Nevertheless, the responsibility for Hill"s defeat cannot be held to rest on Jackson"s shoulders. On August 18, 1870, the Prussian Guards and the Saxon Army Corps were ordered to make a combined attack on the village of St. Privat, the Guards moving against the front, the Saxons against the flank. When the order was issued the two corps were not more than two miles apart. The tract of country which lay between them was perfectly open, the roads were free, and inter-communication seemed easy in the extreme. Yet, despite their orders, despite the facilities of communication, the Guards advanced to the attack an hour and a half too soon; and from six o"clock to nearly seven their shattered lines lay in front of the position, at the mercy of a vigorous counterstroke, without a single Saxon regiment coming to their aid. But the Saxons were not to blame. Their march had been unchecked; they had moved at speed. On their part there had been no hesitation; but on the part of the commander of the Guards there had been the same precipitation which led to the premature attack on the Federal position at Beaver Dam Creek. It was the impatience of General Hill, not the tardiness of Jackson, which was the cause of the Confederate repulse.
We may now turn to the question whether Jackson was justified in not marching to the sound of the cannon. Referring to General Lee"s orders, it will be seen that as soon as Longstreet and D.H. Hill had crossed the Chickahominy the four divisions of the army were to move forward in communication with each other and drive the enemy from his position, Jackson, in advance upon the left, "turning Beaver Dam Creek, and taking the direction of Cold Harbour."
When Jackson reached Hundley"s Corner, and drove the Federal infantry behind the Creek, the first thing to do, as his orders indicated, was to get touch with the rest of the army. It was already near sunset; between Hundley"s Corner and Mechanicsville lay a dense forest, with no roads in the desired direction; and it was manifestly impossible, under ordinary conditions, to do more that evening than to establish connection; the combined movement against the enemy"s position must be deferred till the morning. But the sound of battle to the south-west introduced a complication. "We distinctly heard," says Jackson, "the rapid and continued discharges of cannon."* (*
Jackson"s Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 553.) What did this fire portend? It might proceed, as was to be inferred from Lee"s orders, from the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy covering Hill"s pa.s.sage.
It might mean a Federal counterstroke on Hill"s advanced guard; or, possibly, a premature attack on the part of the Confederates. General Whiting, according to his report, thought it "indicated a severe battle."* (* Whiting"s Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 562.) General Trimble, marching with Ewell, heard both musketry and artillery; and in his opinion the command should have moved forward;*
(* Trimble"s Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 614.) and whatever may have been Jackson"s orders, it was undoubtedly his duty, if he believed a hot engagement was in progress, to have marched to the a.s.sistance of his colleagues. He could not help them by standing still. He might have rendered them invaluable aid by pressing the enemy in flank. But the question is, What inference did the cannonade convey to Jackson"s mind? Was it of such a character as to leave no doubt that Hill was in close action, or might it be interpreted as the natural accompaniment of the pa.s.sage of the Chickahominy? The evidence is conflicting. On the one hand we have the evidence of Whiting and Trimble, both experienced soldiers; on the other, in addition to the indirect evidence of Jackson"s inaction, we have the statement of Major Dabney. "We heard no signs," says the chief of the staff, "of combat on Beaver Dam Creek until a little while before sunset. The whole catastrophe took place in a few minutes about that time; and in any case our regiments, who had gone into bivouac, could not have been rea.s.sembled, formed up, and moved forward in time to be of any service. A night attack through the dense, pathless, and unknown forest was quite impracticable."* (* Letter to the author.) It seems probable, then--and the Federal reports are to the same effect* (* Porter"s Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 222. Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 330.)--that the firing was only really heavy for a very short period, and that Jackson believed it to be occasioned by Hill"s pa.s.sage of the Chickahominy, and the rout of the Federals from Mechanicsville. Neither Trimble nor Whiting were aware that Lee"s orders directed that the operation was to be covered by a heavy cannonade.
Obeying orders very literally himself, Jackson found it difficult to believe that others did not do the same. He knew that the position he had taken up rendered the line of Beaver Dam Creek untenable by the Federals. They would never stand to fight on that line with a strong force established in their rear and menacing their communications, nor would they dare to deliver a counterstroke through the trackless woods. It might confidently be a.s.sumed, therefore, that they would fall back during the night, and that the Confederate advance would then be carried out in that concentrated formation which Lee"s orders had dictated. Such, in all probability, was Jackson"s view of the situation; and that Hill, in direct contravention of those orders, would venture on an isolated attack before that formation had been a.s.sumed never for a moment crossed his mind.* (* Longstreet, on page 124 of his From Mana.s.sas to Appomattox, declares that "Jackson marched by the fight without giving attention, and went into camp at Hundley"s Corner, HALF A MILE IN REAR of the enemy"s position." A reference to the map is sufficient to expose the inaccuracy of this statement.)
MAP OF THE ENVIRONS OF RICHMOND.
Hill, on the other hand, seems to have believed that if the Federals were not defeated on the evening of the 26th they would make use of the respite, either to bring up reinforcements, or to advance on Richmond by the opposite bank of the Chickahominy. It is not impossible that he thought the sound of his cannon would bring Jackson to his aid. That it would have been wiser to establish communication, and to make certain of that aid before attacking, there can be no question. It was too late to defeat Porter the same evening. Nothing was to be gained by immediate attack, and much would be risked. The last a.s.sault, in which the heaviest losses were incurred, was made just as night fell. It was a sacrifice of life as unnecessary as that of the Prussian Guard before St. Privat. At the same time, that General Hill did wrong in crossing the Chickahominy before he heard of his colleague"s approach is not a fair accusation.
To have lingered on the south bank would have been to leave Jackson to the tender mercies of the Federals should they turn against him in the forest. Moreover, it was Hill"s task to open a pa.s.sage for the remaining divisions, and if that pa.s.sage had been deferred to a later hour, it is improbable that the Confederate army would have been concentrated on the north bank of the Chickahominy until the next morning. It must be admitted, too, that the situation in which Hill found himself, after crossing the river, was an exceedingly severe test of his self-control. His troops had driven in the Federal outposts; infantry, cavalry, and artillery were retiring before his skirmishers. The noise of battle filled the air. From across the Chickahominy thundered the heavy guns, and his regiments were pressing forward with the impetuous ardour of young soldiers. If he yielded to the excitement of the moment, if eagerness for battle overpowered his judgment, if his brain refused to work calmly in the wild tumult of the conflict, he is hardly to be blamed. The patience which is capable of resisting the eagerness of the troops, the imperturbable judgment which, in the heat of action, weighs with deliberation the necessities of the moment, the clear vision which forecasts the result of every movement--these are rare qualities indeed.
During the night Porter fell back on Gaines" Mill. While the engagement at Beaver Dam Creek was still in progress vast clouds of dust, rising above the forests to the north-west and north, had betrayed the approach of Jackson, and the reports of the cavalry left no doubt that he was threatening the Federal rear.
The retreat was conducted in good order, a strong rear-guard, reinforced by two batteries of horse-artillery, holding the Confederates in check, and before morning a second position, east of Powhite Creek, and covering two bridges over the Chickahominy, Alexander"s and Grapevine, was occupied by the Fifth Army Corps.
New Bridge was now uncovered, and Lee"s army was in motion shortly after sunrise, Jackson crossing Beaver Dam Creek and moving due south in the direction of Walnut Grove Church.* (* Jackson"s division--so-called in Lee"s order--really consisted of three divisions: Whiting"s Division: Hood"s Brigade, Law"s Brigade.
Jackson"s [Winder] Division: Stonewall Brigade, Cunningham"s Brigade, Fulkerson"s Brigade, Lawton"s Brigade.
Ewell"s Division: B.T. Johnson" Brigade, Elzey"s Brigade, Trimble"s Brigade, Taylor"s Brigade.)
June 27, 5 A.M.
The enemy, however, had already pa.s.sed eastward; and the Confederates, well concentrated and in hand, pushed forward in pursuit; A.P. Hill, with Longstreet on his right, moving on Gaines"
Mill, while Jackson, supported by D.H. Hill, and with Stuart covering his left, marched by a more circuitous route to Old Cold Harbour.
Near Walnut Grove Church Jackson met the Commander-in-Chief, and it is recorded that the staff officers of the Valley army, noting the eagerness displayed by General Lee"s suite to get a glimpse of Stonewall, then for the first time realised the true character and magnitude of the Valley campaign.
12 noon.
About noon, after a march of seven miles, A.P. Hill"s scouts reported that the Federals had halted behind Powhite Creek. The leading brigade was sent across the stream, which runs past Gaines" Mill, and pressing through the thick woods found the enemy in great strength on a ridge beyond. Hill formed his division for attack, and opened fire with his four batteries. The enemy"s guns, superior in number, at once responded, and the skirmish lines became actively engaged. The Confederate general, despite urgent messages from his subordinates, requesting permission to attack, held his troops in hand, waiting till he should be supported, and for two and a half hours the battle was no more than an affair of "long bowls."
The position held by the defence was emphatically one to impose caution on the a.s.sailants. To reach it the Confederates were confined to three roads, two from Mechanicsville, and one from Old Cold Harbour. These roads led each of them through a broad belt of forest, and then, pa.s.sing through open fields, descended into a winding valley, from five hundred to a thousand yards in breadth. Rising near McGehee"s House, due south of Old Cold Harbour, a sluggish creek, bordered by swamps and thick timber, and cutting in places a deep channel, filtered through the valley to the Chickahominy. Beyond this stream rose an open and undulating plateau, admirably adapted to the movement of all arms, and with a slight command of the opposite ridge. On the plateau, facing west and north, the Federals were formed up. A fringe of trees and bushes along the crest gave cover and concealment to the troops. 60 feet below, winding darkly through the trees, the creek covered the whole front; and in the centre of the position, east of New Cold Harbour, the valley was completely filled with tangled wood.
Towards Old Cold Harbour the timber on the Confederate side of the ravine was denser than elsewhere. On the Federal left flank the valley of the Chickahominy was open ground, but it was swept by heavy guns from the right bank of the river, and at this point the creek became an almost impa.s.sable swamp.
Porter, who had been reinforced by 9000 men under General Sloc.u.m, now commanded three divisions of infantry, four regiments of cavalry, and twenty-two batteries, a total of 36,000 officers and men. The morale of the troops had been strengthened by their easy victory of the previous day. Their commander had gained their confidence; their position had been partially intrenched, and they could be readily supported by way of Alexander"s and Grapevine Bridges from the south bank of the Chickahominy.
The task before the Confederates, even with their superior numbers, was formidable in the extreme. The wooded ridge which encircled the position afforded scant room for artillery, and it was thus impracticable to prepare the attack by a preliminary bombardment. The ground over which the infantry must advance was completely swept by fire, and the centre and left were defended by three tiers of riflemen, the first sheltered by the steep banks of the creek, the second halfway up the bluff, covered by a breastwork, the third on the crest, occupying a line of shelter-trenches; and the riflemen were supported by a dozen batteries of rifled guns.* (* The remainder of the guns were in reserve.)
But Lee had few misgivings. In one respect the Federal position seemed radically defective. The line of retreat on White House was exposed to attack from Old Cold Harbour. In fact, with Old Cold Harbour in possession of the Confederates, retreat could only be effected by one road north of the Chickahominy, that by Parker"s Mill and Dispatch Station; and if this road were threatened, Porter, in order to cover it, would be compelled to bring over troops from his left and centre, or to prolong his line until it was weak everywhere.
There was no great reason to fear that McClellan would send Porter heavy reinforcements. To do so he would have to draw troops from his intrenchments on the south bank of the Chickahominy, and Magruder had been instructed to maintain a brisk demonstration against this portion of the line. It was probable that the Federal commander, with his exaggerated estimate of the numbers opposed to him, would be induced by this means to antic.i.p.ate a general attack against his whole front, and would postpone moving his reserves until it was too late.
While Hill was skirmishing with the Federals, Lee was anxiously awaiting intelligence of Jackson"s arrival at Old Cold Harbour.
2.30 P.M.
Longstreet was already forming up for battle, and at 2.30 Hill"s regiments were slipped to the attack. A fierce and sanguinary conflict now ensued. Emerging in well-ordered lines from the cover of the woods, the Confederates swept down the open slopes. Floundering in the swamps, and struggling through the abattis which had been placed on the banks of the stream, they drove in the advanced line of hostile riflemen, and strove gallantly to ascend the slope which lay beyond. "But brigade after brigade," says General Porter, "seemed almost to melt away before the concentrated fire of our artillery and infantry; yet others pressed on, followed by supports daring and brave as their predecessors, despite their heavy losses and the disheartening effect of having to clamber over many of their disabled and dead, and to meet their surviving comrades rushing back in great disorder from the deadly contest."* (* Battles and Leaders of the Civil War volume 2 page 337.) For over an hour Hill fought on without support. There were no signs of Jackson, and Longstreet, whom it was not intended to employ until Jackson"s appearance should have caused the Federals to denude their left, was then sent in to save the day.
As on the previous day, the Confederate attack had failed in combination. Jackson"s march had been again delayed. The direct road from Walnut Grove Church to Old Cold Harbour, leading through the forest, was found to be obstructed by felled timber and defended by sharpshooters, and to save time Jackson"s division struck off into the road by Bethesda Church. This threw it in rear of D.H. Hill, and it was near 2 P.M. when the latter"s advanced guard reached the tavern at the Old Cold Harbour cross roads. No harm, however, had been done. A.P. Hill did not attack till half an hour later. But when he advanced there came no response from the left. A battery of D.H.
Hill"s division was brought into action, but was soon silenced, and beyond this insignificant demonstration the Army of the Valley made no endeavour to join the battle. The brigades were halted by the roadside. Away to the right, above the intervening forest, rolled the roar of battle, the crash of sh.e.l.ls and the din of musketry, but no orders were given for the advance.
Nor had Jackson"s arrival produced the slightest consternation in the Federal ranks. Although from his position at Cold Harbour he seriously threatened their line of retreat to the White House, they had neither denuded their left nor brought up their reserves. Where he was now established he was actually nearer White House than any portion of Porter"s army corps, and yet that general apparently accepted the situation with equanimity.
Lee had antic.i.p.ated that Jackson"s approach would cause the enemy to prolong their front in order to cover their line of retreat to the White House, and so weaken that part of the position which was to be attacked by Longstreet; and Jackson had been ordered* to draw up his troops so as to meet such a contingency. (* This order was verbal; no record of it is to be found, and Jackson never mentioned, either at the time or afterwards, what its purport was. His surviving staff officers, however, are unanimous in declaring that he must have received direct instructions from General Lee. "Is it possible,"
writes Dr. McGuire, "that Jackson, who knew nothing of the country, and little of the exact situation of affairs, would have taken the responsibility of stopping at Old Cold Harbour for an hour or more, unless he had had the authority of General Lee to do so? I saw him that morning talking to General Lee. General Lee was sitting on a log, and Jackson standing up. General Lee was evidently giving him instructions for the day." In his report (O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 492) Lee says: "The arrival of Jackson on our left was momentarily expected; it was supposed that his approach would cause the enemy"s extension in that direction.") "Hoping," he says in his report, "that Generals A.P. Hill and Longstreet would soon drive the Federals towards me, I directed General D.H. Hill to move his division to the left of the wood, so as to leave between him and the wood on the right an open s.p.a.ce, across which I hoped that the enemy would be driven." But Lee was deceived. The Federal line of retreat ran not to the White House, but over Grapevine Bridge. McClellan had for some time foreseen that he might be compelled to abandon the York River Railway, and directly he suspected that Jackson was marching to Richmond had begun to transfer his line of operations from the York to the James, and his base of supply from the White House to Harrison"s Landing.
So vast is the amount of stores necessary for the subsistence, health, and armament of a host like McClellan"s that a change of base is an operation which can only be effected under the most favourable circ.u.mstances.* (* The Army of the Potomac numbered 105,000 men, and 25,000 animals. 600 tons of ammunition, food, forage, medical and other supplies had to be forwarded each day from White House to the front; and at one time during the operations from fifty to sixty days" rations for the entire army, amounting probably to 25,000 tons, were acc.u.mulated at the depot. 5 tons daily per 1000 men is a fair estimate for an army operating in a barren country.) It is evident, then, that the possibility of the enemy shifting his line of operations to the James, abandoning the York River Railroad, might easily have escaped the penetration of either Lee or Jackson. They were not behind the scenes of the Federal administrative system. They were not aware of the money, labour, and ingenuity which had been lavished on the business of supply. They had not seen with their own eyes the fleet of four hundred transports which covered the reaches of the York. They had not yet realised the enormous advantage which an army derives from the command of the sea.
Nor were they enlightened by the calmness with which their immediate adversaries on the field of battle regarded Jackson"s possession of Old Cold Harbour. Still, one fact was manifest: the Federals showed no disposition whatever to weaken or change their position, and it was clear that the success was not to be attained by mere manoeuvre.
Lee, seeing Hill"s division roughly handled, ordered Longstreet forward, while Jackson, judging from the sound and direction of the firing that the original plan had failed, struck in with vigour.
Opposed to him was Sykes" division of regulars, supported by eighteen guns, afterwards increased to twenty-four; and in the men of the United States Army the Valley soldiers met a stubborn foe. The position, moreover, occupied by Sykes possessed every advantage which a defender could desire. Manned even by troops of inferior mettle it might well have proved impregnable. The valley was wider than further west, and a thousand yards intervened between the opposing ridges.
From either crest the cornfields sloped gently to the marshy sources of the creek, hidden by tall timber and dense undergrowth. The right and rear of the position were protected by a second stream, running south to the Chickahominy, and winding through a swamp which Stuart, posted on Jackson"s left, p.r.o.nounced impa.s.sable for hors.e.m.e.n. Between the head waters of these two streams rose the spur on which stands McGehee"s house, facing the road from Old Cold Harbour, and completely commanding the country to the north and north-east. The flank, therefore, was well secured; the front was strong, with a wide field of fire; the Confederate artillery, even if it could make its way through the thick woods on the opposite crest, would have to unlimber under fire at effective range, and the marsh below, with its tangled undergrowth and abattis, could hardly fail to throw the attacking infantry into disorder. Along the whole of Sykes" line only two weak points were apparent. On his left, as already described, a broad tract of woodland, covering nearly the whole valley, and climbing far up the slope on the Federal side, afforded a covered approach from one crest to the other; on his right, a plantation of young pines skirted the crest of McGehee"s Hill, and ran for some distance down the slope. Under shelter of the timber it was possible that the Confederate infantry might ma.s.s for the a.s.sault; but once in the open, unaided by artillery, their further progress would be difficult. Under ordinary circ.u.mstances a thorough reconnaissance, followed by a carefully planned attack, would have been the natural course of the a.s.sailant. The very strength of the position was in favour of the Confederates. The creek which covered the whole front rendered a counterstroke impracticable, and facilitated a flank attack. Holding the right bank of the creek with a portion of his force, Jackson might have thrown the remainder against McGehee"s Hill, and, working round the flank, have repeated the tactics of Kernstown, Winchester, and Port Republic.
But the situation permitted no delay. A.P. Hill was hard pressed. The sun was already sinking. McClellan"s reserves might be coming up, and if the battle was to be won, it must be won by direct attack. There was no time for further reconnaissance, no time for manoeuvre.
Jackson"s dispositions were soon made. D.H. Hill, eastward of the Old Cold Harbour road, was to advance against McGehee"s Hill, overlapping, if possible, the enemy"s line. Ewell was to strike in on Hill"s right, moving through the tract of woodland; Lawton, Whiting, and Winder, in the order named, were to fill the gap between Ewell"s right and the left of A.P. Hill"s division, and the artillery was ordered into position opposite McGehee"s Hill.
4 P.M.
D.H. Hill, already in advance, was the first to move. Pressing forward from the woods, under a heavy fire of artillery, his five brigades, the greater part in first line, descended to the creek, already occupied by his skirmishers. In pa.s.sing through the marshy thickets, where the Federal sh.e.l.ls were bursting on every hand, the confusion became great. The brigades crossed each other"s march.
Regiments lost their brigades, and companies their regiments. At one point the line was so densely crowded that whole regiments were forced to the rear; at others there were wide intervals, and effective supervision became impossible. Along the edge of the timber the fire was fierce, for the Union regulars were distant no more than four hundred yards; the smoke rolled heavily through the thickets, and on the right and centre, where the fight was hottest, the impetuosity of both officers and men carried them forward up the slope. An attempt to deliver a charge with the whole line failed in combination, and such portion of the division as advanced, scourged by both musketry and artillery, fell back before the fire of the unshaken Federals.
In the wood to the right Ewell met with even fiercer opposition. So hastily had the Confederate line been formed, and so difficult was it for the brigades to maintain touch and direction in the thick covert, that gaps soon opened along the front; and of these gaps, directly the Southerners gained the edge of the timber, the Northern brigadiers took quick advantage. Not content with merely holding their ground, the regular regiments, changing front so as to strike the flanks of the attack, came forward with the bayonet, and a vigorous counterstroke, delivered by five battalions, drove Ewell across the swamp. Part of Trimble"s brigade still held on in the wood, fighting fiercely; but the Louisiana regiments were demoralised, and there were no supports on which they might have rallied.
Jackson, when he ordered Hill to the front, had sent verbal instructions-always dangerous-for the remainder of his troops to move forward inline of battle.*
(* The instructions, according to Dr. Dabney, ran as follows:--
"The troops are standing at ease along our line of march. Ride back rapidly along the line and tell the commanders to advance instantly EN ECHELON from the left. Each brigade is to follow as a guide the right regiment of the brigade on the left, and to keep within supporting distance. Tell the commanders that if this formation fails at any point, to form line of battle and move to the front, pressing to the sound of the heaviest firing and attack the enemy vigorously wherever found. As to artillery, each commander must use his discretion. If the ground will at all permit tell them to take in their field batteries and use them. If not, post them in the rear."
Letter to the author.)
The young staff officer to whom these instructions were entrusted, misunderstanding the intentions of his chief, communicated the message to the brigadiers with the addition that "they were to await further orders before engaging the enemy." Partly for this reason, and partly because the rear regiments of his division had lost touch with the leading brigades, Ewell was left without a.s.sistance. For some time the error was undiscovered. Jackson grew anxious. From his station near Old Cold Harbour little could be seen of the Confederate troops. On the ridge beyond the valley the dark lines of the enemy"s infantry were visible amongst the trees, with their well-served batteries on the crests above. But in the valley immediately beneath, and as well as in the forest to the right front, the dense smoke and the denser timber hid the progress of the fight. Yet the sustained fire was a sure token that the enemy still held his own; and for the first time and the last his staff beheld their leader riding restlessly to and fro, and heard his orders given in a tone which betrayed the storm within.* (* It may be noted that Jackson"s command had now been increased by two divisions, Whiting"s and D.H. Hill"s, but there had been no increase in the very small staff which had sufficed for the Valley army. The mistakes which occurred at Gaines"
Mill, and Jackson"s ignorance of the movements and progress of his troops, were in great part due to his lack of staff officers. A most important message, writes Dr. Dabney, involving tactical knowledge, was carried by a non-combatant.) "Unconscious," says Dabney, "that his veteran brigades were but now reaching the ridge of battle, he supposed that all his strength had been put forth, and (what had never happened before) the enemy was not crushed."* (*Dabney, volume 2, page 194.) Fortunately, the error of the aide-de-camp had already been corrected by the vigilance of the chief of the staff, and the remainder of the Valley army was coming up.
Their entry into battle was not in accordance with the intentions of their chief. Whiting should have come in on Ewell"s right, Lawton on the right of Whiting, and Jackson"s division on the right of Lawton.
Whiting led the way; but he had advanced only a short distance through the woods when he was met by Lee, who directed him to support General A.P. Hill.* (* Whiting"s Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 563.) The brigades of Law and of Hood were therefore diverted to the right, and, deploying on either side of the Gaines" Mill road, were ordered to a.s.sault the commanding bluff which marked the angle of the Federal position. Lawton"s Georgians, 3,500 strong, moved to the support of Ewell; Cunningham and Fulkerson, of Winder"s division, losing direction in the thickets, eventually sustained the attack of Longstreet, and the Stonewall Brigade reinforced the shattered ranks of D.H. Hill. Yet the attack was strong, and in front of Old Cold Harbour six batteries had forced their way through the forest.
As this long line of guns covered McGehee"s Hill with a storm of sh.e.l.ls, and the louder crash of musketry told him that his lagging brigades were coming into line, Jackson sent his last orders to his divisional commanders: "Tell them," he said, "this affair must hang in suspense no longer; let them sweep the field with the bayonet."
But there was no need for further urging. Before the messengers arrived the Confederate infantry, in every quarter of the battlefield, swept forward from the woods, and a vast wave of men converged upon the plateau. Lee, almost at the same moment as Jackson, had given the word for a general advance. As the supports came thronging up the shout was carried down the line, "The Valley men are here!" and with the cry of "Stonewall Jackson!" for their slogan, the Southern army dashed across the deep ravine. Whiting, with the eight regiments of Hood and Law, none of which had been yet engaged, charged impetuously against the centre. The brigades of A.P.
Hill, spent with fighting but clinging stubbornly to their ground, found strength for a final effort. Longstreet threw in his last reserve against the triple line which had already decimated his division. Lawton"s Georgians bore back the regulars. D.H. Hill, despite the fire of the batteries on McGehee"s Hill, which, disregarding the sh.e.l.ls of Jackson"s ma.s.sed artillery, turned with canister on the advancing infantry, made good his footing on the ridge; and as the sun, low on the horizon, loomed blood-red through the murky atmosphere, the Confederate colours waved along the line of abandoned breastworks.
As the Federals retreated, knots of brave men, hastily collected by officers of all ranks, still offered a fierce resistance, and, supported by the batteries, inflicted terrible losses on the crowded ma.s.ses which swarmed up from the ravine; but the majority of the infantry, without ammunition and with few officers, streamed in disorder to the rear. For a time the Federal gunners stood manfully to their work. Porter"s reserve artillery, drawn up midway across the upland, offered a rallying point to the retreating infantry. Three small squadrons of the 5th United States Cavalry made a gallant but useless charge, in which out of seven officers six fell; and on the extreme right the division of regulars, supported by a brigade of volunteers, fell back fighting to a second line. As at Bull Run, the disciplined soldiers alone showed a solid front amid the throng of fugitives. Not a foot of ground had they yielded till their left was exposed by the rout of the remainder. Of the four batteries which supported them only two guns were lost, and on their second position they made a determined effort to restore the fight. But their stubborn valour availed nothing against the superior numbers which Lee"s fine strategy had concentrated on the field of battle.
Where the first breach was made in the Federal line is a matter of dispute. Longstreet"s men made a magnificent charge on the right, and D.H. Hill claimed to have turned the flank of the regulars; but it is abundantly evident that the advent of Jackson"s fresh troops, and the vigour of their a.s.sault, broke down the resistance of the Federals.*
(* Porter himself thought that the first break in his line was made by Hood, "at a point where he least expected it." Battles and Leaders volume 2 pages 335 and 340.) When the final attack developed, and along the whole front ma.s.ses of determined men, in overwhelming numbers, dashed against the breastworks, Porter"s troops were well-nigh exhausted, and not a single regiment remained in reserve.
Against the very centre of his line the attack was pushed home by Whiting"s men with extraordinary resolution. His two brigades, marching abreast, were formed in two lines, each about 2000 strong.
Riding along the front, before they left the wood, the general had enjoined his men to charge without a halt, in double time, and without firing. "Had these orders," says General Law, "not been strictly obeyed the a.s.sault would have been a failure. No troops could have stood long under the withering storm of lead and iron that beat in their faces as they became fully exposed to view from the Federal line."* (* Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 363.) The a.s.sault was met with a courage that was equally admirable.* (* "The Confederates were within ten paces when the Federals broke cover, and leaving their log breastworks, swarmed up the hill in rear, carrying the second line with them in their rout."--General Law, Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 363.) But the Confederate second line reinforced the first at exactly the right moment, driving it irresistibly forward; and the Federal regiments, which had been hard pressed through a long summer afternoon, and had become scattered in the thickets, were ill-matched with the solid and ordered ranks of brigades which had not yet fired a shot. It was apparently at this point that the Southerners first set foot on the plateau, and sweeping over the intrenchments, outflanked the brigades which still held out to right and left, and compelled them to fall back. Inspired by his soldierly enthusiasm for a gallant deed, Jackson himself has left us a vivid description of the successful charge. "On my extreme right," he says in his report, "General Whiting advanced his division through the dense forest and swamp, emerging from the wood into the field near the public road and at the head of the deep ravine which covered the enemy"s left. Advancing thence through a number of retreating and disordered regiments he came within range of the enemy"s fire, who, concealed in an open wood and protected by breastworks, poured a destructive fire for a quarter of a mile into his advancing line, under which many brave officers and men fell.