SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 2]
Whether All Sins Are Equal?
Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another.
Obj. 2: Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason, which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things.
Therefore to sin is the same as to pa.s.s over a line. But pa.s.sing over a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one go a long way from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less. Therefore all sins are equal.
Obj. 3: Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are equal.
_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said to Pilate (John 19:11): "He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin," and yet it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore one sin is greater than another.
_I answer that,_ The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in the book on _Paradoxes_ (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal: from which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the pains of h.e.l.l are equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Stoics arrived at their conclusion through looking at sin on the side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure from reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of more or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of privation. For there is a simple and pure privation, which consists, so to speak, in _being_ corrupted; thus death is privation of life, and darkness is privation of light. Such like privations do not admit of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence a man is not less dead on the first day after his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and, in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single shade shutting out all the light. There is, however, another privation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite habit; it consists in _becoming_ corrupted rather than in _being_ corrupted, like sickness which is a privation of the due commensuration of the humors, yet so that something remains of that commensuration, else the animal would cease to live: and the same applies to deformity and the like. Such privations admit of more or less on the part of what remains or the contrary habit. For it matters much in sickness or deformity, whether one departs more or less from the due commensuration of humors or members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in them the privation of the due commensuration of reason is such as not to destroy the order of reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 5. For the substance of the act, or the affection of the agent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of reason. Therefore it matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one departs more or less from the rect.i.tude of reason: and accordingly we must say that sins are not all equal.
Reply Obj. 1: To commit sin is unlawful on account of some inordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater inordinateness are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure privation.
Reply Obj. 3: Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same subject: yet one virtue surpa.s.ses another in excellence according to its species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the same species of virtue, as stated above (Q. 66, AA. 1, 2). Moreover, even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal, since virtues are connected, and vices or sins are not.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 3]
Whether the Gravity of Sins Varies According to Their Objects?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to its mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin.
Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various objects.
Obj. 2: Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice.
Now sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to which it turns, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that which it turns away from. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various objects.
Obj. 3: Further, sins that have different objects are of different kinds. But things of different kinds cannot be compared with one another, as is proved in _Phys._ vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one sin is not graver than another by reason of the difference of objects.
_On the contrary,_ Sins take their species from their objects, as was shown above (Q. 72, A. 1). But some sins are graver than others in respect of their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore the gravity of sins varies according to their objects.
_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been said (Q. 71, A. 5), the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver than another: for just as the good of health consists in a certain commensuration of the humors, in keeping with an animal"s nature, so the good of virtue consists in a certain commensuration of the human act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the higher the principle the disorder of which causes the disorder in the humors, the graver is the sickness: thus a sickness which comes on the human body from the heart, which is the principle of life, or from some neighboring part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must needs be so much the graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher in the order of reason. Now in matters of action the reason directs all things in view of the end: wherefore the higher the end which attaches to sins in human acts, the graver the sin. Now the object of an act is its end, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 3, ad 2); and consequently the difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects. Thus it is clear that external things are directed to man as their end, while man is further directed to G.o.d as his end. Wherefore a sin which is about the very substance of man, e.g. murder, is graver than a sin which is about external things, e.g. theft; and graver still is a sin committed directly against G.o.d, e.g. unbelief, blasphemy, and the like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin will be graver than another according as it is about a higher or lower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species from their objects, the difference of gravity which is derived from the objects is first and foremost, as resulting from the species.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the object is the matter about which an act is concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the intention of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 3, ad 2). Now the form of a moral act depends on the end, as was shown above (Q. 72, A. 6; Q. 18, A. 6).
Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that man turns unduly to some mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good, which aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those things to which man turns.
Reply Obj. 3: All the objects of human acts are related to one another, wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so far as they are directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents all sins from being compared with one another.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 4]
Whether the Gravity of Sins Depends on the Excellence of the Virtues to Which They Are Opposed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed, so that, to wit, the graver sin is opposed to the greater virtue.
For, according to Prov. 15:5, "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength." Now, as Our Lord says (Matt. 5:20, seqq.) abundant justice restrains anger, which is a less grievous sin than murder, which less abundant justice restrains. Therefore the least grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3 that "virtue is about the difficult and the good": whence it seems to follow that the greater virtue is about what is more difficult. But it is a less grievous sin to fail in what is more difficult, than in what is less difficult. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope (1 Cor. 13:13). Now hatred which is opposed to charity is a less grievous sin than unbelief or despair which are opposed to faith and hope. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. 8:10) that the "worst is opposed to the best." Now in morals the best is the greatest virtue; and the worst is the most grievous sin. Therefore the most grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.
_I answer that,_ A sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways: first, princ.i.p.ally and directly; that sin, to wit, which is about the same object: because contraries are about the same thing. In this way, the more grievous sin must needs be opposed to the greater virtue: because, just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object, so also does the greatness of a virtue, since both sin and virtue take their species from the object, as shown above (Q. 60, A.
5; Q. 72, A. 1). Wherefore the greatest sin must needs be directly opposed to the greatest virtue, as being furthest removed from it in the same genus. Secondly, the opposition of virtue to sin may be considered in respect of a certain extension of the virtue in checking sin. For the greater a virtue is, the further it removes man from the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man not only from that sin, but also from whatever leads to it. And thus it is evident that the greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws man also from less grievous sins: even as the more perfect health is, the more does it ward off even minor ailments. And in this way the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue, on the part of the latter"s effect.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the opposition which consists in restraining from sin; for thus abundant justice checks even minor sins.
Reply Obj. 2: The greater virtue that is about a more difficult good is opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult evil.
For in each case there is a certain superiority, in that the will is shown to be more intent on good or evil, through not being overcome by the difficulty.
Reply Obj. 3: Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of G.o.d: hence not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the hatred of G.o.d, which is the most grievous of all sins.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 5]
Whether Carnal Sins Are of Less Guilt Than Spiritual Sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt than spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than theft: for it is written (Prov. 6:30, 32): "The fault is not so great when a man has stolen ... but he that is an adulterer, for the folly of his heart shall destroy his own soul." Now theft belongs to covetousness, which is a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to l.u.s.t, which is a carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins are of greater guilt than spiritual sins.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says in his commentary on Leviticus [*The quotation is from De Civ. Dei ii, 4 and iv, 31.] that "the devil rejoices chiefly in l.u.s.t and idolatry." But he rejoices more in the greater sin. Therefore, since l.u.s.t is a carnal sin, it seems that the carnal sins are of most guilt.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Ethic. vii, 6) that "it is more shameful to be incontinent in l.u.s.t than in anger." But anger is a spiritual sin, according to Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi, 17); while l.u.s.t pertains to carnal sins. Therefore carnal sin is more grievous than spiritual sin.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xiii, 11) that carnal sins are of less guilt, but of more shame than spiritual sins.
_I answer that,_ Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater guilt than each carnal sin; but that, considering the sole difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous than carnal sins, other things being equal. Three reasons may be a.s.signed for this. The first is on the part of the subject: because spiritual sins belong to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to G.o.d, and to turn away from Him; whereas carnal sins are consummated in the carnal pleasure of the appet.i.te, to which it chiefly belongs to turn to goods of the body; so that carnal sin, as such, denotes more a _turning to_ something, and for that reason, implies a closer cleaving; whereas spiritual sin denotes more a _turning from_ something, whence the notion of guilt arises; and for this reason it involves greater guilt. A second reason may be taken on the part of the person against whom sin is committed: because carnal sin, as such, is against the sinner"s own body, which he ought to love less, in the order of charity, than G.o.d and his neighbor, against whom he commits spiritual sins, and consequently spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. A third reason may be taken from the motive, since the stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous the sin, as we shall state further on (A. 6). Now carnal sins have a stronger impulse, viz. our innate concupiscence of the flesh. Therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt.
Reply Obj. 1: Adultery belongs not only to the sin of l.u.s.t, but also to the sin of injustice, and in this respect may be brought under the head of covetousness, as a gloss observes on Eph. 5:5. "No fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person," etc.; so that adultery is so much more grievous than theft, as a man loves his wife more than his chattels.
Reply Obj. 2: The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of l.u.s.t, because it is of the greatest adhesion, and man can with difficulty be withdrawn from it. "For the desire of pleasure is insatiable," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12).
Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher himself says (Ethic. vii, 6), the reason why it is more shameful to be incontinent in l.u.s.t than in anger, is that l.u.s.t partakes less of reason; and in the same sense he says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "sins of intemperance are most worthy of reproach, because they are about those pleasures which are common to us and irrational animals": hence, by these sins man is, so to speak, brutalized; for which same reason Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xi, 17) that they are more shameful.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 6]
Whether the Gravity of a Sin Depends on Its Cause?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend on its cause. Because the greater a sin"s cause, the more forcibly it moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist; for it denotes weakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that is due to weakness is deemed less grievous. Therefore sin does not derive its gravity from its cause.
Obj. 2: Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin; wherefore a gloss on Rom. 7:7, "For I had not known concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils." Now the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome, the less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is diminished by the greatness of its cause.
Obj. 3: Further, as rect.i.tude of the reason is the cause of a virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin.