Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin: so much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether excused from sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously.
Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness of its cause.
_On the contrary,_ If the cause be increased, the effect is increased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous the sin.
_I answer that,_ In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin, and is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as a tree to its fruit, as a gloss observes on Matt. 7:18, "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit": and the greater this cause is, the more grievous will the sin be, since the greater the will to sin, the more grievously does man sin.
The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these causes we must make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very nature of the will: such is the end, which is the proper object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more grievous, because a man sins more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will to sin, against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with the judgment of reason. Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g. ignorance), or which weaken the free movement of the will, (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even as they diminish its voluntariness; and so much so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause diminishes the sin, as stated.
Reply Obj. 2: If concupiscence be understood to include the movement of the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is a greater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a pa.s.sion, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins, being stimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous temptation, wherefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence be taken in this sense follows the judgment of reason, and the movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence, the graver the sin: because sometimes the movement of concupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 7]
Whether a Circ.u.mstance Aggravates a Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that a circ.u.mstance does not aggravate a sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a circ.u.mstance does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof.
Therefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circ.u.mstance.
Obj. 2: Further, a circ.u.mstance is either evil or not: if it is evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil, it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circ.u.mstance nowise aggravates a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away (from G.o.d). But circ.u.mstances affect sin on the part of the object to which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin"s malice.
_On the contrary,_ Ignorance of a circ.u.mstance diminishes sin: for he who sins through ignorance of a circ.u.mstance, deserves to be forgiven (Ethic. iii, 1). Now this would not be the case unless a circ.u.mstance aggravated a sin. Therefore a circ.u.mstance makes a sin more grievous.
_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of virtue (Ethic. ii, 1, 2), "it is natural for a thing to be increased by that which causes it." Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in some circ.u.mstance: because the fact that a man departs from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circ.u.mstances in his action. Wherefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circ.u.mstances. This happens in three ways. First, in so far as a circ.u.mstance draws a sin from one kind to another: thus fornication is the intercourse of a man with one who is not his wife: but if to this be added the circ.u.mstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin is drawn to another kind of sin, viz. injustice, in so far as he usurps another"s property; and in this respect adultery is a more grievous sin than fornication. Secondly, a circ.u.mstance aggravates a sin, not by drawing it into another genus, but only by multiplying the ratio of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom he ought not to give, he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason his sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox. iii) that "in taking his father"s life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who educated him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his position in the republic." Thirdly, a circ.u.mstance aggravates a sin by adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circ.u.mstance: thus, taking another"s property const.i.tutes the sin of theft; but if to this be added the circ.u.mstance that much is taken of another"s property, the sin will be more grievous; although in itself, to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act.
Reply Obj. 1: Some circ.u.mstances do specify a moral act, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 10). Nevertheless a circ.u.mstance which does not give the species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a thing is weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is measured, not only according to the species of that act, but also according to a circ.u.mstance.
Reply Obj. 2: A circ.u.mstance may aggravate a sin either way. For if it is evil, it does not follow that it const.i.tutes the sin"s species; because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species, as stated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate a sin in relation to the malice of another circ.u.mstance.
Reply Obj. 3: Reason should direct the action not only as regards the object, but also as regards every circ.u.mstance. Therefore one may turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single circ.u.mstance; for instance, by doing something when one ought not or where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside from the rule of reason results from man"s turning away from G.o.d, to Whom man ought to be united by right reason.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 8]
Whether Sin Is Aggravated by Reason of Its Causing More Harm?
Objection 1: It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent to the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 5). Therefore a sin is not aggravated on account of its causing more harm.
Obj. 2: Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor.
Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm G.o.d, according to Job 35:6, 8: "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? ... Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee." If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous than sins against G.o.d or oneself.
Obj. 3: Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; because the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man ought to despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace.
Now, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): "Since vice is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it diminishes the integrity of nature." Now the diminution of the integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as it does more harm.
_I answer that,_ Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as when a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a murderer or a thief. In this case the quant.i.ty of harm aggravates the sin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin.
Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; for instance, when a man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case again the quant.i.ty of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will being strongly inclined to sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to another, a harm which he would not wish simply. Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is connected with the sin accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might ensue, a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follow directly from the sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is directly consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin: for instance, if a man is a notorious fornicator, the result is that many are scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor was it perhaps foreseen by him, yet it aggravates his sin directly.
But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected with the sinful act, and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor does it correspond with the gravity of the sin: for instance, if a man in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand, this harm is directly consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has heard nothing about the pains of h.e.l.l, would suffer greater pain in h.e.l.l for a sin of murder than for a sin of theft: but his sin is not aggravated on account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in the case of a believer, who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his desire to sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of sin.
Reply Obj. 1: As we have already stated (Q. 20, A. 5), in treating of the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of an action if foreseen and intended adds to the goodness and malice of an act.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does not follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is inordinateness which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such sins are the most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to be found in sins which man commits against G.o.d, and in some which he commits against himself. Moreover we might say that although no man can do G.o.d any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things concerning Him, e.g. by destroying faith, by outraging holy things, which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely inflicts harm on himself, as in the case of suicide, though this be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery from some anxiety.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument does not prove, for two reasons: first, because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbors; whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not harm but pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and sufficient cause of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient cause of another"s spiritual death, because no man dies spiritually except by sinning of his own will.
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NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 9]
Whether a Sin Is Aggravated by Reason of the Condition of the Person Against Whom It Is Committed?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this were the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy man. But this does not aggravate a sin: because a virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the wrong done him, than others, who, through being scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the person against whom a sin is committed does not aggravate the sin.
Obj. 2: Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin, because, as Cicero says (Paradox. iii): "The man who kills his slave sins once: he that takes his father"s life sins many times." But the kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin, because every man is most akin to himself; and yet it is less grievous to harm oneself than another, e.g. to kill one"s own, than another"s horse, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11).
Therefore kinship of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin.
Obj. 3: Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a sin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according to Wis. 6:7: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented," and Luke 12:47: "The servant who knew the will of his lord ... and did it not ...
shall be beaten with many stripes." Therefore, in like manner, on the part of the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of his position and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a poor man, since "there is no respect of persons with G.o.d"
(Col. 3:25), according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin.
_On the contrary,_ Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are committed against the servants of G.o.d. Thus it is written (3 Kings 19:14): "They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets with the sword." Moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed by a man against those who are akin to him, according to Micah 7:6: "the son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her mother." Furthermore sins committed against persons of rank are expressly condemned: thus it is written (Job 34:18): "Who saith to the king: "Thou art an apostate"; who calleth rulers unG.o.dly."
Therefore the condition of the person sinned against aggravates the sin.
_I answer that,_ The person sinned against is, in a manner, the object of the sin. Now it has been stated above (A. 3) that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more grave, as its object is a more princ.i.p.al end. But the princ.i.p.al ends of human acts are G.o.d, man himself, and his neighbor: for whatever we do, it is on account of one of these that we do it; although one of them is subordinate to the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in respect of the person sinned against, may be considered on the part of these three.
First, on the part of G.o.d, to Whom man is the more closely united, as he is more virtuous or more sacred to G.o.d: so that an injury inflicted on such a person redounds on to G.o.d according to Zech. 2:8: "He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye." Wherefore a sin is the more grievous, according as it is committed against a person more closely united to G.o.d by reason of personal sanct.i.ty, or official station. On the part of man himself, it is evident that he sins all the more grievously, according as the person against whom he sins, is more united to him, either through natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other, and, for this very reason, sins all the more grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5: "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?" On the part of his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously, according as his sin affects more persons: so that a sin committed against a public personage, e.g. a sovereign prince who stands in the place of the whole people, is more grievous than a sin committed against a private person; hence it is expressly prohibited (Ex. 22:28): "The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse." In like manner it would seem that an injury done to a person of prominence, is all the more grave, on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would cause among many people.
Reply Obj. 1: He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but that the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenuate the sin of the injurer.
Reply Obj. 2: The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those things which are subject to the dominion of his will, for instance his possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because he does it of his own will; but in those things that are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury on oneself: for it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. Since, however, things belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the dominion of our will, the argument fails to prove, in respect of injuries done to such like things, that it is less grievous to sin in their regard, unless indeed our neighbor be willing, or give his approval.
Reply Obj. 3: There is no respect for persons if G.o.d punishes more severely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this is done because such an injury redounds to the harm of many.
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TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 10]
Whether the Excellence of the Person Sinning Aggravates the Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving to G.o.d, according to Ecclus. 25:13: "How great is he that findeth wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Lord." Now the more a man cleaves to G.o.d, the less is a sin imputed to him: for it is written (2 Paral. 30: 18, 19): "The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the G.o.d of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified." Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning.
Obj. 2: Further, "there is no respect of persons with G.o.d" (Rom.
2:11). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for one and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning.