Whether the Incontinent Man Sins More Gravely Than the Intemperate?
Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to Luke 12:47, "That servant who knew the will of his lord ... and did not ... shall be beaten with many stripes." Now the incontinent man would seem to act against his conscience more than the intemperate because, according to _Ethic._ vii, 3, the incontinent man, though knowing how wicked are the things he desires, nevertheless acts through pa.s.sion, whereas the intemperate man judges what he desires to be good.
Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
Obj. 2: Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more incurable it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most grave, are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence would appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a person"s sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly are no good to the incontinent man, since he knows he is doing wrong, and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the intemperate man that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be admonished. Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
Obj. 3: Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate, since the incontinent man has vehement pa.s.sions and desires, which the intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
_On the contrary,_ Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12, 13) that "impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost." Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) "the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent, for he holds on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined to repentance." Therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely than the incontinent.
_I answer that,_ According to Augustine [*De Duab. Anim. x, xi] sin is chiefly an act of the will, because "by the will we sin and live aright" [*Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a greater inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas in the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a pa.s.sion. And since pa.s.sion soon pa.s.ses, whereas a habit is "a disposition difficult to remove," the result is that the incontinent man repents at once, as soon as the pa.s.sion has pa.s.sed; but not so the intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned, because the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit.
Wherefore in reference to such persons it is written (Prov. 2:14) that "they are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things." Hence it follows that "the intemperate man is much worse than the incontinent," as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
vii, 7).
Reply Obj. 1: Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the inclination of the appet.i.te and causes it, and then the greater the ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in so far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in the reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appet.i.te, and then such like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin, because the inclination of the appet.i.te is shown thereby to be greater. Now in both the incontinent and the intemperate man, ignorance arises from the appet.i.te being inclined to something, either by pa.s.sion, as in the incontinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless greater ignorance results thus in the intemperate than in the incontinent. In one respect as regards duration, since in the incontinent man this ignorance lasts only while the pa.s.sion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the ignorance of the intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of the endurance of the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any chronic disease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect the ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the thing ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some particular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must choose this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man"s ignorance is about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing good, in order that he may follow his desires without being curbed.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7, 8) that "the incontinent man is better than the intemperate, because he retains the best principle [*_To beltiston, e arche_, "the best thing, i.e. the principle"]," to wit, the right estimate of the end.
Reply Obj. 2: Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent man, for he needs the inward a.s.sistance of grace which quenches concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy of admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above (Q. 142, A. 2). By these same means the intemperate man can be cured. But his curing is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is on the part of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end, which holds the same position as the principle in demonstrations. Now it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs as to the principle; and it is the same in practical matters with one who errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part of the inclination of the appet.i.te: for in the intemperate man this proceeds from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the inclination of the incontinent man proceeds from a pa.s.sion, which is more easily suppressed.
Reply Obj. 3: The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin, is greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appet.i.te is sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man sins even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the intemperate man, "because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with calm," i.e. slight desire. "For what would he have done if he had desired it with pa.s.sion?"
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 4]
Whether the Incontinent in Anger Is Worse Than the Incontinent in Desire?
Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to resist the pa.s.sion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): "It is not wonderful, indeed it is pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains." Now, "as Herac.l.i.tus says, it is more difficult to resist desire than anger" [*Ethic. ii. 3].
Therefore incontinence of desire is less grievous than incontinence of anger.
Obj. 2: Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the pa.s.sion be so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as in the case of one who becomes demented through pa.s.sion. Now he that is incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one who is incontinent in desire: since "anger listens to reason somewhat, but desire does not" as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire.
Obj. 3: Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is.
Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since it leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads.
Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of desire."
_I answer that,_ The sin of incontinence may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the pa.s.sion which occasions the downfall of reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than incontinence of anger, because the movement of desire is more inordinate than the movement of anger. There are four reasons for this, and the Philosopher indicates them, _Ethic._ vii, 6: First, because the movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason, since the angry man tends to avenge the injury done to him, and reason dictates this in a certain degree. Yet he does not tend thereto perfectly, because he does not intend the due mode of vengeance. On the other hand, the movement of desire is altogether in accord with sense and nowise in accord with reason. Secondly, because the movement of anger results more from the bodily temperament owing to the quickness of the movement of the bile which tends to anger. Hence one who by bodily temperament is disposed to anger is more readily angry than one who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent: wherefore also it happens more often that the children of those who are disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger, than that the children of those who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed to concupiscence. Now that which results from the natural disposition of the body is deemed more deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because anger seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise itself and creeps in by stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject to concupiscence works with pleasure, whereas the angry man works as though forced by a certain previous displeasure.
Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to the evil into which one falls through forsaking reason; and thus incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because it leads to things that are harmful to one"s neighbor.
Reply Obj. 1: It is more difficult to resist pleasure perseveringly than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for the moment it is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its impetuousness.
Reply Obj. 2: Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not as though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because nowise does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it is more disgraceful.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers incontinence with regard to its result.
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QUESTION 157
OF CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS (In Four Articles)
We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices.
Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical?
(2) Whether each of them is a virtue?
(3) Whether each is a part of temperance?
(4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 1]
Whether Clemency and Meekness Are Absolutely the Same?
Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is "desire of vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet.
ii, 2]. Since, then, clemency "is leniency of a superior in inflicting punishment on an inferior," as Seneca states (De Clementia ii, 3), and vengeance is taken by means of punishment, it would seem that clemency and meekness are the same.
Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that "clemency is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person," so that apparently clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine [*Ep. ccxi], hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and clemency. Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely the same.
Obj. 3: Further, the same vice is not opposed to different virtues.
But the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and clemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are absolutely the same.
_On the contrary,_ According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca (Obj. 1) "clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior": whereas meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each to everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely the same.
_I answer that,_ As stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, a moral virtue is "about pa.s.sions and actions." Now internal pa.s.sions are principles of external actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore virtues that moderate pa.s.sions, to a certain extent, concur towards the same effect as virtues that moderate actions, although they differ specifically. Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain man from theft, whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire of money, which is restrained by liberality; so that liberality concurs with justice towards the effect, which is abstention from theft. This applies to the case in point; because through the pa.s.sion of anger a man is provoked to inflict a too severe punishment, while it belongs directly to clemency to mitigate punishment, and this might be prevented by excessive anger.
Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of anger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet they differ from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment, while meekness properly mitigates the pa.s.sion of anger.
Reply Obj. 1: Meekness regards properly the desire itself of vengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is applied externally for the purpose of vengeance.
Reply Obj. 2: Man"s affections incline to the moderation of things that are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from one man loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter"s punishment in itself, but only as directed to something else, for instance justice, or the correction of the person punished. Hence love makes one quick to mitigate punishment--and this pertains to clemency--while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this reason Tully says that "the mind provoked to hatred" that is to punish too severely, "is restrained by clemency," from inflicting too severe a punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred but punishment.
Reply Obj. 3: The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the pa.s.sion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly concerned with the pa.s.sion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in punishing. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in punishing." Those who delight in a man"s punishment for its own sake may be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human feeling that leads one man to love another.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 2]
Whether Both Clemency and Meekness Are Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, "Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect" [*Ethic.
ii, 2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain decrease; for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases anger.
Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.