(b) Joy about things that are sinful or consequent on sin rejoices, not that what was done was wicked, but over other circ.u.mstances that were good or indifferent. Examples: An employer admires in the conduct of a dishonest employee, not the injustice committed, but the shrewd manner in which the fraud was perpetrated. A bystander is very much amused to witness a fight, not because he likes discord, but because the acts and remarks of the fighters are comical. A man rejoices when he hears that a friend has committed suicide and made him his heir, if the joy is confined to the second part of the news.
238. The moral gravity and species of evil rejoicing has the same character as the past sins that are its object (see 70 sqq.). For to rejoice over sin is to approve of it, and therefore to be guilty of it in will. Example: A prisoner who, to overcome melancholy, thinks over the times he became intoxicated in the past, is guilty again of those sins, with their number and circ.u.mstances adverted to.
239. What has been said about evil rejoicing applies likewise: (a) to boasting over sin committed, because this implies complacency in the sin; (b) to sorrow over sin omitted, because this means that one approves of sin rather than virtue.
240. To be sorry because one performed good that was not obligatory is not sinful of itself, but it may become so by reason of the evil motive of the sorrow, or of the danger of sin. Examples: If a person is sorry that he performed many unnecessary devotional exercises, because he injured his health thereby, his sorrow is not sinful. If he grieves over this because he now dislikes religion, his sorrow is made bad by his evil motive. If he regrets that he married, this is sinful if it leads him to neglect the duties of his state and commit injustice.
241. Evil desires are acts of the will by which one deliberately intends to commit sin in the future. They are of two kinds, viz., absolute and conditional: (a) absolute or efficacious desires are those in which the mind is fully made up to carry out the evil design, come what may; (b) conditional or inefficacious desires are those in which the purpose to commit sin hinges upon the fulfillment of some event or circ.u.mstance that is explicitly or implicitly willed.
242. Absolute evil desires have the same moral gravity and species as that to which they tend (i.e., they take their character from the object, end and circ.u.mstances). Example: He who plans to steal a large sum from a benefactor in order to be able to live in idleness and dissipation, sins gravely against justice, and is also guilty of ingrat.i.tude and intemperance, for he has committed all these sins in his heart.
243. Conditional evil desires, if they are indeliberate and express rather the propensity of nature than the considered will of him who makes them, are not formally sinful. Examples: A poor man who unthinkingly wishes that stealing were lawful; a sufferer who under the influence of pain wishes that the Almighty had not forbidden suicide.
244. Conditional desires, if made deliberately, are of two kinds. (a) There are some desires in which the condition willed (e.g., if this were not a sin, if this were lawful, if this were allowed by G.o.d, etc.) takes away the malice of the act desired, since some laws may be dispensed or changed. Examples: "Would that G.o.d had not p.r.o.nounced against taking the property of others!" "I would stay away from church, if this were not Sunday." Desires of this kind are not sinful on account of their object, which is not really wished, but on account of their end, or their lack of useful purpose, and of the danger that the conditional may become absolute. (b) There are other desires in which the condition does not take away the malice of what is desired, either because the condition is not at all concerned with the malice, or because it wishes something to become lawful which even G.o.d cannot make lawful. Examples: "I would steal, if this could be done safely." "I would blaspheme, if G.o.d permitted." These desires partake of the malice of the things that are wished.
245. Just as we distinguished above between bad thoughts and thoughts on things that are bad, so may we distinguish between bad desires and desires of what is bad. For bad desires that are not mere velleities are sinful, as we have just seen; whereas the desire of what is physically evil is good, if the evil is wished, not for its own sake, but for the sake of some greater good. Example: To desire out of hatred that a neighbor lose his arm is a bad desire and sinful; but if one wished this as a means to save the neighbor"s life, while he still desires something evil, it is not the evil but the benefit that is intended, and hence the desire itself is not bad.
246. The Causes of Sin.--The causes of sin are partly internal (i.e., those which are in man himself) and partly external (i.e., those which are without).
247. The internal causes of sin are: (a) ignorance in the intellect; (b) pa.s.sion in the sensitive appet.i.tes; (c) malice in the will.
248. Since ignorance and pa.s.sion may render an act involuntary (see 40 sqq.), the sins that result from them are of two kinds, viz., material and formal. (a) Material or objective sins are transgressions of the law that are involuntary, and consequently not imputable as faults.
Examples: Blasphemies uttered by one who is delirious or hypnotized; breaking of the fast by one who is inculpably ignorant of the law; imprecations p.r.o.nounced by a person out of his mind through fear. (b) Formal or subjective sins are transgressions of the law that are voluntary, and hence imputable as faults. They are not only against the law, as is the case with material sins, but they are also against conscience.
249. Ignorance, pa.s.sion and malice cause sin as follows:
(a) Every sin results from practical error (i.e., from a wrong decision as to what one should do here and now), for the will chooses wrong only after the intellect has decided on wrong. In this sense, then, it is said that all who sin are in error (Prov,, xiv. 22), and that every sinner is in ignorance (Aristotle, _Nich. Ethics_, Bk. III, c.1, 1110b 27). But not every sin results from speculative error (i.e., from a false notion or judgment about the lawfulness of an act in general).
else we should have to hold that everyone who sins is in error against the faith;
(b) Speculative ignorance causes formal sin, when the ignorance is culpable and leads to wrongdoing, as when a person has never taken the pains to learn what the law of fast requires and in consequence violates the law, or when an automobilist through carelessness does not see a person crossing the street and runs him down. Speculative ignorance causes material sin, when the lack of knowledge is inculpable and leads one to do what one would not otherwise do, as when a child shoots a playmate, not knowing that this is a sin, or a soldier shoots a comrade whom, on account of darkness, he mistook for an enemy spy;
(c) Pa.s.sion, by clouding the judgment and vehemently inciting the will, leads one to act against one"s better knowledge and to choose inordinately the concupiscences of pleasure, or possessions, or glory (I John, ii. 16). If the pa.s.sion is voluntary, the resulting sin is formal; but, if the pa.s.sion is involuntary and takes away the use of reason, the sin caused is material;
(d) Malice is found in a sense in every formal sin, inasmuch as every sin is committed out of choice. But malice in the strict sense, as here understood, is a choice of sin made, not on account of preceding ignorance or pa.s.sion, but on account of some corrupt disposition of the sinner which makes sin pleasing or acceptable to him, such as a vicious habit or inclination which he cultivates, or willful despair or presumption which he entertains.
250. Ignorance and pa.s.sion do not always make an act involuntary (see 40 sqq.), and hence three kinds of formal sins may be distinguished according to the three kinds of causes from which they proceed:
(a) sins of weakness, which are those that result from antecedent concupiscence or other pa.s.sion that lessens without taking away the voluntariness of an act. Since the First Person of the Trinity is especially described by the attribute of almighty power, sins of this kind are sometimes called sins against the Father;
(b) sins of ignorance, which are those that result from antecedent and vincible ignorance. Since wisdom is especially attributed to the Second Person of the Trinity, sins of this kind are called sins against the Son;
(c) sins of malice, which are those that proceed entirely from a free will that is undisturbed by ignorance or pa.s.sion. Since love is especially ascribed to the Third Person of the Trinity, sins of this cla.s.s are sometimes called sins against the Holy Ghost. Example: One whose heart is so set on wealth that he decides to sacrifice the friendship of G.o.d for new acquisitions; one who sees clearly the offense to G.o.d a sin entails, and deliberately chooses it; one who is so jealous of a neighbor that he schemes to ruin him; one who sins habitually without fear or remorse.
251. Other things being equal, sins of malice are graver than sins of weakness and sins of ignorance, since the former are more voluntary, more enduring, and more dangerous. But just as sins of ignorance and sins of weakness may be mortal, as when their object is seriously wrong, so sins of malice may be venial, as when their object is not seriously wrong. A fully deliberate lie that works no great harm is venially sinful, whereas a murder committed by one who was intoxicated or moved by rage is a mortal sin, if there was sufficient reflection.
252. The external causes of sin are: (a) the devil or other evil spirits, who by acting on the imagination or other sensitive powers of the soul attempt to draw mankind to destruction; (b) the world, that is, the persons and things about us, which by their seductiveness, or by their principles and examples, tend to draw away from the practice of virtue.
253. Since free consent is implied in the concept of formal sin, none of the internal or external causes of sin just mentioned, the choice of the will alone excepted, can actually effect sin. Hence the distinction between temptation and sin. The rebellion of the pa.s.sions, the suggestions of evil spirits, the seductions of the world, are temptations; if the will does not yield to them, there is no sin, but rather virtue and merit.
254. In the presence of temptation fully adverted to, it is not lawful to remain indifferent (neither consenting nor dissenting), since this without just cause exposes one to the danger (see 258 sqq.) of being overcome by sin.
255. Resistance to temptation is made by the act of the will which commands the other powers not to yield and withholds its own consent to the sin suggested. This resistance may be:
(a) implicit or explicit, according as the dissent is expressed in what contains it, or is expressed in itself. Examples: Contempt of a temptation or displeasure over its presence is implicit resistance, while the resolve never to yield to it is explicit resistance;
(b) internal or external, according as it remains in the will, or is also exercised by the other powers. Examples: Displeasure over an uncharitable thought is internal resistance, while the reading of a book to divert the mind from the thought is external resistance;
(c) indirect or direct, according as the means employed to drive away a temptation are flight or attack. Examples: One who is disturbed by thoughts of hatred, resists them indirectly if he goes to the opera in order to be calmed by music, while he resists them directly, if he reads prayerfully I Cor. xiii, in order to become more charitable;
(d) virtual or actual, according as the act of dissent made, and not retracted, is adverted to or not. Examples: If a man rejects a temptation of envy as soon as he notices it, and repeats this act of rejection until the temptation has disappeared, his resistance is actual; if he rejects the temptation once for all as soon as it appears, but is not able to think of this purpose at each instant, his resistance was actual at the beginning, but virtual afterwards.
256. General rules regarding resistance to temptation: (a) it is a grave sin not to resist temptation, when the sin suggested is grave, the danger of consent serious, and the negligence considerable; otherwise the sin is venial; (b) negligence is considerable when the resistance used is not at all in proportion to the temptation. Example: If a man were suddenly to advert to the fact that a shrewd plan he had decided on was gravely unjust, he would be seriously negligent if he put off recalling the decision till he had dwelt more fully on its appealing features.
257. The kind of resistance to be opposed to temptation depends on the character and urgency of the temptation and the disposition of the person tempted. (a) Generally speaking, the more serious the temptation, the stronger should be the resistance. Example: One who knows from experience that temptations to hatred overcome him, if he uses only internal resistance, should make use of external resistance also. (b) In those cases in which the violence of the temptation increases in proportion to the strength of the resistance, it is better that the resistance be internal, indirect, etc. Examples: Temptations against faith are often overcome more readily by turning the mind away from the doubts suggested to other matters. Temptations that last a long time may be conquered more easily by despising them than by worrying about them and renewing protest after protest. The same is true as regards temptations against purity.
258. Danger of sin is the likelihood that it will be committed in certain circ.u.mstances. It is of two kinds, proximate and remote. (a) Danger of sin is proximate, when there is moral certainty that in given circ.u.mstances sin will be committed, either because the generality of mankind falls in such cases (absolute danger), or because in them a particular individual has always fallen (relative danger). Examples: a.s.sociating with depraved persons is a proximate danger of sin for anyone, since it is a matter of universal experience that evil a.s.sociations corrupt good morals. Taking strong drink is a proximate danger for one who has never imbibed moderately in the past. (b) Danger of sin is remote, when the likelihood that sin will be committed is not morally certain, and does not exclude a serious and well-founded probability or expectation to the contrary. Example: There is remote danger in an occasional drink, if a person who had several times relapsed into intemperance, has practised abstemiousness for years.
259. Possibility of sin is the conceivability but unlikelihood that it will result from a certain set of circ.u.mstances. Example: Attention to business sometimes makes a man avaricious, practices of piety may degenerate into hypocrisy, etc., but there is no natural connection between industry and devotion, on the one hand, and greed and insincerity, on the other hand. Sin follows naturally from its danger, but only accidentally from its possibility.
260. It is not lawful imprudently to expose oneself to the danger of sin, since it is manifestly against reason to risk spiritual loss without cause. The character of the sin of him who does this differs according to circ.u.mstances. (a) He who rashly exposes himself to the proximate danger of grave sin, or to what he foresees will become proximate danger, is guilty of grave sin and of the species of sin to which he exposes himself--and this even though the sin does not actually follow. For to love what is so closely related to the sin is to love the sin itself. (b) He who rashly exposes himself to the remote danger of grave sin or to the proximate danger of venial sin is venially guilty. For, while such action is unreasonable, it does not imply affection for grave sin.
261. It is lawful to expose oneself to the danger of sin, if this can be done according to the laws of prudence, for otherwise absurdities would follow (e.g., that urgent duties should not be performed, if one feared they contained the danger of sin). The requirements of prudence referred to are: (a) that the one who exposes himself to the danger of sin be sure that his motive is good (viz., that he firmly intends to avoid the sin to which he may be tempted and to accomplish only the good he desires); (b) that the action he performs and which involves the danger is necessary, and bears a correspondence in importance to the gravity of the sin and the proximity of the risk; (c) that means be employed (e.g., prayer, pious thoughts, spiritual reading, and the use of the Sacraments), which will so reduce the danger that one has confident a.s.surance that the danger will be encountered safely.
262. It is lawful to expose oneself to the possibility of sin, for, since almost every action may be perverted, one who wished to avoid the possibility of sin would have to leave this world and become confirmed in grace.
263. The Occasions of Sin are external circ.u.mstances--persons, places or things--which tempt one to sin. Examples: Persons who invite others to defraud and show how it can be accomplished, theatres where irreligious plays are staged, books that aim to depreciate virtue, etc.
264. The occasions of sin are of various kinds. (a) They are proximate or remote, according as it is morally certain, or only likely that they will lead to sin. (b) Occasions are necessary or free, according as one is able or not able to abandon them without difficulty. For example, one who chooses dishonest persons as his a.s.sociates is in a free occasion of sin; one who is imprisoned with criminals is in a necessary occasion of sin. An occasion of sin is also necessary when the impossibility of leaving it is not physical, but moral. Examples: A wife who is bound to a provoking husband; a person who cannot give up an employment that offers many temptations, without suffering great temporal or spiritual injury, or without incurring a worse condition.
(c) Occasions are present or absent, according as one has the occasion with him or must go to seek it. Examples; Intoxicants kept in his home are a present occasion of sin for a drunkard; atheistic lectures are an absent occasion of sin for one who has to go out to hear them.
265. It is not lawful to remain in a free occasion of sin,, whether it be present or absent; for to do so is to expose oneself rashly to the danger of sin (see 258 sqq.).
266. It is not lawful for one who is in a necessary occasion of sin to neglect means that are adapted to preserve him from the moral contagion by which he is surrounded; for to neglect spiritual safeguards and protections in such a case is to refuse to resist temptation (see 252 sqq.). The means that should be used depend on circ.u.mstances, but prayer and firm resolves to avoid sin should be employed in every case.
267. The gravity of the sin committed by one who freely remains in an occasion of sin, or who does not use the requisite spiritual helps in a necessary occasion, depends on various factors: (a) if the sin to which he is tempted is light, he does not sin gravely; (b) if the sin to which he is tempted is serious, and the occasion is proximate, he sins gravely; (c) if the occasion is remote, he sins venially.
268. The Motives of Sin.--The purposes that lead men to sin can be considered as follows: (a) according to the predominant vices of individual men, which are for them motives for committing their other sins (particular motives)--e.g., a man whose chief sin is unbelief and who is led by it to intolerance, blasphemy, despair, etc.; (b) according to the natural relation to error and sin, and the sensitive appet.i.tes tending inordinately towards delights or away from difficulties; (c) the body which had been in subjection to the soul and endowed with freedom from suffering and mortality, became burdensome to the soul and subject to pain and death.
274. The consequences that are common to all sin, both original and actual, are: (a) the sinner loses the spiritual beauty to which sin is opposed, and this loss is called the stain of sin, since the soul defiles itself by inordinate contact with what it loves; (b) the sinner incurs the debt of punishment, since sin is an injustice against the internal law of reason and against the external law of G.o.d and man.
275. The stain of sin is not: (a) a mere privation or absence of grace, for otherwise all sins would be the same; nor (b) a mere pa.s.sing shadow over the soul, since the bad state of the will can remain after the act of sin.
276. The stain of sin differs according to the sin. (a) The stain of original sin is the privation of original justice (i.e., of the subjection of reason and will to G.o.d), as being a voluntary privation through the will of the first parent Adam; (b) the stain of mortal sin is the privation of sanctifying grace, as connoting the act of the individual will through which it was incurred; (c) the stain of venial sin is the privation of the fervor of charity resulting from the sin, inasmuch as it, to some extent, hinders the beauty of interior grace from appearing in external acts.
277. The stain of grave sin is the disfigurement of death, for (a) it removes the principle of supernatural existence (i.e., grace); (b) it takes away the principles of supernatural activity (i.e., the infused habits), though faith and hope may remain; (c) it deprives the soul of the rights that belong to the spiritually living (i.e., of merits already acquired).
278. The stain of venial sin is the disfigurement of disease, for (a) it disposes one for spiritual death (i.e., for mortal sin); (b) it lessens spiritual vitality, by setting up habits that make the practice of the virtues more difficult.
279. The penalty of sin is threefold according to the threefold offense of sin. (a) Inasmuch as sin is against reason, it is punished by remorse of conscience; (b) inasmuch as it is against ecclesiastical, civil or other human law, it is punished by man; (c) inasmuch as it is against divine law, it is punished by G.o.d.