This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 5]
Whether Hope Is a Theological Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For a theological virtue is one that has G.o.d for its object. Now hope has for its object not only G.o.d but also other goods which we hope to obtain from G.o.d. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 64, A. 4). But hope is a mean between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a species of fort.i.tude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.
Obj. 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith and charity, which are theological virtues.
_I answer that,_ Since specific differences, by their very nature, divide a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place hope, we must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.
Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that hope has the character of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as much as it leans on its a.s.sistance, and as its last final cause, in as much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is evident that G.o.d is the princ.i.p.al object of hope, considered as a virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one that has G.o.d for its object, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 1), it is evident that hope is a theological virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it in reference to G.o.d as the last end, or as the first efficient cause, as stated above (A. 4).
Reply Obj. 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in the measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes.
Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and these things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to follow the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a theological virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by another rule, and that Rule is its proper object. Wherefore it is not proper for a theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to follow the mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with regard to something that is referred to its princ.i.p.al object. Thus faith can have no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on the part of the things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for instance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has no mean or extremes, as regards its princ.i.p.al object, since it is impossible to trust too much in the Divine a.s.sistance; yet it may have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to obtain, in so far as he either presumes above his capability, or despairs of things of which he is capable.
Reply Obj. 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which belongs to longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine a.s.sistance, whether that which we hope for be delayed or not.
Reply Obj. 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of obtaining something that is within one"s power, wherefore its proper object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by another"s help, as stated above (A. 1).
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 6]
Whether Hope Is Distinct from the Other Theological Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects, as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the object of hope is the same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make profession of faith, we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come." Now expectation of future happiness belongs to hope, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore hope is not distinct from faith.
Obj. 3: Further, by hope man tends to G.o.d. But this belongs properly to charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.
_On the contrary,_ There cannot be number without distinction. Now hope is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says (Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity.
Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues.
_I answer that,_ A virtue is said to be theological from having G.o.d for the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in two ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else is attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to G.o.d for His own sake, uniting our minds to G.o.d by the emotion of love.
On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to G.o.d as to a principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from G.o.d both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness.
Accordingly faith makes us adhere to G.o.d, as the source whence we derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what G.o.d tells us is true: while hope makes us adhere to G.o.d, as the source whence we derive perfect goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the Divine a.s.sistance for obtaining happiness.
Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d is the object of these virtues under different aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the object suffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2).
Reply Obj. 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith, not as though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of hope presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on (A. 7).
Hence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.
Reply Obj. 3: Hope makes us tend to G.o.d, as to a good to be obtained finally, and as to a helper strong to a.s.sist: whereas charity, properly speaking, makes us tend to G.o.d, by uniting our affections to Him, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for G.o.d.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 7]
Whether Hope Precedes Faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss on Ps. 36:3, "Trust in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the entrance to faith and the beginning of salvation." But salvation is by faith whereby we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is included in a definition should precede the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in the definition of faith (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Therefore hope precedes faith.
Obj. 3: Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:10): "He that plougheth should plough in hope ... to receive fruit." But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope precedes faith.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 1:2): "Abraham begot Isaac,"
i.e. "Faith begot hope," according to a gloss.
_I answer that,_ Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the object of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In order, therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of hope to be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in one way, eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine a.s.sistance, as explained above (A. 2; A. 6, ad 3): and both of these are proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able to obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose the Divine a.s.sistance is ready for us, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that cometh to G.o.d, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." Therefore it is evident that faith precedes hope.
Reply Obj. 1: As the same gloss observes further on, "hope" is called "the entrance" to faith, i.e. of the thing believed, because by hope we enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is called the "entrance to faith," because thereby man begins to be established and perfected in faith.
Reply Obj. 2: The thing to be hoped for is included in the definition of faith, because the proper object of faith, is something not apparent in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a circ.u.mlocution by something resulting from faith.
Reply Obj. 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but it suffices for it to accompany or follow it.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 8]
Whether Charity Precedes Hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose says on Luke 27:6, "If you had faith like to a grain of mustard seed," etc.: "Charity flows from faith, and hope from charity." But faith precedes charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "good emotions and affections proceed from love and holy charity." Now to hope, considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul.
Therefore it flows from charity.
Obj. 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope proceeds from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but also hope itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience,"
i.e. "from hope," according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes charity.
_I answer that,_ Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and of matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect: the other is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first order hope precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that hope and all movements of the appet.i.te flow from love, as stated above (I-II, Q. 27, A. 4; I-II, Q. 28, A. 6, ad 2; I-II, Q. 40, A. 7) in the treatise on the pa.s.sions.
Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person some good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but that he may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he desires. The first love of G.o.d pertains to charity, which adheres to G.o.d for His own sake; while hope pertains to the second love, since he that hopes, intends to obtain possession of something for himself.
Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as a man is led to love G.o.d, through fear of being punished by Him for his sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so too, hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be rewarded by G.o.d, is encouraged to love G.o.d and obey His commandments.
On the other hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally precedes hope, wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made more perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this sense that Ambrose states (Obj. 1) that charity flows from hope: so that this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.