Objection 1: It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance. For Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xi) that pertinacity arises from vainglory. But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to magnanimity, as stated above (Q. 132, A. 2). Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance.
Obj. 2: Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so either by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess: because the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) "they rejoice when they prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected." And if it be opposed by deficiency, it will be the same as effeminacy, which is clearly false. Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to perseverance.
Obj. 3: Further, just as the persevering man persists in good against sorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against pleasures, the brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But pertinacity is over-persistence in something. Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance more than to other virtues.
_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that pertinacity is to perseverance as superst.i.tion is to religion. But superst.i.tion is opposed to religion, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 1). Therefore pertinacity is opposed to perseverance.
_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x) "a person is said to be pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious."
"Pervicacious" has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man "perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients called "vicia" what we call victory." These the Philosopher (Ethic.
vii, 9) calls _ischyrognomones_, that is "head-strong," or _idiognomones_, that is "self-opinionated," because they abide by their opinions more than they should; whereas the effeminate man does so less than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it is clear that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for falling short of it.
Reply Obj. 1: The reason why a man is too persistent in his own opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own excellence: wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause.
Now it has been stated above (Q. 127, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 133, A. 2), that opposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on their species.
Reply Obj. 2: The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting inordinately in something against many difficulties: yet he takes a certain pleasure in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man.
Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it too much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or effeminate man.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the other virtues persist against the onslaught of the pa.s.sions, they are not commended for persisting in the same way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to praise seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is directly opposed to perseverance.
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QUESTION 139
OF THE GIFT OF FORt.i.tUDE (In Two Articles)
We must next consider the gift corresponding to fort.i.tude, and this is the gift of fort.i.tude. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fort.i.tude is a gift?
(2) Which among the beat.i.tudes and fruits correspond to it?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 139, Art. 1]
Whether Fort.i.tude Is a Gift?
Objection 1: It seems that fort.i.tude is not a gift. For the virtues differ from the gifts: and fort.i.tude is a virtue. Therefore it should not be reckoned a gift.
Obj. 2: Further, the acts of the gifts remain in heaven, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 6). But the act of fort.i.tude does not remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "fort.i.tude encourages the fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from heaven." Therefore fort.i.tude is not a gift.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is a sign of fort.i.tude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures of the pa.s.sing show." Now noisome pleasures and delights are the concern of temperance rather than of fort.i.tude. Therefore it seems that fort.i.tude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fort.i.tude.
_On the contrary,_ Fort.i.tude is reckoned among the other gifts of the Holy Ghost (Isa. 11:2).
_I answer that,_ Fort.i.tude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, A. 3): and this firmness of mind is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in enduring grievous evil. In this sense fort.i.tude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 2).
Yet furthermore man"s mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that he may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils may threaten. This surpa.s.ses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a man"s power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils.
A certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that fort.i.tude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 2) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind by the Holy Ghost.
Reply Obj. 1: Fort.i.tude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to give confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the fort.i.tude that is a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Reply Obj. 2: The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the end. Hence the act of fort.i.tude there is to enjoy full security from toil and evil.
Reply Obj. 3: The gift of fort.i.tude regards the virtue of fort.i.tude not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also inasmuch as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore the gift of fort.i.tude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems to be concerned chiefly with the greater goods.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 139, Art. 2]
Whether the Fourth Beat.i.tude: "Blessed Are They That Hunger and Thirst After Justice," Corresponds to the Gift of Fort.i.tude?
Objection 1: It seems that the fourth beat.i.tude, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the gift of fort.i.tude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of fort.i.tude corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and thirsting after justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this beat.i.tude corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fort.i.tude.
Obj. 2: Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of wisdom, and not the gift of fort.i.tude, corresponds, as stated above (Q. 45). Therefore this beat.i.tude corresponds, not to the gift of fort.i.tude, but to the gift of wisdom.
Obj. 3: Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beat.i.tudes, since delight is essential to beat.i.tude, according to _Ethic._ i, 8. Now the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fort.i.tude.
Therefore neither does any beat.i.tude correspond to it.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Fort.i.tude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to enjoy true goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material things, must toil."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 121, A. 2), Augustine makes the beat.i.tudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which they are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beat.i.tude, concerning the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely fort.i.tude.
Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (A.
1), fort.i.tude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation of works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.
Reply Obj. 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), we may understand here not only particular, but also universal justice, which is related to all virtuous deeds according to _Ethic._ v, 1, wherein whatever is hard is the object of that fort.i.tude which is a gift.
Reply Obj. 2: Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 8, ad 3; I-II, Q. 68, A. 4, ad 3). Hence whatever pertains to fort.i.tude may also be referred to charity.
Reply Obj. 3: There are two of the fruits which correspond sufficiently to the gift of fort.i.tude: namely, patience, which regards the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard the long delay and accomplishment of goods.
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QUESTION 140
OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORt.i.tUDE (In Two Articles)
We must next consider the precepts of fort.i.tude:
(1) The precepts of fort.i.tude itself;
(2) The precepts of its parts.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 140, Art. 1]
Whether the Precepts of Fort.i.tude Are Suitably Given in the Divine Law?
Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of fort.i.tude are not suitably given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the Old Law. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fort.i.tude (Deut. 20).
Therefore precepts of fort.i.tude should have been given in the New Law also.