Reply Obj. 3: The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object: whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in respect of the end.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 4]
Whether the Will Is Moved by an Exterior Principle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by anything exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is essential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle, just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement of the will is not from anything exterior.
Obj. 2: Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above (Q. 6, A. 4). But the violent act is one "the principle of which is outside the agent" [*Aristotle, _Ethic._ iii, 1]. Therefore the will cannot be moved by anything exterior.
Obj. 3: Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover, needs not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently.
Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior.
_On the contrary,_ The will is moved by the object, as stated above (A. 1). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to the sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.
_I answer that,_ As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it is moved in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be moved by some exterior principle.
For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above (A. 3), in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of willing the means. Now it cannot do this without the aid of counsel: for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be attained, and through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills.
But since he did not always actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if the will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this process could not go on to infinity.
Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14).
Reply Obj. 1: It is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward principle be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its first principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of the natural movement is from without, that, to wit, which moves nature.
Reply Obj. 2: For an act to be violent it is not enough that its principle be extrinsic, but we must add "without the concurrence of him that suffers violence." This does not happen when the will is moved by an exterior principle: for it is the will that wills, though moved by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were counter to the movement of the will: which in the present case is impossible; since then the will would will and not will the same thing.
Reply Obj. 3: The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and in its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it needs to be moved by another as first mover.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 5]
Whether the Will Is Moved by a Heavenly Body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to their cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved in _Phys._ viii, 9. But human movements are various and multiform, since they begin to be, whereas previously they were not.
Therefore they are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the heavens, which is uniform according to its nature.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) "the lower bodies are moved by the higher." But the movements of the human body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will.
Obj. 3: Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the will. But this would not be so, if the heavenly bodies could not move man"s will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly body.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts." But they would be, if the will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly bodies.
_I answer that,_ It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object; that is to say, in so far as exterior bodies, which move the will, through being offered to the senses, and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers, are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.
But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the human will, in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will, as to the exercise of its act. But this is impossible. For the "will," as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 9, "is in the reason." Now the reason is a power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the reverse: because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more formal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever.
Therefore it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect or will. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from sense, the theory that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of G.o.ds bring on" [*Odyssey xviii. 135] (referring to Jupiter, by whom they understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally, by the heavenly bodies, i.e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts they are.
But since it has been stated (A. 2) that the intellectual appet.i.te is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appet.i.te, the movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will; in so far as the will happens to be moved by the pa.s.sions of the sensitive appet.i.te.
Reply Obj. 1: The multiform movements of the human will are reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect and will. This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as to its cause.
Reply Obj. 2: The movements of the human body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the disposition suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the influence of heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive appet.i.te is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again, in so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or not to will something; for instance, when the body is chilled, we begin to wish to make the fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of the object offered from without: not on the part of an inward instigation.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Cf. I, Q. 84, AA. 6, 7), the sensitive appet.i.te is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is no reason why man should not be p.r.o.ne to anger or concupiscence, or some like pa.s.sion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his natural complexion. But the majority of men are led by the pa.s.sions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says (Centiloquium v), "the wise man governs the stars"; which is a though to say that by resisting his pa.s.sions, he opposes his will, which is free and nowise subject to the movement of the heavens, to such like effects of the heavenly bodies.
Or, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): "We must confess that when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most hidden inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And since this is done in order to deceive man, it must be the work of the lying spirits."
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 6]
Whether the Will Is Moved by G.o.d Alone, As Exterior Principle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by G.o.d alone as exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved by its superior: thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies.
But there is something which is higher than the will of man and below G.o.d, namely, the angel. Therefore man"s will can be moved by an angel also, as exterior principle.
Obj. 2: Further, the act of the will follows the act of the intellect. But man"s intellect is reduced to act, not by G.o.d alone, but also by the angel who enlightens it, as Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. iv). For the same reason, therefore, the will also is moved by an angel.
Obj. 3: Further, G.o.d is not the cause of other than good things, according to Gen. 1:31: "G.o.d saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." If, therefore man"s will were moved by G.o.d alone, it would never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby "we sin and whereby we do right," as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9).
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is G.o.d Who worketh in us" [Vulg."you"] "both to will and to accomplish."
_I answer that,_ The movement of the will is from within, as also is the movement of nature. Now although it is possible for something to move a natural thing, without being the cause of the thing moved, yet that alone, which is in some way the cause of a thing"s nature, can cause a natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards by a man, who is not the cause of the stone"s nature, but this movement is not natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the stone is caused by no other than the cause of its nature. Wherefore it is said in _Phys._ vii, 4, that the generator moves locally heavy and light things. Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his cause; but that his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.
Now the cause of the will can be none other than G.o.d. And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by G.o.d alone, by creation, as was stated in the First Part (Q. 90, A. 2). Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else can be the cause of the will, except G.o.d Himself, Who is the universal good: while every other good is good by partic.i.p.ation, and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent.
Reply Obj. 1: An angel is not above man in such a way as to be the cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies.
Reply Obj. 2: Man"s intellect is moved by an angel, on the part of the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to man"s knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a creature from without, as stated above (A. 4).
Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d moves man"s will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good. Nevertheless, sometimes G.o.d moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on (Q. 109, A. 2).
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QUESTION 10
OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
(2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object?
(3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appet.i.te?
(4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is G.o.d?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 10, Art. 1]