SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 6]
Whether the Act of Knowledge Acquired Here Remains in the Separated Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired does not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), that when the body is corrupted, "the soul neither remembers nor loves." But to consider what is previously known is an act of memory. Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of knowledge here acquired.
Obj. 2: Further, intelligible species cannot have greater power in the separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. But in this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without turning to phantasms, as shown above (Q. 84, A. 7). Therefore the separated soul cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by intelligible species acquired in this life.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), that "habits produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired." But the habit of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning to phantasms: therefore it cannot produce any other acts. These acts, however, are not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in the state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge acquired in this life.
_On the contrary,_ It was said to Dives in h.e.l.l (Luke 16:25): "Remember thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime."
_I answer that,_ Action offers two things for our consideration--its species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which is the object"s similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the power of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due to the eye"s visual power. Therefore as the intelligible species remain in the separated soul, as stated above (A. 5), and since the state of the separated soul is not the same as it is in this life, it follows that through the intelligible species acquired in this life the soul apart from the body can understand what it understood formerly, but in a different way; not by turning to phantasms, but by a mode suited to a soul existing apart from the body. Thus the act of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a different way.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher speaks of remembrance, according as memory belongs to the sensitive part, but not as belonging in a way to the intellect, as explained above (Q. 79, A. 6).
Reply Obj. 2: The different mode of intelligence is produced by the different state of the intelligent soul; not by diversity of species.
Reply Obj. 3: The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of political justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethic.
v, 8: Magn. Moral. i, 34).
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 7]
Whether Local Distance Impedes the Knowledge in the Separated Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that local distance impedes the separated soul"s knowledge. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), that "the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here."
But they know what is done among themselves. Therefore local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Divin. Daemon. iii), that "the demons" rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown to us." But agility of movement would be useless in that respect unless their knowledge was impeded by local distance; which, therefore, is a much greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul, whose nature is inferior to the demon"s.
Obj. 3: Further, as there is distance of place, so is there distance of time. But distance of time impedes knowledge in the separated soul, for the soul is ignorant of the future. Therefore it seems that distance of place also impedes its knowledge.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 16:23), that Dives, "lifting up his eyes when he was in torment, saw Abraham afar off." Therefore local distance does not impede knowledge in the separated soul.
_I answer that,_ Some have held that the separated soul knows the singular by abstraction from the sensible. If that were so, it might be that local distance would impede its knowledge; for either the sensible would need to act upon the soul, or the soul upon the sensible, and in either case a determinate distance would be necessary. This is, however, impossible because abstraction of the species from the sensible is done through the senses and other sensible faculties which do not remain actually in the soul apart from the body. But the soul when separated understands singulars by species derived from the Divine light, which is indifferent to what is near or distant. Hence knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered by local distance.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine says that the souls of the departed cannot see what is done here, not because they are "there," as if impeded by local distance; but for some other cause, as we shall explain (A. 8).
Reply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks there in accordance with the opinion that demons have bodies naturally united to them, and so have sensitive powers, which require local distance. In the same book he expressly sets down this opinion, though apparently rather by way of narration than of a.s.sertion, as we may gather from _De Civ. Dei_ xxi, 10.
Reply Obj. 3: The future, which is distant in time, does not actually exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far as a thing falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being knowable. But what is locally distant exists actually, and is knowable in itself. Hence we cannot argue from distance of time to distance of place.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 8]
Whether Separated Souls Know What Takes Place on Earth?
Objection 1: It would seem that separated souls know what takes place on earth; for otherwise they would have no care for it, as they have, according to what Dives said (Luke 16:27, 28), "I have five brethren ... he may testify unto them, lest they also come into the place of torments." Therefore separated souls know what pa.s.ses on earth.
Obj. 2: Further, the dead often appear to the living, asleep or awake, and tell them of what takes place there; as Samuel appeared to Saul (1 Kings 28:11). But this could not be unless they knew what takes place here. Therefore they know what takes place on earth.
Obj. 3: Further, separated souls know what happens among themselves.
If, therefore, they do not know what takes place among us, it must be by reason of local distance; which has been shown to be false (A. 7).
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 14:21): "He will not understand whether his children come to honor or dishonor."
_I answer that,_ By natural knowledge, of which we are treating now, the souls of the dead do not know what pa.s.ses on earth. This follows from what has been laid down (A. 4), since the separated soul has knowledge of singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either by some vestige of previous knowledge or affection, or by the Divine order. Now the souls departed are in a state of separation from the living, both by Divine order and by their mode of existence, whilst they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and hence they are ignorant of what goes on among us. Whereof Gregory gives the reason thus: "The dead do not know how the living act, for the life of the spirit is far from the life of the flesh; and so, as corporeal things differ from incorporeal in genus, so they are distinct in knowledge" (Moral. xii). Augustine seems to say the same (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), when he a.s.serts that, "the souls of the dead have no concern in the affairs of the living."
Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided in opinion as regards the souls of the blessed in heaven, for Gregory continues the pa.s.sage above quoted: "The case of the holy souls is different, for since they see the light of Almighty G.o.d, we cannot believe that external things are unknown to them." But Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xiii) expressly says: "The dead, even the saints do not know what is done by the living or by their own children," as a gloss quotes on the text, "Abraham hath not known us" (Isa. 63:16). He confirms this opinion by saying that he was not visited, nor consoled in sorrow by his mother, as when she was alive; and he could not think it possible that she was less kind when in a happier state; and again by the fact that the Lord promised to king Josias that he should die, lest he should see his people"s afflictions (4 Kings 22:20). Yet Augustine says this in doubt; and premises, "Let every one take, as he pleases, what I say." Gregory, on the other hand, is positive, since he says, "We cannot believe." His opinion, indeed, seems to be the more probable one--that the souls of the blessed who see G.o.d do know all that pa.s.ses here. For they are equal to the angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what happens among those living on earth. But as the souls of the blessed are most perfectly united to Divine justice, they do not suffer from sorrow, nor do they interfere in mundane affairs, except in accordance with Divine justice.
Reply Obj. 1: The souls of the departed may care for the living, even if ignorant of their state; just as we care for the dead by pouring forth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state.
Moreover, the affairs of the living can be made known to them not immediately, but the souls who pa.s.s hence thither, or by angels and demons, or even by "the revelation of the Holy Ghost," as Augustine says in the same book.
Reply Obj. 2: That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever is either by the special dispensation of G.o.d; in order that the souls of the dead may interfere in affairs of the living--and this is to be accounted as miraculous. Or else such apparitions occur through the instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the departed; as may likewise happen when the living appear, without their own knowledge, to others living, as Augustine says in the same book. And so it may be said of Samuel that he appeared through Divine revelation; according to Ecclus. 46:23, "he slept, and told the king the end of his life." Or, again, this apparition was procured by the demons; unless, indeed, the authority of Ecclesiasticus be set aside through not being received by the Jews as canonical Scripture.
Reply Obj. 3: This kind of ignorance does not proceed from the obstacle of local distance, but from the cause mentioned above.
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QUESTION 90
OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN"S SOUL (In Four Articles)
After the foregoing we must consider the first production of man, concerning which there are four subjects of treatment:
(1) the production of man himself;
(2) the end of this production;
(3) the state and condition of the first man;
(4) the place of his abode.
Concerning the production of man, there are three things to be considered:
(1) the production of man"s soul;
(2) the production of man"s body;
(3) the production of the woman.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man"s soul was something made, or was of the Divine substance?
(2) Whether, if made, it was created?
(3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality?
(4) Whether it was made before the body?