(e) As regards consequences that are not natural results of an act, if they were not foreseen or intended, they are not credited to the agent.
Example: t.i.tus speaks a simple and ordinary word of good advice to Semp.r.o.nius, but the impression is so great that Semp.r.o.nius undertakes and accomplishes extraordinary things, which t.i.tus would not have deemed possible or advisable.
102. Evil is imputable as follows:
(a) As regards the internal act, a person is guilty of all the evil of the object, end and circ.u.mstances, as far as it is known and willed by him. Example: Balbus wishes he could steal all the possessions of Caius, and thereby drive the latter to suicide. Balbus has committed theft and murder in his heart;
(b) As regards the external act, one is guilty of all the circ.u.mstances of greater willingness, etc., which it adds to the internal act.
Example: If Balbus actually steals from Caius and causes his death, his malice is shown to be very strong and to extend to the evil consequences of his external acts;
(c) As regards acts indirectly willed, one is guilty of the evil they entail, if one could and should have prevented it. Example: Balbus is guilty of the blasphemies he foresees will take place when he has taken too much drink, for he could and should have kept sober.
(d) As regards the evil consequences of acts, foreseen or natural, one is responsible for the evil, if one could and should have prevented it.
Examples: t.i.tus knows that a beggar will use profane language if denied an alms, but t.i.tus cannot spare the money and is not responsible for what happens. Semp.r.o.nius blasphemes in the company of many, and is therefore guilty of the sin of scandal, since he has no right to blaspheme;
(e) As regards the evil consequences of acts that could not have been foreseen, they are not imputable. Example: Balbus steals fifty cents from Caius, and the latter is so heartbroken that he commits suicide.
Balbus is not responsible for the suicide, since such a thing was far from his thoughts when he stole.
103. It was just said (102, d) that when two results, one good and one evil, follow an act, the evil is imputable if it could and should have been prevented. It is not always easy, however, to determine at once when the evil result should be prevented, and, as cases of double effect are many, it will be useful to give rules that are more particularized, and that enable one to decide when it is lawful to do that from which will follow an act indirectly willed, or a consequence that is evil.
104. It is lawful to perform an action from which an evil effect is foreseen when the following conditions are present:
(a) the action willed itself must be good or at least indifferent; for clearly, if the action is bad, it is also unlawful;
(b) a good effect must also follow from the act, and it must not be caused by the evil effect; for the end does not justify the means.
Thus, it is not lawful to take what belongs to others in order to give alms, for the evil effect (stealing) results from the act (taking) immediately; whereas the good effect (almsgiving) results only mediately through the theft;
(c) the agent must intend only the good effect, since it is unlawful to wish evil. Thus, if one foresees that one"s virtuous life will cause the sin of envy in a neighbor, this evil result of one"s virtue must not be entertained by one as something pleasing;
(d) the agent must have a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting the evil result that follows his act. Evil should not even be permitted, unless there is adequate compensation in the good that is intended.
105. To judge whether a reason for permitting an evil effect is proportionately grave, the following rules should be kept in mind:
(a) the greater the evil that results, the greater must be the good that is intended. Thus, it is not lawful to kill a robber in order to save a small amount of money: but it is lawful to kill an aggressor, if this is necessary in order to save one"s life;
(b) the greater the dependence of the evil effect on one"s act, the greater must be the reason for performing the act. Example: t.i.tus gives permission to his cla.s.s to play a game against another cla.s.s, foreseeing quarrels and disputes between the teams. Less reason is required for granting the permission, if t.i.tus knows that higher authority will grant it, should he refuse it;
(c) the more nearly the evil effect follows upon the act, the greater must be the reason for the act, Thus, less reason is required to direct a person who looks like a heavy drinker to the city than to direct him to a bottle of strong drink;
(d) the more certain it is that the evil effect will follow, the greater is the reason required for placing its cause. For example, one who speeds in an automobile on an unfrequented road, does not require the same excusing cause as one who speeds on a thoroughfare where many other cars are pa.s.sing;
(e) the more obligation one has to prevent the evil effect, the graver is the reason required for placing its cause. Thus, since parish-priests, lawgivers, superiors and policemen are bound by their office to prevent moral disorders, a far greater cause is required in them, than in persons who have no such charge, for doing what will have an evil consequence.
Art. 4: ACTS AS MERITORIOUS
(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, q. 21.)
106. When the morality of an act is attributable to one as one"s own, one becomes worthy of praise and reward, if the act is good, but deserving of censure and punishment, if the act is evil.
107. Definitions.--Merit is the right to a reward arising from works done for G.o.d. Demerit is the debt of punishment incurred on account of works done against G.o.d.
108. Divisions.--According to the difference of the person who confers the reward, there are two kinds of merit: (a) human merit, or the claim which a person has to a reward from his neighbor, or from society, for the benefits he has conferred upon his neighbor or society; (b) divine merit, or the right a person has to receive a reward from G.o.d for the fidelity wherewith he has exercised stewardship over his acts, of which G.o.d is the Last End, or wherewith he has served society, of which G.o.d is the Supreme Ruler. Only divine merit is here considered.
109. According to the difference of the object of the reward, there are two kinds of merit: (a) natural merit, which makes one worthy of a reward that does not exceed the native powers or exigencies of a created being, such as success, prosperity, or other goods that do not const.i.tute the Last End of man (see 20). Thus, we read in scripture of pagans or sinners who were blest with temporal happiness on account of their natural virtues; (b) supernatural merit, which makes one worthy of the beat.i.tude surpa.s.sing mere created power that G.o.d has prepared for those who serve Him (see 20). It is only this kind of merit that is being considered here; for, since the Last End of man is a supernatural reward (viz, the Beatific Vision of G.o.d), it follows that the acts by which he tends to that End must be not only human and moral, but supernaturally meritorious.
110. There are four kinds of supernatural merit: (a) condign merit in the stricter sense, that is merit which arises from justice, and which presupposes no favor on the part of the rewarder. In this sense Christ merited, since even the grace which made His merits supernatural was due to Him as the G.o.d-Man; (b) condign merit in the less strict sense, that is merit which arises indeed from justice, but presupposes a favor on the part of the rewarder. In this way the righteous merit before G.o.d, since their works confer a right to their own reward, while the grace which enables them to perform their works is a divine favor; (c) congruous merit in the stricter sense, that is merit which arises not from justice (since there is no equality between the work and the reward), but from the fitness of things, because the person who merits is a friend of G.o.d. In this way all who are in the state of grace can merit spiritual goods for others; (d) congruous merit in the wide sense, that is merit which arises from the liberality of G.o.d, who answers a good work as if it were a prayer. In this way the good works done by sinners can be said to merit conversion for them.
111. The second kind of merit mentioned above--i.e., condign merit in the less strict sense--is that with which we are chiefly concerned here, since it is the kind of merit that must be found in human acts in order that they may lead man to a supernatural reward. A fuller treatment of merit is found in Dogmatic Theology in the Question on Grace.
112. The conditions requisite for the kind of merit now in question are: (a) that the work done be human, that is, free, morally good, and supernatural (i.e., proceeding from sanctifying grace and divine charity); (b) that the one who merits be in the wayfaring state (i.e., that he have not already pa.s.sed to final reward or punishment), and that he be in the state of grace; (c) that G.o.d has promised a reward for the work done. From the statements made above, it follows that all the human and morally good works of those who are in the state of grace possess condign merit.
113. The objects of condign merit--i.e., the rewards promised by G.o.d for the good works done for Him in this life--are: (a) an increase of sanctifying grace; (b) the right to eternal life; (c) the attainment of eternal life, if the one who merits dies in grace; (d) an increase of glory.
114. The conditions for the merit of strict congruity are the same as those given above (112), except the promise made by G.o.d, which is not required. Examples of this kind of merit are the sanct.i.ty of the Blessed Virgin, which made her deserve more than others to be the Mother of G.o.d, and the conversion of St. Paul through the merits of St.
Stephen.
115. For the merit of wide congruity it is necessary that the work done be morally good. Examples of this kind of merit are the sighs of the ancient Patriarchs, as obtaining the coming of the Messiah. The just man can merit with the merit of wide congruity the following: (a) his own conversion after a future fall; (b) his final perseverance; (c) temporal goods.
Art. 5: THE Pa.s.sIONS
(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 22-48.)
116. Having discussed the acts proper to man, we shall now speak of the pa.s.sions, which are common to both man and beast.
117. Definition.--The pa.s.sions--also called the emotions, affections, or sentiments--are acts of desire; but, unlike the acts of the will, they are directed, not to good apprehended by the higher knowing power of the intellect, but to good apprehended by the lower knowing power of sense and imagination. They are defined as: acts or movements of the sensitive appet.i.te which arise from the representation of some good in the sense faculties, and which produce some transformation in the body, such as palpitation of the heart, increased circulation of the blood, paleness, blushing, etc.
118. Division.--There are two cla.s.ses of pa.s.sions; (a) the concupiscible, which have as their object sensible good considered as delightful, or sensible evil considered as unpleasant, and which are love and hatred, desire and flight, delight and sadness; (b) the irascible, which have as their object sensible good or sensible evil considered as difficult to attain or to avoid, and which are hope and despair, boldness and fear, anger.
119. The concupiscible pa.s.sions are defined as follows: (a) love, the first of the pa.s.sions and the cause of all the others, tends to sensible good considered as desirable, abstracting from its presence or absence; while hatred is the aversion from sensible evil considered precisely as unsuitable and abstracting from its presence or absence; (b) desire tends to sensible good that is absent, and flight turns away from sensible evil apprehended as future; (c) delight is the affection produced in the sensitive appet.i.te by the presence and possession of the object desired; (d) sadness is the pa.s.sion which dejects the soul on account of the presence of an evil.
120. The irascible pa.s.sions are explained as follows: (a) hope reaches out towards a future good whose attainment is difficult, but not impossible; despair turns away from a good that seems impossible of attainment; (b) bravery goes out to attack an evil that seems difficult and imminent, but not unconquerable; fear falls back before a future difficulty that seems irresistible; (e) anger is the desire of vengeance for an injury received.
121. Moral Value of the Pa.s.sions.--The Stoics held that all the pa.s.sions are diseases of the soul, and that one is perfect when one arrives at the condition of being pa.s.sionless or apathetic. Lucretius, on the contrary, taught that all the impulses of pa.s.sion are good. The truth is that the pa.s.sions are good or evil according to the way they are considered. (a) Physically, the pa.s.sions are good, since they are the acts of natural powers, or the perfection and complement of something good in itself. (b) Morally, they are indifferent, if they are viewed in themselves, as the product of the sensitive appet.i.te. For this appet.i.te is an irrational power of the soul, similar to that of the beasts, and acts are not moral unless rational--i.e., an act is good or evil only from its relation to reason. (c) Morally, the pa.s.sions are good or bad, if commanded by reason and will, for thus they partake of the good or evil that is in the acts from which they proceed, just as the acts of the external members of the body are moral in so far as they execute the commands of the will. The pa.s.sions are voluntary if commanded by the will, or not forbidden by it. Examples: Our Lord looked about Him with anger, being grieved at the blindness of His enemies who watched Him in the synagogue (Mark, iii. 5); He wept over the destruction of Jerusalem (Luke, xix. 41); He was sad at the approach of His pa.s.sion (Mark, xiv. 34).
122. The pa.s.sions are morally good: (a) if they are directed by the will to a morally good object; for example, shame is a praiseworthy pa.s.sion, because it is fear of what is dishonorable, and pity is also good, because it is according to right reason, being sorrow for the misfortune of another; (b) if they are chosen by the reason for a good purpose; for example, it is good to excite the emotion of joy that one may pray with greater fervor, or to arouse the feelings of pity, fear, or hope, in order that one may be more earnestly moved to acts of mercy, repentance, courage; (c) if the circ.u.mstances are moderated according to right reason; for example, to grieve over the death of a friend excessively, so that one is unfitted for duty and suffers in health, is unreasonable; but to grieve even unto tears, as Christ did at the tomb of Lazarus, is an act of piety. Similarly, the slight anger of Heli was blamable and the great anger of Moses was laudable, because the evils in both instances called for severity (I Kings, ii, iii; Exod., iii).
123. The pa.s.sions can either diminish or increase the goodness of an act. (a) They diminish its goodness, if they are antecedent--i.e., prior to the judgment of the reason--for they thus obscure the mind and make the act that follows less voluntary. For example, there is less goodness in an alms given under an impulse of sentimentality than in one given after serious consideration of the matter and from a motive of charity. (b) They increase its goodness if they are consequent--i.e., subsequent to the judgment and the result of the vehemence of the will, or of deliberate encouragement by the will (see 47 sqq.)--for, just as the external act increases the goodness of the internal act, so is it better that man should tend towards good, not only with the will, but also with the emotions. Examples: The spiritual gladness of the Psalmist is seen to have been more than ordinarily great from the fact that it acted upon his feelings, and both heart and flesh rejoiced (Ps, lx.x.xii. 3); to sing a hymn in order to encourage oneself to greater fervor or devotion adds to the goodness of what is done, through the greater promptness or ease it causes in the act that follows.
124. The pa.s.sions are morally evil: (a) when they are commanded by the will and directed to an object, a purpose, or circ.u.mstances that are evil, Thus, envy is an ign.o.ble pa.s.sion, since it is unreasonable, being sorrow at another"s success. Examples; t.i.tus drinks to excess for the delight of intoxication (bad object); Balbus purposely excites his imagination, that he may hate more bitterly and act more cruelly (bad end); Semp.r.o.nius loves his children so immoderately that he grows morose and jealous (bad circ.u.mstance). (b) The pa.s.sions are also morally evil when they should be forbidden and are not forbidden by the will. Example; Caius is surprised by a sudden burst of anger, which, though he judges to be unreasonable, he does nothing to check.
125. The pa.s.sions can remove, diminish or increase the evil of an act.
(a) Thus, antecedent pa.s.sions take away all evil, if (a thing that is rare) they prevent entirely the use of reason; they diminish malice if they obscure the judgment. Examples: Balbus, fearing that he is about to drown, becomes panic-stricken, seizes t.i.tus and almost drowns him.
Caius, threatened with a black eye if he refuses, calumniates: his calumny would be worse if he acted coldbloodedly. (b) Consequent pa.s.sions increase the evil, for then they manifest a strong intention, or are the result of direct purpose. Examples: Semp.r.o.nius attacks the conduct of an opponent, not with dispa.s.sionate argument and from a love of truth, but with bitter personal feeling and from a desire of revenge. t.i.tia works herself into a rage that she may be the more ready for an encounter with a person of whom she is unjustly jealous.