The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what has been said above (A. 2, ad 2). For the useful and the righteous are not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for its own sake and that which is for the sake of something else: wherefore the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the other; but not conversely.
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QUESTION 9
OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL (In Six Articles)
We must now consider what moves the will: and under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
(2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appet.i.te?
(3) Whether the will moves itself?
(4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle?
(5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body?
(6) Whether the will is moved by G.o.d alone as by an extrinsic principle?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 1]
Whether the Will Is Moved by the Intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect. For Augustine says on Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows sluggishly or not at all: we know what is good, but deeds delight us not." But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect: because movement of the movable results from motion of the mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
Obj. 2: Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object to the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination in representing the appetible object to the sensitive appet.i.te. But the imagination, in presenting the appetible object, does not remove the sensitive appet.i.te: indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us not at all (De Anima ii, 3). Therefore neither does the intellect move the will.
Obj. 3: Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the same thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise the intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that "the appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover moved."
_I answer that,_ A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do this is to move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action.
Thus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.
The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above (Q. 1, A. 2), the principle of this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the art which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is concerned with the means; just as the "art of sailing commands the art of shipbuilding" (Phys. ii, 2). Now good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will.
Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will.
For the end and perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the will as some particular good: and always the art or power to which the universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good--i.e. the order of the whole army--by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.
On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect.
And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it.
Reply Obj. 1: The pa.s.sage quoted proves, not that the intellect does not move, but that it does not move of necessity.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive appet.i.te; so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).
Reply Obj. 3: The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good.
But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true. It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the same respect.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 2]
Whether the Will Is Moved by the Sensitive Appet.i.te?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the sensitive appet.i.te. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to be pa.s.sive," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the sensitive appet.i.te is less excellent than the will which is the intellectual appet.i.te; just as sense is less excellent than intellect.
Therefore the sensitive appet.i.te does not move the will.
Obj. 2: Further, no particular power can produce a universal effect.
But the sensitive appet.i.te is a particular power, because it follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot cause the movement of the will, which movement is universal, as following the universal apprehension of the intellect.
Obj. 3: Further, as is proved in _Phys._ viii, 5, the mover is not moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal motion. But the will moves the sensitive appet.i.te, inasmuch as the sensitive appet.i.te obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appet.i.te does not move the will.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured." But man would not be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were moved by the sensitive appet.i.te, wherein concupiscence resides.
Therefore the sensitive appet.i.te moves the will.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), that which is apprehended as good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him."
Now it is evident that according to a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore according as man is affected by a pa.s.sion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected: thus that seems good to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm.
And in this way, the sensitive appet.i.te moves the will, on the part of the object.
Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders that which is better simply and in itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly the will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appet.i.te: but in respect of the man in whom a pa.s.sion is predominant, in so far as he is subject to that pa.s.sion, the sensitive appet.i.te is more excellent.
Reply Obj. 2: Men"s acts and choices are in reference to singulars.
Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appet.i.te is a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.
Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 3]
Whether the Will Moves Itself?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move itself. For every mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in potentiality; since "movement is the act of that which is in potentiality, as such" [*Aristotle, _Phys._ iii, 1]. Now the same is not in potentiality and in act, in respect of the same. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.
Obj. 2: Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present. But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved itself, it would always be moving itself, which is clearly false.
Obj. 3: Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated above (A. 1). If, therefore, the will move itself, it would follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.
_On the contrary,_ The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the power to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will"s object. Now, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 2), the end is in things appetible, what the principle is in things intelligible. But it is evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.
Reply Obj. 1: It is not in respect of the same that the will moves itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in potentiality in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.
Reply Obj. 2: The power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself.
Accordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself.