Reply Obj. 1: Continence has for its matter the desires for pleasures of touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance which is in the concupiscible), but its business with them is to resist them.
For this reason it must be in another power, since resistance is of one thing against another.
Reply Obj. 2: The will stands between reason and the concupiscible, and may be moved by either. In the continent man it is moved by the reason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the concupiscible.
Hence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to its first mover, and incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both belong immediately to the will as their proper subject.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the pa.s.sions are not in the will as their subject, yet it is in the power of the will to resist them: thus it is that the will of the continent man resists desires.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 4]
Whether Continence Is Better Than Temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that continence is better than temperance.
For it is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy of a continent soul." Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence.
Obj. 2: Further, the greater the reward a virtue merits, the greater the virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater reward; for it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): "He ... is not crowned, except he strive lawfully," and the continent man, since he is subject to vehement evil desires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom these things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater virtue than temperance.
Obj. 3: Further, the will is a more excellent power than the concupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is in the concupiscible, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore continence is a greater virtue than temperance.
_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to a princ.i.p.al virtue.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), continence has a twofold signification. In one way it denotes cessation from all venereal pleasures; and if continence be taken in this sense, it is greater than temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what we said above (Q. 152, A. 5) concerning the preeminence of virginity over chast.i.ty considered absolutely. In another way continence may be taken as denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires when they are vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far greater than continence, because the good of a virtue derives its praise from that which is in accord with reason. Now the good of reason flourishes more in the temperate man than in the continent man, because in the former even the sensitive appet.i.te is obedient to reason, being tamed by reason so to speak, whereas in the continent man the sensitive appet.i.te strongly resists reason by its evil desires. Hence continence is compared to temperance, as the imperfect to the perfect.
Reply Obj. 1: The pa.s.sage quoted may be understood in two ways. First in reference to the sense in which continence denotes abstinence from all things venereal: and thus it means that "no price is worthy of a continent soul," in the genus of chast.i.ty; since not even the fruitfulness of the flesh which is the purpose of marriage is equalled to the continence of virginity or of widowhood, as stated above (Q. 152, AA. 4, 5). Secondly it may be understood in reference to the general sense in which continence denotes any abstinence from things unlawful: and thus it means that "no price is worthy of a continent soul," because its value is not measured with gold or silver, which are appreciable according to weight.
Reply Obj. 2: The strength or weakness of concupiscence may proceed from two causes. For sometimes it is owing to a bodily cause: because some people by their natural temperament are more p.r.o.ne to concupiscence than others; and again opportunities for pleasure which inflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than for others. Such like weakness of concupiscence diminishes merit, whereas strength of concupiscence increases it. On the other hand, weakness or strength of concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spiritual cause, for instance the vehemence of charity, or the strength of reason, as in the case of a temperate man. In this way weakness of concupiscence, by reason of its cause, increases merit, whereas strength of concupiscence diminishes it.
Reply Obj. 3: The will is more akin to the reason than the concupiscible power is. Wherefore the good of reason--on account of which virtue is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to the will but also to the concupiscible power, as happens in the temperate man--is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the will, as in the case of one who is continent.
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QUESTION 156
OF INCONTINENCE (In Four Articles)
We must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?
(2) Whether incontinence is a sin?
(3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance;
(4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in desire?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 1]
Whether Incontinence Pertains to the Soul or to the Body?
Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body. For s.e.xual diversity comes not from the soul but from the body. Now s.e.xual diversity causes diversity of incontinence: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described either as continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body.
Obj. 2: Further, that which pertains to the soul does not result from the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the bodily temperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is especially people of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper whose incontinence is one of unbridled desire." Therefore incontinence regards the body.
Obj. 3: Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent, because "the flesh l.u.s.teth against the spirit," and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul.
_On the contrary,_ Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the soul. Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for we ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly on the part of the soul.
_I answer that,_ Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the part of the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is owing to a bodily disposition that vehement pa.s.sions can arise in the sensitive appet.i.te which is a power of the organic body. Yet these pa.s.sions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient cause of incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so long as the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his pa.s.sions. If, however, the pa.s.sions gain such strength as to take away the use of reason altogether--as in the case of those who become insane through the vehemence of their pa.s.sions--the essential conditions of continence or incontinence cease, because such people do not retain the judgment of reason, which the continent man follows and the incontinent forsakes. From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence is on the part of the soul, which fails to resist a pa.s.sion by the reason. This happens in two ways, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7): first, when the soul yields to the pa.s.sions, before the reason has given its counsel; and this is called "unbridled incontinence" or "impetuosity": secondly, when a man does not stand to what has been counselled, through holding weakly to reason"s judgment; wherefore this kind of incontinence is called "weakness." Hence it is manifest that incontinence pertains chiefly to the soul.
Reply Obj. 1: The human soul is the form of the body, and has certain powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these organs conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from the senses, and the will is urged by pa.s.sions of the sensitive appet.i.te. Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak temperament, the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds to it weakly; although in rare cases the opposite occurs, according to Prov. 31:10, "Who shall find a valiant woman?"
And since small and weak things "are accounted as though they were not" [*Aristotle, _Phys._ ii, 5] the Philosopher speaks of women as though they had not the firm judgment of reason, although the contrary happens in some women. Hence he states that "we do not describe women as being continent, because they are vacillating"
through being unstable of reason, and "are easily led" so that they follow their pa.s.sions readily.
Reply Obj. 2: It is owing to the impulse of pa.s.sion that a man at once follows his pa.s.sion before his reason counsels him. Now the impulse of pa.s.sion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious persons [*Cf. I-II, Q. 46, A. 5], or from its vehemence, as in the melancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most vehemently aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand to that which is counselled, because he holds to it in weakly fashion by reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with regard to woman (ad 1). This is also the case with phlegmatic temperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not a sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain negligence of the spirit in not resisting strongly.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 2]
Whether Incontinence Is a Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "No man sins in what he cannot avoid." Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to Wis. 8:21, "I know [Vulg.: "knew"] that I could not ... be continent, except G.o.d gave it." Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, no one sins in loving G.o.d vehemently. Now a man becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul, through incontinence of divine love, exclaimed: I live, now not I" (Gal. 2:20). Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
_On the contrary,_ It is numbered together with other sins (2 Tim.
3:3) where it is written: "Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful," etc.
Therefore incontinence is a sin.
_I answer that,_ Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence (Q. 155, A. 2). In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first, because the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in accord with reason; secondly, because he plunges into shameful pleasures.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "incontinence is censurable not only because it is wrong"--that is, by straying from reason--"but also because it is wicked"--that is, by following evil desires. Secondly, incontinence about a matter is considered, properly--inasmuch as it is a straying from reason--but not simply; for instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason in his desire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in themselves. About such things there is incontinence, not simply but relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence (Q.
155, A. 2, ad 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from the fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails to observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of themselves desirable.
Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but metaphorically, for instance about the desires for things of which one cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may be said to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because just as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even so is a man entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with reason. Such like incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the perfection of virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without G.o.d"s help, according to John 15:5: "Without Me you can do nothing."
Wherefore the fact that man needs G.o.d"s help in order to be continent, does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3, "what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a way, ourselves."
Reply Obj. 2: The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through a certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting the pa.s.sion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument takes incontinence metaphorically and not properly.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 3]