_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said (Wis. 8) of Divine wisdom.
_I answer that,_ We may consider the order of Divine providence in two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government.
Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly from the fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to good, and everything by its own operation and effort tends to good only, "for no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv): secondly from the fact that, as we have said above (A. 1, ad 3; A. 5, ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of its own accord. For this reason G.o.d is said "to order all things sweetly."
Reply Obj. 1: Some are said to think or speak, or act against G.o.d: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government; for even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 2 is clear from the above.
Reply Obj. 3: From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause; but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.
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QUESTION 104
THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT (In Four Articles)
We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular; concerning which four points of inquiry arise:
(1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by G.o.d?
(2) Whether they are immediately preserved by G.o.d?
(3) Whether G.o.d can reduce anything to nothingness?
(4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 1]
Whether Creatures Need to Be Kept in Being by G.o.d?
Objection 1: It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by G.o.d. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. But some creatures by their very nature cannot not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by G.o.d.
The middle proposition is proved thus. That which is included in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself, because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels (Q. 50, AA. 2, 5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies (Q. 66, A.
2). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality to not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose, since it is not in potentiality to any other form.
Obj. 2: Further, G.o.d is more powerful than any created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect to be preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for some time after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can G.o.d cause His creature to be kept in being, after He has ceased to create it.
Obj. 3: Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be.
Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through some active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to not-being, even if G.o.d were to withdraw His action.
Obj. 4: Further, if G.o.d keeps creatures in being, this is done by some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious, produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving power of G.o.d must produce something in the creature. But this is not so; because this action does not give being to the creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does it add anything new to the creature; because either G.o.d would not keep the creature in being continually, or He would be continually adding something new to the creature; either of which is unreasonable. Therefore creatures are not kept in being by G.o.d.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 1:3): "Upholding all things by the word of His power."
_I answer that,_ Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by G.o.d. To make this clear, we must consider that a thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. In this way G.o.d preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said to preserve another _per se_ and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by G.o.d. For the being of every creature depends on G.o.d, so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi).
This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an agent may be the cause of the _becoming_ of its effect, but not directly of its _being._ This may be seen both in artificial and in natural beings: for the builder causes the house in its _becoming,_ but he is not the direct cause of its _being._ For it is clear that the _being_ of the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the _being_ of a house depends on the nature of these materials, just as its _becoming_ depends on the action of the builder. The same principle applies to natural things. For if an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of _being_ which results from that form; but it will be the cause of the effect, in its _becoming_ only.
Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other"s form as such, since it would then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is in matter--in other words, it may be the cause that "this matter"
receives _this form._ And this is to be the cause of _becoming,_ as when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural effect is such that it has an apt.i.tude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause, then the _becoming_ of the effect, but not its _being,_ depends on the agent.
Sometimes, however, the effect has not this apt.i.tude to receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of _becoming_ but also the cause of _being._
Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the _becoming_ of the effect: so neither can the _being_ of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in _becoming_ but also in _being._ This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire"s action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the fire"s heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect partic.i.p.ation of the principle of heat. On the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. Therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun.
Now every creature may be compared to G.o.d, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun"s nature; so G.o.d alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by partic.i.p.ation, so that its essence is not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. iv, 12): "If the ruling power of G.o.d were withdrawn from His creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse." In the same work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says: "As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of G.o.d, and in His absence returns at once to darkness."
Reply Obj. 1: _Being_ naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun.
Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and heavenly bodies is rather something in G.o.d, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.
Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by G.o.d in so far as the being of an effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of _being_ but only of _becoming._
Reply Obj. 3: This argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not need to be preserved thus, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 4: The preservation of things by G.o.d is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 2]
Whether G.o.d Preserves Every Creature Immediately?
Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d preserves every creature immediately. For G.o.d creates and preserves things by the same action, as above stated (A. 1, ad 4). But G.o.d created all things immediately.
Therefore He preserves all things immediately.
Obj. 2: Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore G.o.d preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them.
Obj. 3: Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its _becoming,_ but also of its being. But all created causes do not seem to cause their effects except in their _becoming,_ for they cause only by moving, as above stated (Q. 45, A. 3). Therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being.
_On the contrary,_ A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being. But G.o.d gives being by means of certain intermediate causes.
Therefore He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a thing keeps another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or hindering the action of a corrupting cause; secondly, directly and _per se,_ by the fact that that on it depends the other"s being, as the being of the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corporeal things there are many causes which hinder the action of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and in like manner with many other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For when we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and princ.i.p.ally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the princ.i.p.al cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause.
For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated; whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like manner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those things which are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that G.o.d keeps certain things in being, by means of certain causes.
Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d created all things immediately, but in the creation itself He established an order among things, so that some depend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He remains the princ.i.p.al cause of their preservation.
Reply Obj. 2: Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving another.
Reply Obj. 3: No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue of some change; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it is lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken place, while the preservation of the light is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the source of light.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 3]
Whether G.o.d Can Annihilate Anything?
Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d cannot annihilate anything. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that "G.o.d is not the cause of anything tending to non-existence." But He would be such a cause if He were to annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate anything.