_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 58, A. 3; I-II, Q. 55, AA. 3, 4) "a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good likewise," wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to a virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the aspect of good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes suitably proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a becoming manner. But order comes under the aspect of good, just as mode and species, according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since then it belongs to religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to G.o.d, it is evident that religion is a virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: To pay reverence to G.o.d is an act of the gift of fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through reverence for G.o.d. Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as the gift of fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something more excellent; for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 68, A. 8).
Reply Obj. 2: Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his master, and so "he makes a virtue of necessity" [*Jerome, Ep. liv, ad Furiam.], by doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner, to render due service to G.o.d may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does so voluntarily.
Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that man should do something through reverence for G.o.d. But that he should do this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of natural reason, but is established by Divine or human law.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 3]
Whether Religion Is One Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not one virtue. Religion directs us to G.o.d, as stated above (A. 1). Now in G.o.d there are three Persons; and also many attributes, which differ at least logically from one another. Now a logical difference in the object suffices for a difference of virtue, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 2, ad 2).
Therefore religion is not one virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, of one virtue there is seemingly one act, since habits are distinguished by their acts. Now there are many acts of religion, for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to pray, to sacrifice and many such like. Therefore religion is not one virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, adoration belongs to religion. Now adoration is paid to images under one aspect, and under another aspect to G.o.d Himself.
Since, then, a difference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it would seem that religion is not one virtue.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eph. 4:5): "One G.o.d [Vulg.: "Lord"], one faith." Now true religion professes faith in one G.o.d.
Therefore religion is one virtue.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1), habits are differentiated according to a different aspect of the object. Now it belongs to religion to show reverence to one G.o.d under one aspect, namely, as the first principle of the creation and government of things. Wherefore He Himself says (Malach. 1:6): "If ... I be a father, where is My honor?" For it belongs to a father to beget and to govern. Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: The three Divine Persons are the one principle of the creation and government of things, wherefore they are served by one religion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the aspect of first principle, because G.o.d produces all things, and governs them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. Wherefore religion is one virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: By the one same act man both serves and worships G.o.d, for worship regards the excellence of G.o.d, to Whom reverence is due: while service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition, is under an obligation of showing reverence to G.o.d. To these two belong all acts ascribed to religion, because, by them all, man bears witness to the Divine excellence and to his own subjection to G.o.d, either by offering something to G.o.d, or by a.s.suming something Divine.
Reply Obj. 3: The worship of religion is paid to images, not as considered in themselves, nor as things, but as images leading us to G.o.d incarnate. Now movement to an image as image does not stop at the image, but goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither _latria_ nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that religious worship is paid to the images of Christ.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 4]
Whether Religion Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from the Others?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a special virtue distinct from the others. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "Any action whereby we are united to G.o.d in holy fellowship, is a true sacrifice." But sacrifice belongs to religion. Therefore every virtuous deed belongs to religion; and consequently religion is not a special virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the glory of G.o.d." Now it belongs to religion to do anything in reverence of G.o.d, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2; A. 2). Therefore religion is not a special virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, the charity whereby we love G.o.d is not distinct from the charity whereby we love our neighbor. But according to _Ethic._ viii, 8 "to be honored is almost to be loved." Therefore the religion whereby we honor G.o.d is not a special virtue distinct from observance, or _dulia,_ or piety whereby we honor our neighbor.
Therefore religion is not a special virtue.
_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned a part of justice, distinct from the other parts.
_I answer that,_ Since virtue is directed to the good, wherever there is a special aspect of good, there must be a special virtue. Now the good to which religion is directed, is to give due honor to G.o.d.
Again, honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to G.o.d a singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpa.s.ses all things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him is special honor due: even as in human affairs we see that different honor is due to different personal excellences, one kind of honor to a father, another to the king, and so on. Hence it is evident that religion is a special virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Every virtuous deed is said to be a sacrifice, in so far as it is done out of reverence of G.o.d. Hence this does not prove that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all other virtues, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1).
Reply Obj. 2: Every deed, in so far as it is done in G.o.d"s honor, belongs to religion, not as eliciting but as commanding: those belong to religion as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of G.o.d by reason of their specific character.
Reply Obj. 3: The object of love is the good, but the object of honor and reverence is something excellent. Now G.o.d"s goodness is communicated to the creature, but the excellence of His goodness is not. Hence the charity whereby G.o.d is loved is not distinct from the charity whereby our neighbor is loved; whereas the religion whereby G.o.d is honored, is distinct from the virtues whereby we honor our neighbor.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 5]
Whether Religion Is a Theological Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is a theological virtue.
Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that "G.o.d is worshiped by faith, hope and charity," which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to religion to pay worship to G.o.d. Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, a theological virtue is one that has G.o.d for its object. Now religion has G.o.d for its object, since it directs us to G.o.d alone, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or moral, as is clear from what has been said (I-II, QQ. 57, 58, 62).
Now it is evident that religion is not an intellectual virtue, because its perfection does not depend on the consideration of truth: nor is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing the mean between too much and too little, for one cannot worship G.o.d too much, according to Ecclus. 43:33, "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for He is above all praise." Therefore it remains that it is a theological virtue.
_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral virtue.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4) religion pays due worship to G.o.d. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that which it offers to G.o.d, viz. worship, and this is by way of matter and object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered, viz. G.o.d, to Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby G.o.d is worshiped do not reach out to G.o.d himself, as when we believe G.o.d we reach out to Him by believing; for which reason it was stated (Q. 1, AA. 1, 2, 4) that G.o.d is the object of faith, not only because we believe in a G.o.d, but because we believe G.o.d.
Now due worship is paid to G.o.d, in so far as certain acts whereby G.o.d is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done out of reverence for G.o.d. Hence it is evident that G.o.d is related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the end.
Reply Obj. 1: The power or virtue whose action deals with an end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and charity have an act in reference to G.o.d as their proper object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which performs certain deeds directed to G.o.d: and so Augustine says that G.o.d is worshiped by faith, hope and charity.
Reply Obj. 2: Religion directs man to G.o.d not as its object but as its end.
Reply Obj. 3: Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and observes a mean, not in the pa.s.sions, but in actions directed to G.o.d, by establishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say "equality," I do not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay G.o.d as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of man"s ability and G.o.d"s acceptance.
And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the Divine worship, not as regards the circ.u.mstance of quant.i.ty, but as regards other circ.u.mstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom it is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some other circ.u.mstance.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 6]
Whether Religion Should Be Preferred to the Other Moral Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion should not be preferred to the other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in its observing the mean, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6. But religion fails to observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an absolute equal to G.o.d. Therefore religion is not more excellent than the other moral virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater need: wherefore it is written (Isa. 57:7): "Deal thy bread to the hungry." But G.o.d needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to Ps. 15:2, "I have said: Thou art my G.o.d, for Thou hast no need of my goods." Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the other virtues whereby man"s needs are relieved.
Obj. 3: Further, the greater the obligation to do a thing, the less praise does it deserve, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth upon me." Now the more a thing is due, the greater the obligation of paying it. Since, then, what is paid to G.o.d by man is in the highest degree due to Him, it would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human virtues.
_On the contrary,_ The precepts pertaining to religion are given precedence (Ex. 20) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief of the moral virtues.
_I answer that,_ Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end the better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above (A. 5; Q. 4, A.
7), are about matters that are ordered to G.o.d as their end. And religion approaches nearer to G.o.d than the other moral virtues, in so far as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor of G.o.d. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is praised because of the will, not because of the ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality which is the mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue deserves no less praise, provided there be no failing on the part of his will.