(b) the detriment must be unjust subjectively, and hence one who in good faith speaks of a neighbors sin, thinking that it is true and public, whereas it is false or secret, is not bound to rest.i.tution, if he discovers his error after the results of the defamation have been removed (see, however, 2102). But if he discovers his mistake while the neighbor is still under a cloud because of the report, he becomes from that moment responsible and subjectively unjust, if he does not take steps as far as he conveniently can to correct the error (see 1769);
(c) the detriment must be due to oue"s act as to its efficacious cause, and hence one is not bound to rest.i.tution if a listener understands one to disparage when in fact one has not disparaged.
2088. Coperators and Rest.i.tution.--Those who coperate in injustice are also held to rest.i.tution (see 1778 sqq.), and hence the following are bound to indemnify a defamed person:
(a) positive coperators are held to rest.i.tution, such as those who command, counsel, or encourage defamation. The same is true of those who share in a defamatory conversation or who merely listen, but by their questions, or show of interest or approval, induce the defamer to continue, or to speak with more a.s.surance;
(b) negative coperators are also held to rest.i.tution, if they were bound in justice to resist or impede defamation. This will apply chiefly to a superior who does not prevent, as he should, the defamation of his subject or community, whether by a subject or a non-subject (see 2080 sqq.).
2089. Circ.u.mstances of Rest.i.tution.--We shall now speak of the circ.u.mstances of rest.i.tution for defamation: (a) the persons bound to rest.i.tution besides the defamer, namely, his heirs, the listeners, etc.; (b) the persons to whom rest.i.tution is to be made; (c) the manner of making rest.i.tution; (d) the time for making rest.i.tution (see 1781 sqq.).
2090. Rest.i.tution for Defamation to Be Made by an Heir of the Defamer.--(a) For the injury to fame, it seems that the heir is not bound, since the duty of rest.i.tution of fame is a personal one, that is, an obligation to perform an act of retraction or apology, not an obligation to pay compensation (see 463). But some hold that defamation may be satisfied for by pecuniary compensation (1750, 1802), and that, if the injured party should insist on this kind of compensation for the infamy suffered, the heirs would be obliged to pay it.
(b) For the damages resulting from injury to fame the heir is bound, since rest.i.tution for losses is a real one and rests upon the property or estate of the deceased. But those who are in good faith are sometimes to be left undisturbed, lest they become guilty of formal sin.
2091. The Persons to Whom Rest.i.tution for Defamation Is to Be Made.--(a) To the person defamed rest.i.tution of fame is owed, and this is true even when the person is already dead. Just as one who dishonors the dead by desecrating their tombs or their remains owes it to their memory to make reparation, so one who defames the dead owes it to their reputation to make rest.i.tution. In fact, the heirs may be bound in conscience to insist upon this rest.i.tution, and it seems they cannot condone it, since it is not their own fame that has been hurt.
(b) To the listeners rest.i.tution is not owed, since no injustice was done them, but reparation for scandal given them may be obligatory.
And, since justice to the person defamed requires retraction or other reparation, the defamer must recall his words before the persons to whom he addressed them. Hence, if defamation appeared in a journal, the honorable reparation should also appear in the same journal and with the same prominence given it as was given the offensive remarks.
2092. Responsibility of Defamer for Spread of Defamation.--Is the defamer bound to recall his words to the wider audience that learned them from his first listeners?
(a) If the defamer is not responsible for the spread of his talk beyond the circle which he addressed (e.g., if he imposed strict silence upon his listeners or had good reason to think that they would keep his remarks to themselves, and his words nevertheless leaked out), the common opinion is that he is not held to reparation before the subsequent listeners.
(b) If the defamer is responsible for the spread of his talk (e.g., if he gave his listeners permission to quote or repeat, or if he knew well that they would carry his words far and wide), he is bound to reparation before the later listeners, in so far as this is possible, especially if he was guilty of calumny. Whether he or his listeners have the first duty of rest.i.tution will depend on the relationship in their coperation (see 1784). If he can do nothing better, he should admonish his listeners to retract before their listeners.
2093. The First Way of Making Rest.i.tution for Defamation.--(a) If the defamation was by calumny, the defamer (and also the propagator) must take back his words, admitting that what he said was untrue. If necessary, he should also make affidavit to this effect, or even admit that he lied. The reason is that the innocent party has a greater right to his fame than the guilty party. But the defamer is not obliged to confess his own malice, when this is not necessary, and it may suffice to say merely that his former statement was not correct.
(b) If the defamation was by detraction, the defamer cannot truthfully say that his words were false, and he must counteract directly or indirectly the effect of his defamation by something favorable to the person he has injured. If the listeners will not be confirmed in their belief by his explanation, the defamer should explain to them that his statements were unjust, that he had no right to make them, that he wishes them to regard as unsaid all that he said, etc. (direct revocation). If this cure would be worse than the sickness by strengthening the belief of the listeners that the defamation was true, the defamer should be silent about his former statements. But he should so honor or praise the person defamed that others will be led to believe, not that rest.i.tution is being made, but that the former good opinion they had of the person defamed was correct (indirect revocation). Thus, if the defamer knows that the injured person has reformed, he may call attention to and emphasize the virtues he now has; if the defamed person has still the same failing, he may be excused, when possible, or praised for the good qualities he does possess, or he may be spoken of in general terms of esteem; if the listeners have been led to dishonor the person who was detracted, the defamer may show special signs of esteem or confidence to the latter, etc.
2094. Other Methods of Making Rest.i.tution.--If the listeners will not be impressed by any of the methods of satisfaction just indicated, what should be done?
(a) If, in the case of calumny, the listeners are unwilling to accept the formal statement that the defamation was untrue, the defamer is obliged to nothing more. For the slanderer has done all that is possible to change the erroneous view of the listeners, and the bad opinion they have of their neighbor must now be attributed, not to the defamer, but to their own wickedness or stubbornness.
(b) If the listeners cannot be properly impressed by the direct or indirect revocation of detraction, the defamer, being unable to make honorable compensation by restoration of fame, should make a profitable compensation by the bestowal of a benefit that will in some way be commensurate with the good of reputation and be acceptable to the other party. Thus, if the person defamed is satisfied with money or something measurable in terms of money, he should be given damages; if this kind of compensation is of little use or is not esteemed (few persons of honor would take money alone as pay for a lost reputation), he should be given some other good which in his own judgment and that of a prudent man is more nearly an equivalent for the good of which he has been deprived. An apology is not sufficient, since the begging of pardon does not restore what was taken; neither is it generally advisable, because the admission to another that one has been secretly defaming him and is now sorry for this may lead to quarrels and hatreds rather than to forgiveness and peace.
2095. Legal Reparation for Defamation.--One who has been sentenced by a lawful judgment of court to reparation and penalty for defamation is obliged to obedience, but if the satisfaction decided on by a jury is excessive or meager, it can be set aside by the court. In Canon Law (Canon 2355) one who has been convicted of defamation may be sentenced: (a) to satisfaction; (b) to damages; (c) to suitable penalties, even to suspension or removal from office or benefice.
2096. The Time When Rest.i.tution for Defamation Is to Be Made.--(a) It should be made as soon as possible, for the longer it is delayed the greater the injury that is suffered, since defamation becomes harder to correct as it progresses, or at least has a longer life when it is not corrected early. But prudence will sometimes dictate that one await a psychological or favorable moment for a retractation. (b) Rest.i.tution should be promised before absolution is given, and, if there is a well-founded doubt about the sincerity of a promise, the confessor may delay absolution until rest.i.tution has been made.
2097. Cessation of Duty of Rest.i.tution.--The duty of rest.i.tution ceases, at least temporarily, in certain cases (see 1797 sqq.), and hence one who has been guilty of injustice through defamation is sometimes excused from reparation. (a) Thus, one is excused temporarily on account of impossibility; (b) one is excused permanently on account of the cessation of the other party"s good name or the termination of one"s own obligation.
2098. Excuse from Rest.i.tution on Account of Impossibility.--(a) Physical impossibility excuses, for example, when one does not know who the persons were before whom one detracted, or cannot recall who the person was whom one defamed. But in this case the defamer should at least make satisfaction by praying for the person whom he defamed, or by having Ma.s.ses offered for him.
(b) Moral impossibility excuses from rest.i.tution, as when the defamer will suffer a far greater loss than he inflicted on the person defamed (e.g., if the defamer cannot retract without losing his life, or a reputation which is far more valuable than that of the obscure person who was defamed). But if the defamer has subjected the injured party to the peril of death, or if he has calumniated an innocent man, he must make satisfaction even at the peril of his own life or at the cost of his own fame; for the right of the innocent prevails over that of the guilty defamer.
2099. Excuse from Rest.i.tution on Account of Cessation of Other Party"s Good Name.--The defamer may also be excused from rest.i.tution on account of cessation of the other party"s good name through another cause, as when the secret defect first made known by the defamer becomes public from another source.
(a) The detractor is excused from the duty of restoring reputation, since the person he defamed has now independently of the first defamation lost his right to reputation (see 2053 sqq.).
(b) The detractor is not excused, however, from payment for damages which the defamed person suffered from the first defamation or for expenses which it caused him. Some moralists hold him obligated also for some compensation for the infamy suffered before the crime became public through others.
2100. Excuse from Rest.i.tution on Account of the Termination of Obligation.--(a) The act of the defamed person ends the obligation, when, without injury to others, he expressly or tacitly condones the offense; for he has dominion over his own fame, as he has over his own money or lands. Thus, it may often be presumed that parents overlook the rest.i.tution owed them by their children for criticisms made by the latter.
(b) The act of the defamed person also ends the obligation, according to the common opinion, when he has inflicted an equal injury by defaming his defamer and is unwilling to make satisfaction for the injury; for though it is unlawful to repay evil with evil, and though one damage does not cure another damage, he who will not pay a creditor cannot insist that the creditor pay him an equal debt. Thus, if t.i.tus has burned the barn of Claudius and Claudius then burns the barn of t.i.tus, and neither will pay damages, the debts neutralize each other, if the losses are equal. The same principle applies in defamatory recriminations.
2101. Right of Defamed Person to Condone Injury.--The person defamed has the right to condone the injury, if it is only personal to himself, but he has not always the right to condone the injury when the defamation causes harm to others.
(a) Thus, the defamed person would sin against justice and his act would be invalid, if he forgave the debt of rest.i.tution despite the fact that his own fame was necessary for the fame of others (e.g., when a monk loses his good name, the monastery is also disgraced), or was necessary for the fulfillment of duties owed by him in justice to others (e.g., when a prelate, priest or public official loses his good name, the good influence he should exercise over his subjects is ended). This conclusion is probable.
(b) The defamed person would sin against charity, but his act would be valid, if he forgave the debt of rest.i.tution despite the fact that his fame was necessary for the fulfillment of charitable duties owed to others, or that his silence in the face of defamation would cause great scandal (e.g., when a preacher loses his reputation, his words do not move, and thus he is unable fruitfully to accomplish works of charity by instructing the ignorant, etc.).
2102. Excuse from Rest.i.tution When Reputation Has Been Recovered.--The obligation of rest.i.tution for defamation also ceases when reputation has been recovered without any act on the part of the defamer; for it is clear that one is not bound to give back that which is already had.
But rest.i.tution may be due, nevertheless, for damages incurred, and some think that compensation (e.g., apology, honor, praise) should be made for the injury of infamy that existed before the good name was regained.
The usual ways in which reputation is recovered without the act of the defamer are: (a) by overthrow of the defamation, as when the facts against it become manifest, or when witnesses prove its falsity, or when a tribunal declares it a criminal libel; (b) by oblivion, as when a misdeed of years ago has faded entirely out of the public memory. If the defamer is uncertain whether his past defamations have been forgotten, he has to act with great prudence; for, if he makes inquiries the memory of the defamations may be awakened, while if he says nothing, the defamations, because never corrected or retracted, may break out anew. He should consider the circ.u.mstances, therefore, and treat the defamed person as he would wish himself to be treated in a like case.
2103. Whispering or Tale-Bearing.--Whispering (_susurratio_), also called mischief-making and tale-bearing, is a speech unfavorable to another person secretly made with the purpose of breaking up a virtuous friendship.
(a) It is unfavorable speech, that is, the whisperer says something to his listener that will turn the latter against the person spoken about.
The thing attributed to the absent person may be either something evil or something that is only seemingly evil, but in either case it will be something displeasing to the listener. Whispering, therefore, does not necessarily include defamation.
(b) It is secret, that is, the whisperer speaks privately, and usually in the way of confidence to the person whose mind he wishes to impress.
Often, however, he goes now to one of the friends, now to another, speaking in different senses to each, to make his work doubly effective. This kind of whisperer is known as double-tongued: "The whisperer and the double-tongued is accursed" (Ecclus., xxviii. 15).
(c) It is aimed at the breaking up of a friendship, that is, the whisperer intends to destroy the feeling of respect and affection which his listener has for the absent person, or even to instill into the listener"s mind a feeling of disrespect and dislike for the absent person. Whispering, therefore, is incomplete when it ends a friendship, and complete when it makes enemies of those who had been friends and sows discords and quarrels: "A pa.s.sionate man kindleth strife, and a sinful man will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst of them that are at peace" (Ecclus., xxviii. 11); "When the tale-bearer is taken away, contentions shall cease" (Prov., xxvi. 20). Whispering, then, differs from simple defamation, whose purpose is to steal away fame, for the mischief-maker intends to steal away friendship.
(d) It is directed against a virtuous friendship, for there is no sin but rather an act of charity in the effort to end a sinful or harmful friendship, as when a parent tries to keep his daughter away from a wicked man with whom she is infatuated, or his son away from a disorderly set whose companionship appeals to the youth (see 1353).
2104. The Sinfulness of Whispering.--(a) Theological Species.--Whispering is from its nature a mortal sin, since it is hateful to G.o.d (the soul of the Lord detesteth "him that soweth discord among brethren," Prov., vi. 19), and deprives man of the boon of a virtuous friendship, the greatest of external goods. "A faithful friend is a strong defence, and he that hath found him hath found a treasure.
Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend, and no weight of gold and silver is able to countervail the goodness of his fidelity. A faithful friend is the medicine of life and immortality" (Ecclus., vi. 14-16).
Whispering is a greater sin than contumely or defamation, since honor is less esteemed than friendship, and reputation is only a means to friendship.
(b) Moral Species.--Generally, whispering is a sin against justice on account of the unjust means (e.g., force, fraud, lies, detractions) to which it resorts; but from its nature it is only a sin against charity, for the injured party has no strict right to friendship, which is a free relationship that may be terminated at will by either of the parties.
2105. Circ.u.mstances Which Affect the Species of Whispering.--Is the species of whispering changed by circ.u.mstances?
(a) The theological species is changed when the sinful act is imperfect in malice (e.g., when the whisperer had not reflected well on the evil that would be caused by him), or when the harm done is slight (e.g., when no enmity was caused and the friendship broken up was not strong or important to the friends). It is not a small matter, however, to destroy friendships that are very necessary, such as the friendship between husband and wife, between parent and child.
(b) The moral species is not subdivided, for, though there are different kinds of friendships (see 1111), whispering is not directed against the special features, but against the general character common to all of them, namely, unity of soul and mutual affection. Hence, the whisperer is not obliged to mention in confession whether the friendship he broke up was based on utility, or pleasure, or virtue. It is clear, however, that a new species may be added to whispering. Thus, he who separates husband and wife, intending to secure the wife for himself, is guilty also of adultery; he who separates a business man and his patrons, intending to attract the trade to himself, is guilty also of theft; he who separates ruler and subjects by his whispering, is also guilty of sedition, etc.
2106. Derision.--Derision is a jest that reproaches another with some defect or evil in order to put him to confusion.
(a) It is a jest, that is, it is spoken in fun and consists in making the defects of another person the object of laughter or amus.e.m.e.nt.
Thus, it differs in manner from contumely, detraction and whispering, which are spoken seriously.
(b) Its purpose is the confusion of the person ridiculed, that is, it intends to take from him the good opinion that he is ent.i.tled to have of himself and the peace of conscience that he enjoys. Thus, it differs in object and purpose from the other injurious words. .h.i.therto considered (see 2009). The intention to put another person out of countenance by ridicule is either formal or material, according as the purpose before the mind is to disconcert that person, or only to have one"s joke, though one sees that this will mean shame and suffering for the victim of the joke.