September 15.
All night long the Confederates slept upon their arms, waiting for the dawn. When day broke, a soft silver mist, rising from the broad Potomac, threw its protecting folds over Harper"s Ferry. But the Southern gunners knew the direction of their targets; the clouds were rent by the pa.s.sage of screaming sh.e.l.ls, and as the sun, rising over the Loudoun Heights, dispersed the vapour, the whole of Jackson"s artillery became engaged. The Federal batteries, worked with stubborn courage, and showing a bold front to every fresh opponent, maintained the contest for an hour; but, even if ammunition had not failed them, they could not have long withstood the terrible fire which took them in front, in flank, and in reverse.* (* The ten guns which had been carried across the Shenandoah were specially effective. Report of Colonel Crutchfield, Jackson"s chief of artillery. O.R. volume 19 part 1 page 962.) Then, perceiving that the enemy"s guns were silenced, Hill ordered his batteries to cease fire, and threw forward his brigades against the ridge. Staunch to the last, the Federal artillerymen ran their pieces forward, and opened on the Confederate infantry. Once more the long line of Jackson"s guns crashed out in answer, and two batteries, galloping up to within four hundred yards of the ridge, poured in a destructive fire over the heads of their own troops. Hill"s brigades, when the artillery duel recommenced, had halted at the foot of the slope. Beyond, over the bare fields, the way was obstructed by felled timber, the lopped branches of which were closely interlaced, and above the abattis rose the line of breastworks. But before the charge was sounded the Confederate gunners completed the work they had so well begun. At 7.30 A.M. the white flag was hoisted, and with the loss of no more than 100 men Jackson had captured Harper"s Ferry with his artillery alone.
The general was near the church in the wood on the Charlestown road, and Colonel Douglas was sent forward to ascertain the enemy"s purpose. "Near the top of the hill," he writes, "I met General White (commanding the Federals), and told him my mission. Just then General Hill came up from the direction of his line, and on his request I conducted them to General Jackson, whom I found sitting on his horse where I had left him. He was not, as the Comte de Paris says, leaning against a tree asleep, but exceedingly wide-awake...The surrender was unconditional, and then General Jackson turned the matter over to General A.P. Hill, who allowed General White the same liberal terms that Grant afterwards gave Lee at Appomattox. The fruits of the surrender were 12,520 prisoners, 13,000 small arms, 73 pieces of artillery, and several hundred waggons.
"General Jackson, after a brief dispatch to General Lee announcing the capitulation, rode up to Bolivar and down into Harper"s Ferry.
The curiosity in the Union army to see him was so great that the soldiers lined the sides of the road. Many of them uncovered as he pa.s.sed, and he invariably returned the salute. One man had an echo of response all about him when he said aloud: "Boys, he"s not much for looks, but if we"d had him we wouldn"t have been caught in this trap.""* (* Battles and Leaders volume 2 pages 625 to 627.)
The completeness of the victory was marred by the escape of the Federal cavalry. Under cover of the night 1200 hors.e.m.e.n, crossing the pontoon bridge, and pa.s.sing swiftly up the towpath under the Maryland Heights, had ridden boldly beneath the muzzles of McLaws" batteries, and, moving north-west, had struck out for Pennsylvania. Yet the capture of Harper"s Ferry was a notable exploit, although Jackson seems to have looked upon it as a mere matter of course.
"Through G.o.d"s blessing," he reported to Lee at eight o"clock, "Harper"s Ferry and its garrison are to be surrendered. As Hill"s troops have borne the heaviest part of the engagement, he will be left in command until the prisoners and public property shall be disposed of, unless you direct otherwise. The other forces can move off this evening so soon as they get their rations. To what point shall they move? I write at this time in order that you may be apprised of the condition of things. You may expect to hear from me again to-day, after I get more information respecting the number of prisoners, etc."* (* O.R. volume 19 part 1 page 951. General Longstreet (From Mana.s.sas to Appomattox page 233) suggests that Jackson, after the capitulation of Harper"s Ferry, should have moved east of South Mountain against McClellan"s rear. Jackson, however, was acquainted neither with McClellan"s position nor with Lee"s intentions, and nothing could have justified such a movement except the direct order of the Commander-in-Chief.)
Lee, with D.H. Hill, Longstreet, and Stuart, was already falling back from the South Mountain to Sharpsburg, a little village on the right bank of the Antietam Creek; and late in the afternoon Jackson, Walker, and McLaws were ordered to rejoin without delay.* (* The Invasion of Maryland, General Longstreet, Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 666.) September 14 had been an anxious day for the Confederate Commander-in-Chief. During the morning D.H. Hill, with no more than 5000 men in his command, had seen the greater part of McClellan"s army deploy for action in the wide valley below and to the eastward of Turner"s Gap. Stuart held the woods below Crampton"s Gap, six miles south, with Robertson"s brigade, now commanded by the gallant Munford; and on the heights above McLaws had posted three brigades, for against this important pa.s.s, the shortest route by which the Federals could interpose between Lee and Jackson, McClellan"s left wing, consisting of 20,000 men under General Franklin, was steadily advancing.
The positions at both Turner"s and Crampton"s Gaps were very strong.
The pa.s.ses, at their highest points, are at least 600 feet above the valley, and the slopes steep, rugged, and thickly wooded. The enemy"s artillery had little chance. Stone walls, running parallel to the crest, gave much protection to the Southern infantry, and loose boulders and rocky scarps increased the difficulties of the ascent.
But the numbers available for defence were very small; and had McClellan marched during the night he would probably have been master of the pa.s.ses before midday. As it was, Crampton"s Gap was not attacked by Franklin until noon; and although at the same hour the advanced guard of the Federal right wing had gained much ground, it was not till four in the evening that a general attack was made on Turner"s Gap. By this time Longstreet, after a march of thirteen miles, had reached the battle-field;* and despite the determination with which the attack was pressed, Turner"s Gap was still held when darkness fell. (* The order for the march had been given the night before (The Invasion of Maryland, General Longstreet, Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 666), and there seems to have been no good reason, even admitting the heat and dust, that Longstreet"s command should not have joined him at noon. The troops marched "at daylight"
(5 A.M.), and took ten hours to march thirteen miles. As it was, only four of the brigades took part in the action, and did so, owing to their late arrival, in very disjointed fashion. Not all the Confederate generals appear to have possessed the same "driving power" as Jackson.)
The defence of Crampton"s Gap had been less successful. Franklin had forced the pa.s.s before five o"clock, and driving McLaws" three brigades before him, had firmly established himself astride the summit. The Confederate losses were larger than those which they had inflicted. McClellan reports 1791 casualties on the right, Franklin 533 on the left. McLaws" and Munford"s loss was over 800, of whom 400 were captured. The number of killed and wounded in Hill"s and Longstreet"s commands is unknown; it probably reached a total of 1500, and 1100 of their men were marched to Frederick as prisoners.
Thus the day"s fighting had cost the South 3400 men. Moreover, Longstreet"s ammunition column, together with an escort of 600 men, had been cut up by the cavalry which had escaped from Harper"s Ferry, and which had struck the Hagerstown road as it marched northward into Pennsylvania. Yet, on the whole, Lee had no reason to be chagrined with the result of his operations. McClellan had acted with unexpected vigour. But neither in strategy nor in tactics had he displayed improvement on his Peninsular methods. He should have thrown the bulk of his army against Crampton"s Gap, thus intervening between Lee and Jackson; but instead of doing so he had directed 70,000 men against Turner"s Gap. Nor had the attack on Hill and Longstreet been characterised by resolution. The advanced guard was left unsupported until 2 P.M., and not more than 30,000 men were employed throughout the day. Against this number 8000 Confederates had held the pa.s.s. Cobb, one of McLaws" brigadiers, who commanded the defence at Crampton"s Gap, though driven down the mountain, had offered a stout resistance to superior forces; and twenty-four hours had been gained for Jackson. On the other hand, in face of superior numbers, the position at Turner"s Gap had become untenable; and during the night Hill and Longstreet marched to Sharpsburg.
September 15.
This enforced retreat was not without effect on the morale of either army. McClellan was as exultant as he was credulous. "I have just learned," he reported to Halleck at 8 A.M. on the 15th, "from General Hooker, in advance, that the enemy is making for Shepherdstown in a perfect panic; and that General Lee last night stated publicly that he must admit they had been shockingly whipped. I am hurrying forward to endeavour to press their retreat to the utmost." Then, two hours later: "Information this moment received completely confirms the rout and demoralisation of the rebel army. It is stated that Lee gives his losses as 15,000. We are following as rapidly as the men can move."*
(* O.R. volume 19 pages 294, 295.) Nor can it be doubted that McClellan"s whole army, unaccustomed to see their antagonists give ground before them, shared the general"s mood.* (* "The morale of our men is now restored." McClellan to Halleck after South Mountain. O.R.
volume 19 part 2 page 294.) Amongst the Confederates, on the other hand, there was some depression. It could not be disguised that a portion of the troops had shown symptoms of demoralisation. The retreat to the Antietam, although effectively screened by Fitzhugh Lee"s brigade of cavalry, was not effected in the best of order. Many of the regiments had been broken by the hard fighting on the mountain; men had become lost in the forest, or had sought safety to the rear; and the number of stragglers was very large. It was not, then, with its usual confidence that the army moved into position on the ridge above the Antietam Creek. General Longstreet, indeed, was of opinion that the army should have recrossed the Potomac at once.
"The moral effect of our move into Maryland had been lost by our discomfiture at South Mountain, and it was evident we could not hope to concentrate in time to do more than make a respectable retreat, whereas by retiring before the battle [of Sharpsburg] we could have claimed a very successful campaign."* (* Battles and Leaders volume 2 pages 666, 667.) So spake the voice of prudence. Lee, however, so soon as he was informed of the fall of Harper"s Ferry, had ordered Jackson to join him, resolving to hold his ground, and to bring McClellan to a decisive battle on the north bank of the Potomac.
Although 45,000 men--for Lee at most could count on no more than this number, so great had been the straggling--were about to receive the attack of over 90,000, Jackson, when he reached Sharpsburg on the morning of the 16th, heartily approved the Commander-in-Chief"s decision, and it is worth while to consider the reasons which led them to disagree with Longstreet.
1. Under ordinary conditions, to expect an army of 45,000 to wrest decisive victory from one of 90,000 well-armed enemies would be to demand an impossibility. The defence, when two armies are equally matched, is physically stronger than the attack, although we have Napoleon"s word for it that the defence has the harder task. But that the inherent strength of the defence is so great as to enable the smaller force to annihilate its enemy is contrary to all the teaching of history. By making good use of favourable ground, or by constructing substantial works, the smaller force may indeed stave off defeat and gain time. But it can hope for nothing more. The records of warfare contain no instance, when two armies were of much the same quality, of the smaller army bringing the campaign to a decisive issue by defensive tactics. Wellington and Lee both fought many defensive battles with inferior forces. But neither of them, under such conditions, ever achieved the destruction of their enemy.
They fought such battles to gain time, and their hopes soared no higher. At Talavera, Busaco, Fuentes d"Onor, where the French were superior to the allies, Wellington repulsed the attack, but he did not prevent the defeated armies taking the field again in a few days.
At the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, the North Anna, and Cold Harbour, the great battles of 1864, Lee maintained his ground, but he did not prevent Grant moving round his flank in the direction of Richmond. At the Second Mana.s.sas, Jackson stood fast for the greater part of two days, but he would never have driven Pope across Bull Run without the aid of Longstreet. Porter at Gaines" Mill held 55,000 men with 35,000 for more than seven hours, but even if he had maintained his position, the Confederate army would not have become a mob of fugitives. No; except on peculiarly favourable ground, or when defending an intrenched camp, an army matched with one of equal efficiency and numerically superior, can never hope for decisive success. So circ.u.mstanced, a wise general will rather retreat than fight, and thus save his men for a more favourable opportunity.* (*
Before Salamanca, for instance, because Marmont, whose strength was equal to his own, was about to be reinforced by 4000 cavalry, Wellington had determined to retreat. It is true, however, that when weaker than Ma.s.sena, whom he had already worsted, by 8000 infantry and 3800 sabres, but somewhat stronger in artillery, he stood to receive attack at Fuentes d"Onor. Yet Napier declares that it was a very audacious resolution. The knowledge and experience of the great historian told him that to pit 32,000 Infantry against 40,000 was to trust too much to fortune.)
But Lee and Jackson had not to deal with ordinary conditions.
Whatever may have been the case in the Peninsula and in the Valley, there can be no question but that the armies in Maryland were by no means equal in quality. The Federals were far more accustomed to retreat than advance. For several months, whether they were engaged on the Shenandoah, on the Chickahominy, on the Rappahannock, or on Bull Run, they had been invariably outmanoeuvered. Their losses had been exceedingly severe, not only in battle, but from sickness and straggling. Many of their bravest officers and men had fallen. With the exception of the Second and Sixth Army Corps, commanded by Sumner and by Franklin, by far the greater part of the troops had been involved in Pope"s defeat, and they had not that trust in their leaders which promises a strong offensive. While at Washington the army had been reinforced by twenty-four regiments of infantry, but the majority of these troops had been but lately raised; they knew little of drill; they were commanded by officers as ignorant as themselves, and they had never fired a musket. Nor were the generals equal in capacity to those opposing them. "If a student of history,"
says a Northern officer, "familiar with the characters who figured in the War of Secession, but happening to be ignorant of the battle of Antietam, should be told the names of the men who held high commands there, he would say that with anything like equality of forces the Confederates must have won, for their leaders were men who made great names in the war, while the Federal leaders were, with few exceptions, men who never became conspicuous, or became conspicuous only through failure."* (* The Antietam and Fredericksburg. General Palfrey page 53.) And the difference in military capacity extended to the rank and file. When the two armies met on the Antietam, events had been such as to confer a marked superiority on the Southerners.
They were the children of victory, and every man in the army had partic.i.p.ated in the successes of Lee and Jackson. They had much experience of battle. They were supremely confident in their own prowess, for the fall of Harper"s Ferry had made more than amends for the retreat from South Mountain, and they were supremely confident in their leaders. No new regiments weakened the stability of their array. Every brigade and every regiment could be depended on. The artillery, which had been but lately reorganised in battalions, had, under the fostering care of General Pendleton, become peculiarly efficient, although the materiel was still indifferent; and against Stuart"s hors.e.m.e.n the Federal cavalry was practically useless.
In every military attribute, then, the Army of Northern Virginia was so superior to the Army of the Potomac that Lee and Jackson believed that they might fight a defensive battle, outnumbered as they were, with the hope of annihilating their enemy. They were not especially favoured by the ground, and time and means for intrenching were both wanting; but they were a.s.sured that not only were their veterans capable of holding the position, but, if favoured by fortune, of delivering a counterstroke which should shiver the Army of the Potomac into a thousand fragments.
2. By retreating across the Potomac, in accordance with General Longstreet"s suggestion, Lee would certainly have avoided all chances of disaster. But, at the same time, he would have abandoned a good hope of ending the war. The enemy would have been fully justified in a.s.suming that the retrograde movement had been made under the compulsion of his advance, and the balance of morale have been sensibly affected in favour of the Federals. If the Potomac had once been placed between the opposing forces, McClellan would have had it in his power to postpone an encounter until his army was strongly reinforced, his raw regiments trained, and his troops rested. The pa.s.sage of the river, it is true, had been successfully forced by the Confederates on September 5. But it by no means followed that it could be forced for the second time in face of a concentrated enemy, who would have had time to recover his morale and supply his losses.
McClellan, so long as the Confederates remained in Maryland, had evidently made up his mind to attack. But if Maryland was evacuated he would probably content himself with holding the line of the Potomac; and, in view of the relative strength of the two armies, it would be an extraordinary stroke of fortune which should lay him open to a.s.sault. Lee and Jackson were firmly convinced that it was the wiser policy to give the enemy no time to reorganise and recruit, but to coerce him to battle before he had recovered from the defeat which he had sustained on the heights above Bull Run. To recross the Potomac would be to slight the favours of fortune, to abandon the initiative, and to submit, in face of the vast numbers of fresh troops which the North was already raising, to a defensive warfare, a warfare which might protract the struggle, but which must end in the exhaustion of the Confederacy. McClellan"s own words are the strongest justification of the views held by the Southern leaders:--
"The Army of the Potomac was thoroughly exhausted and depleted by the desperate fighting and severe marching in the unhealthy regions of the Chickahominy and afterwards, during the second Bull Run campaign; its trains, administrative services and supplies were disorganised or lacking in consequence of the rapidity and manner of its removal from the Peninsula, as well as from the nature of its operations during the second Bull Run campaign.
"Had General Lee remained in front of Washington (south of the Potomac) it would have been the part of wisdom to hold our own army quiet until its pressing wants were fully supplied, its organisation was restored, and its ranks were filled with recruits--in brief, until it was prepared for a campaign. But as the enemy maintained the offensive, and crossed the Upper Potomac to threaten or invade Pennsylvania, it became necessary to meet him at any cost, notwithstanding the condition of the troops, to put a stop to the invasion, to save Baltimore and Washington, and throw him back across the Potomac. Nothing but sheer necessity justified the advance of the Army of the Potomac to South Mountain and Antietam in its then condition. The purpose of advancing from Washington was simply to meet the necessities of the moment by frustrating Lee"s invasion of the Northern States, and when that was accomplished, to push with the utmost rapidity the work of reorganisation and supply, so that a new campaign might be promptly inaugurated with the army in condition to prosecute it to a successful termination without intermission."* (*
Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 554.)
And in his official report, showing what the result of a Confederate success might well have been, he says: "One battle lost and almost all would have been lost. Lee"s army might have marched as it pleased on Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, or New York. It could have levied its supplies from a fertile and undevastated country, extorted tribute from wealthy and populous cities, and nowhere east of the Alleghanies was there another organised force to avert its march."*
(* O.R. volume 19 part 1 page 65.)
3. The situation in the West was such that even a victory in Maryland was exceedingly desirable. Confederate movements in Tennessee and Kentucky had won a measure of success which bade fair to open up a brilliant opportunity. Should the Federals be defeated in both the theatres of war, the blow would be felt throughout the length and breadth of the Northern States; and, in any case, it was of the utmost importance that all McClellan"s troops should be retained in the East.
So, when the tidings came of Jackson"s victory at Harper"s Ferry, both armies braced themselves for the coming battle, the Confederates in the hope that it would be decisive of the war, the Federals that it would save the capital. But the Confederates had still a most critical time before them, and Lee"s daring was never more amply ill.u.s.trated than when he made up his mind to fight on the Antietam.
McClellan"s great army was streaming through the pa.s.ses of the South Mountain. At Rohrersville, six miles east of the Confederate bivouacs, where he had halted as soon as the cannonade at Harper"s Ferry ceased, Franklin was still posted with 20,000 men. From their battle-field at Turner"s Gap, ten miles from Sharpsburg, came the 70,000 which composed the right and centre; and on the banks of the Antietam but 15,000 Southerners were in position. Jackson had to get rid of his prisoners, to march seventeen miles, and to ford the Potomac before he could reach the ground. Walker was twenty miles distant, beyond the Shenandoah; and McLaws, who would be compelled by Franklin"s presence near Rohrersville to cross at Harper"s Ferry and follow Jackson, over five-and-twenty. Would they be up before McClellan attacked? Lee, relying on McClellan"s caution and Jackson"s energy, answered the question in the affirmative.
The September day wore on. The country between the South Mountain and Sharpsburg, resembling in every characteristic the Valley of the Shenandoah, is open and gently undulating. No leagues of woodland, as in Eastern Virginia, block the view. The roads run through wide cornfields and rolling pastures, and scattered copses are the only relics of the forest. It was not yet noon when the Federal scouts appeared among the trees which crown the left bank of the Antietam Creek. "The number increased, and larger and larger grew the field of blue until it seemed to stretch as far as the eye could see. It was an awe-inspiring spectacle," adds Longstreet, "as this grand force settled down in sight of the Confederates, shattered by battles and scattered by long and tedious marches."* (* Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 667.) But when night fell upon the field the only interchange of hostilities had been a brief engagement of artillery.
McClellan"s advance, owing to the difficulty of pa.s.sing his great army through the mountains, and to the scarcity of roads, had been slow and tedious; in some of the divisions there had been unnecessary delay; and Lee had so disposed his force that the Federal commander, unenlightened as to the real strength of his adversary, believed that he was opposed by 50,000 men.
September 16.
Nor was the next morning marked by any increase of activity.
McClellan, although he should have been well aware that a great part of the Confederate army was still west of the Potomac, made no attack. "It was discovered," he reports, "that the enemy had changed the position of some of his batteries. The ma.s.ses of his troops, however, were still concealed behind the opposite heights. It was afternoon before I could move the troops to their positions for attack, being compelled to spend the morning in reconnoitring the new position taken up by the enemy, examining the ground, and finding fords, clearing the approaches, and hurrying up the ammunition and supply trains."* (* O.R. volume 19 part 1 page 55.)
Considering that McClellan had been in possession of the left bank of the Antietam since the forenoon of the previous day, all these preliminaries might well have been completed before daylight on the 16th. That a change in the dispositions of a few batteries, a change so unimportant as to pa.s.s unnoticed in the Confederate reports, should have imposed a delay, when every moment was precious, of many hours, proves that Lee"s and Jackson"s estimate of their opponent"s character was absolutely correct. While McClellan was reconnoitring, and the guns were thundering across the Antietam, Jackson and Walker crossed the Potomac, and reported to Lee in Sharpsburg.* (* According to Jackson"s staff officers he himself reported shortly after daylight.) Walker had expected to find the Commander-in-Chief anxious and careworn. "Anxious no doubt he was; but there was nothing in his look or manner to indicate it. On the contrary, he was calm, dignified, and even cheerful. If he had had a well-equipped army of a hundred thousand veterans at his back, he could not have appeared more composed and confident. On shaking hands with us, he simply expressed his satisfaction with the result of our operations at Harper"s Ferry, and with our timely arrival at Sharpsburg; adding that with our reinforcements he felt confident of being able to hold his ground until the arrival of the divisions of R.H. Anderson, McLaws, and A.P. Hill, which were still behind, and which did not arrive till next day."* (* Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 675.)
Yet the reinforcements which Jackson and Walker had brought up were no considerable addition to Lee"s strength. Jones" division consisted of no more than 1600 muskets, Lawton"s of less than 3500. Including officers and artillery, therefore, the effectives of these divisions numbered about 5500. A.P. Hill"s division appears to have mustered 5000 officers and men, and we may add 1000 for men sick or on detached duties. The total should undoubtedly have been larger. After the battle of Cedar Run, Jackson had 22,450 effectives in his ranks.
His losses in the operations against Pope, and the transfer of Robertson"s cavalry to Stuart, had brought his numbers down by 5787; but on September 16, including 70 killed or wounded at Harper"s Ferry, they should have been not less than 16,800. In reality they were only 11,500. We have not far to look for the cause of this reduction. Many of the men had absented themselves before the army crossed into Maryland; and if those who remained with the colours had seen little fighting since Pope"s defeat, they had had no reason to complain of inactivity. The operations which resulted in the capture of Harper"s Ferry had been arduous in the extreme. Men who had taken part in the forced marches of the Valley campaign declared that the march from Frederick to Harper"s Ferry surpa.s.sed all their former experiences. In three-and-a-half days they had covered over sixty miles, crossing two mountain ranges, and fording the Potomac. The weather had been intensely hot, and the dust was terrible. Nor had the investment of Harper"s Ferry been a period of repose. They had been under arms during the night which preceded the surrender, awaiting the signal to a.s.sault within a few hundred yards of the enemy"s sentries. As soon as the terms of capitulation were arranged they had been hurried back to the bivouac, had cooked two days"
rations, and shortly after midnight had marched to the Potomac, seventeen miles away. This night march, coming on the top of their previous exertions, had taxed the strength of many beyond endurance.
The majority were badly shod. Many were not shod at all. They were ill-fed, and men ill-fed are on the highroad to hospital. There were stragglers, then, from every company in the command. Even the Stonewall Brigade, though it had still preserved its five regiments, was reduced to 300 muskets; and the other brigades of Jackson"s division were but little stronger. Walker"s division, too, although less hardly used in the campaign than the Valley troops, had diminished under the strain of the night march, and mustered no more than 3500 officers and men at Sharpsburg. Thus the ma.s.ses of troops which McClellan conceived were hidden in rear of D.H. Hill and Longstreet amounted in reality to some 10,000 effective soldiers.
It was fortunate, indeed, that in their exhausted condition there was no immediate occasion for their services on September 16. The shadows grew longer, but yet the Federals made no move; even the fire of the artillery died away, and the men slept quietly in the woods to north and west of the little town. Meanwhile, in an old house, one of the few which had any pretensions to comfort in Sharpsburg, the generals met in council. Staff officers strolled to and fro over the broad brick pavement; the horses stood lazily under the trees which shaded the dusty road; and within, Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet pored long and earnestly over the map of Maryland during the bright September afternoon. But before the glow of a lovely sunset had faded from the sky the artillery once more opened on the ridge above, and reports came in that the Federals were crossing the Antietam near Pry"s Mill.
Lee at once ordered Longstreet to meet this threat with Hood"s division, and Jackson was ordered into line on the left of Hood. No serious collision, however, took place during the evening. The Confederates made no attempt to oppose the pa.s.sage of the Creek.
Hood"s pickets were driven in, but a speedy reinforcement restored the line, and except that the batteries on both sides took part the fighting was little more than an affair of outposts. At eleven o"clock Hood"s brigades were withdrawn to cook and eat. Jackson"s division filled their place; and the night, although broken by constant alarms, pa.s.sed away without further conflict. The Federal movements had clearly exposed their intention of attacking, and had even revealed the point which they would first a.s.sail. McClellan had thrown two army corps, the First under Hooker, and the Twelfth under Mansfield, across the Antietam; and they were now posted, facing southward, a mile and a half north of Sharpsburg, concealed by the wood beyond Jackson"s left.
NOTE.
The essential paragraphs of the lost order ran as follows:--
"The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson"s command will form the advance, and after pa.s.sing Middletown, with such portions as he may select, take the route towards Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday night (September 12) take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper"s Ferry.
"General Longstreet"s command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsboro", where it will halt with the reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army.
"General McLaws, with his own division and that of General Anderson, will follow General Longstreet; on reaching Middletown he will take the route to Harper"s Ferry, and by Friday morning (September 12) possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavour to capture the enemy at Harper"s Ferry and vicinity.
"General Walker with his division...will take possession of the Loudoun Heights, if practicable by Friday morning (September 12), ...He will as far as practicable co-operate with General McLaws and General Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy.
"General D.H. Hill"s division will form the rear-guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body.
"General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army and bring up all stragglers.
"The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body at Boonsboro" or Hagerstown."
The second paragraph was afterwards modified by General Lee so as to place Longstreet at Hagerstown.