Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.
Obj. 2: Further, every sin against the Holy Ghost is a mortal sin.
Now prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Ghost, for "it cannot be subject to the law of G.o.d" (Rom. 8:7), and so it seems to be an unpardonable sin, which is proper to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.
Obj. 3: Further, the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 10. Now prudence of the flesh is opposed to that prudence which is the chief of the moral virtues. Therefore prudence of the flesh is chief among mortal sins, so that it is itself a mortal sin.
_On the contrary,_ That which diminishes a sin has not of itself the nature of a mortal sin. Now the thoughtful quest of things pertaining to the care of the flesh, which seems to pertain to carnal prudence, diminishes sin [*Cf. Prov. 6:30]. Therefore prudence of the flesh has not of itself the nature of a mortal sin.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 1; A. 13), a man is said to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, i.e. in relation to the end of life as a whole. Secondly, relatively, i.e. in relation to some particular end; thus a man is said to be prudent in business or something else of the kind. Accordingly if prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so that a man place the last end of his whole life in the care of the flesh, it is a mortal sin, because he turns away from G.o.d by so doing, since he cannot have several last ends, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 5).
If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to particular prudence, it is a venial sin. For it happens sometimes that a man has an inordinate affection for some pleasure of the flesh, without turning away from G.o.d by a mortal sin; in which case he does not place the end of his whole life in carnal pleasure. To apply oneself to obtain this pleasure is a venial sin and pertains to prudence of the flesh. But if a man actually refers the care of the flesh to a good end, as when one is careful about one"s food in order to sustain one"s body, this is no longer prudence of the flesh, because then one uses the care of the flesh as a means to an end.
Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking of that carnal prudence whereby a man places the end of his whole life in the goods of the flesh, and this is a mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 2: Prudence of the flesh does not imply a sin against the Holy Ghost. For when it is stated that "it cannot be subject to the law of G.o.d," this does not mean that he who has prudence of the flesh, cannot be converted and submit to the law of G.o.d, but that carnal prudence itself cannot be subject to G.o.d"s law, even as neither can injustice be just, nor heat cold, although that which is hot may become cold.
Reply Obj. 3: Every sin is opposed to prudence, just as prudence is shared by every virtue. But it does not follow that every sin opposed to prudence is most grave, but only when it is opposed to prudence in some very grave matter.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 3]
Whether Craftiness Is a Special Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that craftiness is not a special sin. For the words of Holy Writ do not induce anyone to sin; and yet they induce us to be crafty, according to Prov. 1:4, "To give craftiness [Douay: "subtlety"] to little ones." Therefore craftiness is not a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 13:16): "The crafty [Douay: "prudent"] man doth all things with counsel." Therefore, he does so either for a good or for an evil end. If for a good end, there is no sin seemingly, and if for an evil end, it would seem to pertain to carnal or worldly prudence. Therefore craftiness is not a special sin distinct from prudence of the flesh.
Obj. 3: Further, Gregory expounding the words of Job 12, "The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn," says (Moral. x, 29): "The wisdom of this world is to hide one"s thoughts by artifice, to conceal one"s meaning by words, to represent error as truth, to make out the truth to be false," and further on he adds: "This prudence is acquired by the young, it is learnt at a price by children." Now the above things seem to belong to craftiness. Therefore craftiness is not distinct from carnal or worldly prudence, and consequently it seems not to be a special sin.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 4:2): "We renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor adulterating the word of G.o.d." Therefore craftiness is a sin.
_I answer that,_ Prudence is _right reason applied to action,_ just as science is _right reason applied to knowledge._ In speculative matters one may sin against rect.i.tude of knowledge in two ways: in one way when the reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to be true; in another way when the reason proceeds from false premises, that appear to be true, either to a true or to a false conclusion.
Even so a sin may be against prudence, through having some resemblance thereto, in two ways. First, when the purpose of the reason is directed to an end which is good not in truth but in appearance, and this pertains to prudence of the flesh; secondly, when, in order to obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man uses means that are not true but fict.i.tious and counterfeit, and this belongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently a sin opposed to prudence, and distinct from prudence of the flesh.
Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine observes (Contra Julian. iv, 3) just as prudence is sometimes improperly taken in a bad sense, so is craftiness sometimes taken in a good sense, and this on account of their mutual resemblance. Properly speaking, however, craftiness is taken in a bad sense, as the Philosopher states in _Ethic._ vi, 12.
Reply Obj. 2: Craftiness can take counsel both for a good end and for an evil end: nor should a good end be pursued by means that are false and counterfeit but by such as are true. Hence craftiness is a sin if it be directed to a good end.
Reply Obj. 3: Under "worldly prudence" Gregory included everything that can pertain to false prudence, so that it comprises craftiness also.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 4]
Whether Guile Is a Sin Pertaining to Craftiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that guile is not a sin pertaining to craftiness. For sin, especially mortal, has no place in perfect men.
Yet a certain guile is to be found in them, according to 2 Cor.
12:16, "Being crafty I caught you by guile." Therefore guile is not always a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly to the tongue, according to Ps. 5:11, "They dealt deceitfully with their tongues."
Now craftiness like prudence is in the very act of reason. Therefore guile does not pertain to craftiness.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 12:20): "Guile [Douay: "Deceit"] is in the heart of them that think evil things." But the thought of evil things does not always pertain to craftiness.
Therefore guile does not seem to belong to craftiness.
_On the contrary,_ Craftiness aims at lying in wait, according to Eph. 4:14, "By cunning craftiness by which they lie in wait to deceive": and guile aims at this also. Therefore guile pertains to craftiness.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to craftiness to adopt ways that are not true but counterfeit and apparently true, in order to attain some end either good or evil. Now the adopting of such ways may be subjected to a twofold consideration; first, as regards the process of thinking them out, and this belongs properly to craftiness, even as thinking out right ways to a due end belongs to prudence. Secondly the adopting of such like ways may be considered with regard to their actual execution, and in this way it belongs to guile. Hence guile denotes a certain execution of craftiness, and accordingly belongs thereto.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as craftiness is taken properly in a bad sense, and improperly in a good sense, so too is guile which is the execution of craftiness.
Reply Obj. 2: The execution of craftiness with the purpose of deceiving, is effected first and foremost by words, which hold the chief place among those signs whereby a man signifies something to another man, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), hence guile is ascribed chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in deeds, according to Ps. 104:25, "And to deal deceitfully with his servants." Guile is also in the heart, according to Ecclus. 19:23, "His interior is full of deceit," but this is to devise deceits, according to Ps. 37:13: "They studied deceits all the day long."
Reply Obj. 3: Whoever purposes to do some evil deed, must needs devise certain ways of attaining his purpose, and for the most part he devises deceitful ways, whereby the more easily to obtain his end.
Nevertheless it happens sometimes that evil is done openly and by violence without craftiness and guile; but as this is more difficult, it is of less frequent occurrence.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 5]
Whether Fraud Pertains to Craftiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that fraud does not pertain to craftiness.
For a man does not deserve praise if he allows himself to be deceived, which is the object of craftiness; and yet a man deserves praise for allowing himself to be defrauded, according to 1 Cor. 6:1, "Why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness.
Obj. 2: Further, fraud seems to consist in unlawfully taking or receiving external things, for it is written (Acts 5:1) that "a certain man named Ananias with Saphira his wife, sold a piece of land, and by fraud kept back part of the price of the land." Now it pertains to injustice or illiberality to take possession of or retain external things unjustly. Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness which is opposed to prudence.
Obj. 3: Further, no man employs craftiness against himself. But the frauds of some are against themselves, for it is written (Prov. 1:18) concerning some "that they practice frauds [Douay: "deceits"] against their own souls." Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness.
_On the contrary,_ The object of fraud is to deceive, according to Job 13:9, "Shall he be deceived as a man, with your fraudulent [Douay: "deceitful"] dealings?" Now craftiness is directed to the same object. Therefore fraud pertains to craftiness.
_I answer that,_ Just as _guile_ consists in the execution of craftiness, so also does _fraud._ But they seem to differ in the fact that _guile_ belongs in general to the execution of craftiness, whether this be effected by words, or by deeds, whereas _fraud_ belongs more properly to the execution of craftiness by deeds.
Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle does not counsel the faithful to be deceived in their knowledge, but to bear patiently the effect of being deceived, and to endure wrongs inflicted on them by fraud.
Reply Obj. 2: The execution of craftiness may be carried out by another vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues: and accordingly nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or illiberality.
Reply Obj. 3: Those who commit frauds, do not design anything against themselves or their own souls; it is through G.o.d"s just judgment that what they plot against others, recoils on themselves, according to Ps. 7:16, "He is fallen into the hole he made."
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 6]
Whether It Is Lawful to Be Solicitous About Temporal Matters?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters. Because a superior should be solicitous for his subjects, according to Rom. 12:8, "He that ruleth, with solicitude." Now according to the Divine ordering, man is placed over temporal things, according to Ps. 8:8, "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet," etc. Therefore man should be solicitous about temporal things.
Obj. 2: Further, everyone is solicitous about the end for which he works. Now it is lawful for a man to work for the temporal things whereby he sustains life, wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 3:10): "If any man will not work, neither let him eat." Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal things.
Obj. 3: Further, solicitude about works of mercy is praiseworthy, according to 2 Tim. 1:17, "When he was come to Rome, he carefully sought me." Now solicitude about temporal things is sometimes connected with works of mercy; for instance, when a man is solicitous to watch over the interests of orphans and poor persons. Therefore solicitude about temporal things is not unlawful.