Before dawn on the 15th, after covering another thirty miles, over a road which was patrolled by the enemy, he reached head-quarters. His squadrons followed, marching at midnight, and bringing with them 165 prisoners and 260 captured horses and mules.
This extraordinary expedition, which not only effected the destruction of a large amount of Federal property, and broke up, for the time being, their line of supplies, but acquired information of the utmost value, and shook the confidence of the North in McClellan"s generalship, was accomplished with the loss of one man.
These young Virginia soldiers marched one hundred and ten miles in less than two days. "There was something sublime," says Stuart, "in the implicit confidence and unquestioning trust of the rank and file in a leader guiding them straight, apparently, into the very jaws of the enemy, every step appearing to them to diminish the hope of extrication."* (* Stuart"s Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1.) Nor was the influence of their achievement on the morale of the whole Confederate army the least important result attained. A host of over 100,000 men, which had allowed a few squadrons to ride completely round it, by roads which were within hearing of its bugles, was no longer considered a formidable foe.
On receiving Stuart"s information, Lee drew up the plan of operations which had been imparted to Jackson on the 22nd.
It was a design which to all appearance was almost foolhardy. The Confederate army was organised as follows:-- Longstreet 9,000 A.P. Hill 14,000 Magruder 18,000 Huger 9,000 Holmes 6,500 D.H. Hill 10,000 Jackson 18,500 Cavalry 3,000 Reserve Artillery 8,500 ------ 88,500 *
(*2 This estimate is rather larger than that of the Confederate historians (Allan, W.H. Taylor, etc., etc.), but it has been arrived at after a careful examination of the strength at different dates and the losses in the various engagements.)
June 24.
On the night of June 24 the whole of these troops, with the exception of the Valley army, were south of the Chickahominy, holding the earthworks which protected Richmond. Less than two miles eastward, strongly intrenched, lay four of McClellan"s army corps, in round numbers 75,000 officers and men.* (* Return of June 20, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 238.)
To attack this force, even after Jackson"s arrival, was to court disaster. The right was protected by the Chickahominy, the left rested on White Oak Swamp, a network of sluggish streams and impa.s.sable swamps, screened everywhere by tangled thickets. It needed not the presence of the siege ordnance, placed on the most commanding points within the lines, to make such a position absolutely impregnable.
North of the Chickahominy, however, the Federals were less favourably situated. The Fifth Army Corps, 25,000 strong,* (* The Fifth Army Corps included McCall"s division, which had but recently arrived by water from Fredericksburg. Report of June 20, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 238.) under General FitzJohn Porter, had been pushed forward, stretching a hand to McDowell and protecting the railway, in the direction of Mechanicsville; and although the tributaries of the Chickahominy, running in from the north, afforded a series of positions, the right flank of these positions, resting, as Stuart had ascertained, on no natural obstacle, was open to a turning movement.
Furthermore, in rear of the Fifth Corps, and at an oblique angle to the front, ran the line of supply, the railway to West Point. If Porter"s right were turned, the Confederates, threatening the railway, would compel McClellan to detach largely to the north bank of the Chickahominy in order to recover or protect the line.
On the north bank of the Chickahominy, therefore, Lee"s attention had been for some time fixed. Here was his adversary"s weak point, and a sudden a.s.sault on Porter, followed up, if necessary, by an advance against the railway, would bring McClellan out of his intrenchments, and force him to fight at a disadvantage. To ensure success, however, in the attack on Porter it was necessary to concentrate an overwhelming force on the north bank; and this could hardly be done without so weakening the force which held the Richmond lines that it would be unable to resist the attack of the 75,000 men who faced it.
If McClellan, while Lee was fighting Porter, boldly threw forward the great army he had on the south bank, the rebel capital might be the reward of his resolution. The danger was apparent to all, but Lee resolved to risk it, and his audacity has not escaped criticism. It has been said that he deliberately disregarded the contingency of McClellan either advancing on Richmond, or reinforcing Porter. The truth is, however, that neither Lee, nor those generals about him who knew McClellan, were in the least apprehensive that their over-cautious adversary, if the attack were sudden and well sustained, would either see or utilise his opportunity.
From Hannibal to Moltke there has been no great captain who has neglected to study the character of his opponent, and who did not trade on the knowledge thus acquired, and it was this knowledge which justified Lee"s audacity.
The real daring of the enterprise lay in the inferiority of the Confederate armament. Muskets and shot-guns, still carried by a large part of the army, were ill-matched against rifles of the most modern manufacture; while the smooth-bore field-pieces, with which at least half the artillery was equipped, possessed neither the range nor the accuracy of the rifled ordnance of the Federals.
That Lee"s study of the chances had not been patient and exhaustive it is impossible to doubt. He was no hare-brained leader, but a profound thinker, following the highest principles of the military art. That he had weighed the disconcerting effect which the sudden appearance of the victorious Jackson, with an army of unknown strength, would produce upon McClellan, goes without saying. He had omitted no precaution to render the surprise complete, and although the defences of Richmond were still too weak to resist a resolute attack, Magruder, the same officer who had so successfully imposed upon McClellan at Yorktown, was such a master of artifice that, with 28,000 men and the reserve artillery,* (* Magruder"s division, 13,000; Huger"s division, 9000; reserve artillery, 3000; 5 regiments of cavalry, 2000. Holmes" division, 6500, was still retained on the south bank of the James.) he might be relied upon to hold Richmond until Porter had been disposed of. The remainder of the army, 2000 of Stuart"s cavalry, the divisions of Longstreet and the two Hills, 35,000 men all told, crossing to the north bank of the Chickahominy and combining with the 18,500 under Jackson, would be sufficient to crush the Federal right.
The initial operations, however, were of a somewhat complicated nature. Four bridges* (* Lee"s bridge, shown on the map, had either been destroyed or was not yet built.) crossed the river on Lee"s left. A little more than a mile and a half from Mechanicsville Bridge, up stream, is Meadow Bridge, and five and a half miles further up is another pa.s.sage at the Half Sink, afterwards called Winston"s Bridge. Three and a half miles below Mechanicsville Bridge is New Bridge. The northern approaches to Mechanicsville, Meadow, and New Bridge, were in possession of the Federals; and it was consequently no simple operation to transfer the troops before Richmond from one bank of the Chickahominy to the other. Only Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridges could be used. Winston"s Bridge was too far from Richmond, for, if Longstreet and the two Hills were to cross at that point, not only would Magruder be left without support during their march, but McClellan, warned by his scouts, would receive long notice of the intended blow and have ample time for preparation. To surprise Porter, to give McClellan no time for reflection, and at the same time to gain a position which would bring the Confederates operating on the north bank into close and speedy communication with Magruder on the south, another point of pa.s.sage must be chosen. The position would be the one commanding New Bridge, for the Confederate earthworks, held by Magruder, ran due south from that point. But Porter was already in possession of the coveted ground, with strong outposts at Mechanicsville. To secure, then, the two centre bridges was the first object. This, it was expected, would be achieved by the advance of the Valley army, aided by a brigade from the Half Sink, against the flank and rear of the Federals at Mechanicsville. Then, as soon as the enemy fell back, Longstreet and the two Hills would cross the river by the Meadow and Mechanicsville Bridges, and strike Porter in front, while Jackson attacked his right. A victory would place the Confederates in possession of New Bridge, and the troops north of the Chickahominy would be then in close communication with Magruder.
Lee"s orders were as follows:--"Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia, June 24, 1862. General Orders, No. 75.
"I.--General Jackson"s command will proceed to-morrow (June 25) from Ashland towards the Slash (Merry Oaks) Church, and encamp at some convenient point west of the Central Railroad. Branch"s brigade of A.P. Hill"s division will also, to-morrow evening, take position on the Chickahominy, near Half Sink. At three o"clock Thursday morning, 26th instant, General Jackson will advance on the road leading to Pole Green Church, communicating his march to General Branch, who will immediately cross the Chickahominy, and take the road leading to Mechanicsville. As soon as the movements of these columns are discovered, General A.P. Hill, with the rest of his division, will cross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, and move direct upon Mechanicsville. To aid his advance the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy will at the proper time open upon the batteries at Mechanicsville. The enemy being driven from Mechanicsville and the pa.s.sage of the bridge being opened, General Longstreet, with his division and that of General D.H. Hill, will cross the Chickahominy at or near that point; General D.H. Hill moving to the support of General Jackson, and General Longstreet supporting General A.P. Hill; the four divisions keeping in communication with each other, and moving EN ECHELON on separate roads if practicable; the left division in advance, with skirmishers and sharp-shooters extending in their front, will sweep down the Chickahominy, and endeavour to drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge, General Jackson bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam Creek, and taking the direction towards Cold Harbour. They will then press forward towards the York River Railroad, closing upon the enemy"s rear, and forcing him down the Chickahominy. An advance of the enemy towards Richmond will be prevented by vigorously following his rear, and crippling and arresting his progress.
"II.--The divisions under Generals Huger and Magruder will hold their position in front of the enemy against attack, and make such demonstrations, Thursday, as to discover his operations. Should opportunity offer, the feint will be converted into a real attack.
"III.--General Stuart, with the 1st, 4th, and 9th Virginia Cavalry, the cavalry of Cobb"s Legion, and the Jeff Davis Legion, will cross the Chickahominy to-morrow (Wednesday, June 25), and take position to the left of General Jackson"s line of march. The main body will be held in reserve, with scouts well extended to the front and left.
General Stuart will keep General Jackson informed of the movements of the enemy on his left, and will cooperate with him in his advance."
June 25.
On the 25th Longstreet and the two Hills moved towards the bridges; and although during the movement McClellan drove back Magruder"s pickets to their trenches, and pushed his own outposts nearer Richmond, Lee held firmly to his purpose. As a matter of fact, there was little to be feared from McClellan. With a profound belief in the advantages of defensive and in the strength of a fortified position, he expected nothing less than that the Confederates would leave the earthworks they had so laboriously constructed, and deliberately risk the perils of an attack. He seems to have had little idea that in the hands of a skilful general intrenchments may form a "pivot of operations,"* (* The meaning of this term is clearly defined in Lee"s report. "It was therefore determined to construct defensive lines, so as to enable a part of the army to defend the city, and leave the other part free to operate on the north bank." O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 490.) the means whereby he covers his most vulnerable point, holds the enemy in front, and sets his main body free for offensive action. Yet McClellan was by no means easy in his mind. He knew Jackson was approaching. He knew his communications were threatened.
Fugitive negroes, who, as usual, either exaggerated or lied, had informed him that the Confederates had been largely reinforced, and that Beauregard, with a portion of the Western army, had arrived in Richmond. But that his right wing was in danger he had not the faintest suspicion. He judged Lee by himself. Such a plan as leaving a small force to defend Richmond, and transferring the bulk of the army to join Jackson, he would have at once rejected as over-daring.
If attack came at all, he expected that it would come by the south bank; and he was so far from antic.i.p.ating that an opportunity for offensive action might be offered to himself that, on the night of the 25th, he sent word to his corps commanders that they were to regard their intrenchments as "the true field of battle."* (* O.R.
volume 11 part 3 page 252.)
June 26. 3 A.M.
Lee"s orders left much to Jackson. The whole operation which Lee had planned hinged upon his movements. On the morning of the 24th he was at Beaver Dam Station. The same night he was to reach Ashland, eighteen miles distant as the crow flies. On the night of the 25th he was to halt near the Slash Church, just west of the Virginia Central Railway, and six miles east of Ashland. At three o"clock, however, on the morning of the 26th, the Army of the Valley was still at Ashland, and it was not till nine that it crossed the railroad.
10.30 A.M.
Branch, on hearing that Jackson was at last advancing, pa.s.sed the Chickahominy by Winston"s Bridge, and driving Federal pickets before him, moved on Mechanicsville. General A.P. Hill was meanwhile near Meadow Bridge, waiting until the advance of Jackson and Branch should turn the flank of the Federal force which blocked his pa.s.sage.
3 P.M.
At 3 P.M., hearing nothing from his colleagues, and apprehensive that longer delay might hazard the failure of the whole plan, he ordered his advanced guard to seize the bridge. The enemy, already threatened in rear by Branch, at once fell back. Hill followed the retiring pickets towards Beaver Dam Creek, and after a short march of three miles found himself under fire of the Federal artillery. Porter had occupied a position about two miles above New Bridge.
The rest of the Confederate army was already crossing the Chickahominy; and although there was no sign of Jackson, and the enemy"s front was strong, protected by a long line of batteries, Hill thought it necessary to order an attack. A message from Lee, ordering him to postpone all further movement, arrived too late.* (* Letter from Captain T.W. Sydnor, 4th Virginia Cavalry, who carried the message.) There was no artillery preparation, and the troops, checked unexpectedly by a wide abattis, were repulsed with terrible slaughter, the casualties amounting to nearly 2000 men.* (* So General Porter. Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 331.) The Union loss was 360.* (* O.R. volume 11 part 1 pages 38, 39.)
4.30 P.M.
Jackson, about 4.30 P.M., before this engagement had begun, had reached Hundley"s Corner, three miles north of the Federal position, but separated from it by dense forest and the windings of the creek.
On the opposite bank was a detachment of Federal infantry, supported by artillery.
6 P.M.
Two guns, accompanied by the advanced guard, sufficed to drive this force to the shelter of the woods; and then, establishing his outposts, Jackson ordered his troops to bivouac.
It has been a.s.serted by more than one Southern general that the disaster at Beaver Dam Creek was due to Jackson"s indifferent tactics; and, at first sight, the bare facts would seem to justify the verdict. He had not reached his appointed station on the night of the 25th, and on the 26th he was five hours behind time. He should have crossed the Virginia Central Railway at sunrise, but at nine o"clock he was still three miles distant. His advance against the Federal right flank and rear should have been made in co-operation with the remainder of the army. But his whereabouts was unknown when Hill attacked; and although the cannonade was distinctly heard at Hundley"s Corner, he made no effort to lend a.s.sistance, and his troops were encamping when their comrades, not three miles away, were rushing forward to the a.s.sault. There would seem to be some grounds, then, for the accusation that his delay thwarted General Lee"s design; some reason for the belief that the victor of the Valley campaign, on his first appearance in combination with the main army, had proved a failure, and that his failure was in those very qualities of swiftness and energy to which he owed his fame.
General D.H. Hill has written that "Jackson"s genius never shone when he was under the command of another. It seemed then to be shrouded or paralysed...MacGregor on his native heath was not more different from MacGregor in prison than was Jackson his own master from Jackson in a subordinate position. This was the keynote to his whole character.
The hooded falcon cannot strike the quarry."* (* Battles and Leaders volume 2 pages 389, 390.)
The reader who has the heart to follow this chronicle to the end will a.s.suredly find reason to doubt the ac.u.men, however he may admire the eloquence, of Jackson"s brother-in-law. When he reads of the Second Mana.s.sas, of Harper"s Ferry, of Sharpsburg and of Chancellorsville, he will recall this statement with astonishment; and it will not be difficult to show that Jackson conformed as closely to the plans of his commander at Mechanicsville as elsewhere.
The machinery of war seldom runs with the smoothness of clockwork.
The course of circ.u.mstances can never be exactly predicted.
Unforeseen obstacles may render the highest skill and the most untiring energy of no avail; and it may be well to point out that the task which was a.s.signed to Jackson was one of exceeding difficulty.
In the first place, his march of eight-and-twenty miles, from Frederickshall to Ashland, on June 23, 24, and 25, was made over an unmapped country, unknown either to himself or to his staff, which had lately been in occupation of the Federals. Bridges had been destroyed and roads obstructed. The Valley army had already marched far and fast; and although Dabney hints that inexperienced and sluggish subordinates were the chief cause of delay, there is hardly need to look so far for excuse.* (* Dr. White, in his excellent Life of Lee, states that the tardiness of the arrival of the provisions sent him from Richmond had much to do with the delay of Jackson"s march.) The march from Ashland to Hundley"s Corner, sixteen miles, was little less difficult. It was made in two columns, Whiting and the Stonewall division, now under Winder, crossing the railway near Merry Oaks Church, Ewell moving by Shady Grove Church, but this distribution did not accelerate the march. The midsummer sun blazed fiercely down on the dusty roads; the dense woods on either hand shut out the air, and interruptions were frequent. The Federal cavalry held a line from Atlee"s Station to near Hanover Court House. The 8th Illinois, over 700 strong, picketed all the woods between the Chickahominy and the Totopotomoy Creek. Two other regiments prolonged the front to the Pamunkey, and near Hundley"s Corner and Old Church were posted detachments of infantry. Skirmishing was constant. The Federal outposts contested every favourable position. Here and there the roads were obstructed by felled trees; a burned bridge over the Totopotomoy delayed the advance for a full hour, and it was some time before the enemy"s force at Hundley"s Corner was driven behind Beaver Dam Creek.
At the council of war, held on the 23rd, Lee had left it to Jackson to fix the date on which the operation against the Federal right should begin, and on the latter deciding on the 26th, Longstreet had suggested that he should make more ample allowance for the difficulties that might be presented by the country and by the enemy, and give himself more time.* (* "Lee"s Attacks North of the Chickahominy." By General D.H. Hill. Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 347. General Longstreet, however, from Mana.s.sas to Appomattox, says Jackson appointed the morning of the 25th, but, on Longstreet"s suggestion, changed the date to the 26th.) Jackson had not seen fit to alter his decision, and it is hard to say that he was wrong.
Had McClellan received notice that the Valley army was approaching, a day"s delay would have given him a fine opportunity. More than one course would have been open to him. He might have constructed formidable intrenchments on the north bank of the Chickahominy and have brought over large reinforcements of men and guns; or he might have turned the tables by a bold advance on Richmond. It was by no means inconceivable that if he detected Lee"s intention and was given time to prepare, he might permit the Confederates to cross the Chickahominy, amuse them there with a small force, and hurl the rest of his army on the works which covered the Southern capital. It is true that his caution was extreme, and to a mind which was more occupied with counting the enemy"s strength than with watching for an opportunity, the possibility of a.s.suming the offensive was not likely to occur. But, timid as he might be when no enemy was in sight, McClellan was const.i.tutionally brave; and when the chimeras raised by an over-active imagination proved to be substantial dangers, he was quite capable of daring resolution. Time, therefore, was of the utmost importance to the Confederates. It was essential that Porter should be overwhelmed before McClellan realised the danger; and if Jackson, in fixing a date for the attack which would put a heavy tax on the marching powers of his men, already strained to the utmost, ran some risks, from a strategical point of view those risks were fully justified.
In the second place, an operation such as that which Lee had devised is one of the most difficult manoeuvres which an army can be called upon to execute. According to Moltke, to unite two forces on the battle-field, starting at some distance apart, at the right moment, is the most brilliant feat of generalship. The slightest hesitation may ruin the combination. Haste is even more to be dreaded. There is always the danger that one wing may attack, or be attacked, while the other is still far distant, and either contingency may be fatal. The Valley campaign furnishes more than one ill.u.s.tration. In their pursuit of Jackson, Shields and Fremont failed to co-operate at Strasburg, at Cross Keys, and at Port Republic. And greater generals than either Shields or Fremont have met with little better success in attempting the same manoeuvre. At both Eylau and Bautzen Napoleon was deprived of decisive victory by his failure to ensure the co-operation of his widely separated columns.
Jackson and A.P. Hill, on the morning of the 26th, were nearly fifteen miles apart. Intercommunication at the outset was ensured by the brigade under Branch; but as the advance progressed, and the enemy was met with, it became more difficult. The messengers riding from one force to the other were either stopped by the Federals, or were compelled to make long detours; and as they approached the enemy"s position, neither Hill nor Jackson was informed of the whereabouts of the other.
The truth is, that the arrangements made by the Confederate headquarter staff were most inadequate. In the first place, the order of the 24th, instructing Jackson to start from Slash Church at 3 A.M.
on the 26th, and thus leading the other generals to believe that he would certainly be there at that hour, should never have been issued.
When it was written Jackson"s advanced guard was at Beaver Dam Station, the rear brigades fifteen miles behind; and to reach Slash Church his force had to march forty miles through an intricate country, in possession of the enemy, and so little known that it was impossible to designate the route to be followed. To fix an hour of arrival so long in advance was worse than useless, and Jackson cannot be blamed if he failed to comply with the exact letter of a foolish order. As it was, so many of the bridges were broken, and so difficult was it to pa.s.s the fords, that if Dr. Dabney had not found in his brother, a planter of the neighbourhood, an efficient subst.i.tute for the guide headquarters should have provided, the Valley army would have been not hours but days too late. In the second place, the duty of keeping up communications should not have been left to Jackson, but have been seen to at headquarters. Jackson had with him only a few cavalry, and these few had not only to supply the necessary orderlies for the subordinate generals, and the escorts for the artillery and trains, but to form his advanced guard, for Stuart"s squadrons were on his left flank, and not in his front.
Moreover, his cavalry were complete strangers to the country, and there were no maps. In such circ.u.mstances the only means of ensuring constant communication was to have detached two of Stuart"s squadrons, who knew the ground, to establish a series of posts between Jackson"s line of march and the Chickahominy; and to have detailed a staff officer, whose sole duty would have been to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with hourly reports of the progress made, to join the Valley army.* (* Of the events of June 26 Dr. Dabney, in a letter to the author, writes as follows:--"Here we had a disastrous ill.u.s.tration of the lack of an organised and intelligent general staff. Let my predicament serve as a specimen. As chief of Jackson"s staff, I had two a.s.sistant adjutant-generals, two men of the engineer department, and two clerks. What did I have for orderlies and couriers? A detail from some cavalry company which happened to bivouac near. The men were sent to me without any reference to their local knowledge, their intelligence, or their courage; most probably they were selected for me by their captain on account of their lack of these qualities. Next to the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of the General Staff should be the best man in the country. The brains of an army should be in the General Staff. The lowest orderlies attached to it should be the very best soldiers in the service, for education, intelligence, and courage. Jackson had to find his own guide for his march from Beaver Dam Station. He had not been furnished with a map, and not a single orderly or message reached him during the whole day.") It may be remarked, too, that Generals Branch and Ewell, following converging roads, met near Shady Grove Church about 3 P.M.
No report appears to have been sent by the latter to General A.P.
Hill; and although Branch a little later received a message to the effect that Hill had crossed the Chickahominy and was moving on Mechanicsville,* (* Branch"s Report, O.R. volume 2 part 2 page 882.) the information was not pa.s.sed on to Jackson.
Neglect of these precautions made it impracticable to arrange a simultaneous attack, and co-operation depended solely on the judgment of Hill and Jackson. In the action which ensued on Beaver Dam Creek there was no co-operation whatever. Hill attacked and was repulsed.
Jackson had halted at Hundley"s Corner, three miles distant from the battle-field. Had the latter come down on the Federal rear while Hill moved against their front an easy success would in all probability have been the result.