Whether Command and the Commanded Act Are One Act, or Distinct?
Objection 1: It would seem that the commanded act is not one with the command itself. For the acts of different powers are themselves distinct. But the commanded act belongs to one power, and the command to another; since one is the power that commands, and the other is the power that receives the command. Therefore the commanded act is not one with the command.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever things can be separate from one another, are distinct: for nothing is severed from itself. But sometimes the commanded act is separate from the command: for sometimes the command is given, and the commanded act follows not. Therefore command is a distinct act from the act commanded.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever things are related to one another as precedent and consequent, are distinct. But command naturally precedes the commanded act. Therefore they are distinct.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "where one thing is by reason of another, there is but one." But there is no commanded act unless by reason of the command. Therefore they are one.
_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents certain things being distinct in one respect, and one in another respect. Indeed, every mult.i.tude is one in some respect, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xiii). But a difference is to be observed in this, that some are simply many, and one in a particular aspect: while with others it is the reverse. Now "one" is predicated in the same way as "being." And substance is being simply, whereas accident or being "of reason" is a being only in a certain respect. Wherefore those things that are one in substance are one simply, though many in a certain respect. Thus, in the genus substance, the whole composed of its integral or essential parts, is one simply: because the whole is being and substance simply, and the parts are being and substances in the whole. But those things which are distinct in substance, and one according to an accident, are distinct simply, and one in a certain respect: thus many men are one people, and many stones are one heap; which is unity of composition or order. In like manner also many individuals that are one in genus or species are many simply, and one in a certain respect: since to be one in genus or species is to be one according to the consideration of the reason.
Now just as in the genus of natural things, a whole is composed of matter and form (e.g. man, who is one natural being, though he has many parts, is composed of soul and body); so, in human acts, the act of a lower power is in the position of matter in regard to the act of a higher power, in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power moving it: for thus also the act of the first mover is as the form in regard to the act of its instrument. Hence it is evident that command and the commanded act are one human act, just as a whole is one, yet in its parts, many.
Reply Obj. 1: If the distinct powers are not ordained to one another, their acts are diverse simply. But when one power is the mover of the other, then their acts are, in a way, one: since "the act of the mover and the act of the thing moved are one act" (Phys. iii, 3).
Reply Obj. 2: The fact that command and the commanded act can be separated from one another shows that they are different parts.
Because the parts of a man can be separated from one another, and yet they form one whole.
Reply Obj. 3: In those things that are many in parts, but one as a whole, nothing hinders one part from preceding another. Thus the soul, in a way, precedes the body; and the heart, the other members.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 5]
Whether the Act of the Will Is Commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the will is not commanded.
For Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands the mind to will, and yet it does not." But to will is the act of the will.
Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
Obj. 2: Further, to receive a command belongs to one who can understand the command. But the will cannot understand the command; for the will differs from the intellect, to which it belongs to understand. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
Obj. 3: Further, if one act of the will is commanded, for the same reason all are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are commanded, we must needs proceed to infinity; because the act of the will precedes the act of reason commanding, as stated above (A. 1); for if that act of the will be also commanded, this command will be preceded by another act of the reason, and so on to infinity. But to proceed to infinity is not possible. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever is in our power, is subject to our command. But the acts of the will, most of all, are in our power; since all our acts are said to be in our power, in so far as they are voluntary. Therefore the acts of the will are commanded by us.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), command is nothing else than the act of the reason directing, with a certain motion, something to act. Now it is evident that the reason can direct the act of the will: for just as it can judge it to be good to will something, so it can direct by commanding man to will. From this it is evident that an act of the will can be commanded.
Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9) when the mind commands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills: but that sometimes it commands and wills not, is due to the fact that it commands imperfectly. Now imperfect command arises from the fact that the reason is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command: wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to command perfectly.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as each of the members of the body works not for itself alone but for the whole body; thus it is for the whole body that the eye sees; so is it with the powers of the soul. For the intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers; and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too.
Wherefore man, in so far as he is endowed with intellect and will, commands the act of the will for himself.
Reply Obj. 3: Since command is an act of reason, that act is commanded which is subject to reason. Now the first act of the will is not due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of nature, or of a higher cause, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 4).
Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 6]
Whether the Act of the Reason Is Commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the reason cannot be commanded. For it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. But it is the reason that commands, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the act of the reason is not commanded.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is essential is different from that which is by partic.i.p.ation. But the power whose act is commanded by reason, is rational by partic.i.p.ation, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13. Therefore the act of that power, which is essentially rational, is not commanded.
Obj. 3: Further, that act is commanded, which is in our power. But to know and judge the truth, which is the act of reason, is not always in our power. Therefore the act of the reason cannot be commanded.
_On the contrary,_ That which we do of our free-will, can be done by our command. But the acts of the reason are accomplished through the free-will: for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "by his free-will man inquires, considers, judges, approves." Therefore the acts of the reason can be commanded.
_I answer that,_ Since the reason reacts on itself, just as it directs the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act.
Consequently its act can be commanded.
But we must take note that the act of the reason may be considered in two ways. First, as to the exercise of the act. And considered thus, the act of the reason can always be commanded: as when one is told to be attentive, and to use one"s reason. Secondly, as to the object; in respect of which two acts of the reason have to be noticed. One is the act whereby it apprehends the truth about something. This act is not in our power: because it happens in virtue of a natural or supernatural light. Consequently in this respect, the act of the reason is not in our power, and cannot be commanded. The other act of the reason is that whereby it a.s.sents to what it apprehends. If, therefore, that which the reason apprehends is such that it naturally a.s.sents thereto, e.g. the first principles, it is not in our power to a.s.sent or dissent to the like: a.s.sent follows naturally, and consequently, properly speaking, is not subject to our command. But some things which are apprehended do not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it free to a.s.sent or dissent, or at least suspend its a.s.sent or dissent, on account of some cause or other; and in such things a.s.sent or dissent is in our power, and is subject to our command.
Reply Obj. 1: Reason commands itself, just as the will moves itself, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 3), that is to say, in so far as each power reacts on its own acts, and from one thing tends to another.
Reply Obj. 2: On account of the diversity of objects subject to the act of the reason, nothing prevents the reason from partic.i.p.ating in itself: thus the knowledge of principles is partic.i.p.ated in the knowledge of the conclusions.
The reply to the third object is evident from what has been said.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 7]
Whether the Act of the Sensitive Appet.i.te Is Commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the sensitive appet.i.te is not commanded. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:15): "For I do not that good which I will": and a gloss explains this by saying that man l.u.s.ts, although he wills not to l.u.s.t. But to l.u.s.t is an act of the sensitive appet.i.te. Therefore the act of the sensitive appet.i.te is not subject to our command.
Obj. 2: Further, corporeal matter obeys G.o.d alone, to the effect of formal trans.m.u.tation, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 65, A. 4; Q.
91, A. 2; Q. 110, A. 2). But the act of the sensitive appet.i.te is accompanied by a formal trans.m.u.tation of the body, consisting in heat or cold. Therefore the act of the sensitive appet.i.te is not subject to man"s command.
Obj. 3: Further, the proper motive principle of the sensitive appet.i.te is something apprehended by sense or imagination. But it is not always in our power to apprehend something by sense or imagination. Therefore the act of the sensitive appet.i.te is not subject to our command.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.]
says: "That which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible and the irascible," which belong to the sensitive appet.i.te. Therefore the act of the sensitive appet.i.te is subject to the command of reason.
_I answer that,_ An act is subject to our command, in so far as it is in our power, as stated above (A. 5). Consequently in order to understand in what manner the act of the sensitive appet.i.te is subject to the command of reason, we must consider in what manner it is in our power. Now it must be observed that the sensitive appet.i.te differs from the intellective appet.i.te, which is called the will, in the fact that the sensitive appet.i.te is a power of a corporeal organ, whereas the will is not. Again, every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ, depends not only on a power of the soul, but also on the disposition of that corporeal organ: thus the act of vision depends on the power of sight, and on the condition of the eye, which condition is a help or a hindrance to that act. Consequently the act of the sensitive appet.i.te depends not only on the appet.i.tive power, but also on the disposition of the body.
Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act, follows apprehension. And the apprehension of the imagination, being a particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason, which is universal; just as a particular active power is regulated by a universal active power. Consequently in this respect the act of the sensitive appet.i.te is subject to the command of reason. On the other hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the command of reason: and consequently in this respect, the movement of the sensitive appet.i.te is hindered from being wholly subject to the command of reason.
Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive appet.i.te is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the imagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the command of reason: although reason could have prevented it, had it foreseen. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the reason governs the irascible and concupiscible not by a "despotic supremacy," which is that of a master over his slave; but by a "politic and royal supremacy," whereby the free are governed, who are not wholly subject to command.
Reply Obj. 1: That man l.u.s.ts, although he wills not to l.u.s.t, is due to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appet.i.te is hindered from perfect compliance with the command of reason. Hence the Apostle adds (Rom. 7:15): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind." This may also happen through a sudden movement of concupiscence, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: The condition of the body stands in a twofold relation to the act of the sensitive appet.i.te. First, as preceding it: thus a man may be disposed in one way or another, in respect of his body, to this or that pa.s.sion. Secondly, as consequent to it: thus a man becomes heated through anger. Now the condition that precedes, is not subject to the command of reason: since it is due either to nature, or to some previous movement, which cannot cease at once. But the condition that is consequent, follows the command of reason: since it results from the local movement of the heart, which has various movements according to the various acts of the sensitive appet.i.te.
Reply Obj. 3: Since the external sensible is necessary for the apprehension of the senses, it is not in our power to apprehend anything by the senses, unless the sensible be present; which presence of the sensible is not always in our power. For it is then that man can use his senses if he will so to do; unless there be some obstacle on the part of the organ. On the other hand, the apprehension of the imagination is subject to the ordering of reason, in proportion to the strength or weakness of the imaginative power.
For that man is unable to imagine the things that reason considers, is either because they cannot be imagined, such as incorporeal things; or because of the weakness of the imaginative power, due to some organic indisposition.
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