, which is the end of society.
Hence, the commands of a tyrant which benefit a few at the expense of public peace and prosperity are not truly laws.
(d) It is made by him who has authority, that is, by the person or persons who have the lawmaking power according to the form of government. Hence, the decisions of an advisory body or the decrees of a usurper are not laws.
(e) It is made by the proper authority in a community, that is, as here understood, in a self-sufficing community, which has its own means for attaining its end and is independent in its own order of other societies. Hence, the regulations made by parents for their family are not called laws, since the family is not a self-sufficing society.
(f) It is an ordinance that has been promulgated, that is, brought to the notice of those whom it binds. Hence, a law that has been drawn up but not published as such, is not obligatory even for those who know of its existence. A law becomes obligatory, however, as soon as it has been promulgated, and the presumption then is that the law is known; but he who is inculpably ignorant is not guilty of formal sin if he breaks the law.
286. Division.--According as the immediate lawgiver is G.o.d or man, laws are divine or human. Divine laws are threefold: (a) the eternal law is the ordinance of the divine mind which from eternity has directed the motions and actions of all creatures for the common good of the universe; (b) the natural law is the light of man"s reason as an impression and reflection of the eternal law; (c) the positive divine law is that which G.o.d of His free will has added to the natural law, viz., the Mosaic law under the Old Testament and the law of the Gospel under the New Testament.
287. Human laws are ecclesiastical or civil according to the authority from which they originate.
288. Collision of Laws.--Not infrequently it happens that opposite laws seem to call for fulfillment at the same time, as, when in case of unjust attack it seems that one is bound to defend oneself and bound not to injure the other party. Hence arises a conflict of obligations and rights. But the difficulty is only apparent; for, since G.o.d is a just and wise lawgiver, He does not intend either that one should be held to impossibilities, or that a superior obligation should yield to one that is inferior. Hence, the rule in such cases of apparent collision of laws is:
(a) if a person can recognize which of the two obligations is superior, he is bound to follow that one; (b) if he is unable to discover after careful examination which obligation has the greater claim, and must decide at once, he may decide for the law whose observance seems to him safer; or, if he sees no difference as regards safety, he may decide for either as he wishes. If the decision is wrong, the error is involuntary, and hence not imputable as sin.
289. When the contending precepts belong to different categories of law, the higher law must be followed. (a) The natural law has precedence over the positive law, divine or human. For example, the natural law of self-preservation allowed David to eat the loaves of proposition, a thing forbidden by the positive divine law. The same law of self-preservation allows a starving man to take what does not belong to him according to human laws, if it is necessary for his life. The same law of self-preservation excuses one from a.s.sisting at Ma.s.s, if one is very ill.
(b) The positive divine law has precedence over human law. Example: The command of Christ to his Apostles to preach His Name was to be obeyed rather than the command of the Sanhedrin to the contrary (Acts, v. 19).
(c) The ecclesiastical law has precedence over civil law, for the end of the Church is higher than that of the State, and the Church"s judgment about the means to her end should prevail.
290. The precedence of ecclesiastical over civil law does not mean that the Church has the right to interfere in matters that belong to the jurisdiction of the State, or that the Church should insist on settling every dispute by its own action alone.
(a) A law on matters purely civil and political made by the Church in opposition to a law of the State would not prevail over the latter, for, as the Church admits, "whatever is to be ranged under the civil and political order is rightly subject to the civil authority" (Leo XIII).
(b) A law on matters directly or indirectly spiritual, made by the Church but not necessary to her end, can be made the subject of negotiation or even of compromise by the Church in order to avoid a conflict of laws; in fact, the Church has shown her willingness to make concessions, where possible, for the common peace and happiness.
291. When contending laws belong to the same category of laws, the more important, or more urgent, or more necessary law prevails.
(a) The law that defends greater goods (those that are spiritual, internal, or common) has precedence over the law that defends lesser goods (the temporal, external, or private). Examples: The natural law that one must save oneself from persecution and death yields to the natural law that one must not blaspheme or deny G.o.d, and hence one must prefer to die rather than blaspheme. The law that one may not expose one"s life to danger yields to the law that the common welfare must be defended; hence, citizens are obliged to go to war when the nation calls, pastors and physicians to remain at their posts in time of pestilence, disaster, etc.
(b) Obligations of justice have precedence over obligations of charity, for in the former case a stricter right is in question. Example: t.i.tus is keeping $5.00 in order to pay a debt to Caius, who needs the money today; Balbus, who is very poor, asks t.i.tus to give the money to him.
t.i.tus should pay Caius.
(c) Negative or prohibitory laws have precedence over affirmative or preceptive laws (see 371). Example: t.i.tus is asked to write out a testimonial stating that he knows that Balbus is honest, competent, etc. Balbus has claims on the help of t.i.tus on account of a promise made in the past; but t.i.tus knows very well that Balbus is not competent, honest, etc. The law forbidding lies prevails here over the law that one keep a promise made.
292. Since rights and duties are correlative--there being a duty that corresponds to every right, and vice versa--and since both are regulated by law, the principles given for the apparent collision of laws can be applied to the apparent collision of rights.
(a) Rights of a higher kind have preference over rights of a lower kind. Therefore, the rights that arise from birth itself, or from the fact that one is a human being (e.g., the right to life), are superior to the rights that are acquired through some condition, such as inheritance or contract (e.g., the right to property, etc.). Example: t.i.tus must get his child, who is in danger of death, to a hospital without delay. Balbus is getting ready for a pleasure ride, but t.i.tus takes his car since there is no other ready means of getting to the hospital. t.i.tus acts within his natural rights, if the car is returned safely and as soon as possible to the owner. According to civil law his act would be technical larceny, but in view of the necessity courts and juries would certainly not insist on the letter of the law.
(b) Inalienable rights (i.e., those which one may not renounce, because they are also duties), such as the right to serve G.o.d, the right to live, etc., are superior to alienable rights (i.e., those which one may renounce), such as the right to marry, the right to own property, etc.
Example: One may surrender the right to drink intoxicants in order to serve G.o.d or preserve one"s life.
293. The Basis of All Laws.--Prior to every other law and the ground and principle of all laws is the Eternal Law; for, since this is the plan of Divine Wisdom directing from eternity all acts and movements to their particular ends and to the end of the universe, it follows that all other laws are reflections of the eternal plan and realizations of the divine decree. The Eternal Law differs from other laws in various ways:
(a) as to duration. The Eternal Law existed before anything was made, whereas all other laws begin to exist when they are promulgated;
(b) as to breadth of application. The Eternal Law regulates, not only contingent things (such as actions) but also necessary things (such as that man should have a soul, hands and feet); for all things created, whether they be contingent or necessary, are subject to divine government. Human laws, as is evident, cannot regulate what is necessary (e.g., it would be foolish for them to decree that men must or must not have souls);
(c) as to subjects. The Eternal Law rules, not only rational creatures (i.e., angels and men), but also irrational creatures, such as matter, plants, and animals. The former are ruled through commands, which require that they direct themselves to their End; the latter are ruled through the inclinations given them by G.o.d, which move them to the ends He desires them to attain. Human laws cannot regulate the acts of irrational creatures, for these creatures cannot understand a command as such, and man cannot give them natural inclinations (e.g., it would be foolish to make a law for cats against the catching of birds).
294. The laws to be considered in the pages that follow are temporal and moral. Thus: (a) they are laws promulgated at some particular time, either from the beginning of humanity (as is the case with the Natural Law) or later (e.g., the Mosaic Law, the Christian Law, etc,); (b) they are laws regulating, not the necessary (as is the case with metaphysical or mathematical laws), but the contingent; (c) they are laws given, not to the irrational creature (as is the case with physical and biological laws), but to the rational, that it may attain its end through self-government in accordance with law.
Art. 2: THE NATURAL LAW
(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 93, 94.)
295. Meaning.--The Natural Law is so called for the following reasons: (a) it is received by man, not through special promulgation, but along with his rational nature. Hence, St. Paul says that the Gentiles, who had not received the laws specially promulgated, were a law unto themselves, that is, through their rational nature (Rom., ii. 14); (b) it includes only such precepts as can be known or deduced from the very nature of man, and thus some pagans fulfilled the Law of Moses naturally, i.e., as regards its natural precepts (Rom., ii. 14); (c) it can be known from the natural light of reason without instruction, being a law written on the heart of man (Rom, ii. 15).
The Natural Law is defined theologically as a partic.i.p.ation of the Eternal Law in man. Three elements const.i.tute its essence in its integrity: (a) a pa.s.sive partic.i.p.ation of the Eternal Law consisting in man"s nature and faculties with their inclinations to their proper acts and ends. This man shares with all creatures. (b) an active partic.i.p.ation in the Eternal Law proper to man. This consists in the activity of man"s intellect through which he shares in G.o.d"s providence and government in a special way as one who can rule himself and others.
Reason, reflecting upon the natural inclinations and ordering them to their proper acts and ends, formulates (c) a dictate or command of the practical reason. This command const.i.tutes the essence of Natural Law.
"Hence the Psalmist after saying (Psalm, IV. 6): _Offer up the sacrifice of justice_, as though some one asked what the works of justice are, adds: _Many say, Who showeth us good things_, in answer to which he says: _The light of thy countenance, 0 Lord, is signed upon us_. Thus the Psalmist implies that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and bad, which is the function of the Natural Law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the divine light.
It is therefore evident that the Natural Law is nothing else than the rational creature"s partic.i.p.ation in the eternal law" (_Summa Theol_.
I-II, q. 91, a.2).
296. Relation of the Natural Law to Other Laws.-(a) The Natural Law is inferior to the Eternal Law; for, while the Eternal Law exists in the mind of G.o.d, underived from any other law and is regulative of all created things, the Natural Law exists in the mind of man, as a derivation and image of the Eternal Law and a rule for man"s acts only.
(b) It is superior to Positive Law, for all Positive Law is a deduction from or a determination of Natural Law.
297. Division.--Since Natural Law is the reflection of the eternal plan of Divine Wisdom in the reason of man, we cannot distinguish different species of it according to difference of lawgivers or subjects. The objects regulated are, however, different; and hence we may distinguish various precepts of Natural Law.