Whether It Is Natural for Man to Possess External Things?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not natural for man to possess external things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which is G.o.d"s. Now the dominion over all creatures is proper to G.o.d, according to Ps. 23:1, "The earth is the Lord"s," etc. Therefore it is not natural for man to possess external things.
Obj. 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man (Luke 12:18), "I will gather all things that are grown to me, and my goods," says [*Hom. in Luc. xii, 18]: "Tell me: which are thine?
where did you take them from and bring them into being?" Now whatever man possesses naturally, he can fittingly call his own. Therefore man does not naturally possess external things.
Obj. 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin. i [*De Fide, ad Gratianum, i, 1]) "dominion denotes power." But man has no power over external things, since he can work no change in their nature.
Therefore the possession of external things is not natural to man.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 8:8): "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet."
_I answer that,_ External things can be considered in two ways.
First, as regards their nature, and this is not subject to the power of man, but only to the power of G.o.d Whose mere will all things obey.
Secondly, as regards their use, and in this way, man has a natural dominion over external things, because, by his reason and will, he is able to use them for his own profit, as they were made on his account: for the imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect, as stated above (Q. 64, A. 1). It is by this argument that the Philosopher proves (Polit. i, 3) that the possession of external things is natural to man. Moreover, this natural dominion of man over other creatures, which is competent to man in respect of his reason wherein G.o.d"s image resides, is shown forth in man"s creation (Gen.
1:26) by the words: "Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea," etc.
Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d has sovereign dominion over all things: and He, according to His providence, directed certain things to the sustenance of man"s body. For this reason man has a natural dominion over things, as regards the power to make use of them.
Reply Obj. 2: The rich man is reproved for deeming external things to belong to him princ.i.p.ally, as though he had not received them from another, namely from G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the dominion over external things as regards their nature. Such a dominion belongs to G.o.d alone, as stated above.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 2]
Whether It Is Lawful for a Man to Possess a Thing As His Own?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a man to possess a thing as his own. For whatever is contrary to the natural law is unlawful. Now according to the natural law all things are common property: and the possession of property is contrary to this community of goods.
Therefore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external thing to himself.
Obj. 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man quoted above (A. 1, Obj. 2), says: "The rich who deem as their own property the common goods they have seized upon, are like to those who by going beforehand to the play prevent others from coming, and appropriate to themselves what is intended for common use." Now it would be unlawful to prevent others from obtaining possession of common goods. Therefore it is unlawful to appropriate to oneself what belongs to the community.
Obj. 3: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp.], and his words are quoted in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii., Can. Sicut hi.]: "Let no man call his own that which is common property": and by "common" he means external things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it seems unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing to himself.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Haeres., haer. 40): "The "Apostolici" are those who with extreme arrogance have given themselves that name, because they do not admit into their communion persons who are married or possess anything of their own, such as both monks and clerics who in considerable number are to be found in the Catholic Church." Now the reason why these people are heretics was because severing themselves from the Church, they think that those who enjoy the use of the above things, which they themselves lack, have no hope of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to maintain that it is unlawful for a man to possess property.
_I answer that,_ Two things are competent to man in respect of exterior things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and in this regard it is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover this is necessary to human life for three reasons. First because every man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is common to many or to all: since each one would shirk the labor and leave to another that which concerns the community, as happens where there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to man if each one is contented with his own. Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise more frequently where there is no division of the things possessed.
The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their need. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17, 18): "Charge the rich of this world ... to give easily, to communicate to others," etc.
Reply Obj. 1: Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in common and that nothing should be possessed as one"s own: but because the division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law, as stated above (Q. 57, AA. 2, 3). Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto devised by human reason.
Reply Obj. 2: A man would not act unlawfully if by going beforehand to the play he prepared the way for others: but he acts unlawfully if by so doing he hinders others from going. In like manner a rich man does not act unlawfully if he antic.i.p.ates someone in taking possession of something which at first was common property, and gives others a share: but he sins if he excludes others indiscriminately from using it. Hence Basil says (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18): "Why are you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience?"
Reply Obj. 3: When Ambrose says: "Let no man call his own that which is common," he is speaking of ownership as regards use, wherefore he adds: "He who spends too much is a robber."
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 3]
Whether the Essence of Theft Consists in Taking Another"s Thing Secretly?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to theft to take another"s thing secretly. For that which diminishes a sin, does not, apparently, belong to the essence of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends to diminish a sin, just as, on the contrary, it is written as indicating an aggravating circ.u.mstance of the sin of some (Isa. 3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it." Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another"s thing secretly.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp., A. 2, Obj. 3, Can. Sicut hi.]: and his words are embodied in the Decretals [*Dist.
xlvii]: "It is no less a crime to take from him that has, than to refuse to succor the needy when you can and are well off." Therefore just as theft consists in taking another"s thing, so does it consist in keeping it back.
Obj. 3: Further, a man may take by stealth from another, even that which is his own, for instance a thing that he has deposited with another, or that has been taken away from him unjustly. Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another"s thing secretly.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x): "_Fur_ (thief) is derived from _furvus_ and so from _fuscus_ (dark), because he takes advantage of the night."
_I answer that,_ Three things combine together to const.i.tute theft.
The first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives to each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take possession of what is another"s. The second thing belongs to theft as distinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such as murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another"s not as a possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or as a person connected with him (for instance, if he carry off his daughter or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft.
The third difference is that which completes the nature of theft, and consists in a thing being taken secretly: and in this respect it belongs properly to theft that it consists in "taking another"s thing secretly."
Reply Obj. 1: Secrecy is sometimes a cause of sin, as when a man employs secrecy in order to commit a sin, for instance in fraud and guile. In this way it does not diminish sin, but const.i.tutes a species of sin: and thus it is in theft. In another way secrecy is merely a circ.u.mstance of sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both because it is a sign of shame, and because it removes scandal.
Reply Obj. 2: To keep back what is due to another, inflicts the same kind of injury as taking a thing unjustly: wherefore an unjust detention is included in an unjust taking.
Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents that which belongs to one person simply, from belonging to another in some respect: thus a deposit belongs simply to the depositor, but with regard to its custody it is the depositary"s, and the thing stolen is the thief"s, not simply, but as regards its custody.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 4]
Whether Theft and Robbery Are Sins of Different Species?
Objection 1: It would seem that theft and robbery are not sins of different species. For theft and robbery differ as "secret" and "manifest": because theft is taking something secretly, while robbery is to take something violently and openly. Now in the other kinds of sins, the secret and the manifest do not differ specifically.
Therefore theft and robbery are not different species of sin.
Obj. 2: Further, moral actions take their species from the end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6). Now theft and robbery are directed to the same end, viz. the possession of another"s property. Therefore they do not differ specifically.
Obj. 3: Further, just as a thing is taken by force for the sake of possession, so is a woman taken by force for pleasure: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that "he who commits a rape is called a corrupter, and the victim of the rape is said to be corrupted." Now it is a case of rape whether the woman be carried off publicly or secretly. Therefore the thing appropriated is said to be taken by force, whether it be done secretly or publicly. Therefore theft and robbery do not differ.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) distinguishes theft from robbery, and states that theft is done in secret, but that robbery is done openly.
_I answer that,_ Theft and robbery are vices contrary to justice, in as much as one man does another an injustice. Now "no man suffers an injustice willingly," as stated in _Ethic._ v, 9. Wherefore theft and robbery derive their sinful nature, through the taking being involuntary on the part of the person from whom something is taken.
Now the involuntary is twofold, namely, through violence and through ignorance, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 1. Therefore the sinful aspect of robbery differs from that of theft: and consequently they differ specifically.
Reply Obj. 1: In the other kinds of sin the sinful nature is not derived from something involuntary, as in the sins opposed to justice: and so where there is a different kind of involuntary, there is a different species of sin.
Reply Obj. 2: The remote end of robbery and theft is the same. But this is not enough for ident.i.ty of species, because there is a difference of proximate ends, since the robber wishes to take a thing by his own power, but the thief, by cunning.
Reply Obj. 3: The robbery of a woman cannot be secret on the part of the woman who is taken: wherefore even if it be secret as regards the others from whom she is taken, the nature of robbery remains on the part of the woman to whom violence is done.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 5]
Whether Theft Is Always a Sin?