Obj. 3: Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical reason, viz. _counsel,_ _judgment_ about what has been counselled, and _command_ [*Cf. Q. 47, A. 8]. Now thought precedes all these acts, since it belongs also to the speculative intellect. Therefore thoughtlessness is not a special sin contained under imprudence.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 4:25): "Let thy eyes look straight on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy steps." Now this pertains to prudence, while the contrary pertains to thoughtlessness.
Therefore thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence.
_I answer that,_ Thought signifies the act of the intellect in considering the truth about something. Now just as research belongs to the reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore in speculative matters a demonstrative science is said to exercise judgment, in so far as it judges the truth of the results of research by tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable principles.
Hence thought pertains chiefly to judgment; and consequently the lack of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, to wit, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of those things on which a right judgment depends. It is therefore evident that thoughtlessness is a sin.
Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when we have the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say, but, in the words quoted, He encourages His disciples, so that when they had no opportunity of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge or through a sudden call, they should trust in the guidance of G.o.d alone, because "as we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to G.o.d," according to 2 Paral. 20:12: else if man, instead of doing what he can, were to be content with awaiting G.o.d"s a.s.sistance, he would seem to tempt G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 2: All thought about those things of which counsel takes cognizance, is directed to the formation of a right judgment, wherefore this thought is perfected in judgment. Consequently thoughtlessness is above all opposed to the rect.i.tude of judgment.
Reply Obj. 3: Thoughtlessness is to be taken here in relation to a determinate matter, namely, that of human action, wherein more things have to be thought about for the purpose of right judgment, than in speculative matters, because actions are about singulars.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 5]
Whether Inconstancy Is a Vice Contained Under Imprudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that inconstancy is not a vice contained under imprudence. For inconstancy consists seemingly in a lack of perseverance in matters of difficulty. But perseverance in difficult matters belongs to fort.i.tude. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to fort.i.tude rather than to prudence.
Obj. 2: Further, it is written (James 3:16): "Where jealousy [Douay: "envy"] and contention are, there are inconstancy and every evil work." But jealousy pertains to envy. Therefore inconstancy pertains not to imprudence but to envy.
Obj. 3: Further, a man would seem to be inconstant who fails to persevere in what he has proposed to do. Now this is a mark of "incontinency" in pleasurable matters, and of "effeminacy" or "squeamishness" in unpleasant matters, according to _Ethic._ vii, 1.
Therefore inconstancy does not pertain to imprudence.
_On the contrary,_ It belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good to the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater good belongs to imprudence. Now this is inconstancy. Therefore inconstancy belongs to imprudence.
_I answer that,_ Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a definite good purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal is in the appet.i.te, for a man does not withdraw from a previous good purpose, except on account of something being inordinately pleasing to him: nor is this withdrawal completed except through a defect of reason, which is deceived in rejecting what before it had rightly accepted. And since it can resist the impulse of the pa.s.sions, if it fail to do this, it is due to its own weakness in not standing to the good purpose it has conceived; hence inconstancy, as to its completion, is due to a defect in the reason. Now just as all rect.i.tude of the practical reason belongs in some degree to prudence, so all lack of that rect.i.tude belongs to imprudence. Consequently inconstancy, as to its completion, belongs to imprudence. And just as precipitation is due to a defect in the act of counsel, and thoughtlessness to a defect in the act of judgment, so inconstancy arises from a defect in the act of command. For a man is stated to be inconstant because his reason fails in commanding what has been counselled and judged.
Reply Obj. 1: The good of prudence is shared by all the moral virtues, and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all moral virtues, chiefly, however, to fort.i.tude, which suffers a greater impulse to the contrary.
Reply Obj. 2: Envy and anger, which are the source of contention, cause inconstancy on the part of the appet.i.te, to which power the origin of inconstancy is due, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: Continency and perseverance seem to be not in the appet.i.tive power, but in the reason. For the continent man suffers evil concupiscences, and the persevering man suffers grievous sorrows (which points to a defect in the appet.i.tive power); but reason stands firm, in the continent man, against concupiscence, and in the persevering man, against sorrow. Hence continency and perseverance seem to be species of constancy which pertains to reason; and to this power inconstancy pertains also.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 6]
Whether the Aforesaid Vices Arise from l.u.s.t?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid vices do not arise from l.u.s.t. For inconstancy arises from envy, as stated above (A. 5, ad 2).
But envy is a distinct vice from l.u.s.t.
Obj. 2: Further, it is written (James 1:8): "A double-minded man is inconstant in all his ways." Now duplicity does not seem to pertain to l.u.s.t, but rather to deceitfulness, which is a daughter of covetousness, according to Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi, 45). Therefore the aforesaid vices do not arise from l.u.s.t.
Obj. 3: Further, the aforesaid vices are connected with some defect of reason. Now spiritual vices are more akin to the reason than carnal vices. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual vices rather than from carnal vices.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory declares (Moral. x.x.xi, 45) that the aforesaid vices arise from l.u.s.t.
_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5) "pleasure above all corrupts the estimate of prudence," and chiefly s.e.xual pleasure which absorbs the mind, and draws it to sensible delight.
Now the perfection of prudence and of every intellectual virtue consists in abstraction from sensible objects. Wherefore, since the aforesaid vices involve a defect of prudence and of the practical reason, as stated above (AA. 2, 5), it follows that they arise chiefly from l.u.s.t.
Reply Obj. 1: Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing away the reason to something else; whereas l.u.s.t causes inconstancy by destroying the judgment of reason entirely. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "the man who is incontinent through anger listens to reason, yet not perfectly, whereas he who is incontinent through l.u.s.t does not listen to it at all."
Reply Obj. 2: Duplicity also is something resulting from l.u.s.t, just as inconstancy is, if by duplicity we understand fluctuation of the mind from one thing to another. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. act 1, sc. 1) that "love leads to war, and likewise to peace and truce."
Reply Obj. 3: Carnal vices destroy the judgment of reason so much the more as they lead us away from reason.
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QUESTION 54
OF NEGLIGENCE (In Three Articles)
We must now consider negligence, under which head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether negligence is a special sin?
(2) To which virtue is it opposed?
(3) Whether negligence is a mortal sin?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 54, Art. 1]
Whether Negligence Is a Special Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that negligence is not a special sin. For negligence is opposed to diligence. But diligence is required in every virtue. Therefore negligence is not a special sin.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to every sin is not a special sin. Now negligence is common to every sin, because he who sins neglects that which withdraws him from sin, and he who perseveres in sin neglects to be contrite for his sin. Therefore negligence is not a special sin.
Obj. 3: Further, every special sin has a determinate matter. But negligence seems to have no determinate matter: since it is neither about evil or indifferent things (for no man is accused of negligence if he omit them), nor about good things, for if these be done negligently, they are no longer good. Therefore it seems that negligence is not a special vice.
_On the contrary,_ Sins committed through negligence, are distinguished from those which are committed through contempt.
_I answer that,_ Negligence denotes lack of due solicitude. Now every lack of a due act is sinful: wherefore it is evident that negligence is a sin, and that it must needs have the character of a special sin according as solicitude is the act of a special virtue. For certain sins are special through being about a special matter, as l.u.s.t is about s.e.xual matters, while some vices are special on account of their having a special kind of act which extends to all kinds of matter, and such are all vices affecting an act of reason, since every act of reason extends to any kind of moral matter. Since then solicitude is a special act of reason, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9), it follows that negligence, which denotes lack of solicitude, is a special sin.
Reply Obj. 1: Diligence seems to be the same as solicitude, because the more we love (_diligimus_) a thing the more solicitous are we about it. Hence diligence, no less than solicitude, is required for every virtue, in so far as due acts of reason are requisite for every virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: In every sin there must needs be a defect affecting an act of reason, for instance a defect in counsel or the like. Hence just as precipitation is a special sin on account of a special act of reason which is omitted, namely counsel, although it may be found in any kind of sin; so negligence is a special sin on account of the lack of a special act of reason, namely solicitude, although it is found more or less in all sins.
Reply Obj. 3: Properly speaking the matter of negligence is a good that one ought to do, not that it is a good when it is done negligently, but because on account of negligence it incurs a lack of goodness, whether a due act be entirely omitted through lack of solicitude, or some due circ.u.mstance be omitted.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 54, Art. 2]
Whether Negligence Is Opposed to Prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that negligence is not opposed to prudence. For negligence seems to be the same as idleness or laziness, which belongs to sloth, according to Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi, 45). Now sloth is not opposed to prudence, but to charity, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 3). Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.