Whether we shall succeed this year in gaining a victory there that will bring the war to an end is still doubtful; therefore, for the present we must be prepared for a further prolonging of the war.
Meanwhile, the Imperial navy is confident that by the unrestricted employment of large numbers of submarines they could in view of England"s economic position, meet with a success which would in a few months make our princ.i.p.al enemy, England, more disposed to entertain thoughts of peace. It is therefore essential that G.H.Q.
should include a submarine campaign among their other measures to relieve the situation on the Somme Front, by impeding the transport of munitions, and so making clear to the Entente the futility of their efforts in this area.
"The whole situation would change if President Wilson, following out the plans he has already indicated, were to make an offer of mediation to the Powers. This would, of course, not have to include any definite proposals of a territorial nature, as these questions should form part of the agenda of the peace negotiations. Such a move, however, would have to be made soon, as otherwise we could not continue to stand calmly aside and watch England, realizing as she does the many difficulties to be reckoned with, exert with impunity increasingly strong pressure on the neutrals, with a view to improving her military and economic position at our expense, and we should have to claim the renewed liberty of action for which we stipulated in the Note of the 4th of May of this year. Should Mr. Wilson insist on waiting until immediately before or after the election, he would lose the opportunity for such a step. Also the negotiations should not at first aim at the conclusion of an armistice, but should be carried on solely by the combatant parties, and within a short period directly bring about the preliminary peace. A further prolongation would be unfavorable to Germany"s military situation, and would result in further preparations being made by the Powers for the continuance of the war into next year, so that there would be no further prospect of peace within a reasonable time.
"Your Excellency should discuss the position cautiously with Colonel House, and find out the intentions of Mr. Wilson. A peace movement on the part of the President which bore the outward appearance of spontaneity would be seriously considered by us, and this would also mean success for Mr. Wilson"s election campaign.
"Gerard has applied for leave, as the result of a private letter from Colonel House, but he has received no reply from the State Department.
"BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."
The explanation of the final sentence of the above telegram is as follows. I have already mentioned that Mr. Gerard was not popular in Berlin, owing to his very highly-strung temperament, his impetuosity and his want of tact. His recall was eagerly desired. Consequently, I had received instructions to arrange, if possible, for the replacement of Mr. Gerard, and in any case that the Amba.s.sador should be recalled for a time to Washington, so that his nerves might have a chance to rest. As always, in strictly confidential matters, I referred this to Colonel House, who told me that in view of the existing political situation there could be no question of a recall of Gerard.
He would, however, arrange for the Amba.s.sador to be summoned at once to Washington for fresh instructions. If once Mr. Gerard learned that the President now had the definite intention of mediating with a view of peace, Colonel House thought he would be received in a more friendly manner in Berlin.
I answered the Chancellor"s last telegram as follows:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Washington, 5th October, 1916.
"No. 121.
"Telegram No. 89 discussed according to instructions.
"No change here in the situation reported in telegrams Nos. 100 and 101.
"In view of possibility of surprises in war and election, Wilson, for reasons already stated, refuses to attempt mediation until re-elected. Result of election, which is being fought exclusively on foreign politics, uncertain. President showing surprising firmness.
If unrestricted submarine campaign unavoidable, advise emphatically, postpone at least until after election. Now, immediate rupture with United States would be certain; after election Wilson"s mediation probable on the one hand; on the other hand at least slight possibility of finding _modus vivendi_ by negotiation with United States."
The instructions from Berlin gave me occasion for repeated conversations with Colonel House. The Imperial Government were now ready to accept Mr. Wilson"s League of Nations programme, which provided for general disarmament, freedom of the seas, and compulsory arbitration. My reports to Berlin on this question had the result that on 9th November the Chancellor in a speech publicly espoused this programme, and that I, at my own suggestion, received permission to communicate officially the Chancellor"s speech to the American Peace League, which published my communication.
On the other hand, the Imperial Government desired that the territorial questions should be regulated by direct negotiations between the combatant Powers. Mr. Wilson, as Colonel House told me, was in agreement with this. Mr. Wilson had already expressed himself to this effect in the above mentioned speech of the 27th May, and in general adopted the point of view that the United States had no interest in the details of territorial adjustment; but that it was of equally fundamental importance for America as for Europe that in future wars should be avoided. The President was only willing to intervene in so far as he was certain of having American public opinion behind him. In my conversations with Colonel House we never spoke of the evacuation of any German territory. We always confined ourselves exclusively to a real peace by negotiation on the basis of the _status quo ante_. With such a peace Germany"s position in the world would have remained unimpaired. The freedom of the seas, a princ.i.p.al point in the Wilson programme, could not but be welcome to us. The President and Colonel House have been the sponsors of this idea in America. Both were indefatigable in their efforts to materialize this idea in such a way that war on commerce should be abolished and that all commerce, even in war-time, should be declared free. As a necessary result of this development of the laws of naval warfare Mr. Wilson hoped to bring about general naval disarmament, since navies would lose their _raison d"etre_ if they could only be used against each other and no longer against commerce and for purposes of blockade. It is a regrettable fact that at the Hague Conference we accepted the English standpoint on the question of war on commerce, and not the American.
In October I was again instructed from Berlin to speed up Mr. Wilson"s peace movement. With regard to this new urgency Herr von Jagow, on the 14th April, 1919, granted an interview to the Berlin representative of the _New York Sun_, the substance of which was as follows:
"In the autumn of 1916 the Emperor, Count Bernstorff and I opposed the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, which was urged with increasing vigor by our military and naval departments, as being the only means of bringing the war to an early conclusion.
Week after week we watched for the hoped-for peace move of President Wilson, which, however, did not come. At last, in October, the Emperor, upon whom increasing pressure was being brought to bear to give his consent to the unrestricted submarine campaign, sent a memorandum to the American Government, reminding them or certain mediation promises which had been made at the time of the _Suss.e.x_ crisis.
"When this memorandum, addressed to Mr. Gerard, reached Berlin Mr. Gerard had already left for America. I, therefore, cabled the text to Washington and instructed Count Bernstorff to hand the memorandum to Mr. Gerard on his arrival in New York. Count Bernstorff, who had been made fully aware that the Emperor wished to avert the submarine campaign and a rupture with the United States, was also informed by me that the memorandum had been written by the Emperor in person. For reasons which there is no need for me to mention here, Count Bernstorff handed the memorandum, not to Mr.
Gerard, but to Colonel House, who certainly communicated it to the President."
The telegram in which the Emperor"s memorandum was communicated to me read as follows:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Berlin, 9th October, 1916.
"His Majesty the Emperor desires that the following memorandum should be handed to Amba.s.sador Gerard on the latter"s arrival.
"Your Excellency should do this in strict confidence and say that the memoir is not intended to convey a threat of submarine warfare.
I should only like you to remind the Amba.s.sador before his interview with the President of the expectations we based in the spring on Wilson and to call his attention to the increasing ruthlessness with which the enemy is carrying on the war. I take it for granted that Gerard will treat my memoir as strictly confidential and will not publish it.
"Should Your Excellency, however, regard the delivery of the memorandum as indiscreet, I request that it may be deferred.
"For Your Excellency"s information (strictly confidential):
"1. The memorandum is written personally by His Majesty.
"2. Unrestricted submarine warfare is for the present deferred.
"MEMORANDUM
"Your Excellency hinted to His Majesty in your last conversation at Charleville in April that President Wilson possibly would try towards the end of summer to offer his good services to the belligerents for the promotion of peace. The German Government has no information as to whether the President adheres to this idea, and as to the eventual date at which his step would take place. Meanwhile the constellation of war has taken such a form, that the German Government foresees the time at which it will be forced to regain the freedom of action that it has reserved to itself in the Note of May 4th last, and thus the President"s steps may be jeopardized."
Mr. Gerard arrived in New York a few days after I had received the Emperor"s memorandum. He was accompanied by the American journalist, Herbert Swope, a correspondent of _The World_, who had spent a considerable time in Berlin. This gentleman professed to be Mr.
Gerard"s confidant, and even from the ship sent wireless messages to his paper in which he reported that the unrestricted submarine campaign was imminent. The Amba.s.sador also, after landing in New York, expressed himself, as I at once learned, to the same effect, and Mr. Swope continued his open Press-campaign in this direction.
Under these circ.u.mstances I considered it inopportune to give Mr.
Gerard the Emperor"s memorandum, as I a.s.sumed that he would read into it merely a confirmation of his view, and would discuss it in that light. If, however, the idea spread abroad that we were about to begin the unrestricted submarine campaign all prospect of success for peace mediation was lost. It was indeed clear that the Entente would not accept American mediation if they could hope for the submarine campaign and consequent declaration of war by the United States. It must continually be repeated that mediation could only succeed if the Entente had already abandoned all hope of American a.s.sistance. On these considerations I handed the memorandum to Colonel House, of whose discretion I had two years" experience.
In this way it came into the hands of the equally unusually discreet President, without anyone else learning anything about it. The memorandum at once produced a great effect, as now the American authorities had no further doubt that the Imperial Government would accept the intended mediation. This could, however, not be speeded up because Mr. Wilson did not want to undertake a great political movement so shortly before the election.
At this time I sent the following report to the Chancellor:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Washington, 17th October, 1916.
"For a week there has again been some excitement here about foreign policy. This is due to a variety of causes. At first the rumor was that Amba.s.sador Gerard was bringing with him a peace proposal from the German Government. In spite of all denials this rumor was believed for a time, because it was started by one of the first bankers of New York. Unfortunately Mr. Gerard heard of this canard while he was still on the ship, and as he was travelling with Herbert Swope a denial, sent by wireless, appeared in _The World_, which was worse than the rumor itself. In this Swope reported that Mr.
Gerard was coming over to announce the approaching beginning of ruthless submarine war. Just at this moment the U53 appeared at Newport, and two days later I had an audience of the President, which had been arranged a long time before, that I might hand to Mr. Wilson the reply of His Majesty the Emperor and King on the question of Polish relief.
"Colonel House, with whom, as is known, I am in constant communication, expected that on his landing Mr. Gerard would let fall some intentional or unintentional diplomatic _lapsus linguoe_, and therefore went in the early morning to the quarantine station in order to protect Gerard from the reporters. Mr. Gerard received a very hearty reception, which, however, had certainly been engineered for election purposes, because it is to the interest of the Democratic Administration to extol their amba.s.sador and their foreign policy. Immediately after the reception Gerard breakfasted with House, and there everything was denied that had been actually said or implied.
"As I have known Mr. and Mrs. Gerard for many years I had a longish conversation with them on the day after their arrival. The quintessence of the amba.s.sador"s remarks was that he was completely neutral, but that Berlin expected more than that.
"Now everything has calmed down again here, and nothing is talked about except the election, which will be decided in three weeks"
time. As I have several times had the honor to report, the result is most uncertain. While four months ago a Republican victory seemed certain, to-day Wilson"s success is very possible. This is explained by the fact that Mr. Hughes has made no permanent impression as a speaker, whereas Roosevelt blew the war trumpet in his usual bombastic fashion. If Hughes should be defeated he can thank Roosevelt. The average American is, and remains a pacifist "_Er segnet Friede und Friedenszeiten_," and can only be drawn into war by pa.s.sionate popular excitement."
With the facts contained in the above report the following telegram is also concerned, which I despatched after the visit to the President mentioned above:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER