[6] _Hyp_. I. 59.
[7] _Hyp_. I. 61.
After reaching this conclusion, s.e.xtus introduces a long chapter to prove that animals can reason. There is no reference to this in Diogenes, but there is other testimony to show that it was a favourite line of argument with the Sceptics.[1] s.e.xtus, however, says that his course of reasoning is different from that of most of the Sceptics on the subject,[2] as they usually applied their arguments to all animals, while he selected only one, namely the dog.[3] This chapter is full of sarcastic attacks on the Dogmatics, and contains the special allusion to the Stoics as the greatest opponents of the Sceptics, which has been before referred to.[4]
s.e.xtus claims with a greater freedom of diction than in some apparently less original chapters, and with a wealth of special ill.u.s.trations, that the dog is superior to man in acuteness of perception,[5] that he has the power of choice, and possesses an art, that of hunting,[6] and, also, is not deprived of virtue,[7] as the true nature of virtue is to show justice to all, which the dog does by guarding loyally those who are kind to him, and keeping off those who do evil.[8] The reasoning power of this animal is proved by the story taken from Chrysippus, of the dog that came to a meeting of three roads in following a scent. After seeking the scent in vain in two of the roads, he takes the third road without scenting it as a result of a quick process of thought, which proves that he shares in the famous dialectic of Chrysippus,[9] the five forms of [Greek: _anapodeiktoi logoi_,] of which the dog chooses the fifth.
Either _A_ or _B_ or _C_, not _A_ or _B,_ therefore _C_.
[1] _Hyp_. I. 238.
[2] Compare Brochard _Op. cit._ 256.
[3] _Hyp_. I. 62-63.
[4] _Hyp_. I. 65.
[5] _Hyp_. I. 64.
[6] _Hyp_. I. 66.
[7] _Hyp_. I. 67.
[8] _Hyp_. I. 67.
[9] _Hyp_. I. 69; _Hyp_. II. 166; Diog. VII. 1, 79.
The dog and other irrational animals may also possess spoken language, as the only proof that we have to the contrary, is the fact that we cannot understand the sounds that they make.[1] We have an example in this chapter of the humor of s.e.xtus, who after enlarging on the perfect character of the dog, remarks, "For which reason it seems to me some philosophers have honoured themselves with the name of this animal,"[2] thus making a sarcastic allusion to the Cynics, especially Antisthenes.[3]
[1] _Hyp_. I. 74.
[2] _Hyp_. I. 72.
[3] Diog. VI. 1, 13.
_The Second Trope_. Pa.s.sing on to the second Trope, s.e.xtus aims to prove that even if we leave the differences of the mental images of animals out of the discussion, there is not a sufficient unanimity in the mental images of human beings to allow us to base any a.s.sertions upon them in regard to the character of external objects.[1] He had previously announced that he intended to oppose the phenomenal to the intellectual "in any way whatever,"[2] so he begins here by referring to the two parts of which man is said to be composed, the soul and the body, and proceeds to discuss the differences among men in sense-perception and in opinion.[3] Most of the ill.u.s.trations given of differences in sense-perception are medical ones; of the more general of these I will note the only two which are also given by Diogenes in his exposition of this Trope,[4] viz., Demophon, Alexander"s table waiter, who shivered in the sun, and Andron the Argive, who was so free from thirst that he travelled through the desert of Libya without seeking a drink. Some have reasoned from the presence of the first of these ill.u.s.trations in the exposition of the Tropes, that a part of this material at least goes back to the time of Pyrrho, as Pyrrho from his intimacy with Alexander, when he accompanied him to India, had abundant opportunities to observe the peculiarities of his servant Demophon.[5] The ill.u.s.tration of Andron the Argive is taken from Aristotle, according to Diogenes.[6]
[1] _Hyp_. I. 79.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 8.
[3] _Hyp._ I. 80.
[4] Diog. IX. 11, 80-81.
[5] Compare _Pyrrhon et le Scepticism primitive, Revue phil._, Paris 1885, No. 5; Victor Brochard, p. 521.
[6] Diog. IX. 11, 81.
Pa.s.sing on to differences of opinion, we have another example of the sarcastic humor of s.e.xtus, as he refers to the [Greek: physiognomonike sophia][1] as the authority for believing that the body is a type of the soul. As the bodies of men differ, so the souls also probably differ. The differences of mind among men is not referred to by Diogenes, except in the general statement that they choose different professions; while s.e.xtus elaborates this point, speaking of the great differences in opposing schools of philosophy, and in the objects of choice and avoidance, and sources of pleasure for different men.[2] The poets well understand this marked difference in human desires, as Homer says,
"One man enjoys this, another enjoys that."
s.e.xtus also quotes the beautiful lines of Pindar,[3]
"One delights in getting honours and crowns through stormfooted horses, Others in pa.s.sing life in rooms rich in gold, Another safe travelling enjoys, in a swift ship, on a wave of the sea."
[1] _Hyp._ I. 85.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 87-89.
[3] _Hyp._ I. 86.
_The Third Trope_. The third Trope limits the argument to the sense-perceptions of one man, a Dogmatic, if preferred, or to one whom the Dogmatics consider wise,[1] and states that as the ideas given by the different sense organs differ radically in a way that does not admit of their being compared with each other, they furnish no reliable testimony regarding the nature of objects.[2] "Each of the phenomena perceived by us seems to present itself in many forms, as the apple, smooth, fragrant brown and sweet." The apple was evidently the ordinary example given for this Trope, for Diogenes uses the same, but in a much more condensed form, and not with equal understanding of the results to be deduced from it.[3] The consequence of the incompatibility of the mental representations produced through the several sense organs by the apple, may be the acceptance of either of the three following propositions: (i) That only those qualities exist in the apple which we perceive. (ii) That more than these exist. (iii) That even those perceived do not exist.[4] Accordingly, any experience which can give rise to such different views regarding outward objects, cannot be relied upon as a testimony concerning them.
[1] _Hyp._ I. 90.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 94.
[3] Diog. IX. 11 81.
[4] _Hyp._ I. 99.
The non-h.o.m.ogeneous nature of the mental images connected with the different sense organs, as presented by s.e.xtus, reminds us of the discussion of the same subject by Berkeley in his _Theory of Vision_.
s.e.xtus says that a man born with less than the usual number of senses, would form altogether different ideas of the external world than those who have the usual number, and as our ideas of objects depend on our mental images, a greater number of sense organs would give us still different ideas of outward reality.[1] The strong argument of the Stoics against such reasoning as this, was their doctrine of pre-established harmony between nature and the soul, so that when a representation is produced in us of a real object, a [Greek: kataleptike phantasia],[2] by this representation the soul grasps a real existence. There is a [Greek: logos] in us which is of the same kind, [Greek: syngenos], or in relation to all nature. This argument of pre-established harmony between the faculties of the soul and the objects of nature, is the one that has been used in all ages to combat philosophical teaching that denies that we apprehend the external world as it is. It was used against Kant by his opponents, who thought in this way to refute his teachings.[3] The Sceptics could not, of course, accept a theory of nature that included the soul and the external world in one harmonious whole, but s.e.xtus in his discussion of the third Trope does not refute this argument as fully as he does later in his work against logic.[4] He simply states here that philosophers themselves cannot agree as to what nature is, and furthermore, that a philosopher himself is a part of the discord, and to be judged, rather than being capable of judging, and that no conclusion can be reached by those who are themselves an element of the uncertainty.[5]
[1] _Hyp._ I. 96-97.
[2] _Adv. Math._ VII. 93.
[3] Ueberweg _Op. cit._ 195.
[4] _Adv. Math._ VII. 354.
[5] _Hyp._ I. 98-99.
_The Fourth Trope_. This Trope limits the argument to each separate sense, and the effect is considered of the condition of body and mind upon sense-perception in relation to the several sense-organs.[1] The physical states which modify sense-perception are health and illness, sleeping and waking, youth and age, hunger and satiety, drunkenness and sobriety. All of these conditions of the body entirely change the character of the mental images, producing different judgments of the color, taste, and temperature of objects, and of the character of sounds. A man who is asleep is in a different world from one awake, the existence of both worlds being relative to the condition of waking and sleeping.[2]
The subjective states which s.e.xtus mentions here as modifying the character of the mental representations are hating or loving, courage or fear, sorrow or joy, and sanity or insanity.[3] No man is ever twice in exactly the same condition of body or mind, and never able to review the differences of his ideas as a sum total, for those of the present moment only are subject to careful inspection.[4] Furthermore, no one is free from the influence of all conditions of body or mind, so that he can be unbia.s.sed to judge his ideas, and no criterion can be established that can be shown to be true, but on the contrary, whatever course is pursued on the subject, both the criterion and the proof will be thrown into the _circulus in probando_, for the truth of each rests on the other.[5]
[1] _Hyp._ I. 100.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 104.
[3] _Hyp._ I. 100.
[4] _Hyp._ I. 112.
[5] _Hyp._ I. 117.