CHAPTER 2.19. SHARPSBURG.
1862. September 17.
It is a curious coincidence that not only were the number, of the opposing armies at the battle of Sharpsburg almost identical with those of the French and Germans at the battle of Worth, but that there is no small resemblance between the natural features and surrounding scenery of the two fields. Full in front of the Confederate position rises the Red Hill, a spur of the South Mountain, wooded, like the Vosges, to the very crest, and towering high above the fields of Maryland, as the Hochwald towers above the Rhineland. The Antietam, however, is a more difficult obstacle than the Sauerbach, the brook which meanders through the open meadows of the Alsatian valley. A deep channel of more than sixty feet in width is overshadowed by forest trees; and the ground on either bank ascends at a sharp gradient to the crests above. Along the ridge to the west, which parts the Antietam from the Potomac, and about a mile distant from the former stream, runs the Hagerstown turnpike, and in front of this road there was a strong position. Sharpsburg, a village of a few hundred inhabitants, lies on the reverse slope of the ridge, extending in the direction of the Potomac, and only the church steeples were visible to the Federals. Above the hamlet was the Confederate centre. Here, near a limestone boulder, which stood in a plot which is now included in the soldiers" cemetery, was Lee"s station during the long hours of September 17, and from this point he overlooked the whole extent of his line of battle. A mile northward, on the Hagerstown pike, his loft centre was marked by a square white building, famous under the name of the Dunkard Church, and backed by a long dark wood. To the right, a mile southward, a bold spur, covered with scattered trees, forces the Antietam westward, and on this spur, overlooking the stream, he had placed his right.
(MAP OF SHARPSBURG, MARYLAND)
Between the Hagerstown pike and the Antietam the open slopes, although not always uniform, but broken, like those on the French side of the Sauerbach, by long ravines, afforded an admirable field of fire. The lanes which cross them are sunk in many places below the surface: in front of Sharpsburg the fields were divided by low stone walls; and these natural intrenchments added much to the strength of the position. Nor were they the only advantages. The belt of oaks beyond the Dunkard Church, the West Wood, was peculiarly adapted for defence. Parallel ledges of outcropping limestone, both within the thickets and along the Hagerstown road, rising as high as a man"s waist, gave good coyer from shot and sh.e.l.l; the trees were of old growth, and there was little underwood. To the north-east, however, and about five hundred yards distant across the fields, lay the East Wood, covering the slopes to the Antietam, with Poffenberger"s Wood beyond; while further to the left, the North Wood, extending across the Hagerstown pike, approached the Confederate flank. The enemy, if he advanced to the attack in this quarter of the field, would thus find ample protection during his march and deployment; and in case of reverse he would find a rallying-point in the North and Poffenberger"s Woods, of which Hooker was already in possession. In the s.p.a.ce between the woods were several small farms, surrounded by orchards and stone fences; and on the slope east of the Dunkard Church stood a few cottages and barns.
Access to the position was not easy. Only a single ford, near Snaveley"s house, exists across the Antietam, and this was commanded by the bluff on the Confederate right. The stone bridges, however, for want of time and means to destroy them, had been left standing.
That nearest the confluence of the Antietam and the Potomac, at the Antietam Iron-works, by which A. P Hill was expected, was defended by rifle-pits and enfiladed by artillery. The next, known as the Burnside Bridge, was completely overlooked by the heights above. That opposite Lee"s centre could be raked throughout its length; but the fourth, at Pry"s Mill, by which Hooker and Mansfield had already crossed, was covered both from view and fire. Roads within the position were numerous. The Hagerstown turnpike, concealed for some distance on either side of Sharpsburg by the crest of the ridge, was admirably adapted for the movement of reserves, and another broad highway ran through Sharpsburg to the Potomac.
The position, then, in many respects, was well adapted to Lee"s purpose. The flanks were reasonably secure. The right rested on the Antietam. The left was more open; but the West Wood formed a strong point d"appui, and beyond the wood a low ridge, rising above Nicodemus Run, gave room for several batteries; while the Potomac was so close that the s.p.a.ce available for attack on this flank was much restricted. The ground could thus be held by a comparatively small number of men, and a large reserve set free for the counterstroke.
The great drawback was that the ridge east of the Antietam, although commanded by the crest which the Confederates occupied, would permit McClellan to deploy the whole of his powerful artillery, and in no place did the range exceed two thousand yards. In case of retreat, moreover, the Potomac, two hundred yards from sh.o.r.e to sh.o.r.e, would have to be crossed by a few deep fords,* (* Two fords, behind the left and centre, were examined by Major Hotchkiss during the battle by Jackson"s order, and were reported practicable for infantry.) of which only one was practicable for waggons. These disadvantages, however, it was impossible to avoid; and if the counterstroke were decisive, they would not be felt.
The left of the position was a.s.signed to Jackson, with Hood in third line. Next in order came D.H. Hill. Longstreet held the centre and the right, with Walker in reserve behind the flank. Stuart, with Fitzhugh Lee"s brigade and his four guns, was between the West Wood and the Potomac. Munford"s two regiments of cavalry, reinforced by a battery, held the bridge at the Antietam Iron-works, and kept open the communication with Harper"s Ferry; and twenty-six rifled pieces of the reserve artillery were with D.H. Hill. From the Nicodemus Run to the bluff overhanging the Burnside Bridge is just three miles, and for the occupation of this front the following troops were at Lee"s disposal:--
Men Guns
Jackson: 5,500 16*
Jones" Division..
Ewell"s Division (General Lawton)
(* The majority of Jackson"s guns appear to have been left behind the team. Having broken down, at Harper"s Ferry.)
Longstreet: D.R. Jones" Division Hood"s Division (detached to Jackson) Evans" Brigade. 8,000 50
D.H. Hill"s Division. 5,000 26 Walker"s Division. 3,500 12
Stuart: Fitzhugh Lee"s Brigade.
Munford"s Brigade. 2,500 4
Reserve Artillery 1,000 26 ------ --- 25,500 134
On the far side of the Potomac the Shepherdstown Ford was protected by the remainder of the reserve artillery, with an infantry escort; but so small was the force whose retreat was thus secured that nearly every man was required in the fighting-line. Except the divisions of Hood and Walker, 5500 men all told, there was no immediate reserve.
But at daybreak on the 17th the troops which had been left at Harper"s Ferry were rapidly coming up. McLaws and Anderson, who had started before midnight, were already nearing the Potomac; Hampton"s cavalry brigade was not far behind, and orders had been dispatched to A.P. Hill. But could these 13,000 bayonets be up in time-before Hooker and Mansfield received strong support, or before the Burnside Bridge was heavily attacked? The question was indeed momentous. If the Federals were to put forth their whole strength without delay, bring their numerous artillery into action, and press the battle at every point, it seemed hardly possible that defeat could be averted.
McClellan, however, who had never yet ventured on a resolute offensive, was not likely, in Lee"s judgment, to a.s.sault so strong a position as that held by the Confederates with whole-hearted energy, and it was safe to calculate that his troops would be feebly handled.
Yet the odds were great. Even after the arrival of the absent divisions" no more than 35,000 infantry, 4000 cavalry, and 194 guns would be in line, and the enemy"s numbers were far superior.
(* Men Guns A.P. Hill"s Division 5,000 18 McLaws" Division 4,500 24 B.H. Anderson"s Division 3,500 18 Hampton"s Cavalry Brigade 1,500 -- ------ -- 14,500 60 )
McClellan had called in Franklin from Rohrersville, and his muster roll was imposing.
Men Guns
First Corps--Hooker 14,856 40 Second Corps--Sumner 18,813 42 Fifth Corps--Porter 12,930 70 Sixth Corps--Franklin 12,300 36 Ninth Corps--Burnside 13,819 35 Twelfth Corps--Mansfield 10,126 36 Cavalry--Pleasanton 4,320 16 ------ --- 87,164 275
In comparison with the ma.s.ses arrayed between the Red Hill and the Antietam, the Confederate army was but a handful.
5 A.M.
Notwithstanding McClellan"s caution, the opening of the battle was not long delayed. Before sunrise the desultory firing of the pickets had deepened to the roar of battle. Hooker, who had been ordered to begin the attack, forming his troops behind the North Wood, directed them on the Dunkard Church, which, standing on rising ground, appeared the key of the position. Jackson had already thrown back his two divisions at nearly a right angle to the Confederate front. His right, which connected with the left of D.H. Hill, and resting on the western edge of the East Wood extended as far as the Miller House, was held by Lawton, with two brigades in front and one in second line. West of the Hagerstown turnpike, and covering the ground as far as the Nicodemus Farm, was Jones" division; the Stonewall and Jones"
brigades in front, Taliaferro"s and Starke"s along the edge of the wood in rear. Three guns stood upon the turnpike; the remainder of the artillery (thirteen) guns was with Stuart on the high ground north of Nicodemus Run. Hood, in third line, stood near the Dunkard Church; and on Hood"s right were three of Longstreet"s batteries under Colonel Stephen Lee.
The ground which Jackson had been ordered to occupy was not unfavourable for defence, although the troops had practically no cover except the rail-fences and the rocky ledges. There was a wide and open field of fire, and when the Federal skirmishers appeared north of the Miller House the Confederate batteries, opening with vigour at a range of eight hundred yards, struck down sixteen men at the first salvo. This fire, and the stubborn resistance of the pickets, held the enemy for some time in check; but Hooker deployed six batteries in reply, and after a cannonade of nearly an hour his infantry advanced. From the cover of the woods, still veiled by the morning mist, the Federals came forward in strong force. Across the dry ploughed land in Lawton"s front the fight grew hot, and on the far side of the turnpike the meadows round the Nicodemus Farm became the scene of a desperate struggle. Hooker had sent in two divisions, Meade on the left and Doubleday on the right, while a third under Ricketts acted in close support of Meade.* (* Doubleday"s Division consisted of Phelps", Wainwright"s, Patrick"s, and Gibbon"s brigades; Rickett"s Division of Duryea"s, Lyle"s, and Hartsuff"s; and Meade"s Pennsylvania Division of Seymour"s, Magilton"s, and Anderson"s.) The attack was waged with the dash and energy which had earned for Hooker the sobriquet of Fighting Joe, and the troops he commanded had already proved their mettle on many murderous fields. Meade"s Pennsylvanians, together with the Indiana and Wisconsin regiments, which had wrought such havoc in Jackson"s ranks at Grovetown, were once more bearing down upon his line. Nor were the tactics of the leaders ill-calculated to second the valour of the troops. Hooker"s whole army corps of 12,500 men was manoeuvred in close combination.
The second line was so posted as to render quick support. No portion of the front was without an adequate reserve in rear. The artillery was used in ma.s.s, and the flanks were adequately guarded.
The conflict between soldiers so well matched was not less fierce than when they had met on other fields. Hooker"s troops had won a large measure of success at South Mountain three days previously, and their blood was up. Meade, Gibbon, and Ricketts were there to lead them, and the battle opened with a resolution which, if it had infected McClellan, would have carried the Sharpsburg ridge ere set of sun. Stubborn was the resistance of Jackson"s regiments, unerring the aim of his seasoned riflemen; but the opposing infantry, constantly reinforced, pressed irresistibly forward, and the heavy guns beyond the Antietam, finding an opening between the woods, swept the thin grey line from end to end. Jones" division, after fighting for three-quarters of an hour on the meadows, fell back to the West Wood; General Jones was carried wounded from the field, and the guns on the turnpike were abandoned.
6.30 A.M.
So tremendous was the fire, that the corn, said Hooker, over thirty acres was cut as close by the bullets as if it had been reaped with the sickle, and the dead lay piled in regular ranks along the whole Confederate front. Never, he added, had been seen a more b.l.o.o.d.y or dismal battle-field. To the east of the turnpike Lawton"s division, strengthened at the critical moment by the brigade in second line, held Meade in check, and with a sharp counterstroke drove the Pennsylvanians back upon their guns. But Gibbon, fighting fiercely in the centre by the Miller House, brought up a battery in close support of his first line, and pressed heavily on the West Wood until the Confederate skirmishers, creeping through the maize, shot down the gunners and the teams;* (* This battery of regulars, "B" 4th U.S.
Artillery, lost 40 officers and men killed and wounded, besides 33 horses. O.R. volume 19 part 1 page 229.) and Starke, who had succeeded Jones, led the Valley regiments once more into the open field. The battle swayed backwards and forwards under the clouds of smoke; the crash of musketry, reverberating in the woods, drowned the roar of the artillery; and though hundreds were shot down at the shortest range neither Federal nor Confederate flinched from the dreadful fray. Hooker sent in a fresh brigade, and Patrick, reinforcing Gibbon with four regiments, pa.s.sed swiftly to the front, captured two colours, and made some headway. But again the Virginians rallied, and Starke, observing that the enemy"s right had become exposed, led his regiments forward to the charge. Doubleday"s division, struck fiercely in front and flank, reeled back in confusion past the Miller House, and although the gallant Starke fell dead, the Confederates recovered the ground which they had lost.
Jackson"s men had not been left unaided. Colonel Lee"s guns had themselves to look to, for along the whole course of the Antietam McClellan"s batteries were now in action, sweeping the Sharpsburg ridge with a tremendous fire; but Stuart, west of the Nicodemus Farm, had done much to embarra.s.s Hooker"s operations. Bringing his artillery into action, for the ground was unsuited to cavalry, he had distracted the aim of the Federal gunners, and, a.s.sailing their infantry in flank, had compelled Doubleday to detach a portion of his force against him. Jackson, with supreme confidence in the ability of his men to hold their ground, had not hesitated to reinforce Stuart with Early"s brigade, the strongest in his command; but before Doubleday was beaten back, Early had been recalled.
7.30 A.M.
It was now half-past seven. The battle had been in progress nearly three hours, and Hooker"s attack had been repulsed. But fresh troops were coming into action from the north and north-east, and Lawton"s and Jones" divisions were in no condition to withstand a renewed a.s.sault. No less than three officers in succession had led the latter. Not one single brigade in either division was still commanded by the officer who brought it into action, and but few regiments. Of 4200 infantry,* (* Early"s brigade had not yet been engaged.) 1700 had already fallen. Never had Jackson"s soldiers displayed a spirit more akin to that of their intrepid leader, and their fierce courage was not to be wasted. Reinforcements were close at hand. Early"s brigade, 1100 strong,* (* One small regiment was left with Stuart.) was moving across from Nicodemus Run into the West Wood. Hood brought his Texans, 1800 muskets, to the relief of Lawton; and on Hood"s right, but facing eastward, for Ricketts was working round Jackson"s right, three of D.H. Hill"s brigades, hitherto hidden under cover, came rapidly into line. Lawton"s division, nearly half the command being killed or wounded, was withdrawn to the Dunkard Church; but on the skirt of the West Wood the heroic remnant of the Valley regiments still held fast among the limestone ledges.
The 8,500 infantry which McClellan had sent to Hooker"s a.s.sistance formed the Twelfth Army Corps, commanded by Mansfield; and with those men, too, Jackson"s soldiers were well acquainted.* (* Mansfield"s corps consisted of two divisions, commanded by Crawford (two brigades) and Greene (three brigades). The brigadiers were Knipe, Gordon, Tynedale, Stainbrook, Goodrich.) They were the men who had followed Banks and Shields from Kernstown to Winchester, from Port Republic to Cedar Run; and the Valley army had not yet encountered more determined foes. Their attack was delivered with their wonted vigour. Several regiments, moving west of the turnpike, bore down on the West Wood. But coming into action at considerable intervals, they were roughly handled by Jones" division, now commanded by Colonel Grigsby, and protected by the rocks; and Stuart"s artillery taking them in flank they were rapidly dispersed. East of the highroad the battle raged with still greater violence. Hood and his Texans, as Lawton"s brigades pa.s.sed to the rear, dashed across the corn-field against Meade and Ricketts, driving back the infantry on the batteries, and shooting down the gunners. But the Federal line remained unbroken, and Mansfield"s troops were already moving forward. Crawford"s brigade, and then Gordon"s, struck the Texans in front, while Greene, working round the East Wood, made a resolute onslaught on D.H. Hill. The struggle was long and b.l.o.o.d.y. The men stood like duelists, firing and receiving the fire at fifty or a hundred paces. Crawford lost 1000 men without gaining a foot of ground; but Gordon turned the scale, and Hood"s brigades were gradually forced back through the corn-field to the Dunkard Church. A great gap had now opened in Jackson"s line. Jones" division, its flank uncovered by Hood"s retreat, found itself compelled to seek a new position. D.H. Hill"s brigades, in the same plight, gave ground towards Sharpsburg; and Greene, following in pursuit, actually crossed the turnpike, and penetrated the West Wood; but neither Hooker nor Mansfield were able to support him, and una.s.sisted he could make no progress.
(MAP of Approximate positions of the Troops during the attacks of Hooker and Mansfield on the Confederate left, at the Battle of Sharpsburg.)
9 A.M.
At this moment, as if by common consent, the firing ceased on this flank of the battle; and as McClellan"s Second Army Corps, led by Sumner, advanced to sustain the First and Twelfth, we may stand by Jackson near the Dunkard Church, and survey the field after four hours" fighting.
a.s.sailed in front by superior numbers, and enfiladed by the batteries beyond the Antietam, the Confederate left had everywhere given back.
The East Wood was in possession of the enemy. Their right occupied the Miller House; their centre, supported by many batteries, stood across the corn-field; while the left, thrust forward, was actually established on the edge of the West Wood, some five hundred yards to northward of the church. But if Jackson had yielded ground, he had exacted a fearful price. The s.p.a.ce between the woods was a veritable slaughter-pen, reeking under the hot September sun, where the blue uniforms lay thicker than the grey. The First Army Corps had been cut to pieces. It had been beaten in fair fight by Jackson"s two divisions, counting at the outset less than half its numbers, and aided only by the cavalry. It had lost in killed and wounded over 100 officers and 2400 men. Hooker himself had been struck down, and as far as the Antietam the field was covered with his stragglers. The Twelfth Corps had suffered hardly less severely; and Mansfield himself, an old man and a gallant soldier, was dying of his wounds.
His batteries indeed remained in action, pouring shot and sh.e.l.l on the West Wood and the Dunkard Church; but his infantry, reduced by more than 1500 rifles, could do no more than hold their ground.
Nor was the exhaustion of the enemy the only advantage which the Confederates had gained by the slaughter of 4000 men. The position to which Jackson had retired was more favourable than that from which he had been driven. The line, no longer presenting a weak angle, was almost straight, and no part of the front was open to enfilade.
Stuart and his artillery, withdrawn to a more favourable position, secured the left. D.H. Hill on the right, though part of his force had given way, still held the Roulette House and the sunken road, and the troops in the West Wood were well protected from the Northern batteries. The one weak point was the gap occupied by Greene"s Federals, which lay between Grigsby"s regiments in the northern angle of the West Wood and Hood"s division at the Dunkard Church. The enemy, however, showed no signs of making good his opportunity; Early"s brigade was close at hand, and Lee had promised further reinforcements.
A glance southward showed that there was no reason for despair. Over all the field lay the heavy smoke of a great artillery battle. From near the Dunkard Church to the bluff overhanging the Antietam, a distance of two miles, battery on battery was in line. Here were Longstreet"s artillery under Stephen Lee, together with the six-and-twenty guns of Cutts" reserve battalion, forty-eight guns in all; the divisional batteries of D.H. Hill, and the Washington artillery of New Orleans,* (* Both D.H. Hill and the Washington artillery had sixteen guns each.) and in addition to these eighty guns others were in action above the Burnside Bridge. An array even more formidable crowned the opposite crest; but although the Confederate batteries, opposed by larger numbers and heavier metal, had suffered terribly, both in men and in materiel, yet the infantry, the main strength of the defence, was still intact.* (* "Our artillery," says General D.H. Hill, "could not cope with the superior weight, calibre, range, and number of the Yankee guns; hence it ought only to have been used against ma.s.ses of infantry. On the contrary, our guns were made to reply to the Yankee guns, and were smashed up or withdrawn before they could be effectually turned against ma.s.sive columns of attack." After Sharpsburg Lee gave orders that there were to be no more "artillery duels" so long as the Confederates fought defensive battles.) The cliffs of the Red Hill, replying to the rolling thunder of near 800 guns, gave back no echo to the sharper crack of musketry. Save a few skirmishers, who had crossed the Sharpsburg Bridge, not one company of McClellan"s infantry had been sent into action south of the Dunkard Church. Beyond the Antietam, covering the whole s.p.a.ce between the river and the hills, the blue ma.s.ses were plainly to be seen through the drifting smoke; some so far in the distance that only the flash of steel in the bright sunshine distinguished them from the surrounding woods; others moving in dense columns towards the battle:
Standards on standards, men on men; In slow succession still.
But neither by the Sharpsburg nor yet by the Burnside Bridge had a single Federal regiment crossed the stream; Lee"s centre and right were not even threatened, and it was evident his reserves might be concentrated without risk at whatever point he pleased.
Walker"s division was therefore withdrawn from the right, and McLaws, who had reached Sharpsburg shortly after sunrise, was ordered to the front. G. T. Anderson"s brigade was detached from D.H. Hill; and the whole force was placed at Jackson"s disposal. These fresh troops, together with Early"s regiments, not yet engaged, gave 10,000 muskets for the counterstroke, and had Hooker and Mansfield been alone upon the field the Federal right wing would have been annihilated. But as the Confederate reserves approached the Dunkard Church, Sumner, whom McClellan had ordered to cross Pry"s Bridge with the Second Army Corps, threw three divisions against the West Wood and the Roulette House. In three lines, up the slope from the Antietam, at sixty yards distance and covering a wide front, came Sedgwick on the right, French on the left, and Richardson to the left rear. So orderly was the advance of those 18,000 Northerners, and so imposing their array, that even the Confederate officers watched their march with admiration, and terrible was the shock with which they renewed the conflict.
Sedgwick, emerging from the East Wood, moved directly over the corn-field, crossed the turnpike, and entering the West Wood to northward of the point still held by Greene, swept through the timber, and with a portion of his advanced brigade reached the further edge. Greene, at the same moment, moved upon the Dunkard Church, and Early, who with the fragments of Jones" division was alone within the wood, marched rapidly in the same direction.
Attacked suddenly in flank from behind a ridge of rock Greene"s regiments were driven back; and then Early, observing Sedgwick"s third line pushing across the turnpike, reformed his troops for further action. Greene, for the moment, had been disposed of, but a more formidable attack was threatening. Sedgwick"s 6000 muskets, confronted only by some 600* (* Letter of Jackson"s Adjutant-General.
Memoirs of W.N. Pendleton D.D. page 216.) of the Valley soldiers under Grigsby, were thronging through the wood, and a change of front southward would have sent them sweeping down the Confederate line.
Early could hardly have withstood their onset; Hood was incapable of further effort, and D.H. Hill was heavily pressed by French. But Jackson"s hand still held the reins of battle. During the fierce struggle of the morning he had remained on the edge of the West Wood, leaving, as was his wont, the conduct of the divisions to his subordinates, but watching his enemy with a glance that saw beyond the numbers arrayed against him. He had already demanded reinforcements from General Lee; and in antic.i.p.ation of their speedy arrival their orders had been already framed. They had not been called for to sustain his front, or to occupy a new position. Despite the thronging ma.s.ses of the Federals, despite the fact that his line was already broken, attack, and attack only, was in Jackson"s mind, and the reserves and the opportunity arrived together. A staff officer was dispatched to direct Walker, on the left, to sustain the Texans, to clear the West Wood, and to place a detachment in the gap between the Dunkard Church and the batteries of Colonel Lee;* (*
Sharpsburg. By Major-General J.G. Walker, C.S.A. Battles and Leaders volume 2 pages 677 and 678.) while Jackson himself, riding to meet McLaws, ordered him "to drive the enemy back and turn his right."