SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 2]
Whether the Separated Soul Understands Separate Substances?
Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to the body than when existing apart from it, being an essential part of human nature; and every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in that whole. But the soul in the body does not understand separate substances as shown above (Q. 88, A. 1).
Therefore much less is it able to do so when apart from the body.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is known is known either by its presence or by its species. But separate substances cannot be known to the soul by their presence, for G.o.d alone can enter into the soul; nor by means of species abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel is more simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at all understand separate substances.
Obj. 3: Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate happiness of man consists in the knowledge of separate substances. If, therefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its happiness would be secured by its separation alone; which cannot be reasonably be said.
_On the contrary,_ Souls apart from the body know other separated souls; as we see in the case of the rich man in h.e.l.l, who saw Lazarus and Abraham (Luke 16:23). Therefore separated souls see the devils and the angels.
_I answer that,_ Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), "our mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself"--i.e. by knowing itself (Q. 88, A. 1, ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other separate things. Now it was said above (A. 1), that as long as it is united to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore it does not understand itself save through becoming actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms; for thus it understands itself through its own act, as shown above (Q. 87, A. 1). When, however, it is separated from the body, it understands no longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply intelligible objects; hence in that state it understands itself through itself. Now, every separate substance "understands what is above itself and what is below itself, according to the mode of its substance" (De Causis viii): for a thing is understood according as it is in the one who understands; while one thing is in another according to the nature of that in which it is. And the mode of existence of a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but is the same as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels so far as its natural knowledge is concerned. But the knowledge of glory is otherwise.
Reply Obj. 1: The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect considering its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body: but it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the present life.
Reply Obj. 2: The separated soul understands the angels by means of divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect knowledge of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an angel.
Reply Obj. 3: Man"s ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge of any separate substances; but in the knowledge of G.o.d, Who is seen only by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if perfectly understood gives great happiness--not final and ultimate happiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly, as was shown above in this article.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 3]
Whether the Separated Soul Knows All Natural Things?
Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul knows all natural things. For the types of all natural things exist in separate substances. Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances, they also know all natural things.
Obj. 2: Further, whoever understands the greater intelligible, will be able much more to understand the lesser intelligible. But the separated soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the highest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more can it understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of intelligibility.
_On the contrary,_ The devils have greater natural knowledge than the separated soul; yet they do not know all natural things, but have to learn many things by long experience, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono i). Therefore neither can the separated soul know all natural things.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the separated soul, like the angels, understands by means of species, received from the influence of the Divine light. Nevertheless, as the soul by nature is inferior to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the body through such species does not receive perfect knowledge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge.
Separated souls, therefore, have the same relation through such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. Now angels through such species know all natural things perfectly; because all that G.o.d has produced in the respective natures of natural things has been produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. ii, 8). Hence it follows that separated souls know all natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge, but in a general and confused manner.
Reply Obj. 1: Even an angel does not understand all natural things through his substance, but through certain species, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 1). So it does not follow that the soul knows all natural things because it knows separate substances after a fashion.
Reply Obj. 2: As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural things perfectly; but it knows them confusedly, as above explained in this article.
Reply Obj. 3: Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future which neither angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so far as future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine revelation. But we are here treating of the knowledge of natural things.
Reply Obj. 4: Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and perfect; the knowledge of which we speak is confused. Hence it does not follow that to study in order to learn is useless.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 4]
Whether the Separated Soul Knows Singulars?
Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not know singulars. For no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in the separated soul, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 77, A. 8). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown (Q.
86, A. 1). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars.
Obj. 2: Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate than knowledge of the universal. But the separated soul has no determinate knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore much less can it know singulars.
Obj. 3: Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for the same reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know all singulars. Therefore it knows none.
_On the contrary,_ The rich man in h.e.l.l said: "I have five brethren"
(Luke 16:28).
_I answer that,_ Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider that there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of abstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1). The other way of understanding is by the infusion of species by G.o.d, and in that way it is possible for the intellect to know singulars. For as G.o.d knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of universal and individual principles (Q. 14, A. 2), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a kind of partic.i.p.ated similitude of the Divine Essence. There is a difference, however, between angels and separated souls in the fact that through these species the angels have a perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas separated souls have only a confused knowledge. Hence the angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, through these species, know not only the specific natures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species; whereas separated souls by these species know only those singulars to which they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or by natural apt.i.tude, or by the disposition of the Divine order; because whatever is received into anything is conditioned according to the mode of the recipient.
Reply Obj. 1: The intellect does not know the singular by way of abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus; but as explained above.
Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of the separated soul is confined to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of determinate relation, as we have said.
Reply Obj. 3: The separated soul has not the same relation to all singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others. Therefore there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 5]
Whether the Habit of Knowledge Here Acquired Remains in the Separated Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for the Apostle says: "Knowledge shall be destroyed" (1 Cor. 13:8).
Obj. 2: Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some who are less good would, even in the future life, excel some who are better; which seems unreasonable.
Obj. 3: Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by influence of the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge here acquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject which cannot be.
Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. vi, 4, 5), that "a habit is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes knowledge is destroyed by sickness or the like." But in this life there is no change so thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge is destroyed by death.
_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), "Let us learn on earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven."
_I answer that,_ Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in the intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible species are not kept in the pa.s.sive intellect. If this were true, it would follow that when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here acquired would also be entirely destroyed.
But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is "the abode of species," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), the habit of knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering the very actions from which knowledge arises. For "habits are like the actions whereby they are acquired" (Ethic. ii, 1). Now the actions of the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers.
Hence through such acts the pa.s.sive intellect acquires a certain facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid sensitive powers acquire a certain apt.i.tude in seconding the action of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible object. But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to habit.
Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers; but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because, as the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its contrary, as heat, by cold; and secondly, indirectly, when its subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty, as above stated (Q. 79, A. 2, ad 2). Neither can the intelligible species in the pa.s.sive intellect be corrupted by their contrary; for there is no contrary to intelligible "intentions," above all as regards simple intelligence of "what a thing is." But contrariety may exist in the intellect as regards mental composition and division, or also reasoning; so far as what is false in statement or argument is contrary to truth. And thus knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a false argument seduces anyone from the knowledge of truth. For this reason the Philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge is corrupted directly: namely, "forgetfulness" on the part of the memorative power, and "deception" on the part of a false argument.
But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore we must conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as it is in the intellect, remains in the separated soul.
Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit, but as to the act of knowing; and hence he says, in proof of the a.s.sertion quoted, "Now, I know in part."
Reply Obj. 2: As a less good man may exceed a better man in bodily stature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge in the future life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, however, cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed by the better man.
Reply Obj. 3: These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same species, so there is no impossibility.
Reply Obj. 4: This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on the part of the sensitive powers.
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