Obj. 3: Further, it has been stated above (Q. 42, A. 3) that those things which occur by our own doing are not fearful. But that which we do from love, is done from our inmost heart. Therefore fear is not caused by love.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): "There can be no doubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love, when we possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope for."
Therefore all fear is caused by our loving something: and consequently love is the cause of fear.
_I answer that,_ The objects of the soul"s pa.s.sions stand in relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial: because the pa.s.sions of the soul take their species from their objects, as the aforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever is a cause of the form, is a cause of the thing const.i.tuted by that form, so whatever is a cause, in any way whatever, of the object, is a cause of the pa.s.sion. Now a thing may be a cause of the object, either by way of efficient cause, or by way of material disposition.
Thus the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable and conjoined: and its efficient cause is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitableness, or goodness, or apprehension of that good thing; while its cause by way of material disposition, is a habit or any sort of disposition by reason of which this conjoined good becomes suitable or is apprehended as such.
Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and difficult to avoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, and, consequently, of fear itself. While that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him, is a cause of fear and of its object, by way of material disposition. And thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through his loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears it as an evil.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 42, A. 1), fear, of itself and in the first place, regards the evil from which it recoils as being contrary to some loved good: and thus fear, of itself, is born of love. But, in the second place, it regards the cause from which that evil ensues: so that sometimes, accidentally, fear gives rise to love; in so far as, for instance, through fear of G.o.d"s punishments, man keeps His commandments, and thus begins to hope, while hope leads to love, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 7).
Reply Obj. 2: He, from whom evil is expected, is indeed hated at first; but afterwards, when once we begin to hope for good from him, we begin to love him. But the good, the contrary evil of which is feared, was loved from the beginning.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument is true of that which is the efficient cause of the evil to be feared: whereas love causes fear by way of material disposition, as stated above.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 43, Art. 2]
Whether Defect Is the Cause of Fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that defect is not a cause of fear.
Because those who are in power are very much feared. But defect is contrary to power. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.
Obj. 2: Further, the defect of those who are already being executed is extreme. But such like do not fear as stated in _Rhet._ ii, 5.
Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.
Obj. 3: Further, contests arise from strength not from defect. But "those who contend fear those who contend with them" (Rhet. ii, 5).
Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.
_On the contrary,_ Contraries ensue from contrary causes. But "wealth, strength, a mult.i.tude of friends, and power drive fear away"
(Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore fear is caused by lack of these.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), fear may be set down to a twofold cause: one is by way of a material disposition, on the part of him that fears; the other is by way of efficient cause, on the part of the person feared. As to the first then, some defect is, of itself, the cause of fear: for it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil. And yet, in order to cause fear, this defect must be according to a measure. For the defect which causes fear of a future evil, is less than the defect caused by evil present, which is the object of sorrow. And still greater would be the defect, if perception of the evil, or love of the good whose contrary is feared, were entirely absent.
But as to the second, power and strength are, of themselves, the cause of fear: because it is owing to the fact that the cause apprehended as harmful is powerful, that its effect cannot be repulsed. It may happen, however, in this respect, that some defect causes fear accidentally, in so far as owing to some defect someone wishes to hurt another; for instance, by reason of injustice, either because that other has already done him a harm, or because he fears to be harmed by him.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument is true of the cause of fear, on the part of the efficient cause.
Reply Obj. 2: Those who are already being executed, are actually suffering from a present evil; wherefore their defect exceeds the measure of fear.
Reply Obj. 3: Those who contend with one another are afraid, not on account of the power which enables them to contend: but on account of the lack of power, owing to which they are not confident of victory.
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QUESTION 44
OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the effects of fear: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear causes contraction?
(2) Whether it makes men suitable for counsel?
(3) Whether it makes one tremble?
(4) Whether it hinders action?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 44, Art. 1]
Whether Fear Causes Contraction?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not cause contraction. For when contraction takes place, the heat and vital spirits are withdrawn inwardly. But acc.u.mulation of heat and vital spirits in the interior parts of the body, dilates the heart unto endeavors of daring, as may be seen in those who are angered: while the contrary happens in those who are afraid. Therefore fear does not cause contraction.
Obj. 2: Further, when, as a result of contraction, the vital spirits and heat are acc.u.mulated in the interior parts, man cries out, as may be seen in those who are in pain. But those who fear utter nothing: on the contrary they lose their speech. Therefore fear does not cause contraction.
Obj. 3: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above (Q. 41, A.
4). But "those who are ashamed blush," as Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc.
iv, 8), and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9) observe. But blushing is an indication, not of contraction, but of the reverse. Therefore contraction is not an effect of fear.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that "fear is a power according to _systole_," i.e. contraction.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 28, A. 5), in the pa.s.sions of the soul, the formal element is the movement of the appet.i.tive power, while the bodily trans.m.u.tation is the material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily trans.m.u.tation a.s.sumes a resemblance to and the very nature of the appet.i.tive movement. Now, as to the appet.i.tive movement of the soul, fear implies a certain contraction: the reason of which is that fear arises from the imagination of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel, as stated above (Q. 41, A. 2). But that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as stated above (Q.
43, A. 2): and the weaker a power is, the fewer the things to which it extends. Wherefore from the very imagination that causes fear there ensues a certain contraction in the appet.i.te. Thus we observe in one who is dying that nature withdraws inwardly, on account of the lack of power: and again we see the inhabitants of a city, when seized with fear, leave the outskirts, and, as far as possible, make for the inner quarters. It is in resemblance to this contraction, which pertains to the appet.i.te of the soul, that in fear a similar contraction of heat and vital spirits towards the inner parts takes place in regard to the body.
Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3), although in those who fear, the vital spirits recede from outer to the inner parts of the body, yet the movement of vital spirits is not the same in those who are angry and those who are afraid. For in those who are angry, by reason of the heat and subtlety of the vital spirits, which result from the craving for vengeance, the inward movement has an upward direction: wherefore the vital spirits and heat concentrate around the heart: the result being that an angry man is quick and brave in attacking. But in those who are afraid, on account of the condensation caused by cold, the vital spirits have a downward movement; the said cold being due to the imagined lack of power. Consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon the heart instead of concentrating around it: the result being that a man who is afraid is not quick to attack, but is more inclined to run away.
Reply Obj. 2: To everyone that is in pain, whether man or animal, it is natural to use all possible means of repelling the harmful thing that causes pain but its presence: thus we observe that animals, when in pain, attack with their jaws or with their horns. Now the greatest help for all purposes, in animals, is heat and vital spirits: wherefore when they are in pain, their nature stores up the heat and vital spirits within them, in order to make use thereof in repelling the harmful object. Hence the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 9) when the vital spirits and heat are concentrated together within, they require to find a vent in the voice: for which reason those who are in pain can scarcely refrain from crying aloud. On the other hand, in those who are afraid, the internal heat and vital spirits move from the heart downwards, as stated above (ad 1): wherefore fear hinders speech which ensues from the emission of the vital spirits in an upward direction through the mouth: the result being that fear makes its subject speechless. For this reason, too, fear "makes its subject tremble," as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 1, 6, 7).
Reply Obj. 3: Mortal perils are contrary not only to the appet.i.te of the soul, but also to nature. Consequently in such like fear, there is contraction not only in the appet.i.te, but also in the corporeal nature: for when an animal is moved by the imagination of death, it experiences a contraction of heat towards the inner parts of the body, as though it were threatened by a natural death. Hence it is that "those who are in fear of death turn pale" (Ethic. iv, 9). But the evil that shame fears, is contrary, not to nature, but only to the appet.i.te of the soul. Consequently there results a contraction in this appet.i.te, but not in the corporeal nature; in fact, the soul, as though contracted in itself, is free to set the vital spirits and heat in movement, so that they spread to the outward parts of the body: the result being that those who are ashamed blush.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 44, Art. 2]
Whether Fear Makes One Suitable for Counsel?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not make one suitable for counsel. For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel, and a hindrance thereto. But fear hinders counsel: because every pa.s.sion disturbs repose, which is requisite for the good use of reason.
Therefore fear does not make a man suitable for counsel.
Obj. 2: Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking and deliberating about the future. But a certain fear "drives away all thought, and dislocates the mind," as Cicero observes (De Quaest.
Tusc. iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel, but hinders it.
Obj. 3: Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas fear is of evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be obtained. Therefore fear is not more conducive to counsel, than hope is.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes men of counsel."
_I answer that,_ A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First, from his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear makes men of counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "we take counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust ourselves." Now things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but have a certain magnitude, both because they seem difficult to repel, and because they are apprehended as near to us, as stated above (Q.
42, A. 2). Wherefore men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid.